Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif recently issued a statement telling the Afghan regime to choose between Pakistan and the TTP. This reflects a renewed hardline stance toward Afghanistan's interim government, based on their response to TTP militants seeking refuge on Afghan soil. In late April 2025, Deputy Prime Minister Ishq Dar visited Afghanistan to discuss bilateral and transit issues. During that meeting, the Taliban assured Dar they would “contain” the TTP, but Pakistan continued to face cross-border terrorist activities against its forces. In the last week of August, the Afghan government accused Pakistan of conducting strikes in the eastern provinces of Afghanistan and targeting civilians, which Pakistan's foreign ministry refuted by saying it was an effort to obscure the seriousness of the ongoing situation.

There has been a surge in militant attacks on Pakistani forces following the fall of Kabul 2.0. Several factors contribute to this rise. First, the uncoordinated and hurried withdrawal created a security and power vacuum in Afghanistan, which militant groups operating under different banners quickly filled. They reorganized and seized control of the most advanced weapons left by NATO and US forces. Pakistan, on its part, failed to consolidate its previous advantage in fighting terrorism by managing development projects, improving governance, and implementing rehabilitation programs in tribal areas. Leaving these gaps, the country became vulnerable to militant infiltration. Another factor is the lack of proper coordination between provincial and federal governments, which has delayed a unified response to the rising threats. Moreover, the flexibility shown by the government in 2021 negotiations with TTP factions weakened Pakistan’s stance, allowing militants to use the talks to increase their influence in the region instead of achieving genuine reconciliation. Additionally, Pakistan's western border is notoriously difficult to control, and despite fencing, militants continue to exploit its porous nature. This was evident in the military operation on September 13, 2025, in which 35 militants were killed.

Pakistan has consistently offered assistance to the Afghan government in combating TTP. However, this offer was rejected by the Taliban regime, which reaffirmed their independence in handling the issue. According to the UN July 2024 Report, about 6000 to 6500 TTP militants are operating from Afghan territory. During a series of backchannel diplomatic talks, the top leadership of the Afghan Taliban assured Pakistan that they would take action against TTP safe havens in Afghanistan. However, with various power centers, differing loyalties, and conflicting agendas, field commanders do not necessarily follow the leadership's directives or ideology. These commanders, who fought alongside the TTP during the anti-US insurgency, refuse to obey any orders from Kabul or Kandahar. The statement by the Pakistani PM also emphasizes that Islamabad's patience is running out due to the Afghan Taliban's duplicity on the TTP issue.

Pakistan has previously responded in various ways to Kabul's ongoing support for militants. Earlier, Pakistan restricted transit trade by closing the Torkham border in August, aiming to pay the price for non-compliance with Islamabad's demands. Additionally, Pakistan has deported 1.2 million non-registered Afghan refugees, a pace that is expected to increase in the coming months. Major regional players have acknowledged the issue, as seen in a joint statement issued during a quadrilateral meeting of China, Russia, Iran, and Pakistan on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly session last year.

China is responding to the situation by encouraging Pakistan and Afghanistan to engage in dialogue. Its efforts to mediate and resolve tensions between Pakistan and Afghanistan represent one of its most prominent diplomatic initiatives in the region. On May 21, 2025, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi led a trilateral meeting with the foreign ministers of Afghanistan and Pakistan in Beijing. China’s primary interest involves expanding the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) into Afghanistan. However, despite these efforts, the process remains far from complete. This contrasts with Afghanistan’s pursuit of trade security and international recognition. Beijing's growing influence over Kabul has yet to translate into effective leverage to persuade the Afghan Taliban to change their regional terrorism policies. Additionally, the presence of ISKP further limits the Afghan Taliban's options against the TTP, as they risk losing thousands of TTP fighters to ISKP. In this context, China, during the meeting, acted as a facilitator rather than a party, leaving it without sufficient leverage to influence Kabul to contain TTP militants.

This growing frustration in Pakistan over the Afghan situation has led to a shift in Pakistan's policy towards Afghanistan, moving toward a carrot-and-stick approach. As the Sharif statement suggests, Pakistan no longer sees Afghanistan as a buffer but is willing to confront issues for the sake of the greater national interest.

To address this growing concern, it is only a matter of time before Pakistan, Central Asian states, along with Russia and China, develop a collective security strategy to counter the increasing threat of transnational terrorism originating from Afghanistan. At the national level, a stable federal-provincial relationship is crucial to strengthening Pakistan’s internal security framework. Currently, the politicization of terrorism has created confusion within the ranks of KP's law enforcement agencies, which could have serious strategic consequences by severely undermining their operational capabilities. Tackling terrorism in the coming year will therefore require a stable federal-provincial relationship. To effectively engage with Afghanistan on the issue of cross-border sanctuaries of TTP, Pakistan’s federal and provincial governments must adopt a unified stance.

Muhammad Asif Khan is an M.Phil. Scholar and researcher affiliated with the Consortium for Asia-Pacific Studies (CAPS). His research focuses on regional politics and foreign policy development in the Asia Pacific region, with a particular interest in analyzing geopolitical dynamics and their global implications.