www.ia-forum.org

# The FORUM


David Axe
Anis H. Bajrektarevic
Erik Brattberg
Lowell Dittmer
Carla P. Freeman
Jolyon Howorth
Guocheng Jiang
Adam Lowther
Sally McNamara
Ramon Racheco-Pardo
Harsh Pant
David H. Shinn
Karen E. Smith
Neil Winn
Ali Wyne

# contents

The FORUM
Discussing International Affairs and Economics

Printed in the U.S.A.
A publication of the Center for International Relations
933 N. Kenmore St. #222, Arlington, VA 22201
703/532-6800 fax: 703/532-6890 email: editor@ia-forum.org

**We want to hear your thoughts**
***Send Editorials and Essays to***
**editor@ia-forum.org**

**For advertising inquiries, contact us at**
**advertising@ia-forum.org**

**www.ia-forum.org**

# Contributors



**David Axe** is an American military correspondent who writes widely on military life and aspects of current conflicts. He is a regular contributor to Wired.com, The Diplomat and other publications. He blogs at Wired's Danger Room and at his own blog at www.warisboring.com.

**Dr. Anis H. Bajrektarevic** is Professor and Chairperson at the International Law & Global Political Studies, University of Applied Sciences IMC-Krems. Prof Bajrektarevic is also Acting Deputy Director of Studies EXPORT EU-ASEAN-NAFTA. He has authored numerous publications and consulted with the Foreign Policy Institute of the Johns Hopkins SAIS, the Malaysian Trade Chamber, the Council of Europe, and the American Bar Association.


**Erik Brattberg** is currently a Research Associate with the the Swedish Institute of International Affairs, focusing on EU foreign and security policy and transatlantic relations. During 2011-2012, he will be a Fulbright Scholar at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University in Washington, D.C.



**Dr. Lowell Dittmer** is Professor at the Charles and Loise Travers Department of Political Science, University of California, Berkeley. His scholarly expertise is the study of contemporary China. He teaches courses on contemporary China, Northeast Asia, and the Pacific Rim. His current research interests include a study of the impact of reform on Chinese Communist authority, a survey of patterns of informal politics in East Asia, and a project on the China-Taiwan-US triangle in the context of East Asian regional politics. Professor Dittmer's recently published books and monographs include *Sino-Soviet Normalization and Its International Implications*(University of Washington Press, 1992), *China's Quest for National Identity* (with Samuel Kim, Cornell University Press, 1993), *China Under Modernization*(Westview Press, 1994), and South Asia's Nuclear Crisis (M. E. Sharpe, 2005).

**Dr. Carla P. Freeman** is Associate Director of the China Studies Program; Associate Research Professor; Foreign Policy Institute Executive Director at Johns Hopkins University, The Paul H. Nitze School of International Advanced International Studies (SAIS). She is co-author of China on the Edge: China's Border Provinces and Chinese Security Policy, co-author (2011); Managing Fragile Regions: Method and Application, co-editor (2010); and numerous journal articles, papers and reviews



**Dr. Jolyon Howorth** is Jean Monnet Professor of European Politics ad personam and Emeritus Professor of European Studies at the University of Bath (UK) and is a Visiting Professor of Political Science at Yale. He is also a Senior Research Associate at the Institut Français des Relations Internationales (Paris), a Fellow of the Royal Society for the Arts (UK), Chevalier dans l'Ordre des Palmes Académiques (France), and Member of the Advisory Boards of the European Institute for Public Administration (Netherlands), the Centre for the Study of Security and Diplomacy (UK), the Institute for Strategic Research (Paris) and the European Business School (London). He has published extensively in the field of European politics and history, especially security and defense policy and transatlantic relations.

# Contributors

**Mr. Guocheng Jiang** (undergraduate diploma, Shanghai Institute of Foreign Languages, China; MA, Nanjing Normal University, China; MA, Johns Hopkins University, USA) is the editor of Air & Space Power Journal-Chinese published by the US Air Force Air University (AU), Prior to joining AU, Mr. Jiang worked several years in US publication and software industries as a language specialist, software localization tester and project manager. His earlier experience in China includes interpreting, technology news writing, teaching, and editing. He wrote several academic journal articles in China Translators' Journal and other magazines back in 1980s. He is the author of Gate to GATT (1993) and cotranslator of Dragon Fire (two volumes, 1995). He has also written several articles reflecting the fast-changing Chinese culture.

**Dr. Adam Lowther** (BA, Arizona State University; MA, Arizona State University; PhD, University of Alabama) is a Research Professor at the Air Force Research Institute (AFRI), Maxwell AFB, AL. His principal research interests include deterrence, nuclear weapons policy, and terrorism.

Dr. Lowther is the editor of Terrorism's Unanswered Questions and the author of Americans and Asymmetric Conflict: Lebanon, Somalia, and Afghanistan. He has published in the New York Times, Boston Globe, Joint Forces Quarterly, Strategic Studies Quarterly and elsewhere.

Prior to joining AFRI Dr. Lowther was an Assistant Professor of Political Science at Arkansas Tech University and Columbus State University, where he taught courses in international relations, political economy, security studies, and comparative politics.

Early in his career Dr. Lowther served in the US Navy aboard the USS Ramage (DDG-61). He also spent time at CINCUSNAVEUR-London, and with NMCB-17.

**Sally McNamara** is a Senior Policy Analyst in European Affairs at The Heritage Foundation's Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom. Formerly the Director of International Relations for the American Legislative Exchange Council, McNamara joined Heritage in 2006 and now concentrates on American relations with the European Union and European countries, with particular focus on economic reform policy, trade issues and the War on Terrorism. She also analyzes NATO's evolving role in post-Cold War Europe. Ms. McNamara also served as Chief Parliamentary Aide to Roger Helmer, a member of the European Parliament in Brussels. Previous to that, she acted as Regional Press Officer for the British Conservative Party in the East Midlands, U.K.

**Dr. Ramon Pacheco-Pardo** is Lecturer in European Studies and Spanish, Portuguese and Latin American Studies at King's College China Institute. He holds a PhD in International Relations from the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE). Before he completed an MA in International Relations at the University of New South Wales and a BA in Journalism at the Complutense University of Madrid.

**Dr. Harsh Pant** teaches at King's College London in the Department of Defence Studies. He is also an associate with the King's Centre for Science and Security Studies and an affiliate with the King's India Institute. His current research is focused on Asia-Pacific security and defence issues. His latest book is The China Syndrome (HarperCollins, 2010).

**Ambassador David H. Shinn** is Adjunct Professor of International Affairs at The George Washington University, Elliott School of International Affairs. He served for thirty-seven years in the US Foreign Service with assignments at embassies in Lebanon, Kenya, Tanzania, Mauritania, Cameroon, Sudan and as ambassador to Burkina Faso and Ethiopia. He is the coauthor of Historical Dictionary of Ethiopia and has authored numerous articles and book chapters.

# Contributors

**Dr. Karen E. Smith** is Reader in International Relations, London School of Economics and Political Science. She is also Director of the European Foreign Policy Unit (within the International Relations Department). In 2007, Dr. Smith received the Anna Lindh award for excellence in research on European foreign and security policy.

**Dr. Neil Winn** is Senior Lecturer in European Studies at Leeds University. His work focuses on the intersection of international relations and European politics, European international relations, and Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union.

**Dr. Ali Wyne** is a researcher at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at the Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. He graduated from MIT in 2008 with bachelor's degrees in Management Science and Political Science. While there he founded the Forum on American Progress, a nonpartisan student group that examines American foreign policy. He also established the MIT International Review, the Institute's first journal of international affairs. As a senior Ali received MIT's highest honor for students, the Karl Taylor Compton Prize.



# CHINA SECURITY



# Air Diplomacy: Engaging China

**Dr. ADAM B. LOWTHER and GUO-CHENG JIANG**

UNITED STATES

In late September 2009, General Xu Caihou, vice chairman of the Central Military Commission of the People's Liberation Army, visited Washington, DC. On his return trip to China, General Xu stopped in Hawaii, where he visited the headquarters of the United States Pacific Command (PACOM). One photograph of the general's visit went largely unnoticed by most observers. However, it caught the attention of the Air and Space Power Journal—the US Air Force's flagship professional journal. Standing in the line to welcome the distinguished Chinese guests were two American Air Force officers, Majors Anthony Davis and Troy Cullen. Their presence was a result of their participation in relief operations following a massive earthquake in the heart of China. The two men were the pilots who flew the first of two C-17s to Chengdu Shuangliu International Airport on 18 May 2008—carrying 75 tons of disaster relief supplies. The flights demonstrated the heartfelt sympathy of Americans for the victims and survivors of the devastating Sichuan earthquake.

Soon after the disaster relief mission, the two officers authored an article for the Air and Space Power Journal in Chinese discussing their feelings about this extraordinary experience: "The entire crew felt honored to be a part of this unique mission. . . . Following the presentation of gifts, the off-loading of humanitarian supplies began. Touchingly, our hosts' warm demeanor made it clear how much they appreciated the relief supplies and support."

This moving scene brings to mind the American pilots who flew the "Hump Route" during World War II. They too received similar expressions of gratitude from the Chinese. In both cases, the US Air Force engaged China in a joint effort to cooperatively combat disasters—human and natural. In years

to come, the United States and China are likely to find many more opportunities to work collaboratively for the maintenance of regional and global security. This article discusses the concept of air diplomacy, focusing on its relevance to Asia-Pacific security and one of its lesser-noticed components—academic engagement.

Why Is Air Diplomacy Increasingly Important?

While air diplomacy is a new term, the concept is not. It can be defined as a proactive approach to preventing conflict by employing airpower—broadly speaking—in nonkinetic operations as an instrument of national power. Air diplomacy is likely to become an increasingly important capability of the US Air Force in the years ahead. More important than declining defense budgets and an anticipated preference for noninterventionist policies are air diplomacy's positive contributions to the United States' broader economic and strategic interests.

As American interests shift to Asia—where distance to the continental United States is much bigger than that from Europe—air, space, and cyber power offer distinct advantages over more land-centric approaches that were preeminent in Cold War Europe. Because of airpower's inherent speed, flexibility, and limited footprint, air diplomacy offers the United States a cost-effective way of maintaining access to bases in Asia, assuring allies of the United States' continued commitment to the region, and building new relationships with countries that have not traditionally been an ally.

Because of the Asia-Pacific region's size, airpower is the best means of rapidly responding to events in the region, on water, on land, or in the sky. The speed at which air, space, and cyber assets can be employed gives the United States a distinct advantage—whether engaged in hard- or soft-power missions. If, as suggested, airpower is best suited to cover the vast distances of the Asia-Pacific region, air diplomacy is a capability well suited to maintaining alliances and access to bases in the region.

In other words, air diplomacy is an effective way of defending vital national interests, building partnerships, working to prevent conflicts, and expanding American influence. With responsibilities in the air, space, and cyber domains, the US Air Force has critical assets that provide the United States an unmatched level of flexibility. Using these assets for soft-power purposes allows the United States to build and strengthen relationships with friends and allies that may or may not possess equal capabilities.

Airpower also has an inherent characteristic that makes it particularly good for soft-power missions: flexibility. With few exceptions, Air Force assets are "dual capable,"

providing the United States with an aircraft, for example, that can deliver kinetic effects or serve as a platform to improve interoperability between the Air Force and a friendly nation. While the examples of this dual-use capability are numerous, the underlying premise is simple: Airmen and the systems they operate can be used to deliver effects or build positive relationships between the United States and critical allies and friends.

Airpower, broadly speaking, has one more important attribute worthy of mention. It is far less likely to create the anti-American sentiment that often accompanies large numbers of boots on the ground. This last point is one of particular importance. While many allies were willing to accept a large American troop presence during the Cold War, the lack of a clear and present danger is making it more difficult for allied governments to justify the presence of American forces in their countries. Airpower's limited presence is a key attribute. Fewer American personnel permanently stationed at overseas main operating bases means fewer opportunities to create a negative view of the United States.

Practicing air diplomacy deliberately and coherently has the potential to effectively leverage the capabilities of the Air Force on behalf of the economic and strategic interests of the United States. However, success will depend on the Air Force making a concerted effort to employ its assets with long-term strategic objectives in mind.

There is one obvious reason why the further development of air diplomacy as an Air Force capability is debated. Some argue that it does not fall within the service's core mission. However, air diplomacy is a broad conceptualization of "building partnerships," currently one of the Air Force's 12 core functions. As currently understood, building partnerships fails to encompass many Air Force missions that would fall within air diplomacy. Every service builds partnerships, but only the Air Force conducts air diplomacy—a point worthy of consideration.
Although the Air Force prepares in peacetime to fight the nation's wars, preventing war is equally desirable. Air diplomacy has the potential to play a critical role in this mission.

Where Does Air Diplomacy Fit on the Diplomatic Spectrum?

Generally associated with peaceful relations between states, diplomacy nevertheless comes in many forms. Note Elmer Plischke's definition of diplomacy, perhaps the most comprehensive one in the literature:

Diplomacy is the political process by which political entities (generally states) establish and maintain official relations, direct and indirect, with one another, in

pursuing their respective goals, objectives, interests, and substantive and procedural policies in the international environment; as a political process it is dynamic, adaptive, and changing, and it constitutes a continuum; functionally it embraces both the making and implementation of foreign policy at all levels, centrally and in the field, and involves essentially, but is not restricted to the functions of representation, reporting, communicating, negotiating, and maneuvering, as well as caring for the interests of nationals abroad.

Keith Hamilton and Richard Langhorne describe diplomacy as simply "the peaceful conduct of relations amongst political entities, their principals and accredited agents." States use diplomacy to promote economic interests (trade), protect citizens abroad, propagate culture and ideology, enhance national prestige, promote friendship, and isolate adversaries. Moreover, diplomacy is the least expensive way to exercise power in international affairs. Above all, diplomacy is one of two elements of foreign policy, the other being war. Both diplomacy and war are means to an end rather than ends in themselves.

Dividing diplomacy into two broad groups—incentive-based and threat-based—may offer additional clarity. On the one hand, incentive-based diplomacy does not rely on the threat of force for success. Rather, it succeeds when states engaged in diplomatic negotiations reach a mutually beneficial agreement. On the other hand, threat-based diplomacy relies on coercive means, such as the threat of force or sanctions. For the United States, the use of incentive-based diplomacy is likely to increase as the Obama administration may well signal a clear shift away from the use of hard power. This policy will give the US Air Force an opportunity to play a greater role in the conduct of soft power or, more specifically, incentive-based diplomacy.

Diplomatic theory and practice suggest that states typically conduct 13 types of diplomacy, each one differentiated by the means employed and ends sought. Although the types of diplomacy vary to a significant degree, their methods and objectives are not necessarily mutually exclusive. A description of each type of diplomacy is provided to clarify corresponding examples of air diplomacy.

Incentive-Based Diplomacy

Traditional diplomacy relies on a professional diplomatic corps that applies "intelligence and tact to the conduct of official relations between the governments of independent states." Commercial diplomacy focuses on securing trade agreements that promote the economic interests of individuals, corporations, and industries (public or private) believed to support national interests. It is designed to influence the policies of foreign governments with respect to regulatory decisions, foreign

direct investment, and trade. Conference diplomacy, dating back to the Concert of Europe, is most widely known for its reliance on international committees such as the United Nations. Public diplomacy, according to Amb. Christopher Ross, "articulate[s] U.S. policy clearly in as many media and languages as are necessary to ensure that the message is received." Preventive diplomacy, coined by Dag Hammarskjöld in the introduction to the 15th Annual Report (1960) of the United Nations General Assembly, seeks to de-escalate tensions by negotiating a resolution to grievances through an impartial arbiter. Resource diplomacy emphasizes the acquisition of four vital interests: food, energy, water, and minerals. Humanitarian diplomacy, developed in the aftermath of World War II, is often designed to aid at-risk populations after a natural or man-made disaster by providing them food, shelter, clothing, and security. Protective diplomacy aims to provide physical protection to citizens abroad or to groups of civilians (ethnic or religious minorities, tribal groups, etc.) that may face persecution or find themselves in harm's way.

Threat-Based Diplomacy

Totalitarian diplomacy is marked by its forceful, inflexible, and seemingly irrational nature—propaganda and deception are two of its primary tools. As the example of North Korea illustrates, totalitarian diplomacy often takes the form of threats to members of the international community or to stability within the international system. According to James Willard, military diplomacy is "the conduct by military diplomats of negotiations and other relations between nations, nations' militaries, and nations' citizens aimed at influencing the environment in which the military operates." Coercive diplomacy applies the threat of violence in a manner and magnitude sufficient to persuade an opponent to cease aggression without requiring the actual use of violence.

Anne Sartori best describes diplomacy by deterrence as "the use of a particular subset of language—deterrent threats—to attempt to convey the information that a state is willing to fight over a disputed issue or issues. Thus, deterrent threats are a form of diplomacy." Former secretary of state Condoleezza Rice describes transformational diplomacy as a multinational effort to build and sustain democracy while developing well-governed and responsible states.

This brief discussion of modern diplomacy provides the context for an examination of the US Air Force's specific contributions to the conduct of diplomacy. At the risk of stating the obvious, airpower is a dual-use capability equally adept at producing kinetic effects on the battlefield and preventing conflicts through air diplomacy.

How Does the US Air Force Conduct Air Diplomacy?

The US Air Force has an illustrious history of conducting public, humanitarian, military, commercial, traditional, preventive, coercive, and deterrence diplomacy. Since the earliest days of aviation, decision makers have employed airpower for diplomatic purposes—and that practice is unlikely to change. Thus, presenting air diplomacy as an option to policy makers bodes well for the Air Force in the future as it seeks to play a part in the success of American foreign policy. Some past examples of the diplomatic use of airpower illustrate the breadth of the Air Force's contribution to furthering the national interest.

Air Diplomacy: Public

When aviation enthusiasts within the Army first attempted to convince Congress and the American people that aviation deserved their support, they undertook a large-scale public diplomacy campaign. In perhaps the earliest example of air diplomacy, members of the fledgling Aviation Section sent its small fleet of aircraft on a successful cross-country tour in 1910, eventually leading to widespread support for military aviation.

In the first three decades of military aviation, the Army's Aviation Section (1914–18), Air Service (1918–26), and Air Corps (1926–41) became adept at conducting diplomacy at home, as leading aviators such as Brig Gen William "Billy" Mitchell and Maj Gen Mason Patrick worked tirelessly to increase the budget and prestige of military aviation.

Well before the establishment of an independent air force, the Army Air Corps conducted what may well have been the first overseas air diplomacy mission. In an effort to showcase the new B-17, demonstrate American power, and counterbalance growing German and Italian influence in Latin America, six B-17s under the command of Lt Col Robert Olds flew a public diplomacy mission from the United States to Buenos Aires for the inauguration of Pres. Roberto Ortiz in February 1938. This mission began the engagement that continues today between the US Air Force and Latin American air forces. Other such missions include regularly participating in international air shows, hosting international conferences, transporting foreign dignitaries and media, and regularly conducting "show the flag" flights to foreign air bases. Perhaps the 89th Airlift Wing carries out the most well-known of the US Air Force's public diplomacy missions by flying Air Force One, certainly one of the most widely recognized symbols of the United States in the world.

Air Diplomacy: Humanitarian

Humanitarian diplomacy is a particular specialty of the US Air Force because of the speed with which it can respond to a crisis. For example, during the Berlin airlift (24 June 1948–12 May 1949), perhaps the best known relief operation in American history, the Air Force responded to a call to provide food, water, and fuel to the people of West Berlin. Initially led by the United States Air Forces in Europe, the operation included airmen from the United States, Britain, and the Commonwealth, supplying Berlin with more than enough necessities for survival. Operation Vittles managed to deliver 13,000 tons of fuel and provisions per day. A resounding success, the Berlin airlift highlighted the ability of the allies to provide humanitarian assistance on a massive scale while avoiding a conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union.

