

THE MAGAZINE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS FORUM

FORUM

Spring 2009

NATO — *at* — SIXTY

Spring 2009

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
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
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
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
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Time to reset NATO-EU relations

By Sally McNamara

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization had much to be proud of when it celebrated its 60th birthday this month in Strasbourg and Kehl. The Alliance was a driving factor in winning the Cold War and defeating the evil empire, and has enlarged to take in former Soviet-oppressed nations from the Baltics to the Balkans. It is now one of the world's most successful multilateral alliances and a vital component of the global security architecture, providing stability from Athens to Ankara, from Pristina to Paris.

However, as with every alliance, threats and challenges exist. Most continental Europeans have not stepped up to the plate to equally share the burdens of the war in Afghanistan, for example. Countries like Germany, Italy and Spain place national caveats on their troop deployments so that their soldiers are kept out of harm's way; which means that other countries such as Britain, Denmark and the United States are required to take on the riskier combat missions. The effective creation of a two-tiered alliance undermines the unity and purpose of NATO and threatens to create permanent divisions within the alliance.

A resurgent Russia has also targeted NATO, attempting to foment splits between old and new Europe, and uses its energy supplies as a weapon to control petro-dependent states such as Germany.

However, a far more insidious challenge to the future of NATO exists, in the shape of the European Union. Brussels' pursuit of an EU military identity, which aims to duplicate NATO in a separate, Europe-only alliance, threatens the very future of the NATO alliance. The European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) has emerged as one of the biggest attempts to expand EU power to date, centralizing the most important tools of nation-statehood. Since its establishment in 1998, the ESDP has been fashioned by EU elites into a military identity distinct from and independent of NATO. It has become a tool for promoting the EU as a global actor and sidelining the NATO alliance from discussions about Europe's security.

The militarization of the European Union marks one of the greatest geopolitical shifts in the transatlantic alliance since the end of the Second World War, and embodies the worst elements of European animosity toward the United States. Regardless, the Obama Administration has enthusiastically endorsed a European defense identity, likely on the assumption that it will result in Europe taking on a greater share of the world's security challenges.

However, this assumption has already proven patently untrue; in fact, the EU's decade-long experiment with the ESDP witnessed a decrease in average European defense spending as well as an increase in the capabilities-gap between Europe and the United States. The International Institute for Strategic Studies also recently reported that just 2.7 percent of Europe's 2 million military personnel are capable of overseas deployment. In terms of spending, manpower and hardware, Europe still needs America if it is to take on major threats to its security. This explains why the



Brussels' pursuit of an EU military identity, which aims to duplicate NATO in a separate, Europe-only alliance, threatens the very future of the NATO alliance.

EU sought a formal relationship with NATO; it needed NATO assets, as well as the buy-in of its pro-American member states like the United Kingdom.

NATO–EU relations are underpinned by the Berlin-Plus Agreement, which was signed in December 2002. Berlin-Plus gives the EU access to NATO assets, having been premised on the idea that ESDP would reinforce NATO, not undermine it. At its inception, Berlin-Plus also stated that there would be no decoupling of the EU and NATO alliances, no duplication of NATO assets and no discrimination against NATO members that are not members of the European Union.

The EU has since reneged on all of these premises because its ambitions for EU defense are less concerned with genuinely increasing Europe's defense capabilities and wholly concerned with the accrual of power for a highly centralized European Union.

For example, in direct contravention of Berlin-Plus, the EU established its own military operations center in Brussels in January 2007, duplicating NATO's operational command center in Belgium. The fledgling EU military headquarters represents not just a wasteful duplication of NATO assets, but a decoupling of the two organizations.

Further, when the African Union requested airlift capacity from the EU and the U.S. in June 2005, the EU insisted on European 'branding' for the operation and organized a separate airlift to NATO's, rather than join in a joint exercise. The AU had the headache of coordinating two separate airlifts in order to satisfy Brussels' vanity.

It is increasingly obvious that the EU favors independent action and cooperates with NATO only when it needs NATO assets. Therefore, the structural and organizational relationship between the EU and NATO must be reassessed—as must the purpose and value of pursuing further integration.

Firstly, the Obama Administration should start by revisiting France's proposal to reintegrate into NATO's military command structures, which is predicated on American support for an independent European defense organization. French President Nicolas Sarkozy has stated his intention to fully rejoin

NATO command structures at the Strasbourg-Kehl summit and has already received American support to develop a European Union defense identity separate from NATO's. It would be a strategic error by the new U.S. Administration to continue supporting French ambitions to Europeanize NATO policy or to support the building of separate EU security structures which exclude American influence completely. Instead, NATO must be reaffirmed as the cornerstone of the transatlantic alliance and the primary actor in European security.

A new category must be formulated to define the EU's relationship status with NATO. The EU should be a deployable, civilian complement to the NATO alliance. The momentum for NATO and the EU to work together in the military sphere is unnecessary and duplicative; however, the EU's army of bureaucrats, police trainers, aid workers, and jurists could complement NATO in a more comprehensive approach to reconstruction and development in war zones.

Finally, the U.S. should reserve NATO resources exclusively for NATO missions and revise the terms of Berlin-Plus to reflect this. U.S. taxpayers should not be expected to subsidize European military adventures and all European military missions should be funded exclusively by EU member states. The ESDP, as a civilian instrument working alongside NATO, should also represent additional resources for European security, rather than allowing for joint NATO-EU members to opt for one or the other.

Both Europe and America face threats to their security and stability and need one another to confront these challenges. The transatlantic relationship has been served well by NATO for the past 60 years, and with enough commitment, leadership and resolve it will do so for another 60. The EU can not be allowed to prevent that.

Germany's place in the sun (and under a NATO flag)

By M.E. (Spike) Bowman

The number world-wide who personally remember Germany's role in the World Wars is dwindling. That is actually a good thing—those wars are culturally, economically, socially and politically of another era and need to be placed in that perspective. Germany has become both a responsible citizen of the world and, in some respects, a model for other nations to emulate. However, Germany, as do all nations, has new issues of maturation to cope with, driven in part by advancing technologies and in part by an era of frenetic globalization. One significant issue for Germany is its future role under a NATO flag.

The yin and yang of policies originating decades past and mired in both war guilt and victor requirements continue to stretch the fabric of German society. These policies manifest themselves in immigration issues, the troubling rise of a skinhead under-culture and uncertainty over defense responsibilities to both NATO and the European Union. Chancellor Schroeder leaned away from NATO and was willing to push back against U.S. entreaties for more active participation in the "War on Terror," putting his emphasis on the development of a European Security and Defense Policy. This made the role of NATO in Germany's future and, indeed, the future of NATO itself murky, at best.

However, a change in Administration appears to have reversed that policy. Chancellor Merkel is not NATO-centric; she is clearly an EU enthusiast. She has been President of the European Council and chair of the G-8. She played a central role in the negotiation of the Treaty of Lisbon and the Berlin Declaration. In domestic policy, health care reform and problems concerning future energy development have thus far been the major issues of her tenure.

Nevertheless, the Merkel Administration has made a clear and unequivocal commitment to NATO, which suggests that NATO remains the cornerstone of German security and defense policy. Defense Minister Franz Josef Jung has gone so far as to suggest that the unilateral United States initiative to place interceptor missiles in the Czech Republic be integrated into the NATO defense shield for Europe.

What this commitment to NATO means in the 21st Century, and just how deep German politics will permit it to go, is far from clear and many commentators would like to be the harbingers of change in the German Republic. The Financial Times, for example, argues that it means, in part, that conscription has to be abandoned in favor of a smaller, more professional force.¹ The New York Times believes this to be a clear

¹ Financial Times, "Marching orders," October 26 2006. The logic of FT is less than compelling.

signal that Germany has grown more confident and assertive about its place on the international stage, after decades spent living down the aggression and atrocities of the Nazi years, and will take a larger role in Europe without distancing itself from NATO.² The International Herald Tribune views all this as a sign that German-U.S. relations need constant care.

² Id, this logic seems to reverse the sequence of events.

Regardless of pundit comments, it is clear that under Chancellor Merkel, Germany has grown more confident and assertive about its place on the international stage.³ Germany's obligation to NATO has extended to a sometimes unpopular decision to allow Bundeswehr troops to deploy outside NATO territory as part of international peace-keeping missions. This is an important step within the alliance, but in practice it has often resulted in vexing expressions of the will of a nation beset with difficult decisions.

³ Chancellor Merkel was the only international leader to confront Chinese officials directly about computer intrusions of German ministries originating in China.

Just how important is Germany to NATO? Germany, trading in part on a traditional German-Russian relationship, has won, on behalf of NATO, Russian permission to use the country's railways to transit military goods bound for Afghanistan. Germany has the world's third largest GDP. In Europe its economic strength is dominant. In population it ranks second only behind Russia. However, Germany currently spends, as a proportion of GDP, about half of what France and Britain spend on defense. Nor does it seem likely that Germany will soon reverse this pattern. One reason is that the comprehensive program of fiscal "consolidation" (austerity), which the current coalition of Social Democrats and Greens has embarked on, has little flexibility for meaningful increases in defense spending. In modern Germany, domestic policy concerns have won a clear priority over the demands of the military.

Domestic priorities are not unreasonable in any society; however, Germany's place in the sphere of global security is unique, which was recently, and clearly emphasized by British Defense Secretary John Hutton who publicly called for Germany to adopt a new policy towards Afghanistan and NATO so that NATO will not decline into irrelevance. Recognizing the economic realities of the alliance, Hutton further believes that Germany must become one of the biggest contributors to the NATO defense budget and must not use the credit crunch as an excuse to reduce its defense spending commitments.⁴ For now, however, Germany has chosen the rather narrower path of anchoring its defenses with NATO, while declining to bolster its foreign policy by way of defense spending.

⁴ As with most NATO countries, Germany's defenses remain largely those that were committed to Cold War realities. Germany is in serious need of upgrading weapons systems of all kinds.

In a testament to the path that Germany has elected in international political affairs, Germany has become a rather less popular actor in the Ukraine due to Germany's refusal to immediately invite Ukraine to NATO's Membership Action Plan (MAP). It would be politically expedient to allow membership, but socially irresponsible to do so without assurance of responsible citizenship. The Ukraine likely will be a responsible world citizen, but Germany is right to insist on it.

Clearly, Germany's economic power and large population gives it a significant role in

NATO and a dominant one in the EU, and the two roles are manifesting themselves in complex requirements. For example, in an attempt to pay homage to both, Germany has agreed to back a NATO anti-piracy mission off the coast of Somalia, but, vexingly, will haul down NATO flags, ostensibly so the move can go ahead without new parliamentary approval. In this scheme, two German ships in NATO's standing naval maritime group will have to conduct anti-piracy duties under the mandate of the European Union. "Our ships are going to participate under the European mandate Atalanta," German Defense Minister Franz Josef Jung told reporters, referring to the EU's mission in the Gulf of Aden.⁵

Somewhat more concerning is the fact that the post-Cold War Germany does not see NATO as such a critical part of its defense. The inconvenient truth is that Germany's defense establishment had it good during the Cold War: larger defense budgets, larger armies, and a clear mission with a clear end state—to stop the Red Army in the Fulda Gap and defeat it on the plains of Central Europe. That critical commitment has given way to the more ephemeral demands of unseen terrorism.

