By Dr. Cornelia Beyer The study I want to present here involved work on the motivations of two regional actors – the EU and ASEAN – for the decision to engage in the US-led Global War on Terrorism (Beyer 2010). The overall argument that this study put forward promoted an understanding of global governance in the area of counterterrorism as showing features of hegemonic leadership. I therefore spoke of hegemonic governance in my writing. I want to reflect on the implications of this research in a bit broader way, and utilize the results to pose sort of a challenge, or critique, to the mainstream literature on global governance. The main argument will be that I believe among the three models of global governance – the world state, governance without government, and hegemonic governance – the latter seems the most empirically appropriate model to understand the current configuration of global governance. While the model of the world state obviously is the most radically normative model and not widely discussed, the mainstream literature focuses on the second model: governance without government. While this is understandable as long as this discourse is understood to be still very normative in nature, I believe this model would misguide us if we take it as an empirically valid model of current global governance arrangements and processes. Two points I want to make for this purpose. First, I think the continuing dominant role of the state is largely underestimated in the mainstream literature on global governance. In contradiction to the literature, my study found evidence for the states being still the most important recipients and actors in global governance. Second, I believe that the implicit or explicit assumption of heterarchy in global governance is misleading us to neglect the importance of hegemonic leadership and agenda setting powers of strong states in global governance. And summing the former two arguments up, I believe that the current discourse on global governance underestimates the systemic forces which are in place in shaping the behaviors of states and influencing their decisions to cooperate or to abstain from cooperation in global governance. Let me explain these points to a bit more detail. The continuing importance of the state. Much of the literature on global governance proposes that the role of the state is declining, or at least transforming. This is a central theme in the discourse, utilized by writers such as Khagram, Niekerk and David Held. The main argument here usually involves the issues of functions shifting to other actors, the state being sandwiched between new political powers above and below, and the overall growth in numbers and following that political participation of new, non-state actors, both on the sub-national and supranational level. Walters confirms the impression that the role of the state is viewed in a very – shall I say optimistic? – manner in most of the literature, and he asks us to take these arguments with caution. There seems to be little evidence from historically comparative studies to really confirm what is presented as a fact: that the state is withdrawing and ceding ever more functions to other actors. I cannot provide with such research myself, but looking at the results from my study on counterterrorism, I would be inclined to support the opposing argument, that the state remains the strongest actor in global governance. In the field of counterterrorism, activities of coordination and cooperation largely took place on a bilateral level. It has not been the interregional level that has showed most importance, not the cooperation in international organizations and, of course, (in the field of counterterrorism) not the transnational interaction between states and private actors. Counterterrorism obviously is a security issue, and in this area of politics states usually are reluctant to cede sovereign powers to other actors. Nonetheless, the observations from this study would confirm the impression that interstate relations still matter most, even in global governance. Counterterrorism happened mostly on the bilateral interstate level. In addition, if we look at international organizations, for example, we see clearly that their memberships still comprise entirely states. It is states who engage with each other in international organizations. Even the EU, as the most state-like entity of that sort, only has an observer status in the UN. And this is the region with most international acceptance as an actor in its own right. Also, private actors are not very fully integrated in international organizations, something which we should expect if the assumption of a recession of the state would really hold true. But I think, looking at the issue of hierarchy and power this might become even clearer. The neglect of hierarchy in global governance is exemplified by statements such as Khagrams normative call for greater equalization of interstate authority. As mentioned, Khagram takes a highly normative view on global governance. However, the assumption of heterarchy is even present in more empirically oriented writings on global governance, such as in Niekerk. “Consequently, globalisation does prefigure a historic power shift from national governments to evolving systems of regional and global economic governance. ... the contemporary world order might best be described as a heterarchy.” (Nierkerk 2010: p. 43). Global governance, I argue here, much more than being a heterarchic undertaking should be understood as hegemonic governance to account for these inequalities in power. Hegemonic governance would take note of the factual configurations of the international system and integrate therefore a more realist inspired worldview with a perspective on global governance. While the term would not stand for a description of global governance solely controlled by the hegemon, it would nonetheless argue that the hegemon, as well as probably other major (Western) powers, has/have an uneven share of power to set agendas and influence other states behaviors. The study indicated, and this was in fact one of the most important findings, that dominance and power in various forms were the main cause for participation in this specific form of global governance. While absolute power differentials in themselves are arguably a reason for states to collaborate with the hegemon, as a form of bandwagoning under hegemony, States collaborated with the hegemon for several – and diverse – additional reasons. In the first case, the EU, it was mostly the perception of the hegemon as a legitimate leader as well as a shared discourse and understanding of the need to engage in a Global War on Terrorism that seemed to explain participation. Other potential factors, such as dependence on, or pressure from, the hegemon were found to be not important. The second study on ASEAN, on the other hand, indicated that economic interdependencies were of immense importance and influencing decisions to cooperate. A shared discourse was found to be present, but had less importance for cooperation than in the case of the EU. Pressure was apparently in some cases exercised. And the role of the US as a hegemon was supported and accepted. These variables can be linked to hegemony, even though we have to combine the Realist understanding here with critical perspective, for example, to be able to account for power in the form of discourse. In both cases, it has to be mentioned that the dominance of the US and their authority were stated, also as a reason to participate. In addition, hegemonic leadership and power exercise was found to be present in global governance more widely. Several authors present arguments for the dominance of United States agenda setting powers in many international organizations, specifically the UN, economic organizations, and NATO. In fact, it had been argued that the United States brings its dominant power to bear in every organization it belongs to. Finally, I would like to conclude with a word on how the findings from this study do influence my understanding of the current configuration of the international system. I have argued for what I termed hegemonic governance. This term for me implies a mixture of systems on the international level. At the one hand, in my view there is still unipolarity, with some major powers emerging but one dominant state. This unipolarity is exercised actively in a hegemonic manner, with the attempt to order international affairs according to the preferences of the hegemon. Effects of such hegemonic ordering activities are manifold and well known (liberalism, democratization etc), a recent one has been the spread of global cooperation in counterterrorism. In addition, global governance arrangements are present and are working in part relatively independently from the hegemon. Oftentimes, and where and whenever it is in the interest of the hegemony, though, the hegemony uses its power to exercise leadership within these global governance arrangements. That leads me to conclude that neither do we already have a fully autonomous global governance sphere set apart from the traditional world of states, nor do states and states’ power count less in current affairs. I therefore argue we have to combine a realist-inspired understanding, which I think must even be combined with some critical literature, of world politics with the more normative accounts on global governance to come to a correct interpretation of current affairs. References Beyer, Anna Cornelia (2010): Counterterrorism and International Power Relations: The EU, ASEAN and Hegemonic Global Governance. London: IB Tauris. Held, David; Anthony McGrew (2002): Governing Globalisation: Power, Authority and Global Governance. Cambridge: Polity Press. Khagram, Sanjeev (2006): Possible Future Architectures of Global Governance: A Transnational Perspective/Prospective. In: Global Governance, 12:1, pp. 97 – 117. Van Niekerk, Arno (2010): Governance from Below and Global Governance: Accomodating Change. In: Gueler Aras, David Crowther (ed.): NGOs and Social Responsibility (Developments in Corporate Governance and Responsibility, Volume 1). Bingley: Emerald Group Publishing Limited, pp.33 – 55. Dr. Cornelia Beyer is a lecturer in Security Studies Department of Politics and International Studies at the University of Hull

Comments in Chronological order (0 total comments)

Report Abuse