More recent examples of the US Air Force's participation in humanitarian diplomacy include Operations Provide Hope (1992–94) in the former Soviet Union, Provide Promise (1992–96) in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Support Hope (1994) in Rwanda. When a 7.9-magnitude earthquake struck a remote region of Sichuan Province, China, on 12 May 2008, two US Air Force C-17s deployed from Hickam AFB, Hawaii, and Elmendorf AFB, Alaska, with desperately needed relief supplies, arriving on 18 May. Joint Task Force Port Opening provided relief to victims of the 2010 Haitian earthquake. Because of its ability to deploy rapidly to locations around the world, the Air Force is undoubtedly the United States' best tool for providing immediate assistance. These relatively low-cost diplomatic missions build goodwill with governments and citizens around the globe.

Air Diplomacy: Military, Commercial, and Traditional

In recent years, the Department of Defense and Air Force have formulated approaches to conducting a combination of military, commercial, and traditional diplomacy. However, current efforts are not the first for the Air Force. During World War II, for instance, the Army Air Forces equipped Britain and the Allies with a number of aircraft and supplies under the auspices of the Lend-Lease Program (1941–45).

Current efforts often fall within the "train, advise, and equip" realm of military diplomacy. Although the sale of weapons systems to foreign governments—through an embassy's Office of Defense Cooperation—often receives the most attention, this example of commercial diplomacy is limited in scope. Traditionally, the US Air Force directs most of its effort toward training and assisting foreign air forces, as it does through the Inter-American Air Forces Academy (IAAFA) at Lackland AFB, Texas. By offering Latin American officers and enlisted airmen a variety of training courses in their native language, IAAFA assists in creating professional air forces in the region,

strengthening ties between the United States and Latin America, and building relationships with future Latin American leaders. Officers who attend IAAFA may also receive additional US professional military education, in programs which give the best officers of international air forces a stronger grounding in the skills necessary to lead a professional air force, one capable of operating jointly with the US Air Force. These officers also find themselves more adept at correctly reading the many cultural and linguistic nuances of US diplomatic signals.

Air Diplomacy: Preventive

During Operations Provide Comfort and Northern Watch (1991–2003), the Air Force conducted preventive diplomacy by protecting Kurds in northern Iraq from Saddam Hussein's depredations. An overwhelming success, the mission achieved its objectives. Similarly, in Operation Southern Watch (1992–2003), the Air Force denied Saddam's regime use of the air south of the 33rd parallel in an effort to protect the Shia from further atrocities. Although not completely successful in this regard, it did prevent the Iraqi air force from using airpower in the south.

Air Diplomacy: Coercive

When incentive-based diplomacy cannot fulfill American objectives, the nation often calls upon the Air Force to conduct coercive diplomacy, which can sometimes straddle the line between diplomacy and force. Operations such as El Dorado Canyon (1986), Deliberate Force (1995), and Allied Force (1999) are examples of airpower serving both purposes. During the Cuban missile crisis (1962), though, the Air Force conducted coercive diplomacy that did not blur the line between diplomacy and force. Soon after the crisis began in mid-October, the Strategic Air Command (SAC) deployed a large number of its strategic nuclear bombers to Florida and the southeast United States. At Florida Air Force bases such as Homestead, MacDill, and McCoy, B-47s sat wing tip to wing tip, waiting to drop their nuclear payloads on Cuba. Aware of SAC's redeployment of nuclear bombers, among other efforts, the Soviet leadership backed down.

Air Diplomacy: Deterrence

For more than 60 years, nuclear deterrence has played a central role in shaping the composition and culture of the Air Force. By maintaining a fleet of nuclear-capable bombers and intercontinental ballistic missiles—along with the US Navy's submarine-launched ballistic missiles—the United States has successfully deterred nation-states from attacking the American homeland with conventional or nuclear weapons. Additionally, conflicts that may have otherwise escalated were kept in check by the

fear that limited war could become nuclear. Undoubtedly, the nuclear arsenal is a key tool of American diplomacy.

Why and How Does the US Air Force Conduct Academic Engagement with China?

In addition to using aerial platforms for air diplomacy, the US Air Force employs academic platforms to engage airpowers around the world. The Air Force understands that no matter how fast and far its planes may fly, they have limitations in performing diplomatic missions. Suspicion, mistrust, sovereignty concerns, and high operational costs are all considerations that can restrict US military aircraft from entering a country's air space. Academic engagement, however, does not have these limitations. This is particularly relevant with the development of US-China military-to-military relations.

Military relations between the United States and China have never been stable, despite frequent high-level visits between the countries, port calls by the US Navy, and occasional joint rescue exercises at sea. Often when a disagreement over a political or economic issue arises, the bilateral military relationship suffers. The hotline may be cut, official visits suspended, and conferences cancelled. This "on-again, off-again" relationship is very frustrating to both sides. More seriously, such volatility increases the probability of unwanted military conflict and risks the fragile security balance in the Asia-Pacific region.

To defuse this risk, the nations' militaries should maintain a certain level of transparency. The United States and Asian partners have pressed China for greater military transparency to reduce mistrust. The Chinese, however, vehemently reject accusations of ambiguity.

Undoubtedly, both the United States and China have worked hard to build confidence with each other. In March 2007, while serving as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen Peter Pace visited Beijing. He observed that the Chinese clearly understand the US position on military transparency: "I think they believe a lot of what they are doing is a head nod in the direction of transparency on their part." However, General Pace was by no means sure about how the Chinese military might move in that direction. A famous photo of General Pace standing on top of the Great Wall looking at it stretch into the fog symbolizes his view on the subject.

Another high-ranking officer, former PACOM commander ADM Timothy Keating, made seven trips to Beijing, three while on active duty and four after retirement. Gravely concerned that a "misunderstanding" might lead to a "miscalculation" that evolves to "serious consequences" in his area of responsibility, Admiral Keating

repeatedly urged the Chinese to improve transparency. However, at the 2011 West Coast Conference, the retired Admiral Keating bluntly defined the current US-China military-to-military relationship in two words: strategic mistrust.

Mitigating strategic mistrust was also a priority of US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates when he traveled to Beijing in January 2011. Before leaving he told reporters, "I believe that kind of a [strategic] dialogue contributes, not only to greater understanding, but contributes to avoiding miscalculations and misunderstandings and miscommunications." He added, "Continuing the strategic dialogue will encourage transparency between the two nations."

The Chinese military, in an effort to improve its image, has released seven biennial national defense white papers. The latest was released on 31 March 2011. As Defense Ministry spokesman Geng Yansheng stated: this document indicates China's willingness to "build confidence" and "should help the international community better understand China's armed forces and advance trust and cooperation between China and the rest of the world."

On various occasions, Chinese military leaders have also refuted the notion that China is hiding the intensions of its military expansion. At the fourth China-US Relations Conference held in Beijing on 22 October 2009, Major General Qian Lihua vigorously defended Chinese behavior. He argued that while some countries, including the United States, are concerned about China's military development, the strategic intentions of China are clear and transparent. In the most recent visit by Chinese General Chen Bingde, the general again assured the US audience: "I can tell you that China does not have the culture, and capability to challenge the United States."

Such public statements by the Chinese military leaders, along with the defense white papers, offer some insight into why China is quickly expanding its military power. Still, it appears that high-level talks, white papers, and public statements are having limited effect because mistrust continues running deep. In our view, only when exchange of information between China and other militaries reaches a certain depth will such mistrust fade. Clearly, a more enduring, stable, and efficient conduit should be explored for military communications.

Academic Engagement: A Stable Channel of Communication with China

Academic engagement can stabilize communication between the American and Chinese militaries. As part of its air diplomacy effort, in the summer of 2007 the US Air Force launched the Chinese edition of Air and Space Power Journal (ASPJ

in Chinese). Although Sino-American military-to-military relations wax and wane, military professional journals have not ceased to publish, and they continue the dialogue. They serve as an enduring channel of communication in good and bad times. Several characteristics make professional journals, particularly ASPJ in Chinese, an ideal air diplomacy tool.

First, academic research is often the accumulation of serious scholarship, experience, knowledge, and observation. Authors express their views in a more measured, studied, and prudent tone than, for example, ad-hoc or spontaneous public speeches. Quality articles often contain original thought, creativity, and foresight, which inspire leaders to think outside the box when tackling seemingly deadlocked issues, such as those frequently faced in the Sino-American relationship.

Second, authors publish articles to be heard and to influence. Such influence may not be as eye-catching as an enthusiastic public speech or a high-level visit, but it often lasts longer and penetrates deeper. Air and Space Power Journal, for example, publishes high-quality articles that may be translated and republished by its five foreign-language editions, reaching a wide and diversified audience. Last year, ASPJ in Chinese published an original article on China's view of nuclear deterrence by a renowned Chinese military researcher. The paper was then republished in the English and Portuguese editions, garnering attention from many military professionals and decision makers.

Third, professional journals value the meaning of professionalism and independence. The Air and Space Power Journal, as an outreach arm of the Air Force Research Institute (AFRI), faithfully executes AFRI's mission "to conduct independent research, outreach, and engagement that contribute ideas for enhancing national security and assuring the continuing effectiveness of the United States Air Force." Editors are encouraged to uphold a high professional standard, making sure the papers they publish are appreciated and valued by the professional readers of the targeted regions.

Fourth, professional journals are venues for academic freedom protected by both China and the United States. Authors speak for themselves when writing in these journals. ASPJ in Chinese makes the disclaimer that "the thoughts and opinions expressed in these papers are the authors' alone and do not necessarily reflect those of the organizations they serve." This disclaimer separates the views of individual authors from the official positions of their organizations. Authors are responsible for what they write and receive the legal protection they need.

Because of the characteristics described here, professional journals are not easily

swayed by the fluctuations of bilateral or multinational relations, which are a striking feature of the Sino-American military relationship.

Academic Engagement: An Effective Means to Help Build Confidence with China

Academic engagement can effectively deepen the mutual understanding between the American and Chinese militaries. In the US military, publications are abundant. Every geographic and functional combatant command and almost every military base has its own website, open to a public audience. On most of these websites one finds links to many military publications, all of them online and in the public domain. Indeed, the US military publishes more literature than can be timely consumed by Chinese researchers. In this sense, it is fair to say that the US military has remained sufficiently transparent. By comparison, public access to Chinese military-related publications is far more limited. The few publications and websites the public can access stay on the level of either grand strategy or "popular science", lacking the necessary depth. Additionally, far more Chinese military researchers read English than their American counterparts read Chinese—a clear asymmetric language advantage" for China. Still, the Air Force Research Institute created ASPJ in Chinese as a platform to encourage military academic engagement with China. Driven by habitual mistrust, some ASPJ in Chinese readers questioned AFRI's motivation. The truth is that all editions of ASPJ publish only scholarly articles, many of them directly translated from the English edition of ASPJ or other sister-service professional journals whose primary readers are Americans. These articles, just as those published in other social science disciplines, are intended to foster the professional exchange of ideas.

The first article published by ASPJ in Chinese, a message of greeting from Gen Steven Lorenz, then Air University's commander, explains well why the US Air Force decided to launch a Chinese edition for a currently less friendly audience in China:

As with our English and other language editions, our goal [of publishing the Chinese edition of ASPJ] is to provide a forum for airmen to discuss topics of common interest, stimulate new ideas to better employ air, space and cyberspace power and promote military professionalism. This new edition reflects our view of the importance of our Chinese-speaking Air Force colleagues to the United States Air Force. We hold you in great esteem and feel that we can benefit from your long history of military innovation and strategic thought.

Fundamentally, the launching of Chinese edition of ASPJ is based on the belief that open academic exchange is a demonstration of self-confidence, mutual respect, objectivity, and forward thinking. All foreign language editions of ASPJ are part of the US Air Force's air diplomacy strategy and are designed to promote better

understanding among the world's air forces—including China's.

A search of the web (outside China) provides few professional papers authored by Chinese military members. The problem is not that Chinese military professionals cannot write—they write well and prolifically and, if necessary, can translate their writing into English. The problem is that their articles are published only in domestic sources and viewed in closed circles. Information security concerns, strict discipline, and the lack of a coherent publication clearance system, among other things, seem to dissuade Chinese military professionals from publishing their articles abroad.

By contrast, the US military, with a well-established publication clearance mechanism, encourages the free exchange of ideas and academic engagement with other militaries. Indeed, the world's militaries have benefited tremendously from such efforts. The US military sets a convincing example for other militaries that it is possible to remain transparent while ensuring information security. It is our belief that, in the current digital world, staying behind opaque or tinted windows, reluctant to publish academic analyses of military issues in international forums, won't build international confidence in one's military intentions, since any claim of being transparent must be supported with substantial actions with a certain depth and breadth.

Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, in his most recent visit to Beijing, sought "to lay the foundation for a lasting military-to-military relationship" through "creating clear and open channels for dialogue and having greater transparency into each other's militaries." China's Minister of Defense, Gen Liang Guanglie, concurred, saying, "We both recognize that enhancing and maintaining dialogue and communication at all levels is of great significance in the development of military-to-military relations." ASPJ in Chinese is, by every measure, a "clear and open channel" designed not only to flow the latest American views to China but also to publish unfiltered views from Chinese military professionals. To persuade the world that China's military is transparent, Chinese defense analysts must have their voices heard regularly by the international community.
ASPJ in Chinese welcomes the contributions of Chinese military professionals. Although one journal may seem insignificant when considering the broad range of air diplomacy capabilities, and missions, in the case of Sino-American military-to-military relations, ASPJ in Chinese can have a significant impact in reducing strategic mistrust.

## Conclusion

The wide range of soft-power missions regularly performed by airmen makes

airpower an attractive option for building partnerships, assuring allies, and dissuading enemies. In the case of China, US air diplomacy must remain focused on building confidence with a country that many fear will one day become a peer competitor of the United States. Considering all the complexities in the Chinese-American military-to-military relationship, building confidence is a daunting task but well worth the effort. Air diplomacy, particularly in the form of academic engagement, has the potential to diminish the distrust and suspicion that currently permeates Sino-American relations. With defense spending likely to decline in coming years, the Air Force and the nation must look for cost-effective ways to engage the Chinese in a positive and meaningful way. Air diplomacy and the Chinese edition of Air and Space Power Journal provides such an option.

. For a list of the core functions, see Department of the Air Force, United States Air Force Posture Statement 2009 (Washington, DC: Department of the Air Force, 2009), 3, http://www.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-090522-062.pdf .

. Quoted in Harvey J. Langholtz, "The Psychology of Diplomacy," in The Psychology of Diplomacy, eds. Harvey J. Langholtz and Chris E. Stout (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishing, 2004), 1.

. Keith Hamilton and Richard Langhorne, The Practice of Diplomacy: Its Evolution, Theory, and Administration (London: Routledge, 1995), 1. Hedley Bull offers a similar definition, suggesting that diplomacy is "the conduct of relations between states and other entities with standing in world politics by official agents and by peaceful means." Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics, 3rd ed. (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 2002), 156.

. A. F. K. Organski, World Politics (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1968), 401.

. Earnest Satow, A Guide to Diplomatic Practice, 2nd and rev. ed. (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1922), 1.

. For a discussion of commercial diplomacy, see "What Is Commercial Diplomacy?" Institute for Trade and Commercial Diplomacy, http://www.commercialdiplomacy.org. See also Michel Kostecki and Olivier Naray, Commercial Diplomacy and International Business (The Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Relations, 2007).

. Richard Elrod, "The Concert of Europe: A Fresh Look at an International System," World Politics 28, no. 2 (January 1976): 159–74; and Johan Kaufmann, Conference Diplomacy: An Introductory Analysis, 2nd rev. ed. (Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Nijhoff, 1988).

. Christopher Ross, "Public Diplomacy Comes of Age," The Washington Quarterly 25, no. 2 (Spring 2002): 77.

. Boutros Boutros-Gali, "Challenges of Preventive Diplomacy," in Preventive Diplomacy: Stopping Wars before They Start, ed. Kevin M. Cahill (New York: Basic Books, 1996), 16–32.

. Martin E. Goldstein, America's Foreign Policy: Drift or Decision (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, 1984), 479–528.

. Larry Minear and Hazel Smith, eds., Humanitarian Diplomacy: Practitioners and Their Craft (New York: United Nations Univ. Press, 2007), 7–14. See also Stephen Browne, Aid and Influence: Do Donors Help or Hinder? (London: Earthscan, 2006); and Carol Lancaster, Foreign Aid: Diplomacy, Development, and Domestic Politics (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 2007).

. S. L. Roy, Diplomacy (New Delhi: Sterling, 1984), 104. See also Ernst Presseisen, Germany and Japan: A Study in Totalitarian Diplomacy, 1933–1941 (The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1958).

. Daniel A. Pinkston, "North Korea's Foreign Policy towards the United States," Strategic Insights 5, no. 7 (September 2006), http://cns.miis.edu/other/pinkston_strategic_insights_sep06.pdf.

. James E. Willard, Military Diplomacy: An Essential Tool of Foreign Policy at the Theater Strategic Level

(Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, 2006), 6–7, http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA450837.
. Bruce Jentleson, Coercive Diplomacy: Scope and Limits in the Contemporary World (Muscatine, IA: Stanley Foundation, 2006), 2. Alexander George described coercive diplomacy as "forceful persuasion." Quoted in Robert J. Art and Patrick M. Cronin, eds., The United States and Coercive Diplomacy (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2003), 6.
. Anne E. Sartori, Deterrence by Diplomacy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 2005), 4.
. Justin Vaïsse, Transformational Diplomacy, Chaillot Papers no. 103 (Paris: Institute for Security Studies, June 2007), 7.
. Warren Kozak, LeMay: The Life and Wars of General Curtis LeMay (Washington, DC: Regnery, 2009), 1–5.
. Irwin F. Gellman, Good Neighbor Diplomacy: United States Policies in Latin America, 1933–1945 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1979), 127–28; and Frank McCann, The Brazilian-American Alliance, 1937–1945 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 1974), 108–13.
. Tom Baldwin and Gerard Baker, "Behind the Story: On Board Flying Virility Symbol," London Times, 11 June 2008, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/us_and_americas/article4107841.ece.
. Roger G. Miller, To Save a City: The Berlin Airlift, 1948–1949 (Washington, DC: Air Force History and Museums Program, 1998).
31. Air Force Doctrine Document 1, Air Force Basic Doctrine, 17 November 2003, 24.
. Public Affairs Office, United States Pacific Command, "US Air Force to Deliver PRC Relief Supplies," 16 May 2008.
. Jim Garamone, "Joint Task Force Organizes Haitian Airport," American Forces Press Service, 28 January 2010, http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=57776.
. Gordon England, Building Partnership Capacity: QDR Execution Roadmap (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2006); and Bruce Lemkin, Global Partnership Strategy (Washington, DC: Department of the Air Force, 2008).
. Thomas Parrish, To Keep the British Isles Afloat: FDR's Men in Churchill's London, 1941 (New York: Smithsonian Books/Collins, 2009).
. This office is not found in every American embassy.
. "Inter-American Air Forces Academy," Lackland Air Force Base, http://www.lackland.af.mil/IAAFA/.
. Jovan Kurbalija and Hannah Slavik, eds., Language and Diplomacy (Msida, Malta: DiploProjects, Mediterranean Academy of Diplomatic Studies, University of Malta, 2001).
. Michael Knights, Cradle of Conflict: Iraq and the Birth of Modern U.S. Military Power (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2005), 217–30.
. Michael T. Klare, Resource Wars: The New Landscape of Global Conflict (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2001), 71.
. A. Timothy Warnock, ed., Short of War: Major USAF Contingency Operations, 1947–1997 (Washington, DC: Air Force History and Museums Program in association with Air Univ. Press, 2000); Dag Henriksen, NATO's Gamble: Combining Diplomacy and Airpower in the Kosovo Crisis, 1998–1999 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2007); and Anthony H. Cordesman, The Lessons and Non-Lessons of the Air and Missile Campaign in Kosovo (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2001).
. James A. Russell and James J. Wirtz, "United States Nuclear Strategy in the 21st Century," in Ian R. Kenyon and John Simpson, eds., Deterrence and the New Global Security Environment (New York: Routledge, 2006), 86–99; and Dave Turner, Strategic Air Command (Paducah, KY: Turner Publishing, 1992).
. Adam Lowther, Challenging Nuclear Abolition, Research Paper 2009-4 (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air Force Research Institute, August 2009), http://www.afa.org/EdOp/2010/Logic_of_Nuclear_Arsenal.pdf, 28.
. Lisa Daniel, "Gates' China Trip Aims for Lasting Military-to-Military Relationship," American Forces Press Service, 6 January 2011, http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=62358.
. Jim Garamone, "Pace Visit Paves Way for Better Relations with China," American Forces Press Service, http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=32579.