Afghanistan is the cradle of current-day terrorism, and despite the fact, as U.S. President Barack Obama has stated during his recent European tour, that Europe is more vulnerable to terrorism than is the United States, Germany is reluctant to play a conflict role. Despite Obama's appeals, Merkel told the German Parliament recently that the country has done enough. "I believe we can be satisfied with our performance," she said. "We Germans can really see ourselves as part of the alliance. I will stress this fully at the summit."⁶

It will be interesting to see how these events play out in the new United States administration. Retired Marine General James L. Jones, Jr., who has become National Security Advisor to President Obama, may be best remembered as a ramrod straight Marine Commandant with John Wayne looks, but his tenure as Commander, United States Forces Europe/Supreme Allied Commander, Europe may be instructive. In that position General Jones grew critical of NATO governments that commit forces to an allied mission, then impose restrictions on tasks those forces may undertake.⁷ He singled out Germany, when German troops refused orders to join other elements of KFOR in using force against rioting crowds of Albanians attacking Serbs in Kosovo.


For years, German governments have worked to place their officers and civilians on NATO's international staff, and now have a disproportionate number of such individuals on the staff. Many believe the Germans have also tried to limit the number of U.S. citizens at NATO Headquarters. Here too General Jones has expressed irritation with Germany for its refusal to allow its nationals on the international staff to assume posts in Iraq for the NATO training mission.

That said, the German populace is generally supportive of Chancellor Merkel's commitment to stabilization of Afghanistan (which also suggests a popular commitment to NATO). Germany's role as "good cop" with Russia is a useful one for the alliance. NATO,

⁵ On March 19, 2009, the North Atlantic Council announced plans to resume a NATO deployment to the Gulf of Aden for anti-piracy patrols. Nations contributing ships were Canada, Portugal, United States, Spain and The Netherlands. "NATO to Resume Allied Protector;" UPI.com, March 19, 2009, http://www.upi.com/Emerging_Threats/2009/03/19/NATO_to_resume_Allied_Protector/UPI-52331237494351/.

⁶ Edward Cody, "Europeans Reluctant to Follow Obama on Afghan Initiative;" Washington Post Foreign Service, April 3, 2009.

⁷ CRS report for Congress, NATO and the European Union, updated January 29, 2008, p. 10.



at least for now, is the bedrock of German defense plans. However, in the end the piper must eventually get his due. It is unlikely that Germany will be able to continue to walk this tightrope of NATO support without investment in the organization. If it is to remain interoperable with NATO, Germany will, in the foreseeable future, have to make a larger investment in both its own and in NATO defense capabilities. If it does not do so, the future of NATO, the only truly successful collective security mechanism in the history of the world, becomes problematic.

NATO's cyberterrorism fight

Interview with Suleyman Anil *Head of NATO's Cyber Defence Support and Coordination Centre*



International Affairs Forum: You've compared the importance of the threat posed by cyber attacks with missile defenses and the fight against terrorism. What kind of threats are you particularly concerned about, and do you feel member countries are now taking the threat seriously enough?



Suleyman Anil: The threats that particularly concern us are state-sponsored cyber attacks/malicious activities. A number of nations have developed cyber warfare capabilities which are provided with, when required, appropriate resources and protection. Cyber attacks performed by such types of threats are most difficult to respond to and can have significant effects on nations, particularly on those with poor or small national IT infrastructures. Such attacks can destabilize national security, cause significant economic loss and disrupt national public and commercial services for days or weeks. These types of attacks are also frequently used for cyber espionage.

Considering the threat posed by cyberattacks, do you feel that an attack on a member nation should be viewed in the same way as a more conventional attack would be?

That's not the policy at the moment. With the current characteristics of cyber attacks, it is difficult cause physical damage or risk human lives, and that's where cyber attacks differ from conventional attacks. This may change in the future as the use and integration of Internet with computer networks controlling the physical infrastructures (e.g. railways, power plants, etc.) expands even further. Moreover, the risks from cyber threats against national security, economy and services may also significantly increase as Internet and connected computers grows to dominate our lives. Therefore the current gap between cyberattacks and conventional attacks may close rapidly and we may soon find ourselves in a situation where risks from conventional attacks become comparable to risks from cyberattacks.

How hard is it to trace back an attack to a state or non-state actor?

From a pure legal and technical perspective, it is close to impossible if the attack is well planned and executed. When analyzed together with political environment and other indicators, then the entities behind an attack can be identified to a large degree.

Are there any NATO members you feel have been taking a lead in bolstering cyber defenses?

Yes, there are a couple of NATO nations with significant investments in cyber defense,

and many are improving their current posture. NATO is playing a significant role in bringing nations experience and knowledge together for more effective and coordinated response to cyber threats.

Are there any particular challenges in trying to encourage coordination on defenses that you feel are unique to cyber threats, such as concerns about sharing information for example?

Information sharing is yet to be at the desired level for various reasons and needs to be improved. But there are other major outstanding issues as well; such as lack of harmonized legislations and clear views on legal aspects of cyber attacks, liabilities of service providers in detecting and responding to cyber attacks, lack of international cooperation, etc. Without addressing and resolving these core issues, which involves international cooperation and a common approach in responding against cyber threats, cyber defense could rapidly become one of the global security challenges.

How optimistic are you about how NATO is moving on this issue?

We have a lot to do, but NATO has developed the required policy and concepts on cyber defense and has also planned the supporting defensive capabilities of which implementation is ongoing for completion in coming years. So, I am optimistic.

NATO enlargement and Russia

By James Goldgeier

In their 60th anniversary summit declaration, the NATO heads of state and government reaffirmed that NATO's door remains open to other European democracies, and they restated their position that Ukraine and Georgia will become members of the alliance. They also made clear their desire to cooperate with Russia on a range of issues, but noted, "Our relations with Russia depend on trust and the fulfillment of commitments." In particular, they called on Russia to abide by the terms of the ceasefire agreements reached last summer in the aftermath of the Russia-Georgia war.

Despite these indications that differences remain between NATO and Russia, the two issues that were extremely divisive both within the alliance and between NATO and Russia in the run-up to last year's summit in Bucharest—missile defense and NATO's relations with Ukraine and Georgia—were much less problematic this time around. U.S. President Barack Obama had reached out to Russian President Medvedev in a private letter well in advance of their meeting, making clear that if the Russians can assist in eliminating a possible Iranian nuclear threat, then the deployments of interceptors in Poland and a radar in the Czech Republic would be unnecessary. Obama has also made clear that he wants to ensure that the proposed deployments are "cost-effective and proven" before proceeding in any event. The Bush Administration had already taken the question of NATO membership action plans (MAPs) for Ukraine and Georgia off the table; in December, NATO established an annual review process that largely serves the same purpose as the MAP program but avoids the use of a term that so antagonized Russia. Although Medvedev complained about both issues in a Washington Post op-ed the day before the 2009 summit, there is no reason for either issue to be prominent anytime soon, and this will ease U.S.-Russian and NATO-Russian tensions significantly.

Nevertheless, while Obama and Medvedev clearly made great progress in charting a new course in U.S.-Russian relations at their bilateral meeting in London, there remains a significant difference in world-view between the two countries. The NATO actions that have most angered the Russians—enlargement into Central and Eastern Europe, military actions in the Balkans, and missile defense—have been taken largely for reasons having almost nothing to do with Russia. (Certainly, there are those both in the West and in Eastern Europe who have supported some of these policies because they saw them as defending against Russia, but that was not the primary motivation in Western capitals.) But regardless of Western efforts to convince the Kremlin that enlargement was designed to create greater stability and security in the region (as were ending the war in Bosnia and defending the Kosovar Albanians), and that missile defense is geared to combat a Iranian nuclear threat, the Russians have insisted that these policies undermine their own security. In the Russian view, any gain for the West must necessarily be a loss for them, and this has made collaboration, especially in their immediate neighborhood, extremely difficult.

Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has sought to pursue a two-track policy: strengthen democracies and market economies throughout Central and Eastern Europe while at the same time reaching out to Russia. It does not want to have to sacrifice one for the other, but it has found that easier

said than done. Part of the problem, of course, is that the effort has involved the use of military tools: extending a military alliance, bombing Serbia, and proposing a missile defense system. From a Western perspective, none of these harms Russian security. But the Russians haven't seen it that way.

Is there another approach?

One possibility, of course, is to reject the use of NATO enlargement as a tool for providing stability in Europe. But this is problematic for at least two reasons. First, the 1949 Washington Treaty opens NATO's door to any European country that adopts a free market democratic system respecting human rights and that can contribute to alliance security. Drawing a line that says some European countries are too close to Russia to be eligible for membership goes against core alliance principles. Second, European Union enlargement in the region has followed NATO's enlargement for good reason: the EU can enlarge to areas it knows are secure and stable; that has required that countries join NATO first.

Another possibility is to build on Medvedev's notion of creating a new pan-European security architecture. It is not clear how this institution improves upon the existing structures, namely NATO-Russia, EU-Russia, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). The latter is in fact pan-European, but its office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) is a target of Russian ire, and thus Russia has prevented the OSCE from succeeding as an institution.

The Russians want a structure in which they can be seen as equals to the other major powers and not have to be seen as just another country in Europe. This drive for stature is one reason that officials in Moscow tend to gravitate toward issues like strategic arms control, which is a bilateral U.S.-Russia endeavor. A new European security architecture might help them further this objective, but the Russians should be careful what they wish for. There are issues not currently addressed well by current arrangements, but one in particular, energy security, is largely a problem because of Russian efforts to manipulate prices for political reasons and to control pipelines across the region.

Because there is no need at the moment to push hard on missile defense nor NATO membership for Ukraine and Georgia, the signs of improvement in U.S.-Russia and NATO-Russia relations should continue. With the onset of the Obama administration, the tone in the U.S.-Europe-Russia relationship has changed dramatically. While underlying tensions will continue to exist (and the U.S.-Russia joint statement in London did not shy away from mentioning that differences remain), the opportunity for a "reset" has opened considerably.

Whither NATO: Alliance, democracy or U.N.?

By Henry R. Nau

U.S. President Barack Obama attended the NATO Summit in Europe on April 3-4, 2009, and made clear the NATO option he favors in the future. Rather than an alliance against a resurgent authoritarian Russia or a League of Democracies to consolidate and spread freedom in eastern Europe, Obama favors a NATO that acts as a collective security organization working with Russia to fight common threats such as terrorism and the spread of nuclear weapons.

NATO celebrated its 60th anniversary at the summit. By any measure, NATO is one of the most successful military alliances in history. Formed initially to support the economic and political reconstruction of Europe in 1949, NATO became a military alliance to contain and deter the Soviet Union during the Cold War. It pioneered the strategy of nuclear deterrence, the dangerous yet necessary diplomacy to threaten the Soviet Union with escalation at any level of attack in order to discourage it from attacking or escalating in the first place.

Paradoxical as it may be, the idea was to threaten war, including limited nuclear war (through so-called counterforce strategies), in order to avoid it. Some observers deny that this strategy was ever necessary. They obscure the reality that nuclear weapons were widely deployed and their use threatened at critical times during the Cold War. They will argue that no one ever really intended to use nuclear weapons, including Khrushchev or Kennedy in the Cuban Missile Crisis. But their view is more conviction than fact. The record shows that Khrushchev risked nuclear war even if he did not want it. And in response so did Kennedy.

The Cuban Missile Crisis sobered the two rivals, although military alerts occurred again in subsequent crises such as the 1973 Middle East war. Eventually, the conflict was decided by diplomacy and domestic economic and political performance. In 1991, the Soviet economy and state collapsed and the Soviet Union disappeared. But all of that took place behind the revitalized wall of NATO military defense and deterrence that President Reagan insisted upon after the Soviets invaded Afghanistan. Reagan believed that the only way to peace was to convince the Soviet Union that it could never win a war or even an arms race against the United States.