. See the cover photo of Joint Force Quarterly, Issue 47, 4th quarter 2007.
. Author got the video script from Prof. Zhang Xinjun of Tsinghai University who cochaired the panel discussion with Admiral Keating at 2011 West Coast Conference, San Diego, 25 January 2011.
. VOA News, March 31, 2011, http://www.voanews.com/english/news/asia/east-pacific/Chinese-Military-Assessment-Seeks-Better-Understanding-118976884.html.
. □□□□□, http://www.chnmilitary.com/html/2011-05/77721.html.
. Here it refers to Sr Col Yao Yunzhu's paper "China's Perspective on Nuclear Deterrence" (□□□□□□□), first published in ASPJ in Chinese, Winter 2009, then republished in the English ASPJ, Spring 2010, and ASPJ in Portuguese, Summer 2010.
. See the Air Force Research Institute's website, http://afri.au.af.mil/about.asp.
. Lt Gen Stephen R. Lorenz, "A Message from the Air University Commander," Air and Space Power Journal in Chinese Vol 1, no. 1 (Summer 2007), 2.
. Lisa Daniel, "Gates' China Trip Aims for Lasting Military-to-Military Relationship," American Forces Press Service, 6 January 2011, http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=62358.
. "Defense Minister Liang Guanglie Meeting U.S. Secretary of Defense Gates," Xinhua News, 10 January 2011, http://politics.people.com.cn/GB/1026/13695704.html.

# Call for Papers and Op-eds

## International Affairs

## Economics

## Security

Send your submission to

editor@ia-forum.org

# China, Asia, and the 'American Pivot'

**Dr. Lowell Dittmer**
University of California, Berkeley
United States

As first American "Pacific president" (born in Hawaii, raised in Indonesia), Barack Obama has attempted to focus on the Asia-Pacific from the outset of his presidency. This was called a "return" to Asia, based on the contention that the region had been unduly neglected by the foregoing Bush administration. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's first trip abroad in February 2009 was a "listening tour" to Tokyo, Jakarta, Beijing and Seoul, followed by attending the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in July and the Asia Pacific Economc Cooperation (APEC) Ministerial Meeting in November. In November 2009 President Obama visited Japan, Singapore, South Korea and China and participated in the APEC Economic Leaders' Meeting the same month.

China has played a central role in the "return." The Sino-American relationship was deemed the most significant in the world, "G-2." Aside from the visits by Clinton and Obama, the Obama administration expanded the Sino-American economic dialogue initiated by Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson to a Strategic and Economic Dialogue, or SED (launched July 2009 in Washington), facilitating annual discussion of a wider range of concerns. Military-to-military exchanges between the two countries, albeit suspended in January 2010 amid Chinese criticism of US arms sales to Taiwan, were resumed at Washington's request the following year. PLA officers were also included in the SED for the first time in 2011.

Yet after 2009, Obama's Asia policy underwent a significant course correction. For a combination of domestic and foreign policy reasons, the "return," now rechristened a "pivot," began to take a more threatening form, at least from the Chinese perspective.

We begin with a brief exploration of the apparent reasons for the pivot. This is followed by an examination of its diplomatic, economic, and strategic dimensions.

We then turn for a brief look at the alternative policy sponsored by Obama's putative Republican opponent in the 2012 presidential election, Mitt Romney.

The Obama Pivot

The central reason for the shift is a sense of mutual disappointment in the early (2008-2010) phase of Obama's "return to Asia." From the administration's perspective, after making considerable effort to assuage Beijing's nationalist sensitivities (by postponing the decision on weapons sales to Taiwan and a visit of the Dalai Lama), Obama's inaugural November 2009 visit to China was disappointing. Though it embraced a broad vision of future cooperation on a wide range of issues, the Obama team was underwhelmed by the Chinese reception, which deprived the president of live access to a Chinese media audience awarded his predecessors. And the Climate conference in Copenhagen the following month reached only a weak outline of a global agreement thanks to an open dispute between developed and developing nations, led by the US and China respectively—China had promised in November to cooperate on this issue..

Chinese disappointment surfaced later, when Obama held his postponed visit with the Dalai Lama and approved a US$6.4 billion dollar arms sale package to Taiwan, including Patriot missiles, Black Hawk helicopters, Harpoon land and sea missiles, mine hunting ships and communications equipment for Taiwan's aging F-16 fighters. These actions seemed to Beijing at odds with the accord reached during the Obama visit vowing mutual respect for "core interests," which from Beijing's perspective certainly included their claims to Tibet and Taiwan. In its toughest response in three decades Beijing announced that it would curtail military exchanges with Washington and even sanction the US companies involved in the arms sales.

The following year began with a reported Chinese claim in bilateral talks that the South China Sea was also a "core interest," a controversial claim not publicly repeated or officially denied. It was however followed by more assertive Chinese claims to the East China Sea and the South China Sea and certain actions in defense of those claims (e.g., warning other ships away from disputed waters, cutting fishing lines, arresting fishermen and confiscating fish). This did not in Chinese eyes challenge American interests, as the US has no territorial claims to either disputed area. But Washington was uneasy about a perceived shift in the balance of power, its regional allies more so. Although China never directly challenged the US presence, PLA rearmament focused on developing "anti-access/area denial" (A2AD) weapons, such as aircraft carriers or anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBM), designed to deter naval intrusion into China's notional maritime frontier (not only its territorial waters, presumably, but China's exclusive economic zone and large portions of the East and

South China Seas). Meanwhile, Western journalistic coverage of these developments heightened popular American apprehensions about China's rise as great power.[1]

American diplomacy began to diverge into three separate discourses. The bilateral discourse remained cordial and even multiplied quantitatively into a host of exchanges and dialogues. Alongside the SED mentioned above, a military-civilian Strategic Security Dialogue (SSD) was launched in 2011 to tackle such intractable issues as cyber-security and maritime security. The first round of the "US-China Consultation on the Asia-Pacific" was convened in June 2011. The most significant outcome of the economic track was the "US-China Comprehensive Framework for Promoting Strong, Sustainable, and Balanced Growth and Economic Cooperation," agreed in principle in talks between Obama and Hu in January 2011 to be further elaborated at the SED session held later that year. Although these talks were cordial and mutually appreciated, the Americans remained skeptical about implementation. Thus an apparently constructive dialogue ironically coincided with a deterioration of trust and an increasingly competitive relationship.

In this context, the architects of the early pro-China policy, Deputy Secretary of State James B. Steinberg and East Asia Security Council counselor Jeffrey Bader, both stepped down in 2011. Their influence was displaced by officials in the Defense and State departments who shared a more "realist" view of China's emerging policy line.

How to explain these paradoxical developments? If we can assume that bilateral diplomacy remained on the whole cordial and productive, the answer must lie in one of the other two arenas in which the two countries engaged. The multilateral Asian diplomatic forums were now frequented by leading US officials, often Clinton or Obama himself. But American leaders often used these forums as a sounding board to raise the issue of China's more assertive territorial claims for public discussion and to call for multilateral rather than bilateral resolution. Thus at the July 210 ASEAN Regional Forum summit, Secretary of State H. Clinton suddenly declared an American "national interest" in the South China Sea disputes because the credibility of American alliance commitments was involved, as well as freedom of commerce, calling for multilateral resolution. The US finally signed ASEAN's Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) and joined the East Asia Summit (EAS) under Obama, and at their first meeting in November 2011 in Indonesia again raised maritime security issues. China was embarrassed by the publicity and has consistently opposed multilateral solutions, and PRC representatives rejoined such discussions with obvious chagrin.

Meanwhile Washington also pursued more active bilateral diplomacy with China's neighbors, negotiating weapons sales, joint military exercises, naval port calls and other forms of enhanced security collaboration. For example, in 2010 the nuclear-

powered aircraft carrier George Washington was deployed to the West Sea [i.e., the Yellow Sea] and the South China Sea in joint naval exercises with Korea and Vietnam. Vietnam opened Cam Ranh Bay to visits by US naval vessels, Singapore announced it would host the forward deployment of US Navy Littoral Combat Ships (part of the Air-Sea Battle Concept), and the Manila Declaration was signed in November 2011 reaffirming the US-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty. South Korea resumed construction of a joint military-civilian port facility on Cheju Island, notwithstanding Chinese criticism. But the most significant signal of enhanced US security engagement on China's periphery was the November 2011 Obama announcement that US Marines would begin rotations to Darwin on the northern coast of Australia in 2012, starting with some 250 personnel and growing to a target number of 2,500 Marines in years ahead. This deployment signals a shift of US forces from northeast to southeast Asia, directly athwart the South China Sea.

But the core of the US "pivot" is strategic. Obama foreshadowed it during his November 2011 visit and it was then set forth in January 2012 in two official documents, the defense strategic review "Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for the 21st Century Defense" introduced by Obama and Defense Secretary Panetta on January 5, 2012; and the Joint Operations Access Concept (JOAC), released 12 days later by the Pentagon.[2] The new strategy was set forth in the Air-Sea Battle Concept (ASBC), expressly designed to project power against "A2AD" resistance.[3] This would entail, inter alia:

1. increasing antisubmarine warfare (ASW) training for Pacific Fleet forces; shifting three Pacific Fleet Los Angeles (SSN-688) class SSNs (nuclear attack submarines) to Guam;
2. basing all three Seawolf (SSN-21) class submarines—the Navy's largest and most heavily armed SSNs—in the Pacific Fleet (at Kitsap-Bremerton, WA);
3. basing two of the Navy's four converted Trident cruise missile/special operations forces submarines (SSGNs, or cruise missile submarines) in the Pacific (at Bangor, WA);
4. assigning most of the Navy's ballistic missile defense (BMD)-capable Aegis cruisers and destroyers to the Pacific—and homeporting some of those ships at Yokosuka, Japan, and Pearl Harbor, HI.[4]

The American leadership accompanied this concerted reorientation of its Asia policy with professions of support for China's "peaceful rise," forswearing any "China threat theory." Although China's public response has thus far been mild, these assurances have clearly not been convincing to Chinese ears.

Domestic critics immediately pointed to the disjuncture between the envisaged new strategy and the budgetary constraints faced by a heavily indebted US government. The department of defense is facing draconian defense cuts of $1 trillion ($486 billion during the next decade and an additional $500 billion under the sequestration slated for the end of 2012). But Obama promised that the US "will be strengthening our presence in the Asia Pacific, and budget reductions will not come at the expense of that critical region," pointing out that 90,000 troops had been removed from Iraq and Afghanistan in 2911 and that further forces would be withdrawn—mechanized ground combat forces from Western Europe as well. While the army will see a reduction in its total strength from approximately 570,000 troops to 490,000 in 10 years' time, Obama vows no reduction in the navy's carrier fleet. Obama claims, mirabile dictu: "a new defense strategy that ensures we maintain the finest military in the world, while saving nearly half a trillion dollars in our budget."[5]

The economic foundation for the pivot consists of two policies, one old, one new. The old policy has been to complain to the Chinese about the bilateral trade deficit and alleged unfair trading practices. Notwithstanding its threat to do so during the 2008 presidential sweepstakes, the administration has not cited China as a currency manipulator nor has this been emphasized in the SED. Complaints now focus on China's "indigenous innovation" program, which is alleged to have complicated US access to domestic markets with government procurement policies, forcing investors to share technology with Chinese competitors and using illegal techniques to appropriate proprietary technology. Reflecting frustration with the results of diplomatic complaints alone, however, Obama emphasized that: "We've brought trade cases against China at nearly twice the rate as the last administration –- and it's made a difference. . . . Tonight, I'm announcing the creation of a Trade Enforcement Unit that will be charged with investigating unfair trading practices in countries like China. (Applause.) There will be more inspections to prevent counterfeit or unsafe goods from crossing our borders."[6]

The new economic component of the Obama pivot is the Trans-Pacific Partnership, or TPP. The TPP is a "high-quality" multilateral trade agreement designed to deal with behind-the-border impediments to trade and investment (intellectual property rights, stronger labor and environmental standards and investment protection requirements) as well—provisions that, perhaps not coincidentally, will make it difficult for China to join. The TPP is the descendant of an agreement by Brunei, Chile, New Zealand and Singapore that was negotiated in 2005 and entered into force May 2006. At the 2010 APEC summit the leaders of nine negotiating countries (Australia, Brunei, Chile, Malaysia, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, the US and Vietnam) endorsed Obama's proposal setting a date for settlement of negotiations by the next APEC summit in November 2011. More recently, Japan, Canada and Mexico have announced

negotiations to join as well. At the November 2011 Honolulu summit; progress was highlighted, a broad framework announced, and a 12 month deadline for establishment of the TPP was set.

The Republican Response

The now virtually certain Republican challenger to President Obama in the 2012 election is also the candidate who has articulated the most coherent and articulate China policy, former Massachusetts governor Mitt Romney. While a challenge to the incumbent on the China issue is far from unprecedented, Romney is unusual in focusing his attack not on human rights or security issues but on trade and "unfair" competition. Thus the China critique is thematically integrated into Romney's central campaign narrative, which emphasizes his determination to overcome the post-Lehman economic malaise and restore American growth and competitiveness.[7]

The Republican critique of Obama's security policy is subordinate to domestic politics but it is relatively simple: the US must retain strategic primacy, and to do so must increase defense spending, including shipbuilding, national missile defense, and space weaponry. Core US defense spending must be maintained at 4 percent of GDP. This would increase annual defense spending to $600 billion or more, and overall military spending to about $720 billion. If Obama's vow to grow the military while cutting its budget strains credibility, Romney's does so even more.

But the most consistent and fully articulated Romney critique is of the Obama economic policy: "On many occasions Chinese companies, have simply reverse-engineered American products, with no regard for the patents and other protections of intellectual property rights that are crucial to our own economic well-being. The Chinese government facilitates this behavior by forcing American companies to share proprietary technology as a condition of their doing business in China. A recent study by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce reports that international technology companies consider these practices to be 'a blueprint for technology theft on a scale that the world has never seen before.' China's unfair trade practices extend to the country's manipulation of its currency to reduce the price of its products relative to those of competing nations such as ours."[8] Thus Romney promises on "Day one" to issue an executive order (not requiring congressional approval) directing the treasury department to label China a "currency manipulator." in its biannual report and to impose "countervailing duties" on Chinese products should China not quickly raise the value of its currency.[9] Romney's plan also promises more trade cases at the World Trade Organization (WTO), intense border inspections, pressure on China to join the WTO's Government Procurement Agreement, and so on.

## Conclusions

The 2012 US election looks as if it will polarize Sino-US relations, not because of partisan differences but because of underlying partisan agreement: Obama has moved to preempt the GOP critique with a tough security policy, while Romney is determined not to let Obama outflank him on the right. In a sense the two contending policies are complementary, with Obama focusing on the military-strategic dimension while his opponent places greater emphasis on economic competition. (Indeed, Romney has applauded Obama's TPP initiative, promising to execute if Obama "stalls" TPP until after the election.) From the Chinese perspective this is a distinction without a difference, confronting a bipartisan anti-China policy.

"The 2012 US election looks as if it will polarize Sino-US relations, not because of partisan differences but because of underlying partisan agreement"

Yet paradoxically, despite the rise of nationalism in China during the runup to the 18th Party Congress in the fall of 2012, the reaction to this hardening US stance has been surprisingly mild. This is not because Beijing has any sympathy at all for the pivot. Chinese policy makers and analysts alike are furious about the pivot, which they hold responsible for the escalating resistance from Japan and various Southeast Asian countries. But the response of China's neighbors has made a definite impression. A polarized political-strategic atmosphere in which China's new trade partners all move back into Washington's strategic orbit is definitely not in China's best interest. Thus although Beijing remains unhappy about what they view as being crowded out of the quest for subsurface mineral rights in territory to which they have "undisputable" claim, Chinese diplomacy has since June 2011 shifted back to a policy of "onconfrontational assertiveness."[10]

## Noter

1 In 2010, a poll by the Pew Research Center found that 61 percent of respondents thought the United States was in decline, and only 19 percent trusted the government to do what is right most of the time. In 1964, by contrast, three-quarters of the American public said they trusted the federal government to do the right thing most of the time. The numbers have varied somewhat over time, rising after 9/11 before gradually declining again. . Asked in another 2010 survey (by Chicago Council on Global Affairs), whether China practices "fair trade," only 29 percent of Americans agreed, as opposed to 81 percent for Canada,

68 percent for the European Union, 58 percent for Japan and 41 percent for Mexico; 53 percent viewed China's economic growth as negative for the United States. See Joseph S. Nye, "The Future of American Power," Foreign Affairs, Nov/Dec2010, Vol. 89, Issue 6.

2 "Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense" (January 5, 2012), http://fulltextreports.com/2012/01/05/sustaining-u-s-global-leadership-priorities-for-21st-century-defense/, accessed March 10, 2012; "JOINT OPERATIONAL ACCESS CONCEPT (JOAC) VERSION 1.0 (17 January 2012), http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/JOAC_Jan%202012_Signed.pdf; accessed April 1, 2012.

3 The ASBC made its first appearance in the US Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) in February 2010, where it was rationalized in terms of a need to defeat adversaries equipped with "sophisticated A2/AD capabilities" and to develop "capabilities needed for effective power projection operations." In November 2011, the Pentagon announced that an ASB Office had been set up and that development of this concept would enter the implementation phase.

4 The Navy's July 2008 proposal to stop procurement of Zumwalt (DDG-1000) class destroyers and resume procurement of Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) class Aegis destroyers can be viewed as having been prompted in large part by Navy concerns over its ability to counter China's maritime anti-access capabilities; though China was never mentioned by name, the Navy's references to ballistic missiles and to submarines operating in blue waters can be viewed, at least in part, as a reference to Chinese ballistic missiles (including ASBMs) and Chinese submarines.

5 Office of the Press Secretary, For Immediate Release (January 05, 2012), "Remarks by the President on the Defense Strategic Review," The Pentagon, 11:00 A.M. EST; and Barack Obama, "State of the Union Address" (January 24, 2012), http://www.cfr.org/us-strategy-and-politics/state-union-address-2012/p27182, accessed March 3, 2012.