Since the end of the Cold War, NATO has been in search of a mission. Is it still an alliance targeted against an enemy, like the former Soviet Union? Is it a League of Democracies that emerged from the Cold War and now embraces the spread of democracy in Eastern Europe, including potentially a new democracy in Russia? Or is it a collective security institution like the U.N. that includes all countries whether democratic or not and considers no single country as a threat but addresses common threats to all countries.

Right after the Cold War ended, NATO seemed to have no further mission, not only because the enemy was gone but because the U.N. seemed to be the new global provider of security. In 1991 the U.N.

conducted history's first successful collective security operation to expel Iraq from Kuwait. But subsequent crises in Bosnia and Kosovo proved too controversial for the U.N. to handle. Russia vetoed U.N. action, and NATO found a new role in quelling ethnic and religious violence in the former Yugoslavia.

In eastern Europe, NATO expanded as a League of Democracies to consolidate and spread freedom. Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic joined in 1999. Seven more countries followed in 2004, including three former republics of the Soviet Union—Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. And Croatia and Albania became members in 2009. The United States convened a Community of Democracies in Warsaw in 2000, which has met every other year since, to consolidate and strengthen the new voice of freedom in the world.

Meanwhile NATO as an alliance fell on hard times. It failed to address the terrorist threat or the resurgence of nationalism in Russia. After 9/11 the United States rejected a NATO offer under Article 5—a threat against one is a threat against all—to fight the Taliban government in Afghanistan. Two years later the United States divided NATO further over the decision to invade Iraq.

At the same time, Russia, unhappy with NATO activities in Bosnia and Kosovo and NATO membership for former Soviet republics, pushed back. It warned the West not to invite Ukraine and Georgia to join NATO or to deploy missile defense systems in eastern Europe against Iranian threats. In recent years, Russia used its leverage to meddle aggressively in the domestic politics of Ukrainian and the Baltic countries and in 2008 invaded disputed provinces in Georgia.

Thus, as an alliance, NATO hangs by a thread. It commands Western forces in Afghanistan, but only a few NATO members contribute combat forces or desperately needed equipment such as helicopters.

The choices at the NATO Summit therefore were stark. Does NATO regroup to fight an actual enemy such as Al-Qaida and to counterbalance a more assertive Russia? Does it continue to push the spread of freedom in eastern Europe by preparing Ukraine and Georgia for NATO membership? Or does it accept the presence of Russian forces in Georgia (which have not withdrawn from undisputed Georgian territory as called for by the cease fire), back off the decision to deploy missile defenses against Iran, and work with Russia to address common threats such as nuclear proliferation and terrorism?

Obama has selected the latter option. He put alliance issues on the back burner—saying nothing about Russia's troops in Georgia or Ukrainian and Georgian membership in NATO, and gaining no additional NATO combat forces for Afghanistan. He undercut new democracies in Poland and the Czech Republic by agreeing to forego missile defenses in these countries if Russia helps to end Iran's quest for nuclear weapons. And he launched an ambitious and hurried program of arms control negotiations with Russia to sign a new START agreement by the end of the year.

Obama's choice is a big gamble. He has mortgaged NATO's unprecedented success as an alliance and community of democracies to undertake a risky collective security partnership with a Russia that has less and less in common with Western democratic societies. If Russia does not come through, a highly likely possibility, Obama may wish he had chosen differently.

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
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
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Collision course: NATO, Russia and the former Communist Bloc in the 21st century

By Georgeta Pourchot

Are relations among NATO, Russia and the former communist bloc going to be fundamentally different in the 21st century? Since much of the friction between NATO and Russia involves former communist countries, it is worth evaluating assumptions about each other's intentions towards one another, and patterns of behavior after the end of the Cold War. Threat assumptions, persisting and increasing distrust among these players, and the complexity of the global landscape indicate that relations among these three parties are going to remain strained for the foreseeable future.

For NATO, the basic assumptions that inform strategy are fairly straightforward. Stability on the continent is not to be taken for granted, frozen conflicts remain and may flare up. Communication and cooperation are better than digging in one's heels over agenda items. Global threats and non-state security risks will continue, and out-of-area instability can affect the interests of the Allies. Russia is a power that should be engaged, not ignored or rattled.

Patterns of behavior since 1990 match these assumptions. Article 5 remains the Alliance's *raison d'être*, but missions continue to expand as out of area conflicts threaten stability. This was the argument in favor of intervening in the Balkan wars, in NATO's first and only military engagement in history. Peace-keeping missions remain in volatile areas of the Balkans, to ensure that the conflict does not spill into neighboring countries. The same assumption informed the Alliance's engagement in Afghanistan, to preempt non-state threats from affecting Euro-Atlantic security.

Communication and cooperation has also been tested by years of rethinking NATO's relationship with other countries. This is why a decision was made to allow for mechanisms of cooperation such as Partnership for Peace, Membership Action Plans, bilateral consultative arrangements, and eventual membership. This assumption informs NATO's decision to keep its door open for partnerships, memberships, and other forms of cooperation that enhance security and stability on the old continent, and beyond.

The assumption that Russia is a power to be engaged rather than neglected—or rattled—has informed action on numerous occasions. Cooperative arrangements such as the NATO-Russia Council and Partnership for Peace are venues for consultation and cooperation between the two sides. As former communist countries joined NATO, they became party to these consultations as well. The sides did not always agree, but Russia was at least informed about the reasons behind a particular course of action; one can argue that indeed, these consultations were the saving grace in bilateral relations.

The ultimate proof that this assumption still informs NATO's mode of operation came with the Russia-Georgia conflict in the summer of 2008. NATO did not intervene as Russia expanded its military operations beyond the disputed South Ossetia and Abkhazia into Georgian territory, nor when Russia destroyed the fleet and military bases of a sovereign country that did not attack it. The secretary general

had heavy words of rebuke for the Russian leadership, but months later, the Allies continued to reengage the Kremlin.

For Russia, basic threat assumptions have come full circle. In the early nineties, the end of the Cold War standoff led to initial assumptions about a future of cooperation between old foes. For a brief moment, even Russia's membership in NATO was floated as a possibility. As former communist countries started to join NATO, and the Alliance led a military offensive in the Balkans, against a traditional Russian ally, Russian threat assumptions and the national interest were redefined in the image of the past. NATO membership for the Baltic countries, the positioning of military bases in Romania and Bulgaria, a planned missile defense site in Poland and the Czech Republic, and possible membership for Ukraine and Georgia convinced Russian policy circles that NATO had a hidden, anti-Russia agenda.

Currently, the Kremlin assumes that NATO is expanding based on an intentional and planned agenda that ultimately seeks to encircle and isolate the Federation.

Currently, the Kremlin assumes that NATO is expanding based on an intentional and planned agenda that ultimately seeks to encircle and isolate the Federation. It assumes that domestic revolutions against the established power in various CIS countries, and regional and local conflicts are engineered and funded by either NATO, or the U.S., or both. Terrorism and further separatist movements threaten the Federation and any means to prevent or stop them are acceptable. Russia owes no explanation to anyone for the way it handles such threats.

Patterns of behavior validate these assumptions. Initially, relations between Euro-Atlantic allies and Moscow were friendly and cooperative. In 1993, as the thaw between East-West was fully on, the new Russian military doctrine declared that the Federation had no potential enemies and stated that it would not take military action except in self-defense. Russia joined Partnership for Peace, and cooperated with NATO in agreed institutional frameworks. Then Presidents Yeltsin and Clinton had a high-level mechanism of consultation that permitted them to air their differences and find areas they could agree on. Yeltsin reluctantly agreed to NATO's first wave of enlargement based on intense diplomacy and promises to keep the process transparent.

When NATO first bombed Belgrade, the Russian defense minister on his way to talks with the Allies turned the plane around and returned to Moscow. The anger over NATO's military engagement in the Balkan conflict, coupled with deep unhappiness over NATO's 'expansion' to Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic marked the return of old threat assumptions about the Alliance's foe status. The admission of the Baltic countries into NATO validated the assumption that the Allies were out to encircle Russia. The 'color revolutions' in Ukraine, Moldova and Kyrgyzstan were considered fomented, organized or

funded 'by the West.' Georgia's attempt to bring back into the fold its breakaway republics was assumed staged by the U.S. and NATO, hence it merited a military response. Every time a former Soviet republic adopted a position that the Kremlin disliked, the Russian leadership and media branded it 'made in the U.S.'

The 'war on terror' launched by the Bush administration was received with some understanding in Russia, offering an opportunity to claim [again] that the war in Chechnya was essentially an anti-terrorist operation. The invasion of Iraq, however, was not. As the Allies enlisted the help of Central Asian countries, including Russia for supply routes to Afghanistan, the use of the Manas base in Kyrgyzstan eventually became a thorny issue. Russia announced a substantial aid package to Kyrgyzstan on the same day that Kyrgyzstan announced that the lease for the use of the base would not be extended, inviting American troops to leave. In Russia, this was considered a major moral victory over the U.S. and NATO.

In the summer of 2008, coming full circle in defining its national interests, the Kremlin announced that its new security and defense doctrine would be formulated based on 'privileged interests' in the post-Soviet space. Coming in the aftermath of Russian military intervention in Georgia, privileged interests were understood as direct interference in the affairs of other former Soviet republics, when and if the Kremlin considered it necessary. In October 2008, the defense ministry announced a thorough overhaul of the armed forces. In March 2009, President Medvedev announced that in light of NATO's expansion towards Federation borders, Russia would begin a comprehensive military rearmament, to increase combat readiness. All signs indicate that Russia views NATO and the U.S. as foes, and it is getting ready for eventual confrontation.

For the former communist bloc, threat assumptions are formulated in terms of retaining sovereignty over the countries' decisions. A strong assumption that the Euro-Atlantic Alliance offers better security guarantees underlines policy in many of these countries. A few former Soviet republics assume that neutrality is better, but none thinks that their security is or should be solely guaranteed by the Russian Federation. Russia is no longer assumed to be 'big brother' guiding these countries' destinies, but good relations are considered preferable.

Consistent with these assumptions, virtually all Central European countries joined NATO of their own volition. Some Balkan countries applied and are working towards membership. Three former Soviet republics also joined, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Two are waiting in line, Ukraine and Georgia. All Central Asian republics joined Partnership for Peace, including Russia's staunchest ally and least democratized former Soviet republic, Belarus. Some countries adopted a strategy of maintaining close relations with both Russia and the Euro-Atlantic community. Armenia maintained a Russian base at Gyumri, but also signed an Individual Partnership Action Plan with NATO. Kazakhstan pursued good trade relations with Russia, but also opened its air corridors to American and NATO planes transporting equipment and personnel to Afghanistan.

Most CIS countries cooperate with Russia through regional agreements. Trade and diplomatic relations are generally good, except for Georgia, who regards Russia's recognition of its breakaway republics as infringement of its sovereignty, and Ukraine who has unresolved gas trading conflicts. Energy crises are becoming predictable in December-January of every year, with Moscow shutting off gas supplies to Eu-

rope due to unclear and unrespected transit agreements with Ukraine.

History continues to pose fundamental challenges to the relationship between Russia and its former sphere of influence. Former Soviet republics demand Moscow's admission of past wrongs. The Baltic countries' incorporation in the Soviet Union, the massive famine in Ukraine and Kazakhstan, the brutal suppression of Chechen independence attempts, Crimea, and other cases remain sources of friction and revisionism. Given that the sides have fundamentally different assumptions about each other's interests and motivations, we should expect increased tension between Russia and its former sphere of influence on the one hand, and between Russia and NATO on the other hand. Some analysts argue that a second Cold War has already started. Whether that is true or not, developments are clearly not headed in the direction of peaceful resolution of persisting disagreements.

THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY

The Washington Quarterly

Journal of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)

Editor-in-Chief:

Alexander T. J. Lennon

Volume 32, 2009, 4 issues per year

Print ISSN 0163-660X, Online ISSN 1530-9177

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
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Europe-centric NATO poor fit for Asia

Interview with Madhav D. Nalapat

Q: **IA Forum:** You've talked in the past about the possibility of an Asia NATO. What do you see as the main benefits of such an organization?

A: **Madhav D. Nalapat:** The main point is that Asia sees Europe differently than it does America. For good or for bad, Asia has had a history of colonization by European countries, so obviously European countries have a different resonance in Asia than countries in North America. The United States, for example, was well-known in India as favoring Indian independence for quite a long time. Some of the best writing on the freedom struggle in India came from American journalists. And some of the best photographs came from American photographers, who portrayed the different aspects of the freedom struggle, including the brutality of the British police etc.

NATO is basically North America and Europe, and it was set up specifically to conquer the Soviet threat and threats to Europe. I think that was an excellent objective and I think NATO should confine itself to threats to Europe from any source whatsoever. But once NATO expands, and starts looking in terms of Asia, then what happens is that you will essentially be telling the Asian countries that they should outsource the solving of their threats to this organization that is heavily influenced by Europe.

Now as I mentioned, Asia has had a history of colonization by Europe, it has had a history of European domination and it doesn't like that history very much. So immediately, that creates a certain amount of public backlash in such activities. We have seen for example what has happened in Iraq. The Americans brought in the British, but the British were the old colonial masters in Iraq. So from my point of view, whatever benefits from the military point of view, the psychological damage was immense because almost automatically it was seen as a fresh war of colonization and occupation, however just or unjustly, by many Iraqis.

Now I agree it is unjust in the sense that Tony Blair's Britain was not the Britain of Winston Churchill or even the Britain even further back of extreme colonialism. But my point is that North America and Asia need to come together to form a security architecture in today's situation, exactly as North America and Europe came together to form a security architecture after the Second World War. There should not be a bleeding of a Europeanized NATO into Asia, because if that takes place, it has a psychological resonance and psychological tension that could damage military operations. The point about military operations is not 'landspace' but 'mindspace.' When you bring European countries into Asia in a combat role, you are immediately creating a constituency for those who are nationalistic and others who don't like the European

experience. Whereas if you bring in North American troops along with local troops, that kind of counterforce is less likely to be created. Which is why it is important there is a separate security organization dealing with security issues in Asia to that of the one dealing with security issues in Europe.

Which countries would you envisage as playing a leading role?

I'd say Japan, Australia—which is increasingly realizing its prosperity depends a lot on Asia—India, Singapore and some countries in the Middle East such as Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, Kuwait. I would say these could definitely all be part of an Asian NATO eventually. But the core countries are going to be the United States, India, Australia and Japan.

Some have worried China might see an Asian NATO as a threat to its interests, or aimed directly at it. Would such an organization likely have China in mind, and to what extent should its concerns be accommodated?

I'd like to say that that depends entirely on the Chinese. Now you take, for example, India's and Chinese responses to territorial disputes. In our case, we have one third of the armed forces because of Jawaharlal Nehru's mistake. And with India prematurely agreeing to a ceasefire over Kashmir, what has happened is one third of Kashmir is now occupied by Pakistan, of which a substantial portion has been gifted over to China. Now despite that, India has made it very plain that it is not thinking of war to take this remaining part back. India is going to let bygones be bygones and go on the basis of the status quo.

Now the McMahon line was drawn by the British. But the Chinese are making a big play that they won't accept this colonial line for the India-China border. But they have accepted this line on the Burmese border and there have been a lot of colonial lines over places like Shanghai and Hong Kong. So I think it is very strange that the only part of the colonial heritage that the Chinese do not seem to like is that relating to the McMahon line, especially as they have taken a huge chunk of Kashmir from the Pakistanis.

So the reality of the situation is that India has said alright, according to our maps a large chunk of territory that is in your possession belongs to us. But let's leave bygones as bygones and let the status quo prevail. My personal view is that the status quo is the healthiest position for all disputes in Asia—whether it is disputed related to Pakistan and India, whether it is disputes between India and China, or China and other countries.

Unfortunately the Chinese are not ready to do that. The Chinese have already taken over Tibet. Now Tibet has been a unique territory because culturally and in many other ways, it is closer to India than it is to China. But India did not make any objection to the takeover of Tibet. The Chinese have been very aggressive toward Taiwan, which very frankly it is a very big stretch to say that Taiwan has historically belonged to the Chinese. If you say that, then the whole of Asia has been historically Chinese. Despite the fact that China has such an enormous land area, it is still demanding so many islands, so

much sea space, so much other space belonging or in effective control of other countries.

So I am sorry to hear China has been so unreasonable about its demands. If China starts to look at military options as a way of settling these disputes, there needs to be an instrument in place that tells the Chinese that the cost of that would be unacceptable. The point about an Asian NATO is to make conflict unacceptable throughout Asia. It is not directed against China, it is not directed against India, or Cambodia or Pakistan—it is directed against war. Any country that wants to change the status quo in Asia by force will have an Asian NATO to contend with.

What do you make of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization? Some see it as a potential future rival to NATO.

I don't think it will fly, simply because the tension between China and Russia is real and I don't think it is going to go away. It is true that within Russia there is a significant component of Russians who are completely in the Chinese camp. If you go to Moscow you will see many people effectively functioning very close to China and who are doing the bidding of the Chinese. In large part that is because of the vast amounts of money that China is spending in Russia.

Now the reality of the situation is that there are significant geopolitical differences between China and Russia—there are serious strategic differences between the two. And these divergences will become more pronounced as and when Russia becomes more stable and when Russia expands. The fact of the matter is that Russia's natural ally in Asia is actually India. India has been an ally of Russia for several decades, and I think India can be a link that brings Russia closer to, for example, the United States.

Way back in 2000, I gave a talk in New York about the possibility of a U.S.-India-Russia alliance. I think it's a very rational idea—for India and Russia to first come together in Asia and for India to then be the buckle that brings the United States and Asia closer together. One problem with the United States' policy toward Russia is that the United States has been led by France and Germany. Now the French and Germans do not want Russia to be integrated into Europe, because that would end Franco-German primacy in Europe. The United States has gone along with France and Germany, and they have used the U.S., in a sense, against Russia to put a cage around it.

After the Cold War ended, a great opportunity was lost by the fact that the Russians were treated almost as second class citizens or a second class country. Now I don't believe that Russia is a European country. But I don't believe it is an Asian country. Russia is Russia—it has a European identity and it has an Asian identity. I'm not sure what the natural partnership will be for it. It will not be France and Germany as long as they are nervous about Russia becoming a part of Europe on equal terms. But India is perfectly ready to see Russia become part of Asia on equal terms. So India is the natural partner, not China, and I think over time Russia will accept that India is a better partner than China.

NATO at 60:

A spry senior in search of the right insurance policy

By Marybeth Peterson Ulrich

Milestone birthdays are causes to reflect on chapters of lives already written. They are also opportunities to draft outlines for chapters yet to be lived. NATO can feel justifiably proud as it takes stock of its accomplishments, which are storied and significant. The Alliance faced down the Soviet Union, extended a hand to its former Warsaw Pact enemies through its Partnership for Peace and membership opportunities, and took on out of area missions in the Balkans to tamp down violence in its own backyard. Yet it is also feeling the strains akin to a long serving board of directors struggling to prioritize among its many business interests, all the while bringing in new board members. Each new member brings different priorities and perceptions of the threats and possibilities operating in the strategic environment. Compounding these challenges is the global financial crisis, the strategic implications of which are only beginning to be considered. But crises have a way of sorting out priorities and reminding those in the midst of them of their core needs.

NATO recognized the need to engage the forces of Islamist militancy in Afghanistan, but has had trouble bringing to bear the right configuration of political will, political-military capabilities, and resources to be effective. Its expansion to 28 members this month with the accession of Croatia and Albania has led to the formation of different camps over time with variable expectations about what they expect to get in return for the premiums on their security insurance policy.

Many commentaries in recent weeks have spoken of a “NATO adrift,” its members lacking the unity and purpose of the Cold War era. However, NATO is merely a tool of its member states and partners. The root cause of this malaise is not that the Alliance is adrift. Rather, NATO’s member states’ strategies are adrift. While states’ interests are enduring, the strategic environment in which they are tested and pursued is constantly evolving. The tools to meet and defeat, exploit and benefit, from the challenges and opportunities in the current international system must adapt with it. So is NATO a spry 60-year-old ready to retool for a second career, or an entity past its time fading into retirement?

Key to NATO’s adaptation and its continued relevance will be the adoption of a new Strategic Concept to update its 1999 Concept. The communique issued at the end of the Strasbourg meeting committed the Alliance to approving an updated Strategic Concept at the next NATO Summit in Portugal. The debate has already begun over what the new Strategic Concept should contain. German Chancellor Angela Merkel has called for a “comprehensive approach” that synergistically applies military and non-military capabilities due to the political and military nature of the threat environment. The Baltic states and Poland want reassurances that Article 5 guarantees will remain meaningful. Their willingness to expend premiums in the form of blood and treasure on expeditionary missions is directly related to their confidence in the continued value of their NATO insurance policies. There is also debate over whether the Alliance should be organized to meet a preponderance of functional or geographic threats.

Of course, the laboratory for continued Alliance viability will continue to be the ISAF mission in Afghani-



Many commentaries in recent weeks have spoken of a ‘NATO adrift,’ its members lacking the unity and purpose of the Cold War era. However, NATO is merely a tool of its member states and partners.

stan. President Barack Obama came to Strasbourg with a freshly minted Afghanistan-Pakistan strategy in hand with the objective of selling it to the U.S.’s NATO partners. Its ends are scaled back to a core goal—to disrupt, dismantle and eventually destroy extremists and their safe havens in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The means to achieve the mission’s ends are being boosted significantly with the United States doubling its troop commitment and calling for more resourcing through non-military elements to defeat the insurgency. Renewed American leadership in Afghanistan in conjunction with reestablishing a balance between strategic ends and means is the best hope for success in this most vexing of strategic challenges.

There are some reports from the field that American servicemen in Afghanistan have come to dub ISAF as I Saw America Fight. Others warn that the new Obama strategy threatens to make Afghanistan America’s war. Yet the security interests being pursued in Afghanistan transcend those of America. A reinvigorated NATO guided by a new Strategic Concept that reflects its members’ enduring interests and that is compatible with the 21st century strategic environment is a critical tool toward ensuring the continued security of its Euro-Atlantic membership and the world at large.

April 4th didn’t mark one birthday, rather it marked the anniversary of 28 different Euro-Atlantic member states and their relationships with NATO. The 12 founding members can reflect back on NATO’s original purpose of collective defense and ponder the extent to which Article 5 obligations should dominate NATO’s future. The members who joined from the East after the Cold War can reflect on the political integration with Europe that they sought and achieved and their security needs that remain. NATO’s global partners, such as Australia, New Zealand, and Japan may focus on how access to common training enhances their capabilities and enables their participation in common missions. France can take pride in its return to the NATO military structure. However, the best gift each guest at the 60th birthday party can provide is a careful and thoughtful review of their own national interests and national strategies in place to achieve them. Such reflection is likely to result in a new appreciation for the Alliance’s critical role and the importance of continuing to pay the premiums, while the policy, itself, is revamped through the crafting of a new Strategic Concept to cover 21st-century security needs.

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Russia and NATO: The need for a new security relationship

By Paul Flenley

The recent crisis in relations between Russia and NATO over the war in Georgia is one of a number of crises that have occurred since Western leaders declared “a new partnership with democratic Russia” in 1991 after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Each of the previous crises was succeeded by a reassessment of the relationship, a greater degree of cooperation and attempts at a deeper understanding of the other side. Boris Yeltsin’s threats in the mid-1990s to restore the division of Europe in response to the first round of NATO enlargement was succeeded by a new enhanced status for the NATO-Russia relationship in the form of the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act. The freeze in relations which followed the NATO bombing of Serbia in 1999 was followed in 2000 with Vladimir Putin’s pursuit of a more pragmatic relationship with the West based on mutual interests and shared threats. The opportunity to put this into practice came with 9/11 and the beginnings of more detailed cooperation as symbolized in the NATO-Russia Council set up in 2002. It is likely that the aftermath of the latest August 2008 crisis will follow a similar pattern. Already within Russia the lessons of the war with Georgia are forcing a reassessment of Russia’s military needs and capabilities. In addition, in the way that a change of Russian president brought about a reassessment of the Russia-West relationship in 2000, so this time the arrival of a new U.S. president is providing the opportunity to press the “reset button” in relations. Also, as was the case in 2001 the talk of renewal takes place in the midst of a radical shift in the international context which focuses attentions on mutual interests. Then it was terrorism. Now it is the global economic crisis.

Revitalizing the relationship will, however, need to be based on a greater comprehension of each other’s position and what went wrong in the period up to 2008. One new element that has emerged in the period from 2000 has been Russia’s greater assertiveness. This has its origins in a number of factors—most obviously the sense of greater economic wellbeing. In addition, the consolidation of the central power of the state has created a greater degree of order in comparison with the chaos of the 1990s. This has been reflected in foreign policymaking. The Yeltsin years saw a degree of chaos in foreign policymaking and undermined Russia’s effectiveness as an international actor.¹ Paradoxically, in spite of western complaints at increasing authoritarianism in Russia the stronger state has delivered Russia as a more coherent partner.

Adding to this new confidence is the perception that the age of U.S. hegemony is over. Having previously been something of a junior partner, Russia is now clearly needed by the West whether it be for diplomatic pressure on Iran in the nuclear dispute or for help in transporting supplies for the war in Afghanistan. The Georgian war also

¹ S.Parrish, ‘Chaos in Foreign Policy Decision-making’, *Transition*, 2(10), 17 May, 1996, pp.30-33,64.

clearly showed Russia's ability to defend its interests in its own "backyard" without fear of wider retaliation. As a consequence, a new "Russia aware" element has come to the fore in discussions both within NATO and the EU in which some members, such as France, Germany and Italy are wary of pursuing agendas such as enlargement to include the Ukraine, which may jeopardize necessary relations with Russia, especially on energy.

One key consequence of this new Russian assertiveness is a desire to dispense with any sense of subservience in external relationships. Russia seeks to be treated as an equal in any relationship. The foreign minister, Lavrov, has called for a renegotiation of any partnerships that are not based on equality.² The old conditionality agenda of NATO and even more so of the EU, is rejected. The talk is of "respect". As Dimitry Rogozin, Russia's Permanent Representative to NATO wrote last month, "Respect and mutual trust are the foundations of practical cooperation, and it goes without saying that those are the things we should work on first."³

Russia now feels it has the right to pursue its own relationships such as with Iran or North Korea—with or without Western approval—for its own pragmatic reasons. As Putin put it in 2005, "As a world power situated on two continents Russia should retain its freedom to determine and implement its domestic and foreign policies, its status and advantages of a Euro-Asian state and the largest country of the CIS, independence of its positions and activities at international organizations."⁴ Russia is involved in a number of bilateral and multi-lateral security relationships in Asia such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. However, the idea of Russia constructing a new anti-Western bloc is unlikely for a variety of reasons. Even if this was Russia's aim, lack of support for Russia in the Georgian war revealed its limitations. The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation rejected Medvedev's appeal for support, condemned the use of force and reaffirmed the commitment to preserving the territorial integrity of a state. China in particular has no need to be locked into a bloc with anyone else and seeks freedom to pursue direct relationships with the West. In any case, in spite of the recent frictions with the West, Russia is still decidedly pro-Western in terms not only of where it sees its major economic relationships, especially with the EU, but also in terms of the individual economic interests and cultural affinities of its elite.⁵


A key cause of the recent deterioration of the relationship has been the way in which, despite the end of the Cold War and the periodic new starts to the relationship, old agendas keep resurfacing. The Russians themselves complain of the perpetuation of the old "bloc mentality". In the 1990s they had called for a new security architecture which would be inclusive and pan-European, possibly based on the OSCE. The alternative which was pursued was an enlargement of NATO combined with periodic efforts to assuage Russian fears through overtures such as the NATO-Russia Council. It is certainly true that since the latter was set up in 2002 the degree and extent of practical cooperation between NATO and Russia has developed considerably. However, the problem with this existing security architecture is that it has been unable to escape its Cold

² S.V.Lavrov, Speech to the 18th Session of The Consultation Council of The Russian Regions on International and External Economic Relations in the Russian Foreign Ministry. <http://www.mid.ru/brp.4.nsf>. Accessed 14/08/07.

³ D. Rogozin, "An End to Cold Peace", *The Guardian*, 30/3/09, p.29.

⁴ V. Putin, "Annual Address to the Federal Assembly", 25/04/05. http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2005/04/2031_type70029_87086.

⁵ Dmitry Shlapentokh, "Russia's approach to the USA: between hate and love", *Perceptions: Journal of International Affairs*, Autumn- Winter 2006, Vol.XI, No.3-4, pp.85-102.



A key cause of the recent deterioration of the relationship has been the way in which, despite the end of the Cold War and the periodic new starts to the relationship, old agendas keep resurfacing.

War origins. Once a major issue emerges such as Georgia, rather than being a forum for the resolution of conflict between Russia and the West or better still the diffusion of it, the architecture is at best paralyzed or actually seems to reinforce the old divisions.

It has to be said that one key problem is the double package of trying to pursue cooperation between NATO and Russia at the same time as arguing for the continuing enlargement of NATO further into the former Soviet Union. The April NATO summit committed itself to that same contradictory package and for that reason is unlikely to provide a long-term solution to the problem of periodic spats with Moscow which actually divert attention away from much more serious threats which are common to both sides. One key reason is that in spite of protestations about benign intentions NATO enlargement perpetuates the psychology of “threat” which is a perennial feature of Russian military and political thinking. It continues to make Russia see its neighbors as a potential source of threat, always in danger of joining the “other side”. It helps to perpetuate the vicious circle of Russian power extension. As the late Alexander Dallin⁶ recognized years ago, if Russia fears that others are seeking to exploit instability on its borders then it is likely to be drawn in to preempt that. As we have seen even recently⁷ with the new members of NATO, this in turn means that Russia’s neighbors seek to sustain the original rationale for NATO’s existence i.e. defense against the Russian threat. Talk of NATO enlargement, however, does not actually add to the security of those neighbors. It is part of the cycle which sustains Russia’s paranoia.

⁶ Formerly Professor of International History, Stanford University.

⁷ See mood at conference in Tallinn on eve of April NATO summit.

The EU idea of building “common spaces” with Russia, including a common space for security is possibly a more fruitful way forward. It is more inclusive and provides more of a non-partisan framework within which disputes could be resolved. For example, in 2006 the Georgians had urged the EU to seek a resolution of the South Ossetia issue within the framework of the EU-Russia relationship.

A new more inclusive architecture needs to break free from the Cold War imagery and associations for good. It needs to prevent the knee-jerk reversion to the old bloc

mentalities when disputes arise and actually help to resolve or even pre-empt those disputes. It also needs to alleviate that element of threat, real or imagined, which has historically characterized the Russia-Western relationship for all concerned, including Russia's neighbors. This may mean NATO abandoning the old project of enlargement to include the countries on Russia's borders and instead trying to build a common security space to include both them and Russia. Dmitry Medvedev has talked of a "united Euroatlantic space from Vancouver to Vladivostok".

In addition, as indicated earlier, there needs to be more of a genuinely equal partnership based on emphasizing the range of shared interests whether in combating transnational crime, terrorism, nuclear arms control or pursuing mutual interests in areas like Afghanistan. A new security architecture need not mean turning a blind eye to internal developments in Russia itself or being soft on any future disputes between Russia and its neighbors. However, it could mean being in a position to provide more continuous and effective leverage and influence than the dramatic breaks in relations that seem to simply entrench attitudes with little actual effect in terms of actually changing behavior. The Declaration of the April NATO summit does talk of Russia as a "partner and neighbor" and the importance of "dialogue and cooperation" to "meet common security threats and challenges". However, the Alliance still encourages the changes necessary for Ukraine and Georgia to achieve their "Euro-Atlantic aspirations" and it seems as yet there is to be no new overall security strategy for the NATO-Russia relationship—"We are convinced that the NATO-Russia Council has not exploited its full potential."⁸ One hopes, but is not convinced, that in spite of the warm atmosphere now between Obama and Medvedev we will not be needing to "press the reset button" again.

⁸ Strasbourg/Kehl Summit Declaration, Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Strasbourg/Kehl on 4 April, 2009. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/nato/ive/news_52837.htm

Hitting the ‘stop’ button on NATO expansion

By Benjamin H. Friedman and Justin Logan

The United States has consistently advocated NATO membership for Georgia and Ukraine. In spring 2008 the George W. Bush administration pushed for Membership Action Plans—the path to membership, for both nations. Our core NATO allies, with Germany and France leading the way, blocked the effort, a move that in retrospect might have prevented August’s dustup between Russia and Georgia from escalating into a nuclear standoff.

Russia’s move into Georgia provoked an outpouring of American outrage. Then-candidate Barack Obama came out in favor of NATO accession for both nations, along with the bulk of the American foreign policy establishment. Obama’s support was based on the idea that bringing Georgia into NATO “in no way threatens the legitimate defense interests of Georgia’s neighbors.”

Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin saw things differently. In August, as *The New York Times* reported, Putin made his case plainly:

Russia viewed “the appearance of a powerful military bloc” on its borders “as a direct threat” to its security. “The claim that this process is not directed against Russia will not suffice,” Mr. Putin said. “National security is not based on promises.”

Complicating matters further, on its way out the door the Bush administration heightened the U.S. commitment to the protection of Ukraine and Georgia. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice signed “Charters on Strategic Partnership” with both countries, pledging to “support [both countries’] sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and inviolability of borders.” The charters are not treaties, and therefore have no legal authority. But along with U.S. support for these nations’ accession to NATO, this sort of language might convince them that Americans will shield them from Russia, encouraging behavior that forces us either to renege on the pledges or face down Russia. An even vaguer commitment seems to have convinced Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili that the U.S. would protect him from Russia last summer, heightening his recklessness.

The story U.S. analysts tell to justify another round of NATO expansion is that Russia—fueled by energy wealth and Vladimir Putin—has reinvigorated its economy, cast off any pretenses of democracy and repaired its military. According to this scenario, Moscow is now poised to overrun its democratic neighbors and reclaim the Soviet empire, all the while gathering energy supplies to use to blackmail Western clients. Hitler and Stalin taught us that aggressors must be stopped early, so it follows that we must now contain Russia by extending security guarantees to its neighbors.