6 Obama, State of the Union address, January 24, 2012.

7 However: "We certainly should not have relegated the future of freedom to second or third place, as Secretary of State Clinton did in 2009 when she publicly declared that the Obama administration would not let U.S. concerns about China's human rights record interfere with cooperation . . . Mitt Romney will seek to engage China, but will always stand up for those fighting for the freedoms we enjoy." Romney delivers speech to AIPAC, "hope is not a foreign policy," (March 6, 2012), in *An American Century: A Strategy to Ensure America's Interests and Ideals*, http://www.mittromney.com/collection/foreign-policy, accessed March 8, 2012

8 *Bellieve in America: Mitt Romney's Plan for Jobs and Economic Growth* (n.p.: Romney for President, Inc., 2011), http://www.mittromney.com/sites/default/files/shared/BelieveInAmerica-PlanForJobsAndEconomicGrowth-Full.pdf, accessed March 6, 2012.

9 *Believe*, p. 6.

10 Li Mingjiang, "Chinese Debates of South China Sea Policy: Implications for Future Developments," RSIS Working Paper no. 239, May 17, 2012, Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Singapore.

# What China Wants in Asia: 1975 or 1908?

## (Gunboat diplomacy in the South China Sea – Chinese strategic mistake)

**Dr. Anis H. Bajrektarevic**
University of Applied Sciences
AUSTRIA

On the eastern, ascendant flank of the Eurasian continent, the Chinese vertigo economy is overheated and too-well integrated in the petrodollar system. Beijing, presently, cannot contemplate or afford to allocate any resources in a search for an alternative. (The Sino economy is low-wage- and labor intensive- centered. Chinese revenues are heavily dependent on exports and Chinese reserves are predominantly a mix of the USD and US Treasury bonds.) To sustain itself as a single socio-political and formidably performing economic entity, the People's Republic requires more energy and less external dependency. Domestically, the demographic-migratory pressures are huge, regional demands are high, and expectations are brewing. Considering its best external energy dependency equalizer (and inner cohesion solidifier), China seems to be turning to its military upgrade rather than towards the resolute alternative energy/Green Tech investments – as it has no time, plan or resources to do both at once. Inattentive of a broader picture, Beijing (probably falsely) believes that lasting containment, especially in the South China Sea, is unbearable, and that – at the same time – fossil-fuels are available (e.g., in Africa and the Gulf), and even cheaper with the help of warships.[1]

In effect, the forthcoming Chinese military buildup will only strengthen the existing and open up new bilateral security deals of neighboring countries, primarily with the US – as nowadays in Asia, none wants to be a passive downloader. Ultimately, it may create a politico-military isolation (and financial burden) for China that would consequently justify and (politically and financially) cheapen the bolder reinforced American military presence in the Asia-Pacific, especially in the South China Sea. It perfectly adds up to the intensified demonization of China in parts of influential Western media.

Hence, the Chinese grab for fossil fuels or its military competition for naval control

> *...the Chinese grab for fossil fuels or its military competition for naval control is not a challenge but rather a boost for the US Asia Pacific*

is not a challenge but rather a boost for the US Asia-Pacific – even an overall – posture. (Calibrating the contraction of its overseas projection and commitments – some would call it managing the decline of an empire – the US does not fail to note that nowadays half of the world's merchant tonnage passes though the South China Sea. Therefore, the US will exploit any regional territorial dispute and other frictions to its own security benefit, including the costs sharing of its military presence by the local partners, as to maintain pivotal on the maritime edge of Asia that arches from the Persian Gulf to the Indian Ocean, Malacca and South China Sea up to the northwest–central Pacific.)

A real challenge is always to optimize the (moral political and financial) costs in meeting the national strategic objectives. In this case, it would be a resolute turn of China towards green technology, coupled with the firm buildup of the Asian multilateralism. Without a grand rapprochement to the champions of multilateralism in Asia, which are Indonesia, India and Japan, there is no environment for China to seriously evolve and emerge as a formidable, lasting and trusted global leader.[2] Consequently, what China needs in Asia is not a naval race of 1908, but the Helsinki process of 1975.

Opting for either strategic choice will reverberate in the dynamic Asia–Pacific theatre. However, the messages are diametrical: An assertive military – alienates, new technology – attracts neighbors. Finally, armies conquer (and spend) while technology builds (and accumulates)! At this point, any eventual accelerated armament in the Asia-Pacific theatre would only strengthen the hydrocarbon status quo. With its present configuration, it is hard to imagine that anybody can outplay the US in the petro-security, petro-financial and petro-military global playground in the following few decades. Given the planetary petro-financial-tech-military causal constellations, this type of confrontation is so well mastered by and would further only benefit the US and the closest of its allies.

Within the OECD/IEA grouping, or closely; the G-8 (the states with resources, infrastructure, tradition of and know-how to advance the fundamental technological breakthroughs), it is only Japan that may seriously consider a Green/Renewable-

tech U-turn. Tokyo's external energy dependencies are stark and long-lasting. After the recent nuclear trauma, Japan will need a few years to (psychologically and economically) absorb the shock – but it will learn a lesson. For such an impresive economy and considerable demography, situated on a small land-mass which is repeatedly brutalized by devastating natural catastrophes (and dependent on yet another disruptive external influence – Arab oil), it might be that a decisive shift towards green energy is the only way to survive, revive, and eventually to emancipate.

An important part of the US–Japan security treaty is the US energy supply lines security guaranty given to (the post-WWII demilitarized) Tokyo. After the recent earthquake-tsunami-radiation armageddon, as well as witnessing the current Chinese military/naval noise, Japan will inevitably rethink and revisit its energy policy, as well as the composition of its primary energy mix.

Tokyo is well aware that the Asian geostrategic myopias are strong and lasting, as many Asian states are either locked up in their narrow regionalisms or/and entrenched in their economic egoisms. Finally, Japan is the only Asian country that has clearly learned from its own modern history, all about the limits of hard power projection and the strong repulsive forces that come in aftermath from the neighbors. Their own pre-modern and modern history does not offer a similar experience to other two Asian heavyweights, China and India. That indicates the Far East as a probable zone of the Green-tech excellence and a place of attraction for many Asians in the decade to come.

1 Since the glorious Treasure Fleets of Admiral Zhèng Hé have been dismantled by the order of the Mandarin bureaucracy in 1433, China has never recovered its pivotal naval status in the Asia-Pacific.
2 More on the pan-Asian architectures in my 2011 work: "Preventive diplomacy: No Asian century…"

# Chinese Foreign Policy-Interpreting the Recent War of Words

**Dr. Carla P. Freeman**
Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies(SAIS)
UNITED STATES

In the past few years, China has seemed more willing to engage in wars of words with the United States and American allies over areas of disagreement in the international arena than at any time since it introduced its reform and opening policies more than three decades ago. China's harsh rhetoric on challenges to its interests in the South China Sea has drawn particular attention of late, but commentators have also taken note of Beijing's hard-line position at the UN Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen, its confrontational reaction to the Obama Administration's decision to have the president meet with the Dalai Lama and proceed with Taiwan arms sales in late 2009, and its recalcitrance on Iran sanctions, among other examples.

How should we interpret Beijing's greater rhetorical assertiveness in the international arena and what are its implications? There is no shortage of opinion on these questions; but three views seem to get the most play. The first of these assesses the tough language emanating from Beijing as evidence of a significant shift in China's international policy. According to this perspective, China, emboldened by its relative resilience through the global financial crisis, has abandoned its *taoguang yanghui* "low profile" approach to international affairs introduced by Deng Xiaoping in the early 1990s that focused national energies on economic development. Beijing's rhetorical push in pursuit of its interests today is seen as a harbinger of a China that is willing to more actively use its economic and military power to assert its interests, can be expected in the near future.

An alternative explanation characterizes the phenomenon as the natural outcome of China's increasingly far-reaching international ties. As China's international reach and influence have become global, the chance that its international actions are closely scrutinized and even challenged by other countries has also grown. A result

has been that China finds itself in the position of defending its international policies more than in the past-- and also sees greater significance for its national interests in doing so. Many western analysts who share this view contend that harsh rhetoric from Beijing is a symptom of Beijing's inexperience and limited capacity to manage its rapidly expanding influence, a capacity they see few signs of Beijing acquiring anytime soon.

A third view sees Chinese rhetorical assertiveness in the context of Chinese domestic politics. The country's current leadership transition is a key factor, in this assessment, which sees it contributing to an atmosphere of insecurity and driving Chinese leaders to ratchet up nationalist rhetoric. This includes propagation of the idea that the West is engaged in a conspiracy to thwart China's rise through a policy of containment. The West's talk of international responsibility and partnership is a sop aimed at bogging China down in commitments it is unprepared for. Western analysts have argued that such domestic and social insecurity in China could constrain China's freedom of action in the foreign policy arena at best or at worst lead it to develop and act on policies that satisfy nationalist sentiment but may not be the most prudent choices in support of China's international interests and international stability.

These assessments of Chinese foreign policy behavior all argue for different approaches by the US toward China --and all have their merits. But none of them is much of a guide, if cooperation between China and the US in the international arena is a goal. If policy makers adopt the first view, they are likely informed by a model of the US-China relationship that sees it as an inherently competitive and confrontational dynamic, with power relations between the two countries a zero-sum calculus. This perspective sees very limited potential for cooperation between China and the US in any dimension of international policy. The second perspective is skeptical of China's ability to assume the responsibilities that accompany its growing influence. China prefers to free-ride and is not a team player and therefore makes an unlikely and unreliable prospective international partner. Finally, the third view does suggest that US policy makers have the potential to enhance US-China relations by recognizing that the Chinese public's interpretation of US policy may affect China's response to it; however, this view also implies a high degree of fragility and unpredictability in the bilateral dynamic with a lots of opportunity for miscalculation, boding ill for a stable relationship based on mutual trust.

As China's power grows, if current powers, most importantly the US, wish to enable the international system to adjust to incorporate its rise in the absence of conflict, improved mutual understanding is critical. If a foreign policy goal of US policymakers is to promote cooperation, not confrontation, toward this end,

the assessments of Chinese foreign policy behavior noted above have significant limitations. Of these, there are two in particular that do not get adequate attention.

One limitation of the views summarized above is that to varying degrees they all treat China as a unitary actor. For example, although the third view gives weight to the role of public opinion as a Chinese foreign policy driver, generally, little is said about the source of that public opinion, enabling the argument that it is the Chinese Party-State that takes the lead in shaping opinion-making in China about international events.

In reality, it has been a long time since the Chinese media spoke with one voice. Chinese media remains heavily censured and regulated, but today there are dozens of formal media outlets, hundreds of radio and television stations and thousands of cable channels, all heavily dependent on commercial revenue. The audience for media in China is enormous, with more than 1.2 billion television viewers and 500 million internet users. Any international issue affecting China WILL [may now] trigger a flood of many different streams of public opinion. These include the viewpoints of a new class of celebrity pundits and hyper-nationalistic netizens, as well as around 7 million Chinese citizens overseas. Beijing may not always respond to these voices, but they may be a factor in its policies. The decision to refrain from vetoing a Security Council resolution to approve the use of force in Libya last year may have been shaped in part by the widespread expression of concern through the internet by Chinese nationals about the protection of the tens of thousands of their fellow citizens in that country.

In addition, a myriad of governmental actors have joined the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as actors in China's foreign affairs. The Ministry of Commerce, National Development and Reform Commission, People's Bank of China, and Ministry of Finance, as well as the People's Liberation Army and local governments, among other parts of the Chinese government, all seek to advance their own policy agendas, including weighing in in public forums on international issues. The fragmentation of influence in the foreign policy arena makes interpreting and responding to China in the international arena extremely challenging, particularly because China's policy making process if pluralized remains opaque. What is clear is that while this may make assessing the direction of Chinese policy more complex, it is important to distinguish between opinions of scholars and other pundits, even those with close ties to branches of the Chinese government. For example, the flames of speculation in US policy circles over whether the South China Sea had been redefined as a "core interest," thus joining a set of issues on which China has asserted a nonnegotiable position-- namely territorial integrity and sovereignty, were briefly fanned by a misinterpretation that a PLA major general who frequently airs his hawkish views in

the Chinese media was speaking in an official capacity for the Chinese government.

Second, none of the three views gives attention to what is conveyed by the Chinese government in criticizing the actions of a foreign country as having "hurt the feelings of the Chinese people." This is also a challenge for westerners who may not grasp the nuance of this meme, frequently connected to other harsh language by Beijing in response to the actions of other countries it opposes. It is a phrase that speaks to Chinese history and its use of history in contemporary policy, as well as to the very construction of China's identity as an international actor. This identity rests heavily on an understanding of China's past that casts the Chinese people as having suffered at the hands of foreign powers.

That the phrase offers a vehicle for the Chinese government to reinforce Chinese national unity against the outside world is certainly one of its purposes. But it also conveys the view that the perpetrator has deliberately humiliated China and caused it to lose face, an injury that requires both punishment and an effort by the victimizer at redemption. Humiliation and the loss of face requires an audience, and the phrase most often is applied to acts that China sees as deliberate efforts to diminish its national standing. The phrase was recently invoked by the Chinese foreign ministry in response to American involvement in the case of blind Chinese activist Chen Guangcheng. International policy clearly cannot be hostage to this formulation by China; however, its real meaning should not be dismissed and understanding this may offer opportunities to manage certain bilateral issues with greater discretion for a better outcome to the extent that that is possible by more open societies.

*"this is a critical time in relations between China and the US and its allies"*

This is a critical time in relations between China and the US and its allies when the stakes for getting relations right are high. Putting China's war of words in informed perspective is important to doing this.

## Further Reading

"Coast Guard Missing Piece of Naval Strength," Global Times, (March 8, 2012), available at

http://www.globaltimes.cn/DesktopModules/DnnForge%20-%20NewsArticles/Print.aspx?tabid=99&tabmoduleid=94&articleId=699279&moduleId=405&PortalID=0
James Fallows, "Annals of Agitprop," The Atlantic, (December 8, 2008), available at http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2008/12/annals-of-agitprop/9171/.
Linda Jakobson and Dean Knox, New Foreign Policy Actors in China, SIPRI Policy Paper No. 26, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, (September 2010), available at http://books.sipri.org/files/PP/SIPRIPP26.pdf.
Joel Martinsen, "Mapping the Hurt Feelings of the Chinese People," Danwei, (December 11, 2008), available at http://www.danwei.org/foreign_affairs/a_map_of_hurt_feelings.php.
Brian Spegele, "China takes new tack in Libya Vote," The Wall Street Journal, (March 20, 2011), available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703292304576212431833887422.html.

Orville Schell, "China: Humiliation and the Olympics," New York Review of Books, (August 14, 2008), available at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2008/aug/14/china-humiliation-the-olympics/?pagination=false.

Michael D. Swaine, "China's Assertive Behavior Part One: On 'Core Interests,'" China Leadership Monitor, No. 34 (February 22, 2011), available at http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/CLM34MS_FINAL.pdf.
http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/harvard_journal_of_asiatic_studies/v071/71.2.barme.html.
Michael D. Swaine, " Perceptions of an Assertive China," China Leadership Monitor, No. 32, (May 11, 2010), available at http://media.hoover.org/sites/default/files/documents/CLM32MS.pdf.
Yun Sun, "Chinese Public Opinion: Shaping China's Foreign Policy, or Shaped by It?" Brookings Northeast Asia Commentary, No. 20, (December 2011), available at http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2011/12/13-china-public-opinion-sun.

Suisheng Zhao, "Understanding China's Assertive Foreign Policy Behavior during the Global Financial Meltdown," The European Financial Review,( December-January, 2011), available at http://www.du.edu/korbel/docs/ADM-Zhao_european_financial_review_article.pdf.

# The Challenge of U.S.-China Relations

**Dr. Ali Wyne**
Harvard University
UNITED STATES

Last October, while discussing the intractability of certain foreign-policy challenges, Council on Foreign Relations President Richard Haass told an audience at the Harvard Kennedy School that he "see[s] some things not as problems, but as conditions, and conditions are not to be fixed, but…to be lived with and managed as best as you can." Although he was discussing the relationship between the United States and Pakistan when he rendered this judgment, he could easily have been discussing that between the U.S. and China. For the better part of the past decade, policymakers and commentators in both countries have been struggling to articulate an overarching framework to define their interactions.

In September 2005, then-U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick famously advised China to be a "responsible stakeholder": "All nations conduct diplomacy to promote their national interests. Responsible stakeholders go further: They recognize that the international system sustains their peaceful prosperity, so they work to sustain that system." This March, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton concluded that China has been a "selective stakeholder," capitalizing on its dual status as a great power and a developing one. She urged it to become a "full stakeholder" that, "for the long run, play[s] a positive role that will enhance security, stability, and prosperity."

Interestingly, the same month that Zoellick delivered his address, influential Chinese strategist Zheng Bijian took to the pages of Foreign Affairs to introduce the term "peaceful rise," which would become China's official doctrine for the first decade of this century: it would lift "its people out of poverty by embracing economic globalization and improving relations with the rest of the world." Last spring, however, arguing that that doctrine needed to be "concretized," Zheng proposed a new one for China to adopt for this decade, "global convergence of interests," whereby China would "'expand and deepen the convergence of interests of all

parties' and foster 'communities of interests' with other countries and regions in different areas and at various levels."

While the U.S. and China will doubtless continue to refine these conceptions as their relationship evolves, their relationship is sufficiently complex that a guiding concept is likely to prove elusive. Never before have a superpower and its chief competitor exhibited a comparable degree of economic interdependence or played as central a joint role in sustaining international order.

The Challenge

Secretary Clinton captured the enormity of the challenge at the fourth round of the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue: "The United States and China are trying to do something that is historically unprecedented, to write a new answer to the age-old question of what happens when an established power and a rising power meet." Writing such an answer would be challenging even if they had anticipated the question decades in advance. In reality, it emerged with rapidity that no one—certainly not China—could have expected. Indeed, while arguments about the singular importance of U.S.-China relations have now assumed axiomatic status, it would be difficult to find such a consensus a decade earlier—when America's strategic outlook was rooted in considerable part in the strength of the trilateral framework: North America, Europe, and Japan—or even five years earlier. Most mainstream judgments at that time held China to be an emerging power of rapidly growing importance, not an ascendant superpower. Take the 2006 National Security Strategy:

*As China becomes a global player, it must act as a responsible stakeholder that fulfills its obligations and works with the United States and others to advance the international system that has enabled its success…China shares our exposure to the challenges of globalization and other transnational concerns. Mutual interests can guide our cooperation on issues such as terrorism, proliferation, and energy security.*

Or consider then-Senator Barack Obama's essay in the July/August 2007 issue of Foreign Affairs: he pledged to "encourage China to play a responsible role as a growing power—to help lead in addressing the common problems of the twenty-first century. We [the U.S.] will compete with China in some areas and cooperate in others. Our essential challenge is to build a relationship that broadens cooperation while strengthening our ability to compete."

While the geopolitical challenges that China's rise poses to the U.S. are widely discussed, it is the psychological challenges that may prove more vexing. Only two

decades after the Soviet Union's implosion seemed to usher in uncontested U.S. preeminence, it must concede an uncomfortable likelihood: that it will, before the middle of this century, cede to its putative replacement the titles of largest economy and largest defense spender—the titles that arguably define "number 1" more than any others. Ceding them to any country would be difficult to accept; ceding them to one whose ideology, governance, and worldview are as different as China's—and which, in the aftermath of Cold War, were widely believed to be obsolete—is likely to prove doubly difficult.

As this calibration between the two countries continues, the U.S. must ensure that the various measures it is taking to hedge against China's rise do not add up to a de facto strategy of containment. China, for its part, must not proceed from an exaggerated assessment of American decline: the past decade of U.S. foreign policy demonstrates the peril of overreaching when strategic trends appear to be in one's favor.

Unanswered Questions

It is not only America's future China policy and China's future U.S. policy that are uncertain. Notwithstanding a prodigious volume of analysis on Sino-U.S. relations, some of the most basic questions that will shape their evolution remain unanswered:

- What is China's long-term geopolitical objective, if indeed it has one?

- What long-term geopolitical objective does China believe that it can achieve, and how will that assessment change over time?

- What does the U.S. believe China's long-term geopolitical objective to be, if indeed it believes China to have one?

- What long-term geopolitical objective does the U.S. believe that China can achieve, and how will that assessment change over time?

> *"...it is the psychological challenges that may prove more vexing."*

At one end of the spectrum is Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Cui Tiankai's answer: "China's developmental goal is just one thing: to allow ordinary Chinese people to have better lives. It is not about vying with any other country for the no. 1 spot in the world." At the other end is the

judgment that China seeks to displace the U.S. as the preeminent power in the Asia-Pacific and ultimately in the world.

If both countries' objectives and decision-making processes were completely transparent, their relationship would principally evolve in accordance with objective realities: for example, the balance in their power-projection capabilities. The greater the gap in mutual understanding, the more likely it is that they will formulate policy toward each other on the basis of unfounded interpretations. Conjecture, then, rather than insight, becomes the basis of policy. Henry Kissinger explains that "[b]oth sides should be open to conceiving of each other's activities as a normal part of international life and not in themselves as a cause for alarm. The inevitable tendency to impinge on each other should not be equated with a conscious drive to contain or dominate." That such common sense has to be explicated evinces the depth of strategic mistrust between them.

The Next 40 Years

Given that mistrust, there is considerable concern about the potential for Sino-U.S. war:

- Although China's gradual economic integration of Taiwan reduces the likelihood that the latter will push for independence, one cannot rule out that move, and the attendant possibility of a military response by China that would, in turn, pressure the U.S. to intervene.

- Tensions in the South China Sea continue to escalate, with some suggesting that it is the site of an emerging great game." If China were to attempt to establish its sovereignty over the Scarborough Shoal through force, it is unclear how the U.S. would respond. On the one hand, its mutual defense treaty with the Philippines obliges it to respond to an attack on "island territories under [Filipino] jurisdiction in the Pacific." On the other hand, the U.S. insists that it takes no position on the territorial dispute between China and the Philippines.

- The Department of Defense's latest appraisal of Chinese military power asserts that "Chinese actors are the world's most active and persistent perpetrators of economic espionage. Chinese attempts to collect U.S. technological and economic information will continue at a high level and will represent a growing and persistent threat to U.S. economic security." Absent clear, enforceable cyber rules of the road, there is a concern that a damaging cyberattack that is believed to have occurred with the Chinese government's permission or support could trigger a U.S. military response.

And yet, it is not the prospect of a military conflict between the two that is most concerning. It is, instead, the reality that the basis for cooperation between them is not developing nearly as quickly as the global challenges that it must address. If the signature achievement of Sino-U.S. diplomacy in the past 40 years was to integrate China into the international system, the central challenge of the next 40 will be to close that gap.

# China's Security Policy in Africa and the Western Indian Ocean

**Ambassador David H. Shinn**
George Washington University
UNITED STATES

Africa and the western Indian Ocean have security implications for China only to the extent that Chinese nationals and investments in the region are threatened or there are interruptions in the flow from Africa of critical raw materials that support China's economy. As a result, China puts a premium on strengthening the stability of African countries, irrespective of their political ideology, especially those that are major exporters of raw materials or have a significant Chinese presence.

China's security-related interests in Africa began in the late 1950s with military assistance and training for a variety of African liberation groups fighting for independence from colonial rule. During the 1960s, China even supported a small number of African rebel groups that opposed independent African governments. This early policy was part of China's doctrine of revolutionary warfare and support globally for wars of national liberation.

As African countries under colonial rule obtained independence and China ended in the 1970s its support for rebel groups opposing independent African governments, it refocused Chinese security strategy in Africa. China became an early although modest supplier of military equipment, especially small arms and light weapons, to African governments. From the 1960s to the 1990s, China's share of conventional arms deliveries to Africa by dollar value varied between 3 and 5 percent of the global total. Since the late 1990s, as China produced higher quality and a wider selection of conventional military equipment, it increased its transfers to Sub-Saharan Africa to about 15 percent. These percentages exclude small arms and light weapons, which are difficult to track but for which China is a major supplier.

Small arms and light weapons do not contribute significantly to the dollar value of

Chinese arms transfers, but those that have made their way into African conflicts such as Darfur, Somalia, Liberia, Chad and the eastern Congo have, together with weapons from other countries, contributed to the loss of life. It is China's policy to transfer weapons only to governments and there is no evidence in recent years that China has provided them directly to rebel groups. In some cases, African governments have transferred them to rebel organizations or they are purchased on the international arms market. A UN Panel of Experts concluded, for example, that Sudan supplied the allied Janjaweed rebel organization with Chinese arms for use in Darfur even after a United Nations' embargo had taken effect.

From the beginning, China's military strategy has relied on a steady stream of exchange visits with African military counterparts. Members of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) and Navy (PLAN) are constantly visiting African countries and African military leaders are frequent guests of the PLA and PLAN. This is a relatively low cost policy with a potentially high return. Some twenty-eight African countries have defense attachés assigned to their embassies in Beijing. China has some sixteen defense attaché offices in Africa accredited to about thirty countries, a surprisingly low number in view of China's growing security interests.

UN peacekeeping operations in Africa have increasingly become a significant component of China's policy. It deployed twenty military observers in 1989 to a UN election monitoring operation in Namibia, its first military deployment with the UN. This was followed by a steady increase of support for UN peacekeeping operations. China now has about 1,500 non-combatant troops and police assigned to six of the seven UN missions in Africa, more than any other permanent member of the Security Council. China sends primarily engineers, transport specialists and medical units. China sees this contribution as a way to increase its standing in the world, test its military ability, learn more about African security, and put it in a position to help protect Chinese interests in Africa. Support for UN peacekeeping is now central to China's military strategy in Africa. By all accounts, including those from American military personnel, China's

> "China and Western countries have...a different understanding of the ultimate goal of UN peacekeeping operations."

peacekeepers have performed well. China has also increased its financial support for UN peacekeeping operations and made modest contributions to operations such as Somalia undertaken by the African Union and sub-regional African organizations.

China and Western countries have, however, a different understanding of the ultimate goal of UN peacekeeping operations. While both camps seek a return to political stability in conflict countries, Western governments emphasize an outcome that results in a liberal democratic government while China's primary goal is economic development that includes poverty reduction, increased employment and infrastructure creation. The establishment of a liberal democratic regime is low on its priority list.

As China increased its engagement with and its physical presence in Africa, it has become subject to more security challenges. The Nigerian Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) warned China to stay out of the region. MEND or similar organizations kidnapped more than twenty Chinese working in the area. Chinese personnel have been kidnapped and killed in Sudan's Southern Kordofan region by forces that oppose Sudan's government. Nine Chinese oil workers died in an attack on their base in the Ogaden region of Ethiopia by the Ogaden National Liberation Front. China's 2009 crackdown on the Muslim Uighurs in Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region of western China resulted in threats against Chinese workers, who number as many as 50,000, in Algeria by al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. The collapse of the regime in Libya required the evacuation of 35,000 Chinese workers from that country in 2011. These and other incidents have caused China to reassess the level of risk it is willing to take and its ability to protect its nationals in Africa.

The outbreak of Somali piracy in the Gulf of Aden and subsequently throughout the western Indian Ocean has impacted Chinese-owned vessels and crews. In its first ever out of region tactical deployment, the PLAN sent at the end of 2008 two frigates and a supply ship to the Gulf of Aden to help the international anti-piracy effort. China continues to maintain this naval presence in the region. In addition to protecting Chinese shipping interests, the naval force is intended to help ensure the safe transit of oil and minerals on other nations' flagged vessels from Africa and the Middle East to Chinese ports. This naval presence has resulted in more frequent PLAN visits to African and Indian Ocean ports and raised the question whether China may seek more permanent naval supply arrangements in the region.

There is significant evidence that China is working to develop a carrier force. Its first carrier began sea trials in 2011 but will not be operational until 2013. In 2008, fifty

students began training as naval pilots capable of operating fixed-wing aircraft from an aircraft carrier. The U.S. Department of Defense believes the PLAN is considering building multiple carriers by 2020. While the western Indian Ocean will not be the highest operational priority for a Chinese carrier task force, it will certainly be a strong candidate. Both the U.S. and Indian navies are following this issue closely. A captain in the Indian Navy wrote in 2010 that deployment of PLAN ships in the Gulf of Aden is a manifestation of the Chinese desire to shed its image as a "brown water" navy and signal to the world its aspiration to become a blue water navy. Some Indian analysts worry that China's goal is the "strategic encirclement" of India.

China's 2010 white paper on national defense states that it "will never seek hegemony, nor will it adopt the approach of military expansion now or in the future, no matter how its economy develops." China has no bases in Africa and insists that it has no intention to establish any, and it has not entered into any formal military alliance with an African or western Indian Ocean country. On the other hand, it is in discussion with Kenya on building a major port facility north of Mombasa, has interests in two container facilities in Port Said, Egypt, and is considering the Seychelles as a resupply port for PLAN vessels taking part in the anti-piracy operation. Several senior retired PLAN officers have recently commented publicly on the need to obtain a permanent resupply base in the region to support Chinese ships.

China has been careful so far to limit its military presence in Africa and the western Indian Ocean, but the fact that it is today the world's second largest economy and will soon take over first place changes the equation. China certainly does not want to rely on the U.S. Navy to protect the sea lanes that transport so much of its imported oil and minerals from Africa and the Middle East. These concerns have already changed China's security strategy and, moving forward, will almost certainly increase its interest in expanding its military reach and ties with countries in Africa and the western Indian Ocean.

# The Growing Potency of the Sino-Indian Rivalry

**Dr. Harsh Pant**
King's College London
UNITED KINGDOM

India grabbed global headlines last month when it successfully test-fired the nuclear capable, 5000 kilometer-range Agni-V ballistic missile and gained entry into an elite club of nations. Only five other states – the US, Russia, China, France and Israel – have this capability. Predictably, Pakistan responded a few days later by test-firing an "improved version" of its nuclear capable Hatf-4 intermediate range ballistic missile, almost demanding the world to pay attention to its own travails. No one actually did because the world is now more interested in a bigger story shaping up in Asia – a Sino-Indian rivalry that is becoming more potent with every passing day.

The success of Agni-V is a significant achievement for India's Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO) and a culmination, in many ways, of efforts that started in 1983 as part of the Integrated Guided Missile Development Program (IGMDP). As the DRDO chief underlined, "the launch has given a message to the entire world that India has the capability to design, develop, build and manufacture missiles of this class." The DRDO has to work on its missile program in face of international technology sanctions and the latest achievement is a testament to the dedication of the Indian scientific community.

The reaction of the US, underlining India's "solid non-proliferation record" is also very instructive of the changing geopolitical realities shaping the Asian strategic landscape and the distance US-India ties have travelled in the last few years. India is widely considered a responsible nuclear power and the logic of India's tests is well understood. The US today welcomes its rise as a balancer in the Asia-Pacific and as a powerful democratic partner at a time when America's traditional allies in the West no longer have the will and the ability to carry the burdens of a global power.

India's no-first use nuclear doctrine relies fundamentally on a credible second strike nuclear capability. The Agni-V, by bringing Chinese heartland into India's missile orbit, makes the Sino-Indian nuclear dynamic more stable than before. India's Agni-III had been deployed very close to the Chinese border to give India a credible second strike capability. Now for the first time India has demonstrated missile capability that is able to cover China. This will give Indian military planners greater flexibility in the deployment of their missile arsenal. This test is also psychologically important for India, boosting its confidence to deal with China as an equal.

China is already at a much advanced stage in its missile capability. China's nuclear arsenal is more than double India's estimated 100 warheads and it continues to deploy both land and submarine launched ballistic missiles. China's reaction has been predictable, underscoring once again the disdain sections of the Chinese elite feel for India. Though officially China just emphasised that India and China are not rivals, the state-run Global Times was openly dismissive of Indian claims arguing that India "should be clear that China's nuclear power is stronger and more reliable," and that "for the foreseeable future, India would stand no chance in an overall arms race with China." But a credible second strike capability vis-à-vis China is just one part of the larger Indian strategy towards China.

Despite all the rhetoric, the Sino-Indian relations have been unstable for some time now amidst a growing consensus in New Delhi that not only does China remain insensitive to core Indian security concerns, but that, among major powers, China remains the only one that does not accept India as a rising global player that should be accommodated into the global political order. This has led New Delhi to adopt a more assertive posture vis-à-vis Beijing in recent times. The most significant has been India's move into the South China Sea waters. The Indian External Affairs Minister last year snubbed China and made it clear that India's ONGC Videsh Ltd (OVL) would continue to pursue oil and natural gas exploration in two Vietnamese blocks in the South China Sea despite Chinese criticism. Asking countries "outside the region" to stay away from the South China Sea, China had issued a demarche to India underlining that Beijing's permission should be sought for exploration in Blocks 127 and 128 and that without it, OVL's activities would be considered illegal. Vietnam, meanwhile had underlined the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea to claim its sovereign rights over the two blocks being explored. India decided to go by Vietnam's claims and ignore China's objections.

India's bold move is aimed at asserting India's legal claims in the international waters of the South China Sea as well as strengthening its relationship with Vietnam. Both moves unsettle China which views India's growing engagement in East Asia with suspicion. In late July, an unidentified Chinese warship had demanded that the INS

Airavat, an amphibious assault vessel, identify itself and explain its presence in the South China Sea after the vessel left Vietnamese waters. The Indian warship was completing a scheduled port call in Vietnam and was in international waters. Though the Indian Navy promptly denied that a Chinese warship had confronted its assault vessel as reported by London's Financial Times, it did not completely deny the factual basis of the report.

With China expanding its presence in South Asia and the Indian Ocean region, India is staking its own claims in East Asia. Most significant in this regard is India's growing engagement with Vietnam. India has decided to work with Vietnam to establish a regular Indian presence in the region as part of a larger Delhi-Hanoi security partnership with Vietnam giving India the right to use its port of Nha Trang. Delhi and Hanoi have significant stakes in ensuring sea lanes security and preventing sea piracy while they also share concerns about Chinese access to the Indian Ocean and South China Sea. Indian strategic interests demand that Vietnam emerge as a major regional player and India is well placed to help Hanoi achieve that objective. Just as China has used states in India's periphery to contain India, many in India would like Delhi to build states like Vietnam as strategic pressure points against China. They argue

With China expanding its presence in South Asia and the Indian Ocean region, India is staking its own claims in East Asia.

that if the South China Sea is a disputed area for China and India should refrain from entering the fray so as to respect Chinese sensitivities, then India can rightfully ask China to do the same in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir, an area recognized by all major powers as a disputed territory. With this in mind, India has been providing Vietnam with help in beefing up its naval and air capabilities.

China is too big and too powerful to be ignored by the regional states. But it is clear that regional states are now seeking to expand their strategic space by reaching out to other regional and global powers. Smaller states in the region are now looking to India to act as a balancer in view of China's growing influence and America's anticipated retrenchment from the region in the near future, while larger states see it as an attractive engine for regional growth. It remains to be seen if India can indeed live up to its full potential, as well as to the region's expectations. Neither India nor the regional states in East Asia have any incentive to define their relationship in opposition to China. But what they are certainly interested in is leveraging their ties

with other states to gain benefits from China and to bring a semblance of equality in their relationships.

The rise of China poses one of the most significant challenges for Indian policy makers, and how they manage this very complicated bilateral relationship would shape not only India's future but also the larger Asian strategic landscape.

# Stealth Fighters Are Hard
## Modernization of China's Aerial Arsenal Encounters Obstacles

**David Axe**
Wired

UNITED STATES

China has a brand new jet fighter. Only it's not really brand new at all. The emergence of the much-touted Shenyang J-16, following years of speculation, represents a surprising twist in China's more than decade-long effort to build a world-class air force – and a reminder to outsiders that even Beijing with its tight central control, extensive manufacturing base and apparent deep pockets cannot perform aerospace miracles.

In December 2010, the Chinese People's Liberation Army Air Force shocked observers when it allowed civilian photographers to snap and publish photos of China's very first, and previously unseen, stealth fighter prototype undergoing ground testing in Chengdu in central China.

The J-20 "Mighty Dragon" took off for its apparent first test flight on January 11, inaugurating what some have described as a new era of aerial warfare, in which advanced Chinese aircraft might challenge the decades-long dominance of the U.S. military with its stealth fighters and bombers. "China's new Chengdu J-20 stealth fighter was an important milestone in China's Long March toward parity in military technology with Russia and the West," wrote Carlo Kopp, an analyst with Air Power Australia, an independent think tank.

Not only did China possess the J-20, its aviation companies were also said to be hard at work on several other radar-evading fighters similar in philosophy to the American F-117, F-22 and F-35 fighters and B-2 bomber. Among these rumored warplanes was the J-16, reportedly in development in Shenyang in northeastern China. The J-16 was, if anything, scarier to the American defense establishment than the J-20, for it was more practical.

The Mighty Dragon was clearly an experimental aircraft incorporating design elements typically not seen on Chinese warplanes, including internal weapons bays. Moreover, the twin-engine J-20 apparently lacked purpose-built engines and could be seen flying with Russian-made AL-31F engines likely poorly-suited for the airframe.

> *"The Mighty Dragon is likely a decade away from frontline service"*

A year after its debut the first J-20 had completed only 60 confirmed testing flights of the thousands required by a new warplane design. A second copy of the Mighty Dragon appeared in the spring of 2012 but by summer still hadn't flown.

The J-16, by contrast, was rumored to be a heavily upgraded version of China's existing J-11 and J-15 fighters, themselves both reverse-engineered models of Russia's twin-engine T-10 "Flanker," which has its roots in the late 1970s but has since evolved into a highly-effective heavyweight interceptor and ground-attack plane. The AL-31 engine was designed specifically for the Flanker. Russian T-10 derivatives still use the AL-31, as do most J-11s and J-15s.

In essence, the J-16 was thought to be equivalent to the Russian T-50, an adaptation of the T-10 with the same basic engines but a new airframe optimized for its low radar signature – though not as low a signature as the U.S. F-22. "It's not an F-22 in many important ways," Bill Sweetman, a highly regarded aviation journalist, wrote about the T-50. The new Russian fighter first flew in January 2010. Today there are three T-50s undergoing testing towards a possible full production version of the jet sometime in the 2020s.

Inasmuch as the Chinese J-16 represented a parallel development to the Russian T-50, it promised to provide Beijing a more harmonious new fighter – and much sooner – than would be possible with the J-20. The Mighty Dragon is likely a decade away from frontline service, if it's even meant to serve in that capacity. The evolutionary (as opposed to revolutionary) J-16 could be ready for combat in just a few years – and still offer big improvements over older jets and better prospects against American-made warplanes. "It's the race of the stealth fighters," commented Larkins Dsouza, an analyst with Defence Aviation.

The J-16's first public appearance occurred in Shenyang in April, when the PLAAF flew at least one of the new fighters before a press audience. Hong Kong's Kanwa magazine described the J-16 as a direct copy of the Su-30, a version of the T-10

dating from the late 1990s. The J-16 in fact doesn't feature any of the rumored stealth enhancements, such as can be found on the T-50. Apparently, the only difference between the Chinese J-16 and the Russian Su-30 it's copied from is that the J-16 can carry Chinese-made weapons. Both the J-16 and the Su-30 use the standard, Russian-made AL-31 engine.