This narrative is devoid of strategic logic. Leaving aside nuclear weapons, which deterrence renders unusable, Russia is not a great power, and is incapable of threatening Western Europe, let alone the United States. The World Bank predicts that Russia’s economy will shrink by 4.5 percent this year, and its unemployment will hit 12 percent. Even close to the height of oil prices, Russia possessed a GDP only roughly

equivalent to that of Italy and Portugal combined. Its stock market is down by more than half since this time last year. Its defense spending totals about \$70 billion annually (less than what the U.S. spends on defense research and investment alone), for what remains a second-rate military.

This is a country strong enough to pummel weak neighbors like Georgia, but one that shouldn't worry Europe, which spends roughly four times more. Balance of power theory tells us that if Russia grows more threatening, the members of the European Union—now collectively richer than the U.S.—will respond by investing more on defense than their current average of 2 percent of GDP, and by further integrating their military capacity.

No longer driven by a revolutionary ideology, Russia also lacks the Soviet Union's ambitions. True, Russia does not like the democratic governments on its flanks in Ukraine and Georgia. But that is because these governments are pursuing policies that anger Russia, not because they are democratic per se. What Russia wants are pliant neighbors. That desire is typical of relatively powerful states: The long U.S. history of violent interventions in Latin America undermines whatever lectures we might direct at Moscow.

Now compare today's security situation to the one that caused NATO's formation in 1949. The Soviets had at least 700,000 troops deemed capable of overrunning a Western Europe left vulnerable by broken armies and empty treasuries. European poverty gave Moscow-backed Communist parties a realistic chance at taking power democratically. Fearing that the Soviet Union—by conquest or revolution—could seize enough of Europe's industrial might to threaten the U.S., Americans sent aid via the Marshall Plan and troops via NATO. U.S. intervention restored the balance of power, serving its own interests.

No similar rationale justifies defending Georgia and Ukraine. In fact, allying with these countries simply creates defense liabilities for NATO members. Alliances are not free. Credible defense commitments require spending and troops, particularly to defend long borders like Ukraine's. With much of NATO's manpower tied down in Iraq and Afghanistan, new commitments may require new recruits, an expensive proposition in an era when the cost of military manpower is quickly appreciating.

These are precisely the sorts of allies a prudent superpower would avoid. They offer few benefits, and come carrying pre-existing territorial conflicts with a stronger neighbor. Ukraine appears to be living up to its reputation for political instability, dangerously verging on the precipice of collapse in the wake of the global financial meltdown. Moreover, a recent poll indicated that 63 percent of Ukrainians do not even want NATO membership. Georgia currently has Russian troops on its territory and is run by a leader with a demonstrated capacity for recklessness. NATO backing will only encourage him.

The benefits of expanding NATO to Ukraine and Georgia are uncertain. Some argue that NATO needs to defend Georgia's gas and oil pipelines. The fear is that the more supply Russia controls, the more it can coerce Europeans by threatening to shut off their power. This analysis ignores the simple fact that energy suppliers also depend on consumers. The oil and gas sector accounted for about two-thirds of Russia's export revenues in 2007, according to the World Bank. That makes it hard to shut off supply, or credibly threaten to do so. Supply threats are more likely drive buyers to invest in new energy sources like liquefied natural gas than to curry Russian favor.

The good news is that President Obama seems likely to silently renounce his prior support for further NATO expansion at the forthcoming NATO summit. This move is wise. But he ought to reconsider NATO expansion more generally. No less a Russia expert than George F. Kennan warned in 1997 that it would constitute the “most fateful error of American policy in the entire post-cold-war era,” because it would inflame Russian militarism, stifle democracy, and generally “impel Russian foreign policy in directions decidedly not to our liking.”

It is past time to cast aside the ideology that promoted NATO expansion in the first place. With a \$530 billion non-war defense budget, two indefinite wars underway, and a financial meltdown at home, Washington needs to stop pretending that every foreign squabble requires American intervention. Russia is not about to march west. Our European friends can defend themselves if we force them to try. As for those, like Georgia and Ukraine, who face different dilemmas, our sympathy for their struggles does not mean we should make them our own.



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Mission nonexistent?

Examining NATO's goals in Afghanistan

By John Mueller

U.S. President Barack Obama repeatedly says that NATO's mission in Afghanistan is to "make sure Al-Qaida cannot attack the U.S. homeland, U.S. interests, and our allies" and cannot "project violence against" American citizens. The assumption is that if the Taliban win, Al-Qaida will again be able to set up shop in Afghanistan to carry out its dirty work. As the President puts it, "if the Afghan government falls to the Taliban or allows Al-Qaida to go unchallenged, that country will again be a base for terrorists who want to kill as many of our people as they possibly can."

There are several reasons why this mission statement, constantly promulgated but rarely examined, needs evaluation.

To begin with, as multiple sources, especially Lawrence Wright's prize-winning book, "The Looming Tower," make clear, the Taliban was a reluctant host to Al-Qaida in the 1990s, and it felt betrayed when the terrorist group repeatedly violated agreements to refrain from issuing inflammatory statements or from fomenting violence abroad. And it was Al-Qaida's venture on Sept. 11, 2001, in which the Taliban played no part, which led to the destruction of its regime in Afghanistan.

The Taliban has very little interest in issues outside of Afghanistan, and, although Al-Qaida apparently is assisting in its insurgency there now, if the Taliban came into control in Afghanistan once again, it is exceedingly unlikely that it would again engage in a hosting operation for the terrorist group like the one in the 1990s that led to its own destruction.

Moreover, the notion that Al-Qaida needs a "safe haven" to carry out its terrorist operations is extremely questionable. After all, if 9/11 had a "safe haven," it was in Hamburg, Germany, where the plotters worked out the scheme. Conspiracy plots by small numbers of people require communication, money, and planning, not a geographic base camp.

In addition, even if Al-Qaida were able to relocate to Afghanistan after a Taliban victory, it would still have to operate under the same siege situation it presently enjoys in what Obama calls its "safe haven" in Pakistan. In fact, given the hostility of the Afghan people to the Taliban - and even more so to foreigners allied to it - residence in Afghanistan might well be more hazardous for it.

Obama stresses that "multiple intelligence estimates have warned that Al-Qaida is actively planning attacks on the United States homeland from its safe haven in Pakistan." However, they've been routinely issuing those same warnings since 2002. At present, Al-Qaida consists of perhaps 200 people running around in Pakistan trying to maintain cover and helping the Taliban where possible. There is as well a disjoint network of independent would-be operators around the world connecting on the internet for whom any sort of "base camp" is irrelevant.

Over the last years, Al-Qaida has almost completely discredited itself in the Muslim world due to 9/11 and subsequent counterproductive terrorism taken in its name (including in Iraq). And, although the President, like his predecessor, darkly suggests that some of the post-9/11 terrorist attacks have had “ties” to Al-Qaida central, it seems quite likely that Al-Qaida has not put together a single full operation since 9/11 anywhere in the world.

And all the violence perpetrated by Al-Qaida wannabes, maybes, and lookalikes since 9/11 outside of war zones has resulted in the deaths of 200-300 people per year. That is 200-300 too many, but it doesn't present a monumental threat. Moreover, the rate of terrorist mayhem outside of war zones seems, if anything, to be declining.

In addition, Al-Qaida has yet to establish anything like a presence in the United States. In 2002, intelligence reports were asserting that the number of trained Al-Qaida operatives in the United States was between 2,000 and 5,000, and FBI Director Robert Mueller was assuring a Senate committee that Al-Qaida had “developed a support infrastructure” in the country, and had achieved “the ability and the intent to inflict significant casualties in the U.S. with little warning.” However, after years of well-funded sleuthing, the FBI and other investigative agencies have been unable to uncover a single true Al-Qaida sleeper cell or operative within the country.

Some two billion foreigners have been admitted to the United States legally since 9/11 and many others, of course, have entered illegally. Even if security were so good that 90 percent were turned away or deterred from trying to get it, some would have made it in. And of those, it seems reasonable to suggest, some would have been picked up by now. Accordingly, the inability of the FBI to find any in the country suggests the terrorists, operating out of their “safe haven” in Pakistan, are either far less diabolically clever and capable than usually depicted or that they are not trying very hard. Of late, FBI chief Mueller's rallying cry has been reduced to a comparatively bland, “We believe Al-Qaida is still seeking to infiltrate operatives into the U.S. from overseas,” even while stressing that his main concern has become home-grown groups.

In assessing dangers presented by international terrorists, then, policymakers should keep in mind the warning of Glenn Carle, a 23-year veteran of the Central Intelligence Agency where he was deputy national intelligence officer for transnational threats: “We must see jihadists for the small, lethal, disjointed and miserable opponents that they are.” Al-Qaida “has only a handful of individuals capable of planning, organizing and leading a terrorist organization,” and “its capabilities are far inferior to its desires.”

Although the President extravagantly insists that “The safety of people around the world is at stake” in NATO's war in Afghanistan, he seems to be on more solid ground when he points out that a return of the Taliban would condemn the Afghan people “to brutal governance, international isolation, a paralyzed economy, and the denial of basic human rights.” Any mission in that country, therefore, is essentially humanitarian. And the people in NATO countries, including increasing those in the United States, are unlikely to wish to sacrifice very many lives for a mission of that kind.

NATO's identity crisis

By Peter Howard

Barack Obama cannot save NATO alone. Obama's election was welcomed by alliance proponents on both sides of the Atlantic as an opportunity to restore and rebuild the frayed relationships between the U.S. and its allies. To be sure, the Obama Administration brings a decided change in tone and outlook to the helm of U.S. foreign policy, but Obama's mere presence as the leader of NATO's largest member cannot bridge all of the gaps that have opened between alliance members. While Obama's first NATO summit was a success and France formally returned to the military side of the alliance, NATO must still negotiate the fundamental question of its post-Cold War identity, and NATO members must still resolve the depth of their commitment to maintaining the alliance.

The early case for NATO's post-cold war demise was somewhat overstated. NATO's identity as the protector of the West easily segued into the creation of a (Western-oriented) "Europe whole and free."

NATO membership provided more than just a goal for defense planning in the post-Soviet space, it provided all the necessary material to meet that goal in its Partnership for Peace and Membership Action Program, with peacekeeping operations in the Balkans serving both as a reminder of the price of failure as well as an active site for implementing peace-operations with new and old members alike. New members readily reinforced NATO's Western orientation. Today, NATO faces the challenge of success—Europe is, by and large, whole and free. It is only now that NATO must finally reckon with the identity crisis that many have been predicting since the end of the Cold War.

There are two questions that constitute NATO's current identity crisis. The first is where the "North Atlantic" region ends. The case for expansion to the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary was, in retrospect, easy, as all three easily identified with the values, traditions, and goals of the Western alliance. Russia's 2008 incursion into Georgia laid bare the stakes: Was NATO really willing to invoke Article 5 to protect Georgia from Russia (or conversely, would NATO have invoked Article 5 to protect Russia from Georgia)? The response was decidedly "No." The remaining candidates for expansion—including Ukraine, Georgia, and perhaps even Russia—feel a step too far for the Alliance. NATO may have found its upper limit on expansion and its ability to provide a security umbrella over and among its members.

With NATO having stumbled into its current boundaries, the second question it faces is how to identify the threats emanating from outside that border. In the Cold War, the boundary was clear—the Inter-German border—and so was the direct threat—the mass of Soviet and Warsaw Pact tanks poised to roll West. There is clear disagreement within the Alliance on what lies beyond its borders and the nature of the threats to NATO today.

One side sees the principle threat to European Security, and by extension NATO, in its own back yard—a more active Russia and an increasingly unstable Middle East and North Africa. Russia's energy strangle-

hold over the continent gives it a stronger hand in certain economic and diplomatic negotiations. Russia's renewed military and demonstrated penchant for intervention in its "near abroad" certainly pose the most proximate source of active military conflict for NATO. However, as the Georgia war made clear, there is little desire for a direct military confrontation with Russia. The Middle East and North African states pose a potentially existential threat to the European allies, not through military force, but through immigration and the potential for social unrest caused by large populations of under-employed, second class, non-integrated ethnic and religious minorities in major European cities. These population centers can easily become fertile breeding grounds for terrorist networks.

The logical response to this is to give NATO a more southern orientation, enhancing such initiatives as the Mediterranean dialogue while retaining a pared-down version of the Alliance's original Russia focus. It also suggests a soft power approach to states in the region to bolster security, border protection, and stabilize governments to prevent radicalism.

The alternative approach, however, looks to global threats to world peace, be they transnational terrorist networks, genocidal regimes, or rogue states. Here, NATO assumes a responsibility for stewardship of international security. This role requires a global NATO, capable of expeditionary force deployments to trouble spots and an active NATO capable of fighting, both in combat and in stability operations, the sources of these threats. It also requires the commitment of alliance members to sustain these operations. This vision tends to align with contemporary U.S. foreign policy views on the nature of the threats to international peace and security. In assuming responsibility for Afghanistan, NATO took on a tremendous responsibility. While the mission has important security benefits in combating the Taliban and Al-Qaida, it also carries a tremendous cost for the alliance. A global NATO demands much more of its members diplomatically, financially, and militarily. It requires deployments of troops in active combat zones. And, it requires staying power to ensure that the fruits of any victory are realized in a stable post-conflict peace. Not all members are willing to send troops to Afghanistan, and the burden of fighting is highly unequal.

The danger NATO faces from its Afghan mission is less failure than it is a schism among its members over the identity and direction of the Alliance. Given the deep U.S. commitment to Afghanistan, one reaffirmed by the Obama Administration, the U.S. will underwrite the mission if and when needed. More to the point, the military operations in Afghanistan could very easily continue for years with no clear delineation between either success or failure. NATO will have to address its identity crisis well before then.

When Obama asks the Allies for increased support in Afghanistan, he's making an argument for the active, global NATO. When member states resist, they are making an argument for a more passive, regional NATO. This debate will surface again, whether in discussions over Darfur, piracy off the coast of Somalia, or Iranian nuclear proliferation. The ongoing negotiations of this identity crisis will determine not just NATO's immediate response, but lay the foundation for the future of the Atlantic alliance.

NATO and Afghanistan: Justifiably ending a commitment

By Michael Scheuer

Almost five centuries ago, Nicolo Machiavelli wrote that in war “injuries ... should be inflicted at all once, that there ill savor being less lasting may the less offend.” In other words, take your best shot first because if you need a stronger second shot you will look both incompetent and cruel. With President Obama’s March 27, 2009 announcement of substantial reinforcements for the U.S.-NATO force in Afghanistan, and his decision to carry the war on Al-Qaida and the Taleban in an unspecified manner into Pakistan, the U.S. and NATO implicitly have unleashed the second shot Machiavelli warned against. It will fail because:

Even when reinforced, the U.S.-NATO force simply will be too small to prevail over the growing numbers of nationalist and Islamist Afghan insurgents, let alone to carry the war into Pakistan with any hope of success. When strategizing for Afghanistan, few Western leaders seem aware that the enemy draws its personnel from a war-like, well-armed, and ethnically and religiously homogenous population of 30-plus million Pashtun tribesmen that straddles the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. Even for 75,000 high-quality NATO troops, the enemy’s manpower resources seem a bit daunting.

Because Afghans loathe centralized power, the Obama-stated goal of building a strong centralized Afghan Army and police force—4,000 U.S. advisers have been given the task—is an ignorant and ahistorical endeavor that will train and arm thousands of men who will pocket the experience and weapons and return to their tribes to fight and evict the foreigners and then battle each other.

Our Afghan foes will see Obama’s plan to reinforce as evidence of desperation and incompetence; that is, U.S.-NATO forces have lost the military initiative and, in the war’s eighth winter, their commanders have yet to decide on an appropriate order of battle. Al-Qaida will rejoice for at least two reasons: (a) it will soon have more killable “Christian” U.S. service personnel occupying Afghanistan and fighting Muslims—a propaganda bonanza, and (b) the high cost of deploying more U.S. forces will move America a bit closer to its main goal: bankrupting the United States.

Our Afghan Northern Alliance “allies” will see additional U.S. troops as yet another indicator that suggests they have fought since 1979 and succeeded only in trading infidel Soviet occupation for U.S.-NATO Christian occupation. Some Northern Alliance commanders are likely to begin attacking U.S., NATO, and Western NGO interests in Kabul and the Northern provinces they control.

Muslims worldwide will see the application of more U.S. military power against their Afghan brethren as anti-Islamic cruelty. We must not forget that: the current Afghan war is an Islamic priority because it offers Muslims a chance to defeat the invading second superpower; the Arabic and much of the European media will cover the escalation intensely and negatively; non-Afghan mujahedin will flock to the Prophet’s banner in Afghanistan as they did in Iraq and are now in Somalia; and, even in these straightened times, more-than-sufficient funding will flow to the mujahedin—especially from the Gulf contributors.

Pakistan will increase its support of the Taleban and the Pashtun tribes—and by logical necessity Al-Qaida—because President Obama’s action will be seen as either a declaration of war on, or a signal of utter U.S. unconcern about Pakistan’s political stability and territorial integrity. Now nearly in extremis as a nation, Pakistan’s leaders will support the Islamist forces which are facing westward—away from Pakistan proper—and are willing to fight and die to put an Islamist regime in Kabul, an event the Pakistanis believe will quiet their border with Afghanistan border. Moreover, if Pakistan’s generals had any doubt that U.S. policy toward their country is malevolent, it will be erased by Obama’s decision to form a “contact group” to settle the Afghan problem that will include three of Pakistan’s enemies—India, Iran, and Russia.

What does this mean for NATO? It means, I think, that the next two years will see the Alliance’s commitment to Afghanistan quickly erode, and for three very good reasons.

First, for the reasons noted above, Obama’s plan will fail. The Afghan commitment is an expensive proposition for NATO countries in terms of men and money, and prolonging it on the lines Obama outlined can be reasonably expected to yield a textbook example of the disaster that inevitably ensues from reinforcing defeat.

Second, most NATO nations are afflicted with rising Islamist militancy at home, and staying involved in NATO’s U.S.-led “cruel” second punch will sharpen that sentiment and probably lead to domestic violence. In a worst-case scenario, some NATO states may find urgent domestic order-keeping requirements for the military forces they have serving in Afghanistan.

Third, Obama’s plan will increase the tempo and intensity of U.S. and NATO military operations; in other words, to retake the military initiative from the Afghan insurgents a lot more dying by insurgents, civilians, and NATO soldiers is just around the corner. This will sharpen existing internal Alliance tensions between NATO states fielding forces that fight and those whose forces primarily dig wells, build roads, and deliver humanitarian aid. It also is likely to create a firestorm of opposition to contributing NATO governments from the many and varied non-Muslim pacifist, anti-military, anti-capitalist, and anti-American elements in Europe’s politics and media.

There certainly are other factors that will undercut NATO’s ability to maintain its Afghan commitment, but the foregoing, I think, are fairly formidable. U.S. politicians will surely whine about the perfidy of some NATO countries as the Alliance’s Afghan commitment ebbs, but lacking an even remotely plausible route to victory and facing increasing popular opposition at home, NATO governments will look after their national interests according to their best lights.

And when the whining stops, U.S. leaders may finally find time to read a book of Afghan history that will teach them what has been explicitly and historically clear from the first. That is, the sole means of accomplishing America’s post-9/11 mission was to conduct a large, highly destructive, and quickly concluded punitive military expedition that killed as many Taleban and Al-Qaida leaders and fighters as possible, followed by a speedy and complete withdrawal from Afghanistan. But, alas, where is Lord Roberts of Kandahar when you most need his guidance?

France and NATO: The path to ‘normalization’

By Leo Michel

In March, 1966, President Charles de Gaulle, in a five-paragraph letter to Lyndon Johnson, stated that France would withdraw from NATO’s integrated military structures while remaining a party to the 1949 Washington Treaty. De Gaulle’s resentment over what he considered to be Anglo-American “domination” of NATO—combined with rows with LBJ over East-West relations, Vietnam, and U.S. military bases in France—partly explained the rupture. But le General aimed to send a broader message: France would not accept any impediments to its sovereignty or ability to conduct an “independent” foreign policy. The move was controversial. (Opposition figure Francois Mitterrand, who later became the Fifth Republic’s first socialist president, was among those who denounced de Gaulle’s decision.) Yet France’s “special status” eventually became an article of faith across the country’s political spectrum.

Hence, when President Nicolas Sarkozy announced 43 years later that it was time for France to “take its full place” inside NATO, he faced a delicate task: rebutting a Gaullist tenet—that participation in its military structures is incompatible with French independence—without appearing disrespectful to the late president’s memory. Sarkozy ultimately outmaneuvered his domestic opposition and met his goal of announcing France’s “normalization” of relations with NATO at the recent Strasbourg-Kehl summit.

It was not an easy victory, however. That Socialist Party leaders, followers of centrist maverick Francois Bayrou, and a few die-hard Gaullists led the charge was hardly a surprise. Over the past year, the first two groups had staked out anti-Sarkozy positions across the board, and the third group, while an increasingly marginal political force, could not ignore this perceived insult to their hero’s memory. Perhaps more worrisome for Sarkozy were reservations voiced within his own UMP party, including by figures such as former Prime Minister Alain Juppe.

The president’s critics advanced a number of complaints. Some argued that the status quo was less expensive than “reintegration” when the French defense ministry is laboring to finance greater defense investment through reductions in personnel and excess infrastructure. (“Reintegration” is the term favored by Sarkozy’s opponents to emphasize its break with Gaullist orthodoxy.) But most focused their ire elsewhere. They claimed that Sarkozy’s move would diminish France’s international stature and influence, undercut its efforts within the European Union to strengthen an “autonomous” European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), and even hurt French commercial interests. Indeed, prominent figures on the right and left warned ominously that France would be seen as joining the other American “vassals” within the Alliance. Some suspected a ruse by Washington, which recently decided to send 17,000 more soldiers to Afghanistan, to “force” France to increase its contingent there.

Although Sarkozy arguably had been slow to tackle such arguments head-on, he did so forcefully in a March 11 speech to top government and parliamentary leaders and security experts. Prefacing his remarks with reassurances of France’s commitment to strengthen ESDP, he proceeded to “remind the French of the facts.” Among his key points:

- Rapprochement with NATO will ease concerns among European partners who have suspected that France wants to transform ESDP into a full-fledged alternative to NATO—a vision that the vast majority of the 27 EU members (21 of whom are also NATO Allies) simply will not support.
- The absence of senior French officers within top NATO positions means French views are not fully taken into account in defining the goals of NATO operations and the military capabilities needed to support NATO's level of ambition. "Yet this is our own fault, because we've excluded ourselves," Sarkozy observed. "NATO is thus the only international organization where France doesn't seek to be present and influential."
- As for supposed U.S. "domination" of NATO, it is illogical, he pointed out, to complain about Europe's relative position while France, by its selective participation, rejects an opportunity to advance the "Europeanization" of the Alliance.
- Finally, he emphasized that full participation in NATO structures will not compromise France's national control over its nuclear deterrent, nor place French forces under NATO command in peacetime, nor oblige France to send troops to engage in any operations without the agreement of French political authorities. In a direct rebuttal to some of his critics, Sarkozy added: "To claim that France's rapprochement with NATO would have led to the French army in Iraq is a shameful lie."

Whether his spirited defense made many converts within the French *classe politique* is hard to tell. To preempt embarrassing defections from UMP ranks, Prime Minister Francois Fillon was obliged to attach the March 17 National Assembly debate on France's role in NATO to a vote of confidence in the government's overall foreign policy. Predictably, even recalcitrant UMP deputies fell into line and delivered a 330 to 238 vote in support of the government. Still, the debate—in the parliament, media, and the growing French "think tank" community—served a vital purpose in raising awareness of their country's role and stakes in NATO.

But what will this "normalization" mean in practice?

The near-term practical questions concern France's future role within NATO's military structures. The latter include eleven fixed headquarters spread across nine countries and directed by a hundred or so generals and admirals—"flags" in NATO jargon—with ranks of one to four stars. The flags are allocated on the basis of criteria that take into account their country's contribution to NATO's military budget, its role in operations (with a bonus for more difficult ones like Afghanistan), its participation in NATO's nuclear forces, and its share of the nearly 15,000 officers and noncommissioned officers billets within headquarters staffs.

Currently, the United States holds three of the Alliance's four-star posts, including its two "Supreme Commander" positions overseeing Allied Command Operations in Mons, Belgium, and Allied Command Transformation in Norfolk, Virginia. Germany, the United Kingdom and Italy share the four remaining four-star posts, a significant number of the lesser flags, and together provide some 4,200 officers and non-commissioned officers to headquarters staffs (nearly twice as many as the Americans.)

But France—one of the top-ranking European contributors in terms of military personnel engaged in NATO operations (including 2,800 troops in Afghanistan and 1,800 in Kosovo), payments to NATO's budgets, and participation in the NATO Response Force (NRF)—has provided, since 2004, just two one-star flags and barely one percent of the military staffers to NATO headquarters. As Sarkozy suggested, this situation has incontestably limited French influence on the strategic direction of the Alliance, the development of its doctrines and capabilities, and the planning and conduct of its operations. At the same time, it has deprived the other Allies of valuable expertise residing in the French military establishment, one of Europe's most experienced and respected in complex stabilization missions.

In principle, there were two options to achieve normalization. One would have been to insert French flags within a rotation of key posts now held by Germans, British and Italians. However, such an approach would have unleashed a competition among Europeans and run counter to President Barack Obama's efforts to convince Europeans to do more within the Alliance.

In the end, Washington was prepared to consider a more audacious approach, which the French have now accepted: the United States will refrain from nominating a four-star officer to replace the Supreme Commander of Allied Command Transformation (charged with leading the development of Alliance capabilities and doctrine) as well as a replacement for the current American three-star commander at NATO's Joint Headquarters near Lisbon (whose responsibilities have included operational command of the NRF and Alliance assistance to African peacekeepers in Darfur.) These actions will open the door for French flags to assume these important commands without disadvantaging other key European Allies. Moreover, there is speculation that Lisbon might be elevated to a four-star position.

This is not to say that a French-American understanding was sufficient to close a deal. First reason: changes to the command structure must be approved by a consensus within the Defense Planning Committee (DPC), one of the civilian committees (the other being the Nuclear Planning Group) where France, by its own choice, has not participated since 1966. If France now seems prepared to rejoin the DPC, the other 25 Allies expect in return to see an end to the French *a la carte* approach. Hence, France will now join in that committee's work to develop Alliance capabilities corresponding to the level of ambition set (again, by consensus) by the heads of state and government. (Most French analysts believe that France will not rejoin the Nuclear Planning Group, although to date their government has not explicitly ruled this out.)


Second reason: top military posts do not come without offsetting obligations. Thus, if France wants to approximate the British or Italian presence in the command structure in terms of flags, it will have to assign something in the order of 900-1,000 military (including some 300-400 officers) to the various headquarters staffs. According to French estimates, this increased participation will cost France some 80 million euros annually (in addition to the 145 million euros that France currently contributes to NATO common military and civilian budgets.) Paradoxically, once normalization is set in motion, France will be in a stronger position to argue for reducing the overall size of the command structure and increasing its flexibility—a direction favored, in fact, by the Americans, British, and Dutch but resisted, so far, by several other Allies.

As for the broader political implications of this move, Sarkozy's assessment that the world, France and NATO have changed greatly since de Gaulle is fundamentally correct. Despite his critics' laments that normalization will somehow compromise France's stature and influence, it is hard to believe that Russian, Iranian or other leaders in Asia, Africa or Latin America—much less, the Taliban or Al-Qaida sympathizers—particularly care about the level of French participation in NATO's military structures or whether France boycotts one or two of NATO's principal civilian committees. On the other hand, some of Sarkozy's foremost critics (such as former conservative Prime Minister Dominique de Villepin and former socialist Foreign Minister Hubert Vedrine) never seemed to understand that their derogatory references to fellow Allies that participate fully in NATO are unlikely to encourage those same European governments to work with France on building defense cooperation under EU auspices.

Ultimately, the best arguments for normalization are straightforward. Every step taken by France to improve the cohesiveness and efficiency of NATO will sooner or later benefit European defense as well—in terms of capabilities, interoperability, operational performance, and defense industrial cooperation. At stake in this rapprochement is the ability of the transatlantic partners to respond to huge 21st-century challenges, including Afghanistan, terrorism, the proliferation of dangerous weapons and technologies, and building a more cooperative security relationship with Russia.

In June 2008, in unveiling the White Book on Defense and National Security, Sarkozy captured these essential points when he recalled that “this alliance between Europeans and the United States is also—this is not said enough—an alliance among the European nations.” France's Allies are hoping that French public opinion will understand in time that a stronger Alliance will reinforce the independence of all its members.


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


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
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European integration and transatlantic ties in a multi-player world

By Stanley R. Sloan

As the members of NATO celebrated the alliance's 60th anniversary, the return of France to NATO's integrated command structure perhaps closed one chapter and opened another, potentially more constructive, period of transatlantic relations. The chapter that closed is one that featured France trying to create a European pole to balance American power in a hoped-for multi-polar international system. The chapter that opened—in an increasingly multi-player world—may lead to a more credible European pillar in the transatlantic relationship, rather than in competition with it.

The question of how the process of European integration relates to transatlantic relations is an old one. French President de Gaulle tried to put an independent French signature on the issue in 1966, removing French forces from NATO's integrated command structure. He saw NATO as an American policy tool that limited French and European independence. Some years later, in April 1973, U.S. National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger gave a speech entitled "The Year of Europe," which led to European concern and speculation about Kissinger's "agenda." The questions Kissinger raised about how transatlantic relations would be affected by the process of European integration undoubtedly gave rise to the U.S. intelligence community's decision to prepare an estimate on the development of a "common" European approach.¹

Many of the issues raised in 1973 are still open today, and the overall conclusion in the estimate remains reasonably accurate. The draft approved in the interagency review process noted that the United States should think in terms of a "uniting Europe," observing that European integration was a long historical process, with no clear outcome foreordained.

The estimate concluded that as integration advanced, and as more common policies were decided, a "uniting Europe" would nonetheless present a mixed picture to the outside world, a blend between areas in which the central institutions had been given authority over key decisions and implementation of community policies and areas in which national identities, interests and prerogatives still prevailed.

Even though the European Union of 2009 is far advanced from the European Community of 1973, the even-more solidified core of the process remains hedged by its member states. The European Union is much more of an international actor than it was in 1973, although it is still misleading to speak of "Europe" as if it consisted of like-minded, similarly-thinking and acting states and citizens. It perhaps was never that "united," but the EU's post-Cold War enlargement has made creation of a unitary

¹ The account of this matter is based on the author's recollection of events as seen from his position as drafter of the estimate.

European actor across the entire range of international relations even more problematic. And, Europe's "identity" remains clouded by questions about future expansion, particularly whether or not Turkey should be brought into the European fold or left with tenuous European moorings.

By some accounts, the EU is second only to the United States in measures of deployable soft and hard power.² The EU has impressive resources that it can call on to affect international affairs: well-trained and capable diplomats, development assistance expertise and resources, military units prepared to take on relatively modest missions on short notice, and a senior official who acts like the EU's foreign minister, even if the position is not endowed with significant independent powers of initiative.

² Gregory Treverton and Seth G. Jones, "Measuring Power: How to Predict Future Balances," *Harvard International Review*, Vol. 27 (2) Summer 2005.

The unilateralist character of U.S. foreign and defense policy under President George W. Bush led some Europeans to favor using integration in the European Union to "balance" U.S. power in the international system. This multi-polar temptation, like the U.S. unilateral temptation, threatened transatlantic cooperation and therefore international stability. Francois Heisbourg, director of the French Fondation pour la Recherche Strategique, has argued persuasively that his nation's government should avoid the divisive rhetoric of multipolarity and pursue a multilateral agenda of cooperation with the United States and others.³ Real world developments have reinforced such perspectives.

³ Francois Heisbourg, "Chirac should be more cynical," *Financial Times*, June 4, 2003.

The failure of the EU Constitution to win approval in France and The Netherlands undermined the argument that Europe could effectively balance U.S. power, and strengthened the case for building Europe in parallel with maintenance of a cooperative transatlantic relationship—a position favored by several EU members led by the U.K. and many of Europe's new democracies.

A "Reform Treaty" negotiated in Berlin in June 2007—a more modest version of the EU constitution—if approved, would confirm the continuity of the process of integration. But it would also confirm the judgment that the emergence of anything like a United States of Europe remains for future generations to manage. As the respected German commentator Theo Sommer has observed: "...the United States of Europe is a long way off. But the United Europe of States is a realistic short-term goal."⁴ French President Nicolas Sarkozy still talks about a multi-polar world, but makes it clear that this neither requires Europe to balance American power nor France to submerge its sovereignty in an EU framework.⁵

⁴ Theo Sommer, "Not a Cinch, but a Success," *The Atlantic Times*, Vol. 4, No. 7, July 2007, p. 1.

⁵ See, for example, President Sarkozy's answers to questions on his visit to Iraq on February 10, 2009. The text can be found at http://www.ambafrance-uk.org/President-Sarkozy-s-visit-to-Iraq.html#sommaire_1 (Accessed, February 20, 2009).

Perhaps now it would be more appropriate to talk about a "multi-player" international system, in which the European Union is an important player in many policy areas. But a "multi-polar" system implies competition, shifting alliances and balance of power politics—a system that would serve neither American nor European interests.

It remains too simplistic to view Europe as a unitary actor on the international scene.



For the next period of history, the European Union will neither be transformed into a United States of Europe nor fall apart at the seams. It will continue to evolve toward a “United Europe of States,” as suggested by Theo Sommer. Someday, the members of the European Union may decide to create a unitary political state but, until that day, the member states will retain ultimate control over their foreign and defense policies.

The return of France to full participation in the alliance helps make the point that European integration and transatlantic cooperation can and should be compatible and mutually reinforcing. This is the only way that the allies can deal with the near-term challenges posed by Afghanistan and the longer term challenges of international terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and the task of nurturing stable and cooperative relations with Russia, China and other important players in the international system.