In that sense, the "new" Chinese fighter isn't new at all. Instead of representing an immediate step towards a stealthy fighter force rivaling America's, Beijing's new warplane holds the line at late '90s-early 2000s technology. Unless China is developing any other new warplanes – and that's certainly possible – a true generational leap in front-line fighter technology will have to wait for the J-20 to achieve operational readiness. That could take a decade, by which time the U.S. military will likely have brought potentially hundreds of new F-35 stealth fighters into service.

As the J-16 was making its first public appearance, Beijing was also negotiating with Russia to purchase copies of the Su-35, the newest T-10 model. The proposed purchase only underscores China's apparent inability to produce its own combat-capable versions of even moderately stealthy warplanes anytime soon. Perhaps Beijing is learning the lesson that the U.S. government learned during the 15-year, $70-billion development of the F-22: that inventing stealth fighters is hard.

# PROFOUND




## Driven from Home

Protecting the Rights of Forced Migrants

**David Hollenbach, SJ, Editor**

"Finally the book that matches asking the right hard questions about forced migration with providing profoundly thoughtful, visionary yet pragmatic responses from a range of perspectives. This bold and intellectually honest, clear, and accessible analysis of one of the most pressing moral and political questions of our time is for students and scholars, national and international policymakers, opinion leaders, and ethically engaged citizens everywhere."

*—Abdullahi A. An-Na`im, Emory University*

978-1-58901-646-0, paperback, $29.95




## Refugee Rights

Ethics, Advocacy, and Africa

**David Hollenbach, SJ, Editor**

"*Refugee Rights* addresses one of the most crucial issues concerning the plight of Africa since the 1980s. We warmly welcome the effort to explore the refugee issue from different perspectives: theological, ethical, legal, political, economic, and cultural. Such a holistic approach makes this book a seminal study in the attempt to understand our individual and collective responsibility vis-à-vis the refugee problem; and there is no doubt that this book will become a magnum opus for NGOs, activists, and many centers and institutes of peace in Africa."

*—Paulin Manwelo, SJ, director, Hekima College Institute of Peace Studies & International Relations, Nairobi, Kenya*

978-1-58901-202-8, paperback, $26.95

**GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY PRESS**

800.537.5487 • www.press.georgetown.edu

# EU SECURITY



# The European Union's Security Policy: An Attempt to Counterbalance America

**Sally McNamara**
Heritage Foundation

UNITED STATES

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States has emerged as the world's unrivalled military, economic and technological power. But unlike most previous dominant powers, the U.S. has not sought to expand its geographical territory. Since the end of the Second World War, the United States has, in fact, guaranteed Europe's security through a web of bilateral and multilateral alliances—with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) at the heart of transatlantic security. It is impossible to imagine Europe's post-War security (and prosperity) in the absence of America's security guarantees.

However, a second European defense identity has gradually emerged, separate to and independent of the very alliance which has guaranteed European security for the past 60 years. The European Union's Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) was born in the wake of the Balkans Crises of the 1990s, where Brussels' extraordinary powerlessness had been badly exposed. To this day, Luxembourg's Foreign Minister Jacques Poos must regret his infamous proclamation: "This is the hour of Europe. It is not the hour of the Americans"—which was uttered just before the Americans had to step in and stop ethnic cleansing right on Europe's doorstep. By the war's end in Kosovo in 1999, the U.S. had provided 100 percent of NATO's signal-jamming capability, 90 percent of the air-to-ground surveillance, 80 percent of the air-refueling tankers and U.S. fighters and bombers had delivered 90 percent of the precision-guided munitions against Serbia.

Resentment festered in many European quarters that NATO—and more specifically the United States—had been called in to resolve a quintessentially European conflict. For its part, the United States was frustrated by Europe's unwillingness (and inability) to shoulder a greater share of the defense burden.

British Prime Minister Tony Blair—one of the CSDP's original architects—saw EU defense integration as a vehicle for increasing European military capabilities through the greater pooling of resources. This reasoning still lingers on the lips of EU elites today, as a way of pushing for further European defense integration. However, the CSDP's other architect, French President Jacques Chirac, saw it as a way to advance an autonomous EU defense identity that could operate independently of NATO.

> *"for Europe, real security is about creation of a multipolar system where decisions are made multilaterally..."*

Chirac had no concern for increasing European military capabilities so as to relieve Continental Europe's free ride on the U.S. defense bus. Neither did he care about ensuring America's continued involvement in European security affairs; rather, he wanted to see the exact opposite.

And Chirac ultimately had his way. European military capabilities remain as limited today as they were in 1999. Since 1999, average European defense spending has actually decreased and the EU's much-touted civilian assets have failed to play a big role in global stability operations—and especially not in EU members' main theatre of operations in Afghanistan. EUPOL Afghanistan has been derided by both the NATO Parliamentary Assembly and the House of Lords as being all but useless.

All-in-all, despite multiple treaties and resolutions on security, the EU is not a serious military power as a collective entity. However, it would be wrong to say that the EU does not have its own security policy. It does. And that policy is to balance against the United States' global hegemonic position. The EU has thrown its lot in –lock-stock-and-barrel—with Immanuel Kant's vision of an international rules-based global order. The CSDP is not about creating a robust European military; it is about frustrating American leadership on the world stage. The EU is attempting to establish itself as a global player in a rules-based system which is undergirded by the United Nations—and not by American power. The Institute for Security Studies' Alvaro de Vasconcelos neatly describes the EU's main strategic goal as the "multilateralisation

combined and joint operations, three key geo-economic challenges already weaken EU effectiveness. Such weaknesses arise primarily from the EU's 27 members and serious dependencies verging on geo-economic security dilemmas. They center on continued membership, extended trade, and needed energy, all areas impacted by globalization that threatens the EU's ultimate success from its six decade-old integration. Indeed, the EU's energy dependency on Russia may yet determine the most troublesome geo-economic linkage, tying together key aspects of membership and trade. Even as specific member states' domestic indebtedness- such as Greece, Ireland, and Spain- plagues the EU institutionally, geo-economic energy dependency on Russia may actually damage the CSDP, upending the CFSP and EU institutionally, and descending EU members into re-nationalization.

As Russian national security concentrates increasingly on its energy capabilities to ensnare EU members in an even more extensive dependency, the EU may find itself more encumbered geo-economically on Russia's western and southwestern periphery. The Russian threat of military intervention in Ukraine over the past several years and the Russo-Georgian war in 2008 have driven West European political considerations and economic necessities. More than Russian military challenges, political and economic concerns have antagonized relations between the EU's Central-East European leaders, their newer EU members, and their West European counterparts. Subsequently, non-EU states, Ukraine and Georgia, have become geopolitical pivots in Russian military planning for larger Russian national security strategy toward Europe. Given the pivotal Russian energy pipelines that traverse Central-East Europe into West Europe via these non-EU states, and the expanded EU membership of bordering Central-East European nations during the past decade, regional tensions will likely remain high. Therefore, energy security policy figures much more prominently in the EU's eastern outreach, particularly in the aftermath of the January 2009 Russian-Ukrainian disputes and attendant broader European energy supply cut-offs.

During 2008-2009, EU energy assistance to non-Russian, non-EU states bordering Russia's western periphery increasingly antagonized Russo-European ties over energy security. EU outreach initiatives consisted of and currently focus on financing and politico-economic support for Southern and Southeast European pipelines – attempting, in some instances, to avoid Russia and de-link from Russian pipelines. Instead of corroboration with Russia, EU eastern outreach raises EU-Russian tensions and continually provokes disagreement at EU-Russian Summits. Hence, EU enlargement to Central-East Europe in the twenty-first century (aimed at integrating Europe) actually heightens Russo-European tensions, particularly as the EU tries extending security to former Soviet Republics. Russian military anxiety intensifies as the EU increasingly sees its role across Europe and globally to conduct

not only politico-economic policies, but also security policies with growing military implications. For the Russian military, the EU's cultivation of its newly forming Eastern Partnerships may result in an anti-Russian and greater geo-strategic rivalry. Russian energy resources will continue to fuel European security developments as geopolitical struggles, mainly for oil and gas, may give Russia greater sway over European security.

Inherent in Russian national security strategy toward Eastern and Central Europe lies the basis for confrontation in Russo-EU relations. Growing EU development eastward alarms Russia. Since Central-East European leaders consistently point to Europe's needed reinforced commitment to them via NATO, the EU's drive for pipeline politics and economic maneuverability may yield higher stakes energy security competition. This geopolitical competition may then put Russian military strategy at a crossroads. The geo-strategic maneuvering among Russia, Central-East European EU and non-EU members, and West Europe, with a declining U.S. European role, signal potential renationalization over these counter-productive nation-state pipeline policies. The increased possibilities for renationalization for EU members may then augur such institutionally disintegrative tendencies and policies. Re-nationalized tendencies could stem from differing national security strategies regarding energy supply networks, resulting in intra-competitive EU regions along Russia's Western and Southwestern borders. The consequences for renationalization and EU disintegration then make the challenges for reviving the CSDP and CFSP frameworks pale in comparison. Such regional geo-economic energy security dilemmas foreshadow further corrosive political discord within the EU, endangering the EU's future cohesion, its institutionalization, and, ultimately, its survival.

# What Did the Libyan Crisis Say About EU Defense Policy?

*Interview with* **Dr. Jolyon Howorth**
Yale University
UNITED STATES

**International Affairs Forum: The NATO military intervention in Libya, particularly in light of Germany's refusal to aid in the 'no-fly zone' effort, caused rifts within the EU member states. In light of this, how do you view current EU security and defense policy?**

**Dr. Jolyon Howorth:** There are several aspects to this which all interconnect. Twenty years after the outbreak of the wars of Yugoslav succession we recall that the then Foreign Minister of Luxembourg, Jacques Santer, said that 'this is the hour of Europe, not the hour of the Americans', which made him something of a laughing stock around the world. Clearly the Europeans were not ready to tackle Yugoslavia in 1991. They gave themselves 20 years to develop institutions, decision-making procedures, and military and civilian capacity. All of that was set in motion over a 20 year period with precisely the purpose of allowing the European Union, if another crisis arose or when the next big crisis broke out abroad, to be ready. What Libya has demonstrated is that Europe is still not ready.

When we look at it in some more detail, that conclusion must be nuanced with a recognition that certain member states are ready and they're ready to cooperate with each other. Those states which have been involved in the military activity in Libya, largely the UK and France, still have power projection capacity way beyond the immediate European theatre. Then there are serious participants such as Italy, that has offered its airbases for use in the 'no-fly zone' effort, Belgium and Denmark which are hitting targets on the ground. However, Spain, Greece, Sweden and Turkey have caveats which restrict their role to air-air operations only. .

Now, a key question here is why did this become a NATO mission rather an EU mission? That's rather complicated to answer. My sense is that in Washington DC,

there was an unspoken assumption that if America was going to take a 'back seat' in this particular operation, then the lead should be taken by the EU, rather than by NATO. There was a window of three or four days during which there was talk of handing over the US command to "another entity". But the Obama administration did not want this to be a NATO mission because NATO is perceived around the world as an American-led alliance. It is awkward, to say the least, for the United States to be saying that it will do the initial heavy hitting and then hand over to a "European entity" which turns out to be NATO, which is of course commanded by an American admiral. So there was an assumption in Washington that this could be the first time we'd see the much vaunted European Security and Defense Policy, now called Common Security and Defense Policy, engaging in this sort of operation in a lead position. The Obama administration didn't want it to be NATO, Turkey didn't want it initially to be NATO, Germany certainly didn't want it to be NATO, and France didn't want it to be NATO, all for rather different reasons.

The fact that it turned out in the end to be a NATO operation was I think due to two circumstances. The first was that NATO is the only organization that has the necessary command and control capacity to organize such as mission. The other was that Turkey changed its mind when it sensed that France might emerge as the leader of this operation. For Turkey, opposition to any French lead proved stronger than opposition to NATO taking over the mission. . Remember, Cameron had signed a Defense Treaty with Sarkozy back in November 2010. The French hoped that this Franco-British entity could be the lead organization for the Libya operation. But Cameron was determined that it should be a NATO mission. Then the Turks joined forces with him and essentially succeeded in turning it into a NATO mission. So, from almost every angle, we see the Europeans failing yet again to generate the dynamics which could produce European leadership.

One further element is the political element. From the very outset of the Libyan crisis, the European member states were coming at the problem as they used to in the '60s and '70s. When the Germans initially and the British and the French suggested sanctions, the Italians, the Greeks and the Cypriots opposed those sanctions. Even on something as simple as sanctioning the Libyan regime, we find that there is no agreement or consensus internally within the European Union. When you get to much more significant instruments such as a no fly zone or military action, then there's even less agreement. So the politics of it, the military dimension, the strategic dimension, and the practical economic control dimension all added up to another European defection.

**Do you think a strong EU defense policy strengthens NATO?**

**Dr. Howorth:** Absolutely. That has been the proposition on which almost all of the European defense developments have been predicated over the last 20 years. It will strengthen the trans-Atlantic alliance because traditionally within NATO there have been far too many European free riders. That free riding has resulted in a sub-optimal European capacity to take on military or civilian/military missions.

From the end of the Cold War - and this was the case throughout the Balkans crisis - the message from Washington to the Europeans was very loud and clear: Europe had to get its act together because the United States did not feel that there was any obligation anymore to send American troops to places like Bosnia-Herzegovina or (now) to Libya. Also, if and when the Europeans got their act together, this would strengthen the trans-Atlantic relationship, which is something bigger than simply NATO. It would strengthen the whole relationship and allow Europe to be a true partner with the United States.
That would obviously have some repercussions for NATO. Both the European Security and Defense Policy per se, and alsßo NATO since the end of the Cold War, have been projects in the process of becoming. It's not entirely clear to anybody quite what either of these will eventually become and how they will interact. There have been millions of words written and oceans of ink spilt about the interaction or the relationship or the potential for cooperation between these two entities. Nobody has yet resolved that dilemma.

But there is absolutely no question that the greater the European capacity to engage in this type of crisis management operation, the more it will consolidate the Atlantic Alliance and the more it will be useful to NATO as well as to the Europeans.

**Turning to Russia, President Medvedev has stated that systems protect Europe from missile attack risk being ineffective and threats to stability if they don't include Russia. What is your reaction?**

**Dr. Howorth:** Since the end of the Cold War, Russia has made a number of overtures to the West, largely to the United States but also through Europe to the United States, to the effect that the interests of all of the countries in the northern hemisphere are shared interests against the potential of terrorist attacks from the south. They have been quite explicit in saying that, in Moscow's view, that's where the attacks will come from. The underlying proposition is that we have shared interests and therefore we should pool our resources and coordinate our objectives. At the same time, Russia has blown hot and cold over its relationship with NATO, and one can understand this since Russia always saw NATO as the fundamental adversary. For people in the West to expect that Russia will join NATO or will even enjoy an easy relationship with NATO is probably unrealistic. Russians wanted something more general in terms of cooperation.

There's also a geostrategic aspect if we are talking about a missile defense system

that will protect both Europe and the United States against any future potential missile attacks from somewhere in the southern parts of Central Asia. Technically, yes, it makes sense for us to make use of resources the Russians have in terms of radar or possibly even intelligence. But that has proven to be very, very sensitive politically within the West and remains an unfulfilled promise.

**Back to Libya and another quote. Sir John Major has been quoted as saying the EU and NATO would be lost if Qaddafi clung to power. Do you agree with that?**

**Dr. Howorth:** I think that's putting it rather strongly. The United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973 simply calls for military action to protect the civilian population of Libya. To a certain extent, that has been achieved. Yet, in their joint editorial a few weeks back, President Obama, President Chirac and Prime Minister Cameron upped the ante by explicitly saying that they would not rest, and NATO should not slow down on its efforts, until Gaddafi has left power. In that respect, this might well prove to have been a statement of intent that doesn't provide the means to deliver. If Qaddafi were to succeed in staying on in power and if Libya were de facto divided or partitioned, then in one sense the precise Libyan objectives of the Europeans and of NATO could be said to have failed.

But I do not think that if Qadaffi were to succeed in clinging to power one could say that NATO and the European Union's CSDP would be "lost" as such. Both entities will continue to exist and they will continue to develop their capacity. They will engage in further missions in the future. But failure in Libya would certainly be a major blow, a political blow, to an operation which has gone off in rather ambiguous circumstances in terms of its precise military objectives.

# The Future of CFSP, CSDP, NATO, and Transatlantic Cooperation

**Dr. Neil Winn**
University of Leeds
**UNITED KINGDOM**

The European Union (EU) is an emerging actor in the fields of foreign and security policy predicated on mainly soft power values and policies. The EU's policies in the fields of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) are based on unanimity and intergovernmental decision-making preserving the national veto. The Lisbon Treaty of December 2009 largely retains this status quo position and is best described as being a consolidating treaty as opposed to being a revolutionary, reformative treaty.[1] The sovereignty of the member states of the EU in the areas of defence and foreign policy is maintained in those fields due to national interests particularly those of the larger member states. Britain, France and Germany have global diplomatic and economic interests, which transcend the borders of Europe. They collectively determine the shaping of foreign policy objectives in the CFSP/CSDP and have been accused of being a de-facto "directoire" in EU foreign policy-making, which also occasionally includes the likes of Italy and Spain depending on the issue.[2]

European foreign trade policy is perhaps the most integrated of the Union's external policies and arguably has the greatest impact in the global environment.[3] The EU uses its economic and trade prowess in the world as a geopolitical tool to attain compliance in the absence of equivalent military and political power. This is particularly the case in respect of developing countries, which have less bargaining power; the EU also prefers bilateral trade agreements as this gives it more bargaining power.[4] If the EU is anything it is an economic actor, partly because it has developed in this manner since the early 1950s and partly because its member states can see the benefits of external economic integration in the world economy.

The broader transatlantic trade relationship is deeply interconnected and interdependent at the level of trade, banking, goods, services, manufactures and

capital. Each side of the Atlantic depends on the other to a great degree for its economic strength in the globalized system of trade preferences. Indeed:

> "The transatlantic mechanisms created in the process of institutionalization [in the post-War period] have led to the creation of dense networks between the EU and the US. These networks, in turn, became transatlantic decision-making forums. Here, communication between EU and US counterparts forms the closest thing there is to a transatlantic 'policy process'."[5]

Europe and America account for over half of the world's Gross Domestic Product (GDP), they have the largest bilateral trade relationship in the world economy, and as such are arguably necessary partners in the global political economy. The EU exports 18 per cent of all its exports to the US (compared to 8.4 per cent for China) and imports 11.4 per cent of all its imports from the US (compared to 18.9 per cent for China).[6] The transatlantic economy also shapes global trade investment flows as both the US and Europe are the primary targets for other countries trade and investment in the world economy. This arguably gives Europe and America the power to structure the world economy, in spite of the rise of China in recent years.

EU policy is somewhat less integrated in diplomatic and broader in foreign policy terms. The EU has engaged in intra-European foreign policy cooperation since European Political Cooperation (EPC) was instituted in 1970.[7] Over the past four decades EU has encouraged its member states to "Europeanise" their national foreign policies and the Union has developed a "coordination reflex" based on the daily practice of cooperation.[8] The member states expect to coordinate and harmonise their national foreign policies in an Europeanised, multilateral manner through a quasi-European lens because of decades of cooperation and learned behavior. However, the EU's decision-making systems for the successor to EPC the so-called CFSP/CSDP are still intergovernmental and are subject to unanimity.[9] In some ways the larger member states – particularly Britain, France and Germany – use CFSP/CSDP to pursue their own national interests. Both Britain and France seek to lead CFSP/CSDP as another avenue to punch above their weight in the realm of international relations beyond their medium sized power status. In this view the EU is just another venue for national foreign policy interests to be projected into the wider world. Britain, France and Germany do not have the global reach in politico-military terms that the United States (US) has. Hence the "big three" in the EU do, to an extent, use the Union as a foreign and defence policy multiplier to ratchet up their own global presence. The same point applies even more so to the smaller EU member states as the Union gives them a global platform that they would otherwise lack.[10] Germany seeks to hide its power in the world and pursues a strong trade policy, with no global military policy to speak of apart from peacekeeping, security sector reform and the carrying out of wider Petersberg Tasks.[11] Berlin is still the civilian power par excellence that can straddle Europe and America and

> *"EU policy is somewhat less integrated in diplomatic and broader in foreign policy terms."*

remain friends with both without actually "normalizing" its foreign policy despite being labelled a laggard by the US in military terms. Germany is a product of its history and post-war democratic political culture and finds the use of force a non-issue in its own foreign policy.[12]

In strictly foreign policy and diplomatic terms the EU is a longstanding actor in its own right, based on intergovernmental cooperation between its member states. New capabilities and institutions have been added in an ad-hoc fashion to EU foreign policy since the St.Malo Summit between Britain and France in December 1998, which mainly deal with crisis management, and Petersberg Tasks.[13] The Union today has a High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, its own diplomatic corps called the European External Action Service (EEAS) and a range of European-level institutions to underpin the EU's foreign external actions. However, EU foreign policy still largely rests on national foundations, despite ongoing efforts to build capabilities for the future.[14] Nevertheless, the new institutions are embryonic in terms of their operation, but the EEAS in particular has the potential to become a supranational diplomatic arm of European foreign policy.[15]

In terms of defence policy the EU is an embryonic actor in comparison to the economic and diplomatic fields. Indeed, the EU does not per se have a defence policy: instead the Union has a defence profile that is largely based on intergovernmental cooperation and predicated on national sovereignty.[16] The EU also suffers from a capabilities-expectations gap in defence terms.[17] The CSDP relates to the field of crisis management and encompasses both civilian and military doctrines. Since 2003 the EU has undertaken over twenty civilian missions and military operations, most of which fall under the civilian heading.[18] Military crisis management operations rely on national funding from the participating countries and are used to underpin civilian missions' objectives.[19] This explains why the Union has mainly tackled civilian crisis management missions - the Union finds it difficult to collect funds for military missions from the participating member states.[20] The military missions are themselves used for broadly humanitarian purposes confirming the EU's status as a "soft power", built upon civilian power foundations.[21] Additionally, the

Union lacks a central command structure for force projection. The defence of the of the Atlantic Alliance (even though Europe has no existential threats to its security at present) whereas the EU pursues more autonomy in crisis management missions under CSDP structures that in the end still heavily rely on US assets.[22] National armed forces in Europe are also organized along national lines and the loyalties of élites and masses alike are with the nation-states where defence is concerned. Few people would "die for Europe", their identities are still nationally oriented.[23] Europe also lacks a distinctive, supranational strategic/military culture that could bring together national militaries effectively, but the EU does, and in contradistinction, projects a distinctive political culture to the outside world that is predicated on normative "soft" power and civilian power mechanisms.[24] Additionally, national militaries in Europe have not been making the necessary changes to their armed forces to adapt to the European level and for rapid reaction, although Britain and France will increasingly cooperate in military terms to boost European capabilities and save money.[25] Indeed, European militaries are cooperating more closely together – as in the Lisbon Treaty's Permanent Structured Cooperation[26] – than ever before.[27] Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the key threats that Europe faces are internal-security related within EU borders and relate to justice and home affairs that have also begun to translate themselves into EU foreign policy objectives externally.[28] This means that the actual need for the EU to have a grand strategy in the world is arguably questionable if internal European threats are the drivers of foreign policy. It also probably means that the Atlantic Alliance is not the best institution to manage these security-related issues as opposed to defense-related problems.[29] The conclusion of EU's Lisbon Treaty (2009) and the conclusion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Summit in Lisbon on the renewal of the Strategic Concept in November 2010[30] has seen the emergence of much common ground between the EU and NATO as complementary institutions, particularly in the fields of crisis management and Petersberg Tasks.[31] Others argue that the EU can only pursue successful policies in the fields of freedom, security and justice if the EU has a cohesive sense of internal and external security threats and the policies to address them in the fields of foreign policy, defense, development and external economic policy.[32] Furthermore, the security threats actually facing the EU and its member states today are increasingly complex and arguably require that the Union attempts to shape world events to manage those threats in a cohesive manner and further to influence the structure of global politics to avoid irrelevance in the world. [33] A strong EU-NATO relationship is important in this regard. Additionally, nobody can predict what security threats Europe will face in the future and a comprehensive strategy may be needed to address them or at least to have the option of deploying military forces both regionally and globally. In a slightly different vein, there are those in the Brussels institutions who see CFSP/CSDP as a component part of the broader integration project to build European political union along federal lines.[34] The European federal project has been ongoing since the early 1950s and is mainly based on the Community method of technical functional integration.[35] Thus far, the areas of defence and foreign policy have not been subject to this method and continue to be based on

intergovernmental cooperation between member states.

EU Foreign Policy in the Context of Transatlantic Relations

What does this all mean for transatlantic relations? In particular, what does the forgoing mean for EU-US relations and EU- NATO relations?

Washington's primary security focus in the past decade has been the "war on terror". Most EU member states have not followed the US lead and have tended in the main to follow legal soft power approaches whereas the US has utilized a mixture of soft and hard power.[36] Indeed, most European states would not define counter-terrorism as fighting a war. Instead, they prefer to utilize legal means to curb the al-Qaeda threat. Why is this? The majority of EU member states lack military capabilities. The Union is not a state and lacks the legitimate monopoly of the means of violence. Therefore, even if the EU wanted to treat the post-9/11 period as a "war" it could not. As Zielonka has stated:

> The Union has no effective monopoly over the legitimate means of coercion. It has no clearly defined centre of authority. Its territory is not fixed. Its geographical, administrative, economic and cultural borders diverge. It is a polity without coherent demos, a power without identifiable purpose, a geopolitical entity without defined territorial limits.[37]

Additionally, the EU has developed as a soft power legal actor since its inception in the 1950s. There is also the empirical fact that America was attacked on September 11 and therefore feels itself as being under attack and at war, whereas Europe does not. Furthermore, the Obama Presidency has been lukewarm towards Europe, focusing on Asia-Pacific and Latin America in US foreign policy.[38] In the President's worldview Europe needs to shape up, take responsibility for some of the world's problems and stop "free-riding" on the US for its parochial security needs in order to avoid decline as a global actor.[39] There have also been transatlantic disagreements in recent years on how to respond to the global economic downturn, trade reform and climate change.[40] Then there is the lack of Europe-wide support for the American led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) counter-insurgency operation in Afghanistan and for out-of-area operations more generally.[41] This led the US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates to criticise several European states – particularly Germany – for not doing enough to assist the US in the Afghan operation.[42] The implication is that Washington will gradually withdraw resources from Europe as it perceives that he European states are incapable of helping the US broader strategy in the world. This is further compounded by the fact that the recession has negatively impacted on defence spending in Europe[43] sending a message to Washington that the Europeans

do not intend to increase capabilities and hence commitments to transatlantic and global defense.[44] The Europeans also lack key military capabilities such as intelligence, heavy-lift, command and control and sea power.[45] This also makes the Europeans less useful to America in the context of NATO-led operations throughout the world. However, Washington does regard CSDP as having some utility under a NATO umbrella for operations in Europe and the region in the context of executing crisis management and Petersburg Tasks.[46] This is where the EU can have an impact by niche marketing its limited military capabilities under CSDP within the context of humanitarian operations thereby making the EU-NATO relationship complementary in this area at least. Furthermore, as is mentioned above, Britain and France have also renewed military cooperation to boost European defense capabilities in areas such as rapid reaction working alongside NATO and CSDP as in Libya in early 2011.[47]

## Conclusion

As is mentioned above, Europe and America are deeply intertwined in the world economy; this in itself necessarily keeps both sides of the Atlantic in a state of close cooperation. Interests and values are seemingly aligned in the economic field. On the surface Europe and America seem to diverge more seriously in the defence and security fields. Post 9/11 the EU and its member states individually have broadly supported the US in its "war on terror". However, whereas Washington has used a mixture soft and hard power, the Europeans have tended to use almost exclusively soft power instruments. Indeed, many European states do not see the utility of using force to combat the threat of terrorism and instead favour the use legal and economic means to address with the problem. It must also be said that the EU and its member states lack world-class military capabilities (save Britain and France) and this exasperates American foreign policy élites and both political parties in Washington. There is a feeling in the US that Europe is in decline and cannot add anything to American capabilities around the world.[48] Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has hinted that Europe will become less relevant in the American grand strategy because it has not grasped the nettle of making itself more useful in the management of international security. Indeed, Secretary Gates has stated that European demilitarization is a threat to world peace.[49] This view arguably underplays Europe's role in the world through civilian power tools. As Wallace has argued the EU plays an important role in the management of global security via its aid, trade, and development policies and well as being a good multilateral friend to the US.[50] The EU and NATO have also reached some degree of complementarity on crisis management and the Petersburg Tasks working together for the greater European and transatlantic good. Additionally, the bilateral relationship in trade between the EU and US is the cornerstone of the global economy. Collectively, at European and transatlantic levels all the behind the scenes diplomacy contributes much to the stability of the international system. Indeed, as Calleo points out, both sides of the Atlantic seem parochial and adrift without each other in a political, economic and military sense.

[51] Perhaps European soft and normative power has a role to play in the transatlantic relationships of the future alongside European and American "hard" power, as do the CFSP, CSDP and NATO as part of that broader core transatlantic relationship.

(Endnotes)

1 Brendan Donnelly, `Europe in the World: All Change or No Change in Foreign Policy After Lisbon?', International Spectator, Vol. 45, No. 2, 2010, pp.17-22. For the full text of the Lisbon Treaty see: http://europa.eu/lisbon_treaty/full_text/index_en.htm

2 Christopher Hill, "The Directoire and the Problem of a Coherent EU Foreign Policy", CFSP Forum, 4,
no. 6, 2006, pp. 1–4. www.fornet.info/CFSPforum.htlm.

3 On this see: Stephen Woolcock, `The Treaty of Lisbon and the European Union as an actor in international trade', ECIPE Working paper, 1/2010. ECIPE, Brussels, at: http://www.ecipe.org/publications/ecipe-working-papers/the-treaty-of-lisbon-and-the-european-union-as-an-actor-in-international-trade

4 Raymond J. Ahearn, `Europe's New Trade Agenda', Congressional Research Service, Paper RS22547, December 6, 2006, p3.

5 Rebecca Steffenson, Managing EU-US Relations: Actors, Institutions and the New Transatlantic Agenda, New York, Palgrave, 2005, p.68.

6 Eurostat, (Comex, Statistical Regime 4), DG Trade, Brussels, at: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/html/113465.htm, 17 March 2011.

7 On the evolution of EU foreign policy, see: Stephan Keukeleire and Jennifer MacNaughtan, The Foreign Policy of the European Union, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2008, Chapter 2. Also see Christopher Hill and Michael Smith (Eds), International Relations and the European Union, Oxford University Press, 2005, Chapter 1.

8 Michael E. Smith, Europe's Foreign and Security Policy: The Institutionalization of Coordination, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2004, p.95.

9 Sven Biscop, (Ed), `Special Issue: European Foreign and Security Policy after Lisbon', Studia Diplomatica Vol. 63 No.1. 2010, pp.1-147.

10 Anders Wivel, `The Security Challenge of Small EU Member States: Interests, Identity and the Development of the EU as a Security Actor', Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 43, No. 2, 2005, pp.393-412.

11 Eva Gross, 'Germany and European Security and Defence Cooperation: The Europeanization of National Crisis Management Policies?', Security Dialogue, Vol. 38, No. 4, 2007, pp.501-520.

12 Simon Bulmer and William E. Paterson. `Germany and the European Union: from 'tamed power' to normalized power?', International Affairs, Vol. 86, No.4, 2010, pp.1051–1073.

13 Daniel Keohane, `10 Years After St. Malo', ISS Analysis, EU Institute for Security Studies, October 2008, at: www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/10_yrs_after_St_Malo.pdf

14 For recent developments in EU foreign policy, see: Frederiga Bindi (Ed), The Foreign Policy of he European Union: Assessing Europe's Role in the World, Washington, DC, Brookings Institution Press, 2010.

15 Josep M. Lloveras Soler, `The New EU Diplomacy: Learning to Add Value', EUI, Robert Schuman Centre on Advanced Study, RCAS Paper 05/2011, at: www.eui.eu/Projects/GGP/Documents/Publications//WorkingPapers/RSCAS201105-LLoveras.pdf

16 Pierre-Henri d'Argenson, `The Future of European Defence Policy', Survival: Global Politics

and Strategy, Vol. 51, No. 5, 2009, pp.143-154.
17 Christopher Hill, 'The Capabilities–Expectations Gap, or Conceptualizing Europe's International Role'. Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 31, No. 3, 1993, pp. 305–28.
18 Christopher J. Bickerton, Bastien Hirondelle and Anand Menon, `Security Co-operation beyond the Nation-State: The EU's Common Security and Defence Policy', Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 49, No.1, 2011, pp.1-21.
19 See: Giovanna Bono, 'The EU's Military Doctrine: An Assessment', International Peacekeeping, Vol. 11, No. 3, 2004, pp.439-456.
20 Aurel Sari, `Status of Forces and Status of Mission Agreements under the ESDP: The EU's Evolving Practice', The European Journal of International Law Vol. 19 No. 1, 2008, p.72
21 See: Joseph H. Nye, Jr, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics, New York, Basic Books, 2004. Also see: Francois Duchêne, 'The European Community and the Uncertainties of Interdependence', in M. Kohnstamm and W. Hager (eds) A Nation Writ Large? Foreign-Policy Problems before the European Community, 1973, pp. 1–21. London, Macmillan; Hedley Bull, 'Civilian Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?', Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 12, No. 2, 1982, pp.149–64.
22 Stephanie C. Hofmann, `Overlapping Institutions in the Realm of International Security: The Case of NATO and ESDP', Perspectives on Politics, Vol. 7, No. 1, 2009, pp.45-52.
23 Sean Carey, `Undivided Loyalties Is National Identity an Obstacle to European Integration?', European Union Politics, Vol. 3, no. 4, 2002, pp.387–413.
24 Rob de Wijk, `European Military Reform for a Global Partnership', The Washington Quarterly, Vol.27, No.1, 2003, pp. 197–210. Also see: Ian Manners, `Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?', Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 40, No.2, 2002, pp.235-258.
25 Julian Lindley-French, 'Britain and France: A Dialogue of Decline? Anglo-French Defence Co-operation and Implications for the European and Euro-Atlantic Security and Defence Relationships', Chatham House, International Security Programme Paper: ISP PP Paper 2010/02, 2010.
26 Sven Biscop and Jo Coelmont, `Permanent Structured Cooperation for Effective European Armed Forces', Egmont Security Policy Brief, 09/2010, pp.1-6, at: www.egmontinstitute.be/papers/10/sec-gov/SPB-9_PSCD.pdf
27 See: Anthony King, The Transformation of Europe's Armed Forces: From the Rhine to Afghanistan, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2011.
28 Jörg Monar, 'The EU's Externalisation of Internal Security Objectives: Perspectives after Lisbon and Stockholm', The International Spectator, Vol. 45, No. 2, 2010, pp.23-39.
29 Sven Biscop, 'From Lisbon to Lisbon: Squaring the Circle of EU and NATO Future Roles' Egmont Security Policy Brief, 16/2011, p.2, at: http://www.egmontinstitute.be/papers/11/sec-gov/SPB-16_Op-Ed-Nato.pdf
30 For the full text of the NATO New Strategic Concept from the Lisbon Summit of November 2010 see: http://www.nato.int/strategic-concept/index.html
31 See: Alvaro de Vasconcelos (Ed), `What do the Europeans Want From NATO?', EUISS Report No.8, Paris, November 2011.
32 Sarah Wolff, Nicole Wichmann, and Gregory Mounier, 'The External Dimension of Justice and Home Affairs: A Different Security Agenda for the EU?', Journal of European Integration, Vol. 31 No. 1, 2009, pp.9-23. Also see: Karen E. Smith, Special Issue: The External Dimension of Justice and Home Affairs: A Different Security Agenda for the EU?, Journal of European Integration, Vol. 31, No. 1, 2009, pp.1-156.
33 Jolyon Howorth, 'The EU as a Global Actor: Grand Strategy for a Global Grand Bargain?, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 48, No. 3, 2010, pp.455-474.
34 On the relationship between federalism and European integration see: Anand Menon and Martin Schain (Eds), Comparative Federalism: The US and EU in Comparative Perspective, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2006.
35 See: Michael Burgess, Federalism and European Union: the Building of Europe, 1950-2000. London: Routledge, 2000.

36 Jörg Monar, `The EU's Approach Post-September 11: Global Terrorism as a Multidimensional Law Enforcement Challenge', Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Vol. 20, No. 2, 2007, pp.267-283.
37 Jan Zielonka, 'Europe as a Global Actor: Empire By Example?', International Affairs, Vol. 84, No. 3, 2008, pp.473-474.
38 Timothy Garton Ash , ` Europe is sleepwalking to decline. We need a Churchill to wake it up', The Guardian (London), May 19 2010, at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2010/may/19/europe-sleepwalk-decline-wake
39 Cristina Barrios, 'Rival Universalisms in Transatlantic Relations: Obama's Exceptionalism Meets Europe's Low Profile', European Political Science, Vol. 10, No. 1, 2011, pp.11–19
40 Daily Telegraph (London), `Barack Obama's relationship with Europe 'not living up to its potential'', July 15 2010, at: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/barackobama/7891434/Barack-Obamas-relationship-with-Europe-not-living-up-to-its-potential.htm
41 Theo Farrell and Sten Rynning, 'NATO's Transformation Gaps: Transatlantic Differences and the War in Afghanistan', Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 33, No. 5, 2010, pp. 673-699.
42 Peter Spiegel, ` Gates rebukes Nato allies over Afghanistan', Financial Times (London), March 11 2011, at: http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/a499c626-4bd9-11e0-9705-00144feab49a.html#axzz1IZB0kDsb
43 The Europeans are currently spending on average just over 1% of GDP ineffectively on defense even before further defense cuts are being instituted in many EU countries. The two major military powers in Europe, Britain and France spend a little over 2% respectively of GDP on defense. Germany spends a little over 1% of GDP on defense. The US spends about 4.5% of GDP on defense and much more effectively than in Europe because it is a nation-state unlike the EU which is an international organization. See: The Military Balance, 2011: International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, IISS, 2011. Also see: Daniel Fiott, 'The Political Economy of European Defence', Europe's World, January 25 2011, at: http://www.europesworld.org/NewEnglish/Home_old/CommunityPosts/tabid/809/PostID/2214/ThePoliticalEconomyofEuropeanDefence.aspx
44 James Blitz, 'Nato chief warns Europe over defence budgets', Financial Times (London), February 7 2011, at: http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/db0fb476-32fd-11e0-9a61-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1IZB0kDsb
45 Asle Toje, 'The EU, NATO and European Defence – A slow train coming', Occasional Paper No. 74, EUISS, Paris, December 2008.
46 Jolyon Howorth, 'NATO and ESDP: Institutional Complexities and Political Realities', politique étrangère, English edition, Vol. 4, 2009, pp.95-106, at: www.ifri.org/downloads/pe42009howorth.pdf
47 James Kirkup and John Bingham, 'Anglo-French military force makes 'perfect sense' – Liam Fox', Daily Telegraph (London), November 2 2010, at: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/8104258/Anglo-French-military-force-makes-perfect-sense-Liam-Fox.html# Also see: BBC, `Libya: US, UK and France attack Gaddafi forces', at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-12796972, March 20 2011.
48 See for example: Alberto Alesina and Francesco Giavazzi, The Future of Europe: Reform or Decline, Camdridge, MA, The MIT Press 2006, which argues that Europe is in political and economic decline.
49 Brian Knowlton, 'Gates Calls European Mood a Danger to Peace', New York Times, February 23 2010, at: http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/24/world/europe/24nato.html
50 William Wallace, 'Europe, the necessary partner', Foreign Affairs, Vol. 80, No.3, 2001, pp.16-34.
51 David P. Calleo, Follies of Power: America's Unipolar Fantasy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2009, pp.165-166.

# The Travails of the European Union at the United Nations

**Dr. Karen E. Smith**
London School of Economics and Political Science
**UNITED KINGDOM**

Since the Lisbon Treaty entered into force on 1 December 2009, representatives from European Union member states and institutions have spent a considerable amount of time and energy trying to create the European External Action Service (EAS) and the office of the new High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. The appointment of Baroness Ashton as High Representative, her rocky period in office, and the bureaucratic and institutional battles over the EAS have made headlines across Europe. The fiercest battles are over, and the EAS is up and running (if not yet at full steam). But one area where the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty is still in flux is the European Union's relations with the United Nations. Indeed, it is still not clear how the Lisbon Treaty's provisions will be applied in this case, and the situation is further complicated in that the battles are not only 'internal' – within the EU – but external, with other members of the UN. A dramatic illustration of this came on 14 September 2010, when a majority in the UN General Assembly defeated an EU resolution to create an 'enhanced observer status' for the EU at the UN. EU member states had argued that such a status was necessary because they had to comply with the Lisbon Treaty; other UN members did not accept that the EU should have such a privileged position within the General Assembly.

How has this situation come about? Under the Lisbon Treaty, the High Representative is to organise the coordination of EU member states' actions in international organisations, and to express the Union's position in international organisations. In practice, the coordination is done by new 'EU delegations' to the international organisations, which replace the old delegations of the European Commission, and EU delegation officials are to speak on the EU's behalf in organisations such as the UN.

Why have these provisions created problems for the EU at the UN? First of all, the member states remain full members of the United Nations; they are not being replaced by an

EU seat. Indeed, all EU member states value their roles at the UN – as a cursory examination of any of their foreign ministry websites would show. They have long agreed, however, that they will coordinate their positions within the UN. Before the Lisbon Treaty entered into force, the rotating presidency (held by each member state in turn for six months) organised the coordination; now the High Representative is to do so. The key issue here is that member states may not always agree. A recent example of this is the vote in the UN Security Council on 17 March 2011, when Germany abstained on Resolution 1973, which allowed limited military action against Libya, while France and the UK pushed heavily for it. In another part of the UN, the Human Rights Council, the member states have regularly been divided in votes on Israeli actions. If the member states are divided, then it is obvious that there is no EU position to be expressed in the UN.

Secondly, the Lisbon Treaty indicates that if the EU member states do agree a common position, then it is to be expressed by the High Representative. This is quite a change, in that the rotating presidency would no longer be the 'voice' of the EU in UN bodies. This creates several dilemmas for the EU: before 2009, the European Commission occasionally spoke for the European Union in the UN, and it had 'observer status' at the UN. Observers speak after all other UN states speak, and are granted less speaking time than states. In contrast, the EU presidency, because it represented a grouping of states, often spoke at the beginning of debates (along with states representing groupings such as the African or Arab states). The new EU delegation, inheriting the observer status, would also inherit the limitations on its 'voice'. In replacing the presidency with the EU delegation, the EU loses out – and even more so if the EU member states do not speak in their capacities as UN members, as 27 voices would be reduced to only one.

For these reasons, in New York the EU and its member states decided to push for a new 'enhanced status' which would give the EU delegation more privileges during debates in the General Assembly. Yet other UN members had their reasons for objecting to this. If the EU demands a special status, then why can't other groupings? The United States, for one, is concerned that the EU's request would spark similar moves by other groups. Other groups have exactly the opposite concern, in that the enhanced observer status should not be exclusively for the EU.

A larger question here is whether the UN should be divided into regional blocs. There are ideas floating around for the membership of the UN Security Council to be based on regional seats, for example. This would be a radical shift in the practice of multilateralism – and for that reason, is unlikely to happen. But it would be wise for the EU to think about the wider implications of its attempt to force the rest of the UN to make special arrangements for it.

In the Human Rights Council, the EU is often outvoted and isolated. Why? Because there are strong blocs functioning there, who will always be able to win debates and pass resolutions because their members outnumber the EU member states (and EU 'allies') in the Human Rights Council. For example, the Organisation of the Islamic Conference calls upon its member states to vote together, and oppose measures that run counter to OIC objectives and values. The OIC is a voting bloc of 57 states, and has successfully pushed its own resolutions (often focusing on Israeli violations of human rights) and blocked initiatives (often supported by EU member states) that it doesn't like. Given that EU member states are in a minority at the Human Rights Council, it is imperative that the EU reaches out to the wider HRC membership, to build support for its positions. But building cross-cutting coalitions is difficult if blocs are united against the EU. In a UN dominated by blocs, the EU loses out. It is hard to see how in such a situation the EU can push for the 'effective multilateralism' it so often declares is one of its core strategic objectives.

Paradoxically, then, to maximise its influence in multilateral bodies such as the UN, the EU may have to minimise its "actorness". This is the uncomfortable position of a Union that is clearly not yet a state, but is more than just a loose regional group. The EU may find it has to be more flexible in terms of the exact extent to which the Lisbon Treaty provisions are to be implemented in international organisations.

# The EU and the War on Terror: More Than Meets the Eye

**Dr. Ramon Pacheco-Pardo**
Kings College
**UNITED KINGDOM**

The EU is keen to use its military power. This is a line that many outside of Europe would be surprised to read. It is also a line that more than a few officials in Brussels would rather not publicly acknowledge. Yet, when it comes to the war on terror the EU is willing to roll up its sleeves, flex its muscles, and use all means necessary to prevent terrorist attacks similar to the 2004 Madrid and 2005 London bombings.

Often portrayed as a normative power that prefers to use international norms and institutions to achieve its foreign policy goals, the EU has showed that when it comes to its own security all options are on the table. In the specific case of the war on terror, international norms do not apply. Terrorist networks and sympathetic governments targeting the EU do not abide by international law. Therefore, EU officials do not feel it is sufficient to resort to international norms and institutions to strengthen security. Normative power Europe might be a nice buzzword, but it does always not apply in practice.

Counter terrorism or the unfinished business

Counter terrorism is one of the areas of greater activity of the EU in the war on terror. The attacks on New York and Washington in 2001 were a wakeup call for Americans. The bombings in Madrid and London had a similar effect on Europeans. Certainly, EU officials had been aware that Europe was a target for Islamic terrorists for a long time. But many European citizens still believed that they were safe and that once autochthonous terrorist groups were under control the EU would be spared from terrorist attacks. After this belief was shattered in the worst possible way, the EU stepped up its game.

The European Security Strategy of 2003 had already identified terrorism as one of the five key threats to European security. The Strategy also identified different ways to fight this threat using intelligence, judicial, police and military measures and was further developed in the Counter-Terrorism Strategy, finalized in 2005. Published only four months after the London attacks, the document made clear that the EU would use all available means and act in as many places around the world as necessary to combat terrorism. To an extent, the EU has acted on its promise.

Several EU member states have their armies fighting in Afghanistan and Iraq. Even though the EU per se does not have an army, member states involved in these wars cooperate with each other and in some cases even operate together. Moreover, the EU does have a EU Police mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL) to train the country's police forces. Military intelligence gathering is a central component of Brussels' counter terrorism strategy, showing the EU's willingness to use military tools in this field.

*"Intelligence is the area in which cooperation among EU member states has been weakest"*

Police and judicial cooperation among EU member states has been strengthened since the publication of the 2005 Strategy. Thanks to the coordination work carried out by Europol and Eurojust, it is increasingly difficult for terrorist suspects to move from one member state to another to escape police investigation, something that was surprisingly easy only fifteen years ago. Since the establishment of Europol in 1999 and Eurojust in 2002 police forces and prosecutors from EU member states have had a common legal framework within which to fight terrorism. However, some member states are unwilling to channel resources into these areas, preferring to concentrate on issues such as tackling illegal immigration or enhancing energy security.

Intelligence is the area in which cooperation among EU member states has been weakest, and as a result the EU has been unable to fulfil its potential. The EU's equivalent of the CIA is the Joint Situation Centre, which has been home to a Counter-Terrorism Group since the 2001 terrorist attacks in America. However, the Centre's human and financial resources have been extremely limited when compared to those allocated to Europol and Eurojust. This might change following the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, since the Centre is now integrated into the European

External Action Service that will institutionalise EU foreign policy. To date, however, the Centre's record has been poor.

Another problem with the EU's counter terrorism strategy is the alleged unwillingness of member states, which are less threatened by terrorist networks to take a larger share of the burden of terrorism prevention. France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and the UK have been very active in shaping and implementing a common EU counter terrorism policy. They have also been the largest providers of funding and intelligence to Europol, Eurojust and the Joint Situation Centre, along with Sweden. But other member states have been unwilling to date to treat terrorism as a central threat to European security.

Counter proliferation or an integration success

Counter proliferation, or non-proliferation in Brussels' jargon, is the second area of greatest activity of the EU in the war on terror. But differently from counter terrorism, the EU's counter proliferation policy is much better defined and more effectively implemented. Crucially, the proliferation of WMD is an issue of concern to all EU member states, making cooperation easier. This is an area in which normative power Europe definitely does not exist. The EU is comfortable using its military muscle to ensure that WMD do not reach the hands of terrorist groups and so-called rogue regimes.

Proliferation has been a major concern for European countries since the 1980s. Indeed, the 2003 European Security Strategy called it "potentially the greatest threat" to the security of the EU. The Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, published two days before the Security Strategy, along with two other documents published earlier in 2003, enunciated the pillars of the EU's counter proliferation policy: action against proliferators, stable international environment, cooperation with key partners, and development of EU internal structures.

Building on its diplomatic and technical capabilities, the EU has been working with Armenia, Kazakhstan, Russia and Ukraine through political dialogue and technical support programmes to manage and, when possible, dismantle the nuclear programmes of these former Soviet republics. Putting its money where its key security interests are, the technical support programme has been generously funded since it began, shortly after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The EU has been successful in helping these countries manage their nuclear power plants and ensuring that no technology is transferred to unreliable third parties.

At the international level, the EU is one of the most active actors in the Nuclear

Non-Proliferation (NPT) regime. Brussels presented a common position of all EU member states at the 2005 and 2010 review conferences. Baroness Catherine Ashton, the EU's High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, spoke for the EU at the 2010 conference, providing Brussels with a seat at the table and a common voice. The EU has been publishing working papers on NPT safeguards since 2007, all of them jointly agreed by all member states. If there is a matter on which all EU countries agree it is their position with regards to the NPT.

The willingness of the EU to use coercive tools to control the proliferation of WMD has been most clearly demonstrated through the Proliferation Security Initiative. Initially conceived by the George W. Bush administration to intercept transfers of WMD and related materials, the initiative has been most successful in intercepting shipments going to or coming from the Middle East. The EU and all its member states participate in the initiative and several of them have deployed their navies to give military support to interception activities.

In addition, the EU and its member states have been closely involved in drafting and implementing UN Security Council and bilateral sanctions on Iran. Tellingly, EU sanctions have been even tougher, showing Brussels' willingness to go beyond what the international community deems proper action. Given that the EU is Iran's largest trading partner and oil export market, its sanctions have had a real economic impact on the Iranian regime.

Thinking about the future

The counter terrorism and counter proliferation policies of the EU are well developed. Nonetheless, there is certainly scope for Brussels to improve its role in both areas.

To begin with, counter terrorism policy coordination among member states is still limited. Asking all member states to agree to send their troops to war, as some have done in Afghanistan and Iraq, might be a step too far. But the fact that police and judicial cooperation and intelligence sharing are still not a priority for many member states hinders EU efforts to implement a coherent policy. The recently created area of freedom, security and justice should ensure better coordination and, in theory, strengthen the capabilities of those member states weaker in these areas. However, as discussed, political will is still lacking in many member states. The recent financial crisis and European sovereign debt crisis have not helped in this regard.

Intelligence gathering is a second area in which Brussels must also work harder. Some member states have modern and well-resourced intelligence services. The British MI6 and the French DCRI are two examples. However, other member states have not shown much commitment to surveillance of terrorism suspects and WMD shipments. Top notch human

resources exist, but political commitment to equip them with sufficient material resources does not. The work of the Joint Situation Centre depends heavily on the material provided by five or six member states. This has led some of them to develop stronger ties with the intelligence services of other countries, most notably the CIA. Differences between the intelligence services of Eastern and Western Europe is to be expected, given that most of their high ranking directors were recruited during the Cold War or shortly afterwards. But differences among Western Europe's intelligence communities do exist, and are unlikely to disappear any time soon.

Finally, the EU needs to become more involved outside of its immediate borders. Brussels has often been accused of focusing too much on its neighbouring regions. This is counterproductive for an EU that wants to be treated as a superpower and which claims to be a central player in global governance. The bilateral dialogue with India on nuclear issues initiated in 2005 was a step in the right direction. However, this has not been followed up with more activities elsewhere. Technical training and intelligence gathering outside of the EU neighbourhood have been especially weak. Given the transnational and globalised nature of today's security threats, it is not possible for the EU to protect itself effectively without improving its work in other regions of the world, never mind be considered a leading power. The European Security Strategy recognized this. The Treaty of Lisbon is a step in the right direction. Now it is up to the member states to allow Brussels to become a global player.

# The European Union: a Quietly Rising Global Smart Power in the 21st Century?

**Erik Brattberg**
Swedish Institute of International Affairs
**SWEDEN**

Sixty years after the birth of the European integration project, which was aimed at creating a peaceful and prosperous European continent in the aftermath of World War II, it has become a popular exercise for political pundits to assess Europe's standing in the world.

One of the most noticeable fads is the declaring of the impending end of the EU's global ambitions. Pointing to the rise of China, the decline of America, and the seeming inability of Europe to keep its own affairs in order, commentators have found it easy to at best ignore the EU, or even discount it entirely. Such arguments are headline grabbing, but flawed for at least three reasons.

First, these arguments are premised on a massive shift in global wealth and power to the South and the East. This shift is taking place, to be sure, and the old international order is giving way to one shared by non-Western rising states. The current international order – made up of open and rule-based relations embedded in institutions such as the United Nations and the so-called Bretton Woods institutions – must learn sooner rather than later how to accommodate new global players in meaningful ways. Decades of talk about reform of these institutions must lead to action today.

Yet the international order isn't really under threat. As John Ikenberry has pointed out, today's power transition is taking place within – not in contradiction to – the existing international order. China, for instance, needs that system and the rights and protections it affords. It's the hierarchies within that system, once dominated by the U.S. and Europe, that are changing – not the system itself. The old powers must make room, but they aren't being pushed to the sidelines. Paraphrasing Ikenberry, the United States and Europe will no longer dominate the international order as

they have been doing for decades, but they will still need to uphold it. This system requires maintenance, protection and support. Often seen as a more credible player than the United States, Europe, with its long commitment to multilateralism, is well-placed to lead this reform drive.

Second, overly negative predictions of the EU's role in the world are rooted in assumptions about shifting levels of economic power. The BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India and China) we are told, are rising in economic strength and will soon leave Europe behind. Europe, on the other hand, isn't in a position to stop this, since its periphery is in economic flames and its center is preoccupied with crisis management.

And on top of the current economic and financial crisis, lingering structural problems, ranging from an aging population to chronic unemployment to growing government deficits, suggest that European countries will stand little chance of competing against the booming economies in the global South and East. This crude generalization, however, presupposes a future based on the status quo, where Europe is doomed to inaction.

Yet Europe isn't doomed to inaction, although it does indeed face a pressing need to rebuild its financial system and boost competitiveness. With half a billion citizens, a fourth of the world's economy and almost a fifth of global trade, Europe remains an economic giant. Although the euro is currently facing serious problems, the financial crisis is also likely to prompt new powers at the European level to increase political coordination. There's a very real possibility that a stronger Europe will rise from the ashes of the current euro crisis. Moreover, the EU's services sectors, the last of the internal market initiatives requiring implementation, is an untapped source of economic strength, accounting for over 70% of the EU's aggregate GDP, but only a fifth of its global exports. So Europe can still keep up with other global players, and as others falter (even China certainly will at some point), Europe's economic assets will remind the world that economic fluctuations are a relative, not absolute, question.

Third, these arguments rely heavily on the belief that military might will remain a fundamental source of political strength in the years ahead. Few can dispute the fact that capability to project power requires a strong military presence, and that the EU's efforts to build a military capability have faltered of late. Although Europe isn't likely to become a full-fledged hard power, at least not in the foreseeable future, it still needs to continue developing its military capacities.

Despite attempts since the mid-1990s to bolster the EU's hard power capabilities, European countries still spend less than half of what the U.S. does on defense. Furthermore, the so-called "Helsinki Headline Goals", stipulating that the EU is

to have 60,000 troops on stand-by for overseas crisis management missions, remain unfulfilled. Moreover, as the recent military operation in Libya has once again reminded us, European countries still have a long way to go before having the unilateral capacity to project power anywhere close to that of the U.S. These shortcomings are further compounded by the spending cuts on defense in the wake of the economic and financial crisis. France and the UK, which together constitute two thirds of the EU's overall defense capabilities, have already taken concrete measures toward further reductions in their respective defense expenditures. But inadequate capabilities aren't the only problem for the EU's ability to project hard power; lacking political will is an equally salient factor. As seen during the Libya crisis, some EU member states (notably Germany) are still opposed to the EU playing any sort of military role during crises, even in response to a humanitarian crisis.

Nevertheless, Europe still has a critical role to play in global security. Modern security problems will continue to be divided between clear crises and more disparate threats stemming from the forces of globalization. To rehearse an important but oft-forgotten adage, guns do not solve all of the world's security problems. Rebuilding states, deterring cyber-sabotage, suppressing terrorism and strengthening critical infrastructures are equally important tasks in today's complex multidimensional security landscape as the ability to launch military operations.
To succeed in the long term, with reconstruction and with promoting sustainable peace in fragile societies, a mix of civilian means such as police and judicial support, security sector reform and development assistance is required. Here, the EU's wide array of civilian instruments gives it a critical, even leading, role in addressing complex, transboundary security threats. As a global "soft power", Europe accounts for roughly half of the world's total development assistance (whereas the U.S. only accounts for a fifth), and it's a leading actor when it comes to environment and human rights issues. With the Lisbon Treaty, the EU has also beefed up its diplomatic presence around the globe. The new EU "State Department", the European External Action Service (EEAS), now exists side by side with the national representations. Taken together, some 94,000 European diplomats are today stationed across the world, giving the EU unsurpassed diplomatic clout.

So, let us not discount the future of Europe quite yet. Europe still has the potential to play a strong and meaningful role in the international order, global economy and multidimensional security environment in the years ahead. In a world where both hard and soft power matter, the EU can leverage what it has of both to fulfill the prescription for "smart power". But to do so requires action now to take steps that will enable it to fulfill these functions. We outline three areas where urgent reform is needed: