

The Role of African Union and the Arab League in supporting political integration and stability in Sudan: Case Study of Darfur

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Dedications

This study is respectfully presented to the people of Darfur, whose boldness, bravery, and fortitude against all odds and limits know no bound. Their tales of struggle against violence, displacement, and hardship are a stark reminder of the need for justice, peace, and change.

Abstract

This research critically evaluates the roles played by the African Union (AU) and the Arab League (AL) in promoting political integration and stability in Sudan, with a prime focus on the Darfur conflict. Through the analysis of their respective interventions, strategies, and impacts, the study explores how these two regional organizations addressed one of the longest and most devastating crises in Sudan's modern history.

The study concentrates on the African Union's military and mediation efforts, particularly its peacekeeping missions, and the diplomatic and political efforts by the Arab League to promoting regional stability. Through comparative analysis, the research explores the interactions between these organizations and the complexities resulting from Sudan's dual membership of both the African Union and Arab league.

Drawing on Darfur as a case study, the research intends to bring into light the wider-ranging implications of regional cooperation on conflict management and political integration in Sudan. The findings can inform future regional organizational interventions, providing suggestions for enhancing their effectiveness in conflict resolution and governance. It can guide Sudanese policymakers on how to deal with dual memberships for the greatest national benefit.

Chapter one

1.1 Introduction

According to political terminology, the process of amalgamation or arranging various units into an integrated whole is termed integration. If not merely unification, it also denotes "centralization, in which decision-making and government are focused to bring about a more united entity". From unity and centralization perspectives, integration can be analyzed in terms of the following aspects of dimension (Ilievski, 2021):

- Development of one legal entity
- Existence of one institution
- Centralization of decision-making mechanisms
- The establishment of a social identity.
- Development of a collective identity. (Ilievski, 2021).

Sudan is a Northeast African country that borders, to the southwest, the Central African Republic; further west, Chad; northwest, Libya; north, Egypt; east, the Red Sea; southeast, Eritrea and Ethiopia; and to the south, South Sudan. By 2024, Sudan has an estimated population of 50 million people and an area of 1,886,068 square kilometers, making it the third-largest country in both Africa and the Arab League by area. Since its secession in 2011, Sudan was the largest country in both the regions of the Sudan(Wikipedia, 2024).

Sudan became a member of the Arab League on January 19, 1956, just several months after independence from British-Egyptian rule. The implication of this membership has been increased political, economic, and cultural relations between Sudan and other fellow Arab states. The following highlights the place of Sudan within the League:

Political Framework Agreement: Many political agreements that have been first initiated within Sudan, with the support of the Arab League, have been a driver for stability and facilitated transitions towards better times for political and economic reasons. More precisely, in December 2022, it supported the Political Framework Agreement as a roadmap towards a new transitional period headed to national elections.

Conflict Mediation: The Arab league has been involved in the mediation of Sudan's internal conflicts for active ceasefires and the promotion of peace talks. Often, this is in cooperation with other international agencies like the United Nations and the African Union.

National Initiatives: The League has been in consistent support of the various initiatives being taken up by Sudan pertaining to political stability and economic development. This includes support for international aid and resumption of development projects led by international financial bodies (Qatar News Agency, 2022).

Cooperation with Other Agencies: Arab League, through joint cooperation with other regional and international agencies, is trying to resolve the conflict and bring about peace in Sudan that would help in long-term regional stability (United Nations, 2024).

Sudan is also an influential member of the African Union as it is among the founding members of the organization. The AU officially started its operations on May 26, 2001, in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, and was launched on July 9, 2002, in Durban, South Africa, and replaced the Organization of African Unity that Sudan joined in 1963 (Wikipedia).

The major focuses of Sudan engagement with the AU are:

The AU has been influential in the mediation process in Sudan, especially over the Darfur issue and recently during civil unrest. It has facilitated negotiations towards peace and called for ceasefires to be in place. (Changwe & Alusala)

Support for Democratic Transition: Through the AU, Sudan has been able to transition to democratic governance, with a peaceful transition of power and authority led by civilians.

Humanitarian Missions: The AU has also marshaled response activities in Sudan in light of humanitarian crises through protection of civilians and adherence to the rules of international humanitarian laws.

Peace Missions: The AU created a special mission in April 2023 to intervene in the current civil war in Sudan. This mission is involved in negotiations with stakeholders in this civil war,

including military groups, civil society, and international interest groups, to assist in finding a solution to the problem.

This integrated approach by the Arab League and the African Union underlines their critical roles in shaping Sudan's political landscape and has marked the complexity involved in navigating Sudan's dual membership of these regional organizations (PSC Report, 2021).

1.2 Background

Sudan Before joining the Arab League 1953-1956

On February 12, 1953, an agreement between the United Kingdom and Egypt granted Sudan self-government rights and an opportunity for self-determination. This marked the beginning of a transitional period during which, in 1954, a parliamentary system was introduced. That very year, on August 18, 1955, an armed rebellion broke out in the southern Sudanese town of Torit. Although this revolt was quickly suppressed, it marked the start of a low-level guerrilla war headed by former southern soldiers and, in hindsight, could be considered the commencement of the First Sudanese Civil War. On 15 December 1955, at the Second Conference of the National Unionist Party, Prime Minister Ismail al-Azhari announced that within four days, Sudan would unilaterally declare independence. On January 1, 1956, the parliament of Sudan declared this country independent of foreign control, an act to which both the United Kingdom and Egypt granted immediate recognition (Wikipedia, 2020).

Sudan's Relations with the Arab League

Sudan joined the Arab League in 1956 primarily to confirm its position as an Arab state and to consolidate regional cooperation after gaining independence from British-Egyptian condominium rule. It joined to identify itself with other Arab states for political and economic support, given its weak diplomatic influence and cultural ties within the Arab world.

The relation of the League of Arab States with Sudan has been broad-ranging and multi-layered. Sudan represents a very important bridge between the Arab world and Sub-Saharan Africa. For the neighboring Arab countries, Sudan is of strategic importance from the point of view of various security problems, including those related to the distribution of Nile water and issues linked with armed groups allegedly supported by the Sudanese government. Despite allegations of Sudan supporting international terrorism, the Arab League often treats Sudan as a political ally in its struggle against Western influence. In turn, Sudan has received mixed perception in the Arab world itself, with many in the region viewing it as a backward, almost "primitive cousin" that calls into question its identity as an Arab nation. This tension has motivated Egyptian politicians and thinkers over the years to offer various political unions or schemes with Sudan in a bid to stabilize the two nations. While Egypt and Sudan acknowledge

each other's sphere of influence, the two states often operate unilaterally rather than multilaterally, hence making their relations complex.

During the 1990s, Sudan's membership into the so-called Tripoli-Baghdad-Tehran axis made numerous Arab regimes wary, especially once Hassan al-Turabi emerged as a major political player, promoting a platform of political Islam. Recently one of the most influential Sudanese politicians during the mid-1980s turmoil and following the 1989 coup d'état led by Omar al-Bashir, surged to challenge the Arab League by advocating the Popular Arab and Islamic Conference. The latter was a parallel organization to the Arab League and thus criticized Arab regimes to the extent that Sudan's relations with Egypt deteriorated. Sudan labeled Egypt as the "client-state" of the United States, aligned with Israel, and witnessed hostilities in the form of reports because of several pressure factors of border disputes like the Hala'ib region conflict and the attachment of Turabi to terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda, Hezbollah and Hamas. Things reached a height after the assassination plot on Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in Addis Ababa in 1995, which the government officials believed was related to the Turabi regime. After this incident, Egypt provided asylum for various Sudanese opposition leaders, including John Garang, who was the leader of the SPLA. Following the 1999 break of al-Bashir with Turabi, Egypt formally changed its allegiance and provided support to al-Bashir's government. Nevertheless, this assistance was given behind closed doors through third-party NGOs since Egypt remained officially wary towards Sudan throughout that era.

Sudan's Turabi regime during the 1990s rendered Sudan an isolated country in the international platform. The U.S. government accused Sudan of supporting terrorism, hence making ties with Arab nations more strained especially following the controversial stance of Sudan during the Gulf War. It got worse when Sudan was listed as a state sponsor of terrorism upon the bombing of the World Trade Center in 1993 which culminated into the airstrikes by the U.S. in 1998 against the al-Shifa pharmaceutical factory in Khartoum. This attack reflected Western interference; thus, Sudan began to seek international legitimacy and took a distance from Turabi's regime accordingly. This can be seen in the fact that Turabi dissolved his organization known as the National Islamic Front in 2001 (Weber, 2010).

Sudan's Political State Before its Admission to the OAU

Political power in Sudan was accumulated at the center following the military coup engineered by General Ibrahim Abboud in 1958, thereby making civilian government irrelevant. Abboud

established what came to be called the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, made up of military officers reputedly aligned with influential factors such as the Ansar and Khatmiyyah. The Ansar faction was very influential at first, but the influence began to wane after the removal of Abboud's deputy Abd al-Wahab in March 1959. The early Abboud years were not altogether unsuccessful in that there was a good cotton marketing season and, after disputes over Nile water, there was a temporary normalization between Cairo and Khartoum.

The regime militarized the state and the political influence of the Ansar and Khatmiyyah factions waned regardless. Influential Ansar leader Abd al-Rahman al-Mahdi died in early 1959, and the faction lost further ground as his son Sadiq al-Mahdi held a brief sway over the Ansar but never attained his father's stature. The opposition to the Abboud regime began to grow, and anti-government military officers attempted three coups in 1959. Whereas these coups indeed failed and their leaders were put in prison, opposition continued, especially from the Sudanese Communist Party. Actually, the government of Abboud was having quite a hard time in consolidating power and dealing with extremely high political instability, economic stagnation, and a lack of any effective civilian advisers. This policy of suppression of cultural and religious resistance in southern Sudan led to the undermining of Abboud's regime. It is said, "Abboud's Southern Policy was geared towards suppressing the cultural and religious resistance in southern Sudan, and this undermined his regime" (Wikipedia, 2024).

Sudan and the Organization of African Unity (OAU)

The Organization of African Unity (OAU) was an intergovernmental organization that was aimed at fostering cooperation among newly independent African states. Sudan was one of the founding members of the Organization of African Unity, which was established on May 25, 1963, in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Its mission was closely related to the ideals of pan-Africanism, and it had much to do with the unity and solidarity in African states, the improvement of standards of living, the protection of the sovereignty of member states, and the eradication of colonialism. It ensured the realization of these ideals through peaceful coexistence and cooperation, and progressively came to incorporate all African countries with the exclusion of Morocco alone (Beverton, 2009).

African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS)

The African Union Mission in Sudan was basically the peacekeeping force established by the African Union as a response to the Darfur conflict, specifically within the western area in Sudan. Formed in 2004 with an initial deployment of 150 personnel, AMIS grew to around 7,000 troops by mid-2005. It was during this time that the United Nations Security Council, by way of Resolution 1564, ordered that AMIS was to work in close coordination with the UN Mission in Sudan, which was then to be known as UNMIS. Until the deployment of the joint UN-AU mission in December 2007, AMIS was the only foreign military force in Darfur, though it struggled to contain the violence. Despite proposals for a larger UN peacekeeping force back in September 2006, this was delayed due to opposition by the Sudanese government. The mandate of AMIS was extended several times in 2006 as the situation in Darfur kept deteriorating, and it finally led to the establishment of UNAMID towards the end of 2007. (Wikipedia, 2024)

1.3 Research Problem

This study attempts to explore, how the African Union and Arab League, through their respective roles, mechanisms, and interaction, have shaped the political integration and stability of Sudan. Using the Darfur conflict as a primary case study, this paper explores the complex dynamics that result from the different approaches that these organizations have adopted in the context of peacekeeping, mediation, and diplomatic support for sovereignty. Sudan's dual membership in both organizations has increased the already high entanglement of mediation efforts and put forward juxtaposed peace initiatives; often with very contradictory content. These dynamics raise questions about how regional organizations can support sustainable peace and integration in politically unstable environments such as Sudan.

1.4 Research objectives

General objective: To analyze and compare the impact of the Arab League and the African Union on Sudan's political integration and stability.

Specific objectives:

1. To evaluate the effectiveness of the African Union's peacekeeping and mediation efforts in reducing conflict-related violence and fostering stability in Darfur.

2. To analyze the Arab League's diplomatic role in supporting Sudan's sovereignty and its impact on the international perception and resolution of the Darfur conflict.
3. To examine the challenges and opportunities arising from Sudan's dual membership in the African Union and the Arab League, and how this dynamic shaped conflict mediation and peacebuilding efforts.
4. To identify the implications of conflicting approaches by the African Union and the Arab League on the coherence and success of regional and international peace initiatives in Darfur.

1.5 Research questions

1. How effective were the African Union's peacekeeping and mediation efforts in reducing conflict-related violence and fostering stability in Darfur?
2. What role did the Arab League's diplomatic support for Sudan's sovereignty play in shaping the international perception and resolution of the Darfur conflict?
3. What challenges and opportunities arose from Sudan's dual membership in the African Union and the Arab League, and how did this dynamic influence conflict mediation and peacebuilding efforts?
4. How did the differing approaches of the African Union and the Arab League affect the coherence and success of regional and international peace initiatives in Darfur?

1.6 Hypothesis

The study is guided by the following hypotheses, which will be tested using comparative analysis:

- Hypothesis 1 (H1): A basic hypothesis is that the League of Arab States (AL) and the African Union (AU) can often have similar goals of achieving stability, development, and political integration, but their roles may conflict in crises, leading to instability, poor development, and failed political integration.
- Hypothesis 2 (H2): The AU's peacekeeping missions in Darfur have been more effective in reducing conflict-related violence compared to the AL's diplomatic efforts, due to the AU's active military engagement on the ground.
- Hypothesis 3 (H3): Sudan's membership in both the AU and the AL has created a dual-influence dynamic complicating international mediation efforts in the Darfur conflict, as each organization brings different priorities and interests.

1.7 Significance of the study

The influence of regional organizations on the political integration or stability, or otherwise development, of individual member states such as Sudan can be elucidated by comparison and contrast with the influences of the Arab League and the African Union. This research will, therefore, shed light on ways in which regional organizations shape the trajectories of their members by serving both to support and challenge national development processes dependent on priorities, capacities, and geopolitical contexts within which they act.

The resultant work will, in turn, serve usefully to inform Sudanese policy makers and analysts of how best the country can negotiate the implications of its dual membership of both the Arab League and the African Union. In so doing, it will help Sudan to maximize the opportunities accruing from the exercise of such a dual membership while minimizing possible tensions or contradictions. This research will thus provide the groundwork for devising a more effective and coherent foreign policy strategy that furthers Sudan's national interests within both regional frameworks. Knowledge Gap: Finally, this study shall help bridge an important knowledge gap in the existing literature.

Amidst the wealth of research that has been carried out on these organizations as separate entities, not much can be compared in terms of how both the Arab League and the African Union have impacted, say, a single country. This paper will add to the various ways in which regional bodies shape national trajectories in complex and multifaceted ways by focusing on the experiences of Sudan.

1.8 Limitations of research

While this research provides an in-depth overview of the role of the Arab League and African Union regarding the political integration, stability, and development of Sudan, this work is by no means limitation-free.

Data Availability: Most of the data in the research are from secondary sources, official documents, scholarly articles, and news reports. However, these may have biases, lapses, or inaccuracies that could affect the findings of the study, notwithstanding their usefulness. In

addition, the internal information about some aspects within the Arab League and the African Union may be difficult to access, since events are not available to the public.

Focus on a Single Case: Since the research is focused on one country, Sudan, it has limited generalizability to other contexts. Even though the research targets drawing a broader lesson on the roles of both the Arab League and the African Union, the unique historical, political, and socioeconomic factors facing Sudan mean that the findings cannot be directly generalized to include other member states of these organizations. Thus, the comparative design might have been useful in the context of multiple case studies for the research study.

Conceptual Difficulties: The concepts of political integration, stability, and development are abstruse and multidimensional. Though the study will operationalize these concepts in a clear and rigorous way, yet there could be limitations in capturing the full nuances and complexities of these concepts. Different indicators and measurements might yield different findings, which again stresses upon the need for transparency in the research design and methodology.

1.9 Research Structure

It consists of five chapters:

- Chapter 1: Introduces the research topic, providing background, States the research problem, objectives, significance, research questions, and hypotheses and explains the scope and limitations of the study.
- Chapter 2: Is the literature review of factors associated with the research objectives
- Chapter 3: Research Methodology
- Chapter 4: Data analysis; Interpretation of findings
- Chapter 5: Conclusion, key lessons and recommendations

1.10 Conclusion

The political landscape investigation of Sudan has, therefore, come full circle as it concludes Chapter 1, underlining a set of very particular challenges and opportunities created by the country's dual membership in both the African Union and the Arab League. At the crossroads between the influence areas of African and Arab regions, the efforts of Sudan with regard to political integration and stability are often defined by the sometimes complementary, often conflicting approaches of the two organizations. While the peacekeeping and humanitarian missions of the AU are more active, sometimes the diplomatic support of the AL itself runs in contrast to a preference for governmental positions in comparison to grassroots conflict resolution.

The Sudanese journey demonstrates the influence these two organizations have on its internal matters and finds a balance, especially amidst several lingering conflicts like that of Darfur. These are preliminary deliberations against which further discussions on how these regional bodies contribute to efforts towards political integration by Sudan are presented, including how Sudan may strategically use its membership in both the AU and AL in pursuit of stability and peace.

What makes this study important for the promotion of the unique position that Sudan occupies, along with adding to the bigger discourse on the influence of regional organizations in the management of conflict and national development, are highlighted in this chapter.

Chapter Two

Literature Review

2.1 Introduction

Countries such as Sudan, known for their political instability and significant humanitarian crises, are often intricate areas that demand international concern. This has been the case with the Darfur conflict. In this respect, the African Union (AU) and the Arab League have been pivotal as regional organizations. Therefore, this literature review will focus on the contribution of the AU and the Arab League in maintaining political integration and stability in Sudan, drawing especially from the lessons learnt in the Darfur crisis.

The AU is primarily concerned with regional integration and cooperation and it has been involved in mediating and promoting peace in the continent. Its involvement in Darfur has included diplomatic activities, peace enforcement operations, and the promotion of talks between warring factions. The Arab League has also sought to assist its member Arab states and contain any internal and external strife that threatens them from their own and outside as well in the case to protect the integrity of its members such as Sudan.

This review will explore the strategies employed by both organizations, assess their effectiveness in promoting peace and stability, and analyze the challenges they face in a complex geopolitical landscape. By synthesizing existing research, this review aims to provide a comprehensive understanding of the dynamics at play in Darfur and the broader implications for regional integration and stability in Sudan. Ultimately, it will highlight the necessity for collaborative approaches that leverage the strengths of both the AU and the Arab League in addressing the multifaceted issues in Darfur.

2.2 Definition of Key Terms

Political Integration: refers to the organization of relationships between governments, institutions, and private actors in order to achieve congruent governance which may range from a single level government to several levels of expansive collaboration. (Ronald K. Vogel, 2010,)

Regional international Organization (RIO): a RIO is defined as an organized group made up of states and other international organizations, which has members whose geographical, linguistic, cultural, economic, political, legal or any other aspects, resemble one another. (Fernando Lusa Bordin and Jed Odermatt, 2024)

African Union (AU): The African Union (AU), founded in 2002 as the successor to the Organization of African Unity, consists of African states and seeks to promote economic growth and political stability by fostering greater cooperation among its member states. (William Collins Sons, 2012)

The Arab League (AL): is a regional organization consisting of Arab countries in the Middle East and North Africa, established in Cairo on March 22, 1945, as a result of the Pan-Arab movement. (Adam Zeidan., 2024)

UNAMID (United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur): was established with the mandate to protect civilians, facilitate humanitarian assistance, and mediate between the Government of Sudan and non-signatory armed groups based on the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur (DDPD). It also supports the mediation of community conflicts and addresses their root causes. The mission's headquarters is located in El Fasher, North Darfur, with sector offices in E l Geneina, Nyala, Zalingei, and El Daein, and a total of 35 deployment locations across the five Darfur states. (United Nations, 2024)

The Africa Mission in Sudan (AMIS): formerly known as the Ceasefire Commission (CFC), was created by the African Union (AU) in April 2004 to oversee the monitoring of the Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement inked on April 8, 2004, between the government of Sudan (GoS) and two rebel factions from Darfur: the Sudan Peoples Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM). As an observer mission, AMIS included 80 military observers and a protection force of 600 troops. (Richard Kamidza 2005)

The Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM, SLA, or SLM/A) is a rebel group from Sudan, active in the Darfur region. (Wikipedia, 2024)

The Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) was established in the beginning of the year 2003 by a cohort of educated and politically savvy individuals hailing from the region of Darfur, a

good number of whom took part in the Popular Congress Party (PCP) of Hassan al-Turabi, the foremost architect of the Islamic revolution in Sudan. (HSBA, 2024)

The Doha Document for Peace in Darfur (DDPD) is one of the peace agreements which was adopted in its final form during the All Darfur Stakeholders Conference held in Doha, Qatar in May 2011. Subsequently, on the 14th day of July 2011, both the Government of Sudan along with the Liberation and Justice Movement signed a protocol agreeing to observe the DDPD which has since become the basis of the all-inclusive peace process in the Darfur region. (United Nations, 2024).

2.3 A general overview of the role of international regional organizations in conflict

The process of conflict management encompasses diverse actions that aim at preventing, minimizing, and finally ending conflicts. One can picture a continuum of different types of conflict management interventions depending on the extent of effort involved and the situational specifics. Towards the lower side of this continuum, for example, regional blocks create a set of rules on benign and sometimes vexatious issues such as peace and security. Within the Americas, for example, there exists a strong norm of democracy promotion that actively assists in reducing the chances of unconstitutional overthrow of governments that would otherwise create conflict in the regions thus promoting peaceful resolution of conflicts across ends of the spectrum.

The scope of the conflict management mechanisms offered by regional international organizations takes a different meaning if evaluated from the perspective of global organizations. On one hand, it is clear that regional organizations, except for perhaps a few examples, are not always in a position to provide superior conflict resolution outcomes as compared to the UN. Thus, organizations of both types, whether global or regional, to an extent face the same challenges when engaging in conflict management. However regional organizations tend to enjoy more factors in terms of prevailing internal agreement, greater beneficial support from local parties, higher opportunities for successful conflict management, and better management of the interference of third countries.

Enhanced Internal Cohesion: Regional bodies usually have a more balanced range of membership than the United Nations. Countries are often at the same level of development,

have similar historical or cultural backgrounds, and are influenced politically by issues predominant in the region. Such conditions may lead to comparatively higher agreement with less resistance to conflict management measures. Unlike the UN, most regional organizations do not suffer from the veto powers of the major countries and some have introduced methods to prevent such stalemate.

Greater Willingness of the Parties: This factor adds to the effectiveness of regional organizations as they are also likely to receive backing from local disputants and the community at large. Regions' peoples and governments may feel more at home with regional structures and may frown at what they perceive as interference by strangers. Therefore, many times there are cries for the regional conflict solution first before the international community becomes involved. Parties to the conflict may be more comfortable with regional measures, and local actors may view such measures as more legitimate than those offered by worldwide bodies such as the UN.

Facilitated Resolution of Conflicts: Regional organizations may be even better placed to resolve conflicts that the United Nations has sometimes sought to do with limited success, usually resulting in an interim solution. Oftentimes, the United Nations is tasked with brokering ceasefires or sending peacekeepers to war-torn countries but without addressing the issues that caused the wars in the first place. This may prevent the warring parties or the international community from putting in further efforts to solve the problem diplomatically. Regional organizations on the other hand, may in most cases have a real reason or desire to deal with the bare issues as they have a stake. For example, they may attach resolutions, peacekeeping or its components to conflict resolution processes, such as elections in order to increase chances of closures.

Lastly, it is more likely that international regional organizations will be able to mobilize support of the so called interested third party states, which are usually more or less part of the conflict. Such states are most likely to take part in any deliberations and decision making about what measures to take, which is not the case with the UN. Their involvement can also help operationalize their interests in the operations, which enhances the probability of approval of the initiatives aimed at the regional management of the conflict. (African research review, 2016)

2.4 The Darfur Conflict

Darfur is a region situated in western Sudan, which occupies roughly one-fifth of the territory, and is about the same size as France, extending from the Sahara in the north to a less arable savannah zone in central Darfur and then south to lands that are somewhat more prosperous. To its northwest is Libya, the west and southwest border Chad and to the south is the Central African Republic. It was under the government of Nimeiri in 1974, North and South Darfur were formed. Al-Bashir's administration further subdivided Darfur into North, West and South Darfur. Eastern Darfur and Central Darfur was joined to this administrative district in August of 2012 reckoning these administrative territories into five regions in total. Darfur is made up of a mix of Arab and African tribes, including the Fur, Zaghawa, Ruzaigat tribes and the Baqara tribe. Since 2003, a variety of conflicts in Darfur have extended to war and armed violence resulting in an estimated about 300,000 deaths, many causing by malnutrition and disease, and the displacement of more than 2.7 million people. There are a multiplicity of underlying factors contributing to the conflict in Darfur. While tribes had conflict over resources and environmental degradation (climate), the proliferation of weapons among tribes and issues brought by turmoil in neighboring countries fed exacerbate tensions in Darfur. Unfortunately, a struggle over natural resources became a broader rebellion against the government. The struggle in Darfur received international attention, resulting in a referral to the International Criminal Court from the UN Security Council and a case of genocide and war crimes against the president. Drought and desertification are significant factors contributing to violence, and key to tribes in northern, western and eastern Darfur (Zaghawa and northern Rizeigat). Arab tribes migrated to the Jebel Marra area and there had conflict over land use and resources with the Masalit tribe. About 80% of conflict in Darfur is attributed to resource conflicts and is made up of armed clashes, even among Arab tribes. The situation in Darfur has developed into a struggle of two ideological factions or frameworks, one advocating for the supremacy of Arab powers, and the other representing the Fur tribes. On the one hand, multiple Arab tribes have come together in a coalition, while the Fur have gathered together as a single group of ethnicities. Intensible occupation has continued, as Arab militias have attacked Fur farmlands and destroyed crops, while the Fur have denied Arabs access to water. People in the region of Darfur are increasingly perceiving the government as biased towards the Arab factions, whom they believe to be supported by Janjaweed who displaced the Fur and ruined their lands. In reaction to violence and inequity, the Fur formed their own militias in order to protect their

resources, which turned into armed opposition movements, primarily the Sudan Liberation Movement and Justice and Equality Movement, which carried out attacks against Al-Bashir's government. Such actions were in part responding to the government neglect and failure to protect villagers from attacks by tribes of Bedouins, and to the marginalizing of the region economically since 2003. (Mansour,2015)

2.5 African Union roles in conflict

The African Union (AU) has an unavoidable and prominent role in conflict management. Their approach towards conflicts is management, prevention and resolution. Given the frequent incidence of wars in Africa, the work of the AU is essential to ensuring peace and security. In the case of contentions however, the Peace and Security Council of the AU becomes useful since it has been established for issues of peace and security in Africa. It is through this council, that the AU deals with matters such as terrorism, peace keeping operations and mediation between warring factions. AU' engagement include such disputes even after elections results, evidencing the organization's inclination to mitigate tensions arising from such instances.

Moreover, the efforts made by the AU in resolving conflicts correspond with the objectives of the union as seen with Agenda 2063 which advocates for peaceful coexistence and security of all regions. The AU in this respect understands that such aspirations are not achievable without functional structures for conflict management, prevention and resolution. The AU also works with regional economic communities like ECOWAS to fast track the security and peace efforts in the continent.

The AU Commission's Constitutive Act of 2000 stipulates that the African Union (AU) shall strive to encourage peace, security and stability in Africa, which entails amongst other things, peace-making, peace enforcement and peacekeeping. So far, the AU has pursued its primary objective of promoting peace and security throughout Africa by sending peacekeeping missions to various crises on the continent. Such missions form an important part of the AU's assurances of the respect for peace and security across the region.

The AU has carried out several peace enforcement operations in association with its partners at the United Nations and regional organizations such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). The objectives of these operations include but are not limited to,

the protection of non-combatants, management of hostilities in a given region, and enhancement of the peace processes where it exists. It is also worth noting that the AU seeks to put an end to violent engagements by assisting in building peace within the respective nations in Africa where such conflicts persist. The need to address the underlying grievances and to bring the warring factions to the negotiating table is part of the AU's vision of stability.

Another important area of the AU's conflict management function is coordination with external actors, specifically the UN, EU, and various member states. Incorporating these efforts improves the success of peacekeeping operations and post-conflict reconstruction strategies, mainly because new resources, skills and political will to overcome the insecurity are developed and utilized.

To conclude, the AU's conflict resolution duties are quite extensive and include the actions of peacekeeping, mediation, and development of peace. To enhance peace and security in Africa, the proactive engagement of the AU is essential and its relations with international and regional organizations enhances its ability to manage and resolve conflicts and promote peace throughout the continent. (Aemro Tenaw Birhan, 2024)

2.6 Arab League roles in conflict

The League seeks to enhance the existing ties between member states, streamline their activities, and steer them towards a greater good. It does not condone violence as a means of solving disputes between its members, and it has the right to peacefully resolve even those disagreements which do not concern its members. For that purpose, the League strives to achieve economic cohesiveness amongst its members and manage disputes regionally without any outside assistance. In the year 1950, the League made a commitment to its member states through the enactment of a mutual defense treaty. Although this unification and security treaty did not come into effective use upon its adoption but rather remained adoption, incorporation, exclusion and interaction of treaties signifying nowadays the establishment of a common system within which violence directed against one treaty member would mean violence against them all. In 1965, the League This initiated the common market strategy. Furthermore, it resolved in 2001 to form the Arab Parliament, and at the Algiers Summit of 2005, it endorsed the establishment of the Arab Peace and Security Council. (INTS 22464 Regional Organizations, 2015)

2.7 Theoretical framework

Liberal theory came to reject the image of realism that international policies are based on the logic of force without taking into account changes and developments stemming from international interdependence.

Liberals believe that topics that emerge within the scope of cooperation or struggle between international actors as a key focus of the content of international policies.

The most important principles of liberal theorizing in understanding international relations are to reduce the severity of conflicts between countries by following the logic of cooperation and rapprochement between countries and creating common values, and achieving this cooperation is by establishing organizations that work to achieve cooperation and security and reduce the severity of threats.

Liberal theory believes that states are equal to other non-state actors such as international organizations that may sometimes be independent actors in order to achieve their interests, thus showing us the image of the liberal theory. It is a pluralistic image where states and other actors play multiple roles in international politics. Liberals believe that international organizations have important roles in managing disputes that may arise due to state decisions and trying to protect their interests, and may also have a role in providing important information that would influence the states definition of their interests. As mentioned, the main objective of the liberal theory is to achieve cooperation between states and non-state actors, and affirms that international institutions are the best way to achieve such cooperation. Based on this theory, we will explain the roles of the League of Arab States and the African Union in the aspects of helping the state achieve political stability, integration and achieve the greatest degree of cooperation, and their roles in how to achieve their common interests and deal in case of conflict of interests.

2.8 Previous Scholars

Faisal Abdul Raouf Fayyad (2022) The ability of the League of Arab States to resolve Arab-Arab conflicts: the sources of success and failure. The study dealt with the ability of the League of Arab States in resolving Arab-Arab conflicts, where several examples were highlighted, and dealt with the areas of success and failures. The study tried to prove its hypothesis that the

position of the League of Arab States is characterized by weakness towards Arab-Arab conflicts. The study reached results, most notably: that the role of the League in this regard will remain limited and marginal in general, which makes it necessary for it to reconsider its system and charters, and the uneven positions of the League of Arab States towards Arab-Arab crises and conflicts. The study also recommended that the League of States should be reformed and that the level of freedoms and the field of political participation in member states should be heated.

Arkan ibrahim adwan (2024) The role of the League of Arab States in confronting the Arab crises after 2011. The research dealt with the role of the Arab league in confronting the crises and conflicts it faced after the Arab countries after 2011 to show the extent of its effectiveness in performing its duties towards the member states by identifying its circumstances, its establishment, its most important objectives and its position on the Arab crises during the study period and then evaluating its performance in the face of these crises. The study reached the most important results of which is the weakness and ineffectiveness of the League in managing attitudes towards the Arab member states, and that it has become a subsidiary entity that achieves the interests of some countries and regional bodies.

Balour Abdel Salam (2016), The role of the African Union in the management of internal conflicts in Africa (Darfur Case Study). The research dealt with the role played by the African Union after the Cold War in the African continent, specifically in the conflict areas in which the organization intervened, and the intervention in Darfur was taken as a case study, and the repercussions of this role on the future of African countries, as well as the ability of the African Union to adapt to international and regional changes after the Cold War. The study reached several results, most notably the weakness of the African Union's ability to lead the continent, and the lack of activation of the new mechanisms for conflict resolution.

Mona Hussein Obaid, African Union and African State Issues (Ivory Coast - Darfur as a model) 2001-2004. African countries sought to put an end to the conflicts in the African continent, so most African countries agreed to unify their efforts to form an organization that includes most African countries that was called when it was founded (the Organization of African Unity), an organization that was able to intervene to develop solutions to several crises that faced the countries of the continent, but as a result of the weakness that affected the organization in many of its institutions prevented it from continuing in the required form, which put African countries

in front of a new option and either to remain in a state of disintegration or find a formula to develop the organization, which had some weakness, and it was the second option that resulted in the establishment of (African Union), which was a development of the Organization of African Unity for the purpose Avoiding and solving the problems and conflicts that occurred on the African continent, and the best proof of this is the role played by the African Union in solving the two issues of Ivory Coast by supporting international mediations and agreements as its position in support of The Marcoussis Agreement, the African Union also succeeded in leading the negotiation in the Darfur region. The study reached the most important conclusions, the most important of which is that the African Union had an active role in solving African disputes.

2.9 Empirical literature review

Ralph Mamiya & Wibke Hansen (2020) Assessing the Effectiveness of the United Nations-African Union Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID). This study aims to assess the strategic impact of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur from 2007 to 2017. It also aims to focus on the future considerations of the hybrid operation and the extent to which the mission has progressed in its mandated tasks and the extent of the impact on the ground in terms of security, political operations and conflict. The study's methodology used primary research methods represented by individual and group interviews with individuals from the region and officials, as well as community consultations, where a total of 147 individual interviews were conducted in small groups, 25% of which were with women and 75% with men. The maps were also used to place the beginning of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur, and the numbers of troops in the Darfur regions. Graphs and statistical drawings of the uniformed personnel of the hybrid operation were also used, and the explanation of conflict incidents and deaths in Darfur from 2003 to 2017, as well as illustrative schedules for interviews and timetables for the political process and political events. The most important finding of this study is that the political process in Darfur suffered from the lack of agreement on a coherent political strategy, and there were divisions between mediators that affected decision-making, and its weak influence did not make it able to change the strategic context in which the mission worked through.

The study was designed according to the means of collecting raw data, as it was based on information from sources directly on the ground, which enhanced the accuracy of the

information. It was also based on digital statistics, data and ratios, which increased the accuracy of information. This helped to properly analyze the methodological context and clarify the details, roles and impact of UNAMID on the Darfur conflict.

2.10 Research Gap

Previous literature has focused on the roles played by the League of Arab States and the African Union in their intervention with regards to conflicts within their respective scopes and the degree to which they can successfully settle such disputes. However, these studies have not fully analyzed the principal roles that these two organizations play in promoting political integration and cooperation, not to mention their review of how their activities influence the decisions of the states involved. This dual membership, with the set of challenges that Sudan presents within both the AU and AL, remains understudied, especially in terms of how this dynamic has affected mediation efforts and the coherence of peacebuilding initiatives. Similarly, while assessing the effectiveness of the AU's military interventions and the AL's diplomatic efforts has been widely done, few have explored the differences in approach between them and the impact on the overall success rate of conflict resolution frameworks in Darfur. Lastly, there are no direct studies that comparatively analyze the roles of both regional organizations in Sudan.

2.11 Conceptual Framework

The term political integration in this research refers to the extent to which the Organization of the League of Arab States and the African Union affects the ability of Sudan to achieve internal political stability that enables it to cooperate with external parties such as regional and international organizations, and how to achieve balance and cooperation with these organizations and achieve political integration with them and neighboring countries in achieving common goals and policies. (Asmaa Faraj, 2021)

It is worth mentioning here the role of regional organizations in achieving peace and stability for their member states, as the settlement of disputes is one of the basic principles of various international and regional organizations, and the Charter of the United Nations has affirmed the role of regional organizations in resolving and resolving conflicts. (Nabil Ghaleb, 2016)

This conceptual framework bridges together, the roles and interactions of regional international organizations (RIOs); namely the African Union (AU), the League of Arab States (Arab League) in achieving political integration and conflict resolution with reference to the Darfur crisis. This framework will highlight mechanisms, effectiveness and challenges in the path of

regional stability and integration, contextualize them through practical examples. It does not prioritize particular aspects, especially the economic and social.

Economic Factors:

The framework does not outline the economic effects of the Darfur conflict: for instance, on regional trade or comparative advantage and lack of resources, or indeed on broader Sudanese economic policy.

Social Dynamics:

The framework does not engage very deeply with the socio-political dimensions of the conflict including for example issues around displacement and societal trauma or how community level reconciliation might provide a means to find sustainable peace.

2.12 Conclusion

This chapter reviewed the key concepts, theoretical perspectives, and existing literature to illustrate how these regional organizations have functioned as critical actors in peacekeeping and conflict resolution.

The AU has been in the forefront of attempting to bring peace, either through mediation, peace enforcement, or cooperation among regions. The challenges that have classically defined the resources and political constraints of the AU's interventions are getting to the roots of conflicts and supporting post-conflict reconstruction. Similarly, the Arab League aimed at enhancing unity among its member states, though it has been handicapped both by internal divisions and by pressures from the outside world.

Founded on the theory of liberalism, this theoretical framework gave much attention to international and regional organizations' potential in promoting cooperation, reducing conflict, and fostering integration. Empirical studies reviewed in this chapter have shown both the successes and limitations of these two organizations' roles, hence landing us to a multi-dimensional understanding of their impact on the Darfur crisis.

There was also a big research gap highlighted: little emphasis on how such organizations balance the realization of competing goals and interests in securing integration and cooperation for member states, such as Sudan. This study will fill that gap and provide a better understanding of ways in which regional organizations can more effectively support stability and integration in complex geopolitical settings. The findings provide a backdrop to the subsequent discussions on how to enhance the effectiveness of the AU and the Arab League in promoting peace and political stability in Sudan.

Chapter Three

Research Methodology

3.1 Introduction

This study pursues qualitative objectives and seek to examine and establish the differences in the roles of the League of Arab States and the African Union in Sudan and its consequences bearing in mind political integration and stability. The research utilizes a comparativist framework that is ideal for analyzing the functions of these two regional organizations in the context of Sudan, as well as their influence. The purpose of this strategy is to analyze how each such organization functions and works, and what its consequences are for political integration and stability in Sudan.

3.2 Research Design

In order to enhance this comparative analysis further, a case study curriculum will be employed with dedicated attention to the case of Darfur. The case of the Darfur conflict also features as a practical case in analyzing the interventions and impact of the League of Arab States and the African Union. Due to its ethnic and political complexities, the conflict will prove to be an important conflict resolution capacity challenge for the two organizations. The case study approach also allows the research to highlight the strategies and initiatives implemented and challenges experienced by the two in the course of their peacekeeping and mediation efforts in Darfur. It will point out in what ways their interventions were successful or not with an overall view of the impact of their engagement on the conflict resolution.

3.3 Population

The population for this study consists of previous scholars who have contributed to the academic discourse on the Darfur conflict, the peacekeeping efforts of the League of Arab States and the African Union, and the broader topics of conflict resolution and peacebuilding. These scholars, through their research and publications, provide valuable insights into the successes, failures, and challenges of international peace interventions in Darfur, which will be central to the comparative analysis conducted in this study.

3.4 Data Collection and Sources

The research will be conducted using a desktop-based approach, meaning that all data collection will rely on secondary sources, without the need for fieldwork or direct engagement with participants. This methodology will involve gathering and analyzing data from official documents, reports, previous research, scholarly books and articles, and case studies related to the interventions in Sudan by the League of Arab States and the African Union. Through this comparative case study, the research seeks to elucidate the distinct roles each organization has played in promoting political stability in Sudan and to examine how these roles have influenced the broader goals of regional political integration and security.

3.5 Data Analysis

In order to examine the data obtained in the course of this study, a qualitative content analysis method will be employed. This implies systematically formatting of the data in order to look for themes, patterns, and relationships that are pertinent to the study aim.

3.5.1 Comparative Framework

a comparative framework to assess the similarities and differences between the AU and AL in terms of their approaches to conflict resolution, political stability, and integration. The variables tested will be Mandates and Engagement, Resource and Capacity, Strategies of Intervention, Political Dynamics and Challenges, Outcomes and Effectiveness.

3.6 Conclusion

In this chapter, the research methodology presented in this study is relevant to the comparative assessment of the League of Arab States and the African Union concerning Sudan with emphasis on the case of Darfur.

The research in question is descriptive in nature and follows a qualitative research design employing a comparative methodology to assess the role and contributions of the two organizations in the political development and stability of Sudan. The case study of the Darfur conflict in particular provides a sharp context in which to analyze what each organization has done and how effective each has been towards resolving the conflict. Secondary data collection and analysis of this research suggest that it is necessary to carefully evaluate sources for assessment and relevance. The goal of this ethnographic research is to bring greater clarity to

the situation in Sudan, and in particular to the role of regional organizations in conflict resolution, and so draw on a variety of sources.

CHAPTER FOUR

Comparative Analysis

4.1 Introduction

This chapter seeks to evaluate the roles of Arab League and African Union in the Darfur conflict in terms of approaches, strategies, and results, and consequently, a comparative case study of their involvement is conducted. The Darfur conflict, which, is a multifaceted and destructive political debacle which poses a threat to regional peace, which is why multiple organizations had to step in. Therefore, while both the organization of Arab States and the African Union acknowledged the conflict, the way they engaged, their interests and the depth of engagement were not the same. Such differences constitute a prerequisite exposition, which is very important to the understanding of the role of regional organizations in conflict and post-conflict situations.

The research will employ a case-by-case comparison which is presenting the African Unions actions and strategies first, followed by those of Arab league , then analyze the similarities and differences .This comparative assessment will also address the variance in response to the conflict that each organization exhibited as a function of the organization's structure, resources and political relationships and how this may be indicative of the functions of regional organizations in conflict within states which are complex.

4.2 African Union and the peace process in Darfur

The response of the international community to the crisis in Darfur, Sudan, has been characterized by high rhetoric, poor measures, and inaction for far too long. The lack of commitment and political will by the general community has ensured that continued wide-scale attacks on civilians and humanitarian aid workers proceed with apparent impunity. Too many Western countries have cited various diplomatic, bureaucratic, and political challenges that reduce much deeper involvement. Because of this failure, the international community's hot potato on the situation in Darfur was passed to the African Union, reinforcing the notion of "African solutions to African problems." Since the beginning of its engagement in 2004, the African Union has worn the mantle of most developed international actor in this crisis.

Thereafter, the African Union showed its commitment through launching political negotiations in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, and later in Abuja in Nigeria. Besides that, it also established a ceasefire commission and deployed the African Union Mission in Sudan, which is popularly known as AMIS, for monitoring the ceasefire.

While the AU involvement provided the much-needed response in the absence of action from Western powers, the organization has struggled with capacity and resources, ultimately with the political will to hold the parties that conflict accountable to their agreements.

The attempts by different African parties to solve the Darfur crisis started as early as 2003. The first political initiative was the Abeche mediation, led by Chadian President Idress Derby. The first political initiative was that of the mediation of Abeche by Chadian President Idress Derby. This mediation brought about the signing of the Abeche ceasefire agreement on September 3, 2003. This agreement called for a ceasefire, control of irregular armed groups, the release of prisoners of war, the cantonment of SLA forces, and the establishment of a tripartite commission to oversee its implementation. The agreement, however, quickly fell apart in the first weeks of this year as a result of its own signatories' violations, specifically the government and its militias.

The African Union's intervention was called by the deadlock of the Chadian-mediated peace process, further deteriorated by the humanitarian situation in Darfur. A new ceasefire agreement was signed in N'djamena, Chad, after a series of mediated talks. The peace talks which followed in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, mediated by the African Union, signed agreements on security and humanitarian issues and were designed to underpin the N'djamena ceasefire. (SAKA LUQMAN, 2012)

The political peace process then shifted to Abuja, Nigeria, where representatives of the Sudanese government and rebel groups were to meet in search of ways of ending the conflict. Accordingly, the Abuja negotiations, under the auspices of the African Union, have focused on the four most critical drivers of the conflict: humanitarian, security, political, and socio-economic concerns. Upon substantial deliberation, the Sudanese government and rebel groups signed the Abuja protocols on humanitarian and security concerns, providing further weight to the earlier agreements, especially the N'djamena ceasefire.

The signing was followed by negotiations over thorny issues like political representation, power sharing, wealth sharing, compensation to victims, and the reconstruction of Darfur. After almost two years of hard negotiation and pressure from the international community, the parties signed the Darfur Peace Agreement on May 5, 2006. Key components of the DPA included power sharing, wealth sharing, comprehensive ceasefire, final security arrangements, and a Darfur-Darfur dialogue and consultation conference.

However, one of the major weaknesses in this agreement is that this agreement was signed only by representatives of the Sudanese government and the Sudan Liberation Movement/Minni Minnewit Faction. The two other rebel groups present at the Abuja talks, the Sudan Liberation Movement/Abdul Wahid Nur Faction and the Justice and Equality Movement, refused to sign the agreement because of some weaknesses and unmet demands.

Their refusal to sign, coupled with the determination of the international community to go on regardless, marked how little patience the latter had with the peace talks. The rashness of this move, coupled with the marginalization of groups in dissent, as well as other inherent defects in the agreement, did tag the Lomé peace agreement with failure from the very first day. The peace agreement was badly weakened by the fact that it lacked any support from groups who did not sign it; continued fragmentation among rebels; spiraling violence; accusations of bias against the AU itself; and caution from the government of Sudan to fulfill the DPA. (SAKA LUQMAN, 2012)

The crisis in Darfur has attended with numerous efforts to find a viable resolution, among them those by the AU Peace and Security Council. At its 13th meeting on 27 July 2004, the Council urged the Commission Chairperson of the African Union to devise a detailed plan for a Mission with the objective of disarming the parties at war in addressing peace and security, and putting an end to the ongoing conflict in the region. On 20 October 2004, the 17th meeting of the Council established a peacekeeping force in Sudan known as the African Union Mission in Sudan, comprising 3,320 personnel: 2,341 military personnel, 450 observers, 815 civilian police, and 26 international civil staff. The operation was to last one year, up until the year 2005. (SAKA LUQMAN, 2012)

The following were the main objectives of AMIS:

The mandates of MINUCI were as follows: 1. To ensure that the parties in N'Djamena ceasefire agreement in April 2004 and other related agreements were implemented. 2. To establish confidence, create a secure environment in the region, promote access for the delivery of humanitarian aid, and pave the way for the eventual return of displaced persons and refugees. 3. To protect civilians, contribute to the resolution of the conflict, and work for regional unity and stability-that remained the core goal of the mission.

The Council also requested the Chairperson of the AU Commission for whatever assistance AMIS may need in these directions. The Chairperson, therefore, acting in concert with the United Nations, arranged an international conference on Darfur from 10 to 22 March 2005, in order to take the support of the UN and its member states.

To supplement the mission, the AU Commission, with the assistance of international partners, established a committee to assess the situation in Darfur. Based on the recommendations from this committee, the mission of AMIS was expanded in two phases. The first phase was completed by May 2005, while the second phase aimed to make the mission fully functional and effectively deploy military personnel, police, and civilians. This phase also contemplated a force build-up to 6,171 military personnel and 1,560 police forces that indeed took place on 30 April 2005. Thereafter, since the expansion took place, conditions in Darfur improved somewhat as the situation began to be managed and controlled by the mission, to an extent. But from August 2005, things started deteriorating again.

In August 2005, AMIS peacekeepers were also targeted, leaving several injured, others kidnapped; some were killed. Humanitarian supplies were stolen in August while being distributed to civilians. These attacks were blamed on the Sudan Liberation Movement, as well as Sudanese government forces and the Janjaweed militia, in September 2005.

In response to this situation, the AU Peace and Security Council agreed on a transfer of the mission's responsibility to the United Nations in 2006, falling under the collaborative framework between the African Union and the UN. The AMIS mission was then extended until the month of March of 2006.

In early 2006, with further deterioration of the situation in Darfur, the United Nations, joined by the United States and the European Union, pressed charges against the African Union,

charging it for failure to act in what they described as a genocide. The international actors held that given the AU efforts, it had not been able to manage the crisis in Darfur.

On 9 March 2006, talks were held in Brussels between the European Union, United Nations, and the African Union. Succumbing to international pressure, and at the behest of deteriorating situation in Darfur, on 10 March 2006, the AU Peace and Security Council met, and agreed:

Events decided upon and approved the transfer of peacekeeping operations in Darfur to the United Nations, within the framework of cooperation between the African Union and the United Nations; Extended for a further period the duration of the peacekeeping mission until the end of September 2006 and declared its determination to do everything possible toward settling the crisis between Sudan and Chad, given the fact that this is an already direct influence on resolving the crisis in Darfur.

Apart from the direct intervention by the AU through the United Nations-African Union Mission, which was jointly adopted, the AU Peace and Security Council also played an important role in the reconciliation efforts, inclusive of accountability for the crisis. In 2008, the Council adopted a resolution calling for the establishment of an AU high-level team on Darfur. To this effect, the Chairman of the African Union Commission appointed a team of eminent African personalities to serve in the same team, a decision that obtained full endorsement at the second regular session of the African Union Conference held in 2009.

It was mandated to undertake in-depth examination of the situation in Darfur and make recommendations on the best way to address questions of accountability, impunity, and healing, and reconciliation. This report made, among others, the following recommendations:

1. Draft a political agreement on conflict settlement.
2. Organize negotiations between the government of Sudan and armed movements with a view to arriving at an agreement on the cessation of hostilities.
3. A criminal court for the most serious crimes shall be established for the most serious crimes, whose judges and experts in law are both Sudanese and international, nominated by the African Union.

4. A Truth and Justice and Reconciliation Commission may grant amnesties where it deems fit, and may further use traditional mechanisms for conflict resolution which will ensure that the work of the commission is effectively done.
5. Provide compensation to those victimized by war and bring them social and economic justice; present an overall strategy for reconstruction in Darfur, including a balanced budget.

The report also recommended that the African Union and the United Nations support international mediation to ensure that negotiations on peace agreements were successfully done within set timelines. It further recommended the establishment of a committee with extended powers of monitoring and enforcement to oversee the implementation of the agreements.

The Government of Sudan welcomed the recommendations made by the committee, but showed skepticism about the proposed mixed court to prosecute crimes in Darfur. For their part, government reactions were basically negative, bordering on rejection rather than acceptance or negotiation. In rebel circles, the reactions were mixed, though not as intense as might have been expected. For their part, the armed movements felt that full account had not been taken of their demands about criminal accountability.

While the government of Sudan and some rebel groups signed some peace agreements, and relative lull happened to have taken place in the region, what was at stake was to get to that final, comprehensive agreement that may bring the conflict to an end and create ways for the return of persons displaced and refugees. This therefore, called for further efforts by all parties involved to bring such a conflict to a lasting resolution. (SAKA LUQMAN, 2012)

Meanwhile, the African Union-United Nations developed under the banner of the joint peacekeeping mission in Darfur, called UNAMID. Operations began officially on 31 December 2007. Large elements of African forces were built into the mission, and they worked with candor to achieve their stated goals, namely,

1. Protection of civilians and humanitarian workers
2. Security of aid routes and facilitation of humanitarian assistance deliveries to all communities affected.
3. Support the implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement and encourage further peace agreements with non-signatory parties.

4. Assist all Parties to resolve the conflict and in seeking holistic solutions to the crisis. (Fatma Ali Mansoor Al Khairi, 2015)

Shift in Mandate, 2014:

- UNAMID's strategic focus was scaled down to:

Protection of civilians

Mediation in conflicts between the government and rebels.

Assistance in mediation initiatives at the grassroots level.

- Government Counterinsurgency

Campaign, 2014-2016:

The government of Sudan under President Omar al-Bashir launched a full-scale scorched-earth military campaign against rebel groups. Rebel groups were dislodged from their strongholds in Jebel Marra, with several thousand civilians either killed or displaced.

Such events weakened the peace process further and deteriorated conditions on the humanitarian front.

3. Transition Planning, 2017:

- UNAMID began shrinking its troops' footprint, concentrating the peacekeeping effort on flashpoints such as Jebel Marra and moving toward peacebuilding in other areas.

The drawdown planned for the mission appears to reflect budget pressures and a decline in interest by the international community amid continued fighting.

However, UNAMID officially ended its mandate on December 2020, marking the conclusion of the AU's formal peacekeeping operations in the region. (Ralph Mamiya, 2020)

4.3 Contribution of African Union to Peace Building in Sudan

(i) Military Contributions by African Union

It is obvious that the armed forces of the African Union were heavily instrumental in the management and resolution of the Darfur crisis. This section evaluates the actual number of troops deployed to Darfur, Sudan, by the African Union during the period under consideration. Table 1.1 summarizes the numbers of troops for the African Union Mission in Sudan - AMIS - prior to the takeover by the United Nations.

According to Table 1.1, below, the African Union first deployed 150 personnel to Darfur in July 2004. From January to June of 2005, troop strength increased to 300. From July 2005 to June 2006, the African Union vastly expanded its deployment to 7,000 troops. This force strength of 7,300 was maintained from July 2006 until the UN took over the mission on 31 December 2007, replacing AMIS with the United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID).

Table 1.2 provides an overview of the spread of the troops deployed under UNAMID. The operation with Darfur began officially in January 2008. According to the table, for the period between January 2008 and December 2009, UNAMID had 26,000 troops overall, with 17,300 of these troops coming from the African Union. For the period between January and June 2010, the overall troop strength for UNAMID was 28,000, while the African Union still maintained a constant contribution of 17,300 troops. In all, UNAMID increased its total troop strength from July 2010 to December 2011 to 29,000, and its African Union contribution went up to 17,500. (Agaba Halidu, 2022)

Table 1.1: Distribution of AU Troops to Darfur before UN took over

2006 July-December	7,300
2007 January-June	7,300
2007 July-December	7,300

Source: AU, (2011).

Table 1.2: Distribution of Troops deployed to Darfur under UNAMID

Year	No. of troops
July-December	150
January-June	300
July-December	7000
January-June	7000

2008 January-June	17,300	8,700	26,000
2008 July-December	17,300	8,700	26,000
2009 January-June	17,300	8,700	26,000
2009 July-December	17,300	8,700	26,000
2010 January-June	17,300	10,500	28,000
2010 July-December	17,500	11,500	29,000
2011 January-June	17,500	11,500	29,000
2011 July-December	17,500	11,500	29,000

AMIS (2008) reported that during the period when the African Union was solely responsible for the mission, the organization deployed a total of 200 medical personnel.

ii) Humanitarian Contributions of the African Union

This section looks into the African Union's efforts at providing humanitarian assistance to the internally displaced as well as the affected population in light of the serious humanitarian situation at Darfur and especially to the Southern Sudanese.

Before the African Union handed over the mission to the United Nations, it deployed medical supplies and equipment worth approximately 450 million USD to address the health needs of the Southern Sudanese.

The African Union also reported in 2011 that since the UN took over the mission, it had still been making consistent humanitarian contributions. These were 100 health workers as well as medicine and food worth 150 million USD annually towards the operations of UNAMID. The report also added that individuals and non-governmental organizations from all over Africa had donated enormous amounts of relief materials toward the Darfur region. (Agaba Halidu, 2022)

(iii) The Role of the African Union in the Sudan Referendum

On November 9, 2004, the government of Sudan and two of the main rebel groups-the Justice and Equality Movement, or JEM, and the Sudanese Liberation Army, or SLA-signed two short-term peace agreements to move closer toward addressing the conflict. The first step taken by the African Union in providing support for the referendum was implementing a no-fly zone over rebel-controlled areas of Darfur. This would help prevent the Sudanese military from bombing rebel villages and would create conditions much more favorable to negotiations. The second accord opened every area in the Darfur region to international humanitarian aid organizations. Both agreements were the fruit of African Union-sponsored peace talks held in Abuja which began on 25th October 2004.

Basically, the African Union had to ensure that the core functions dealing with humanitarian assistance, protection, promotion of human rights, and facilitation of the African Union Mission in Sudan were performed in complementing the Comprehensive Peace Agreement signed by the Sudanese government and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement on October 25, 2004. In this case too, the AU called upon the United Nations Security Council for intervention into the security situation in Darfur. The UN Security Council, in turn, created the

United Nations Mission in Sudan, known as UNMIS, by Resolution 1590 of 24 March 2005, because the Darfur crisis constituted a threat to international peace and security."

To supplement these efforts, further talks between the parties, UN representatives, and the African Union took place. Mohamed Saleh, from military-led JEM, in a meeting in Abuja, Nigeria, argued that the Southern Sudanese had collectively made up their minds to leave Sudan. (Agaba Halidu, 2022)

African Union's Role in the Darfur Crisis: Key Points

First Troop Deployment and Budget:

The first AU troop deployment in the Darfur region happened in July 2004, placing 150 personnel with a budget of \$220 million.

As the conflict mounted, AU troops reached 7,300 by December 2007. The budget also shot upwards to \$450 million in the same period. This force came under the African Union Mission in Sudan-AMIS until UN took over from it on 31 December 2007 following the UN Security Council Resolution 1769.

INSTRUMENTAL ROLE OF AU IN CONFLICT RESOLUTION:

Despite the heavy presence of government and rebel forces, the African Union constituted the first major intervention force in Darfur.

The efforts put forth by AU contributed much to the signing of the April 2005 ceasefire agreement between the Sudanese government and the Sudan People's Liberation Army as a means to end the Second Sudanese Civil War.

African Union's Contribution to UNAMID:

After the UN took over the mission, AU contributed 65% of the troops to the United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur, UNAMID and the remaining 35% from the non-African UN member states.

The majority of the peacekeeping troops were African Union troops that gives significant credits to the AU for the successes recorded in the mission.

Financial Contributions:

The AU significantly funded the peacekeeping mission. In the three successive years the AU led the mission, it spent \$120 million, \$220 million, and \$450 million, respectively, to support the process of conflict resolution. (Agaba Halidu, 2022)

From the time the UN took over, the annual budget for the mission rose to \$2.25 billion, with the African Union still maintaining a \$900 million contribution, translating to 40% of the funds towards the mission.

The financial role set by the AU means that the leading financier of the Sudan peacebuilding process.

Role in the Referendum of Sudan

The African Union played a very major role in making these mediations possible which indeed even after the UN had taken over the process also laid the bedrock for subsequent negotiations. The efforts of mediation by the AU led to the Sudanese referendum that finally resulted in the independence of South Sudan in July 2011.

In sum, the role of the African Union in Darfur and the Sudanese referendum required a multi approach undertaking involving military intervention, financial contributions, and diplomatic efforts, among others, to prevent conflict. The proactive measures of the AU made a difference in the Darfur crisis, while continued efforts at peacebuilding underscore its importance to the continent's conflict resolution strategies. (Agaba Halidu, 2022)

4.4 Arab League and Darfur

The Arab League did not view the Darfur conflict as an "Arab Cause", as it did with other issues such as the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. The issue was not put in a framework of other civil wars erupting in other African states, rather it was a tribal problem that had evolved into

an international dispute. The reasons behind the conflict were all imbalance and marginalization, which the Arab League did not catch on. Instead, Darfur was a tribal conflict that gained international attention and provided grounds for a cultural clash between the West and the Sudanese government in Khartoum. The crisis in Darfur, unlike those in Bosnia, Kashmir, and other places, didn't invoke the same sympathy for Muslim victims from the Arab world. While some Arab commentators did call for Khartoum to take responsibility, such views failed to enter formal statements of the Arab League, instead being discussed informally.

Blame in the West fell upon the government of Sudan, and the regime of President al-Bashir was classified as a "rogue state." This made Darfur's rebel groups more popular, and its leader of the Sudan Liberation Army — SLA, Abdel Wahid al-Nur, was relocated to Paris after being exiled in Asmara, Eritrea. Although human rights organizations called on the rebels to respect international law, the Western media generally portrayed them as the "good guys." The view was very different in the Arab world. Here, the Sudanese government was up against armed rebels challenging its monopoly on violence. While the West designated such groups elsewhere as terrorists, it championed these Darfur rebels, whom Arab commentators characterized as agents of outside interests. As a result, the root causes of the conflict were masked and eventually forgotten with time.

Even though Muslims were being assaulted in Darfur, the conflict was all but ignored like other Sudanese conflicts. Similarly, human rights abuses against the civilian population in southern Sudan and in the Nuba Mountains by the Sudanese government attracted little, if any, interest from the Arab League. One consolation rather than a cause for alarm was the assurance that the League got from the Sudanese government that it would deal with the insurgency in Darfur militarily. The conflict was seen in part to be a result of foreign powers' influence, especially Israel, as a way of dividing the Arab world. (Annette Weber, 2010)

The inaction of the Arab League in terms of the issue saw criticism from some quarters by Arab commentators such as one noting that "the killings were shrugged off and accountability was overlooked. It framed the conflict as more of a tribal issue, with the aspect of foreign involvement garnishing a much greater emphasis. A conflict in Darfur that was initially ignored gained recognition as a valid counter-insurgency campaign by the Sudanese government. Sudanese and Arab media made more of the international implications of the Darfur crisis rather than its internal causes and internal dynamics.

In May 2004, the Arab League sent a fact-finding mission to Darfur. Though the report was not made public, leaked information revealed strong criticism of human rights abuses by all parties, including the Sudanese government. Part of this report is now available on the Arab League's website. The report also recommended an independent investigation. Sudan's government pressed to keep the report confidential, a request the League honored, as it did with other requests from Sudan.

In the wake of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1556, passed on 30 July 2004, Sudan's Foreign Minister, Muhamed Osman Ismail called for an urgent Arab League meeting on Darfur. Ismail requested that the Arabs support his government and called upon them to assist Sudan's armed forces to secure roads and capture the "rogue elements" operating in Darfur. The first reaction was not military in nature, but a diplomatic one; the Arab League siding with Sudan's position on the international arena, but not obligating itself to direct military support. "Sudan needs more time and its instability is because of foreign interference," claimed Hassam Zaki, a spokesman for the Arab League. The League asked the UN Security Council to rescind the 30-day deadline given to Sudan to disarm Janjaweed militias. The failure to disarm them on the part of Sudan was explained as being beyond its control, which the League largely accepted. At later stages, the spokesperson of the Arab League justified that sanctions would corner Sudan and make it unable to function effectively as a partner. Sudan's pro-government position put the Arab League in an invidious position as it can never emerge as a neutral mediator during the crisis. (Annette Weber, 2010)

First, the reaction of the League had a diplomatic tint. It did not pledge the direct military contribution of troops that might have been used to assist Sudan in securing roads or countering insurgency. However, the League supported the government of Sudan on the international arena. Its AL spokesperson Hassam Zaki said that Sudan needed more time to deal with events and declared that the interference from abroad was the reason of its instability. The League also demanded the Security Council lift its 30-day deadline for the Sudanese government to disarm the Janjaweed. Sudan's government did nothing to disarm them and afterward claimed it was beyond their control—a claim the League easily swallowed. The AL spokesperson said laying sanctions on Sudan would serve only to isolate it further as an Arab League member and reduce its efficacy as a partner. Consequently, this attitude of support on the part of the

League for the government of Sudan placed the League itself in a no-win position, in which its ability to act as a disinterested mediator with access to all parties in conflict was highly limited. The Arab League, with a view to supplementing the Sudanese efforts against insurgency, reached a decision to deploy troops to back up the Darfur-based AU observer mission known as AMIS. In late July 2006, at a press conference urging the AU to allow Arab troops in Darfur, Secretary General Amr Moussa described the Sudanese conflict as "the world's worst current humanitarian crisis." Although the League formally expressed its solidarity with the Sudanese government, a month after the signing of the DPA in Abuja in May 2006, the Secretary General underscored that a UN peace mission to Darfur was urgent and necessary, and it had to be politically accepted by Khartoum for the rapid implementation of the DPA. This view did not prevail, however. (Annette Weber, 2010)

4.5 Arab peace initiatives

From individual members to the League itself, with over 105 peace initiatives for Sudan, the AL remains actively involved in promoting peace efforts in Sudan, though this role is yet to be highly recognized in the public domain. Since the collapse of the Darfur Peace Agreement hosted by the African Union in Abuja in 2006, mediation has largely been left to joint initiatives led by the UN and the AU-perceived essentially as the only contact line between the rebels and the Sudanese government. With the JEM's attack on Omdurman, however, and issuance of an arrest warrant for President Bashir, Arab League members have taken center stage in negotiations. The League itself is also troubled by internal divisions and competing initiatives of its members. Of the 105 peace efforts, only a handful are formally under the AL's auspices; the rest are the products of individual member states, with the League occasionally giving them ex post facto endorsement. These competing efforts detract from the Arab League's overall potential to serve as an effective mediator of the Darfur crisis.

The most promising peace effort on Darfur today is the Arab League Initiative housed in Doha. In September 2008, the foreign ministers of the Arab League created a committee responsible for coordinating the peace process for Darfur that included the states of Libya, Syria, Algeria, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia. Despite these question marks within the League over the real possibility that the Doha gatherings could achieve a breakthrough, they nonetheless continue to be supported as pan-Arab League initiative, rather than led by any one country. In Egypt,

however, there is vigorous resistance to Qatar assuming this mantle. As one Egyptian intellectual noted, "Doha can bribe two or three factions to sign anything."

Of the Arab League members, Libya has been the most active and, in the forefront, when it comes to peace talks. Whether this is coincidental or part of a broader vision of the Arab League is open to question, but this does indeed underpin the hegemonic ambition of Libya's leader, Muhammad al-Gaddafi. (Annette Weber, 2010)

4.6 The Comparative Analysis

1. Mandates and Engagement

African Union (AU): The AU intervened on the principle of "African solutions to African problems." It began its engagement in 2004 by deploying AMIS-the African Union Mission in Sudan-charged with implementing ceasefires and protecting civilians through active field peacekeeping.

Arab League (AL): The Arab League took a more diplomatic approach to the conflict, often considering it from the regional and political perspective rather than a purely humanitarian basis. Essentially, this meant that they acted almost as Sudan's proxy on the international front but themselves played little part in keeping or enforcing the peace until quite late into the disaster, with only limited efforts towards reinforcing the work of the AU through sending observer missions.

2. Resource and Capacity

The AU faced various resource and capacity challenges, making it incapable of fully carrying out the mandates towards restoring stability in Darfur. The contribution of personnel from the bulk of the AU members, although initially limited in resources, reached into the thousands over these years.

The League was even less financially invested in direct interventions, deploying minimum resources compared to the AU. Most of its efforts have been limited to diplomatic support, not

necessarily engaging in broad financial or personnel commitments for peacekeeping missions within the region.

3. Strategies of Intervention

AU focused on direct peacekeeping and mediation right from ceasefires to formal negotiations, such as Abuja talks, which would bring conflicting parties together around the negotiating table. The AU strategy later transformed into a partnership with the United Nations' UNAMID, after realizing limitations in its resources and mixed forces between the AU and UN for effectiveness.

AL: The Arab League's effort has so far been confined to the political support of Sudan for the international community, balancing the weight of the West. It held numerous peace initiatives, with its most concerted effort being in Doha. These, however, have often faced internal divisions and competing member state agendas.

4. Political Dynamics and Challenges

The AU's intervention also confronted political resistance, both internally and externally: key parties in Sudan were unwilling to abide by the peace deals, while the international community was critical of the effectiveness of the AU. Its role has often been perceived as partial, thereby compromising any semblance of neutrality.

AL: The AL was confronted by sharp divisions within its membership due to cross interest in the highest levels of its membership; notably, Libya and Egypt were on opposite sides. Furthermore, the AL's backing of the government in Sudan destroyed any chance that the AL would be an honest broker. This also reduced the AL's potential for a robust conflict resolver.

5. Outcomes and Effectiveness

The AU managed to affect a series of settlements through its interventions, though these usually were fragile, only partially effective due to the failure of some groups to adhere to them. Continuing collaboration between the AU with the UN brought improvements in humanitarian access and protection of civilians, even though long-term peace remained elusive.

AL: Its role remained pretty limited as this organization relied solely on the methods of diplomacy and refrained from direct intervention. Probably, its most well-known action, the Doha process, was successful only partly due to apparent internal differences and skepticism on the part of both Darfur factions and AL member states.

In short, while the AU was more aggressive with boots-on-the-ground interventions, capacity and political barriers hindered their implementation. The Arab League's response was more cautious, with primary actions limited to diplomatic support for Sudan on international bodies, although it was weakened by internal divisions and partiality. Both organizations' strategies reflect their wider organizational priorities: the AU, regional security; and the AL, political alliance and diplomatic engagement.

The involvement of Sudan in the AU and AL had serious implications for the nature and efficacy of the various interventions in the conflict in Darfur. Its membership in both of these organizations made Sudan enjoy strategic leverage and challenges that restricted the moves of both an organization toward the conflict individually.

1. Strategic Benefits for Sudan

Playing different support structures: A member of the two organizations, Sudan would seek to balance the different comparative advantages within each group in its favor. For instance, Sudan took advantage of the principle of "African solutions to African problems" applied by the AU and framed the conflict in the regional dimension since the AU put emphasis on African-led peace processes. On the other hand, Sudan benefited from the AL's diplomatic support in that this league kept on framing the conflict as an internal affair exaggerated by foreign interference, especially the Western influence. Therefore, this dual positioning allowed Sudan to receive sympathetic diplomatic support from the AL while maintaining the regional peacekeeping response from the AU.

Hedging Against International Pressures: Such dual membership by Sudan allowed it to utilize the political support of AL against international criticisms, particularly from the West, which had termed the genocide committed by the government in Darfur. The role of the League in resisting punitive measures like sanctions allowed Sudan a diplomatic shield in international

forums. It helped Sudan hedge off pressure exerted from both regional and international actors by somewhat insulating itself from the full wrath of international criticism.

2. Conflicting Organizational Approaches as Challenges

Divergent Priorities: The AU and the AL viewed the Darfur conflict from different standpoints, which fragmented the approach toward resolution efforts. While the approach of the AU was more interventionist because the focus was directly on peacekeeping and mediation of conflict, the approach of the AL remained conservative by viewing it through the lens of a political and regional conflict. This divergence at times lessened the effectiveness of peacebuilding activities, as Sudan could opportunistically align with either organization's position to evade decisively acting against its interests.

Limited Neutrality: As Sudan enjoyed close ties with both organizations, it automatically restrained neutrality for effective mediation. While the AU peacekeeping mission acted on principles of neutrality publicly, certain rebel groups saw bias toward meeting the needs of the Sudan government and other international observers. This feeling was further driven by the fact that AL overtly supported Sudan in most international forums through opposition to some UN mandates and sanctions. The dynamics, therefore, weakened the perceived impartiality of the two organizations hence limiting their potential to act as neutral mediators.

3. Implications for Conflict Resolution and Peacemaking

The peace initiative has become fragmented: the result of Sudan's twin membership of these two organizations has been separate, often contending peace processes—one driven by the AU, the other by the AL. Whereas the AU hosted the Abuja peace talks that resulted in the Darfur Peace Agreement, the AL supported various independent initiatives, like the Doha process. Overlapping initiatives, each ostensibly intended to advance a coherent peace process, do not always have an overall coordination; hence, there were constant holdups and inconsistencies in the processes that jeopardized the steps toward a coherent peace strategy.

Divided International Support: The simultaneous membership of Sudan in both organizations divided international support in its attitude towards the crisis in Darfur. While the AU was actively involved in peacekeeping missions supported by the UN, the reluctance of the AL to

military interventions and its disposition for the support of Sudan's government conflicted with Western actors who called for stronger action. This schism among international actors empowered Sudan to handle the conflict, to a great degree, with impunity and loosened the overall international reaction towards the crisis.

4. Repercussions for Regional and International Relations

Dual Loyalty: Very often, membership in both bodies put Sudan in a tight corner where it had to juggle its identity and loyalty quite strongly between its African and Arab allegiances. Its dual identity played into Sudan's diplomatic behavior and responses within each organization, able to emphasize its "African-ness" in the AU and its "Arab-ness" in the AL, as situations warranted. Such a dual alignment made the consistency of each organization's approach toward the Darfur crisis complex, while Sudan adopted flexible positions that suited its interests.

Wider Ramifications for AU-AL Relations: Sudan's dual membership also underlined the wider tensions between the AU and AL in conflict management on the African continent. The different approaches toward Darfur exemplified the issues of cooperation between the two organizations, with their diverse regional concerns, resource capacities, and intervention strategies. This revealed the necessity for better coordination between African and Arab actors regarding complex crises within overlapping regions.

4.7 Testing the hypothesis

Testing Hypothesis 1 (H1)

Hypothesis: The League of Arab States (AL) and the African Union (AU) can often have similar goals of achieving stability, development, and political integration, but their roles may conflict in crises, leading to instability, poor development, and failed political integration.

Evidence from the analysis:

The AU's Darfur Crisis approach emphasizes peacekeeping and direct engagement through the African Union Mission in Sudan, later jointly with the United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur. This intervention focused on monitoring ceasefires, providing humanitarian support, and protecting civilians.

While the Arab League portrayed Darfur largely as a "tribal issue" and less of a political one, or even a regional threat, it often provided political support to the government of Sudan with fewer direct military actions. This has also limited how effective this support can be in impartial mediation and the full addressing of root causes.

Competing strategies finally created an overlap and sometimes counterproductive peace efforts. It was tough to create an environment of sustained political integration when the AU's direct peacekeeping tendencies were always met by the AL's tendency to defer to Sudan's requests on international stages.

Conclusion: Chapter 4 confirms H1, in that both organizations follow stability and integration, at one and the same time as adopting approaches conflicting with each other, and which can indeed lead to instability and undermine cohesive development efforts.

Testing Hypothesis 2 (H2)

Hypothesis: The AU's peacekeeping missions in Darfur have been more effective in reducing conflict-related violence compared to the AL's diplomatic efforts, due to the AU's active military engagement on the ground.

Evidence from the analysis:

The AU's AMIS deployed large-scale peacekeeping resources; it built up its troop presence from 150 to over 7,000 between 2004 and 2006. Its goals spanned from civilian protection and humanitarian access to ceasefire implementation, temporarily reducing violence at times and thereby improving conditions.

The Arab League, in comparison, was confined to strongly depending on diplomatic measures of political support for Sudan, without any form of direct contact. The fact that the AL was strongly supportive of Sudan's sovereignty contradicted the international call for humanitarian intervention, thus preventing the effective implementation of peace protocols. This means that the League had no military presence and thus was confined to a lack or even an effecting of conflict-related violence.

Success of AU-led initiatives like UNAMID in violence mitigation, though not without their challenges, suggests that the latter's military presence had more immediate effects on reducing violence compared to the often non-enforcement augmented diplomacy from the AL.

Conclusion: Evidence in Chapter 4 supports H2 because the military involvement of the AU on the ground was able to bear greater impact on reducing violence, while the diplomacy of the AL without enforcement power wielded little influence.

Testing Hypothesis 3 (H3)

Hypothesis: Sudan's membership in both the AU and the AL has created a dual-influence dynamic complicating international mediation efforts in the Darfur conflict, as each organization brings different priorities and interests.

Evidence from the analysis:

The membership of Sudan was thus able to invoke the AU's pan-Africanist philosophy of "African solutions to African problems" while at the same time drawing on the AL's diplomatic shield, which more often than not rejected sanctions and any threat to Sudan government autonomy.

The AU's peacekeeping focus stood in contrast to the AL's largely diplomatic support, placing Sudan in a position where it could use AL support as leverage to selectively counterbalance pressures by both the AU and UN. This was in part seen within those specific areas where the AL supported Sudan's opposition to international sanctions, a position directly running against the mandate of the AU to ensure accountability by Sudan for violence.

This dual influence did, however, allow Sudan to exploit the divisions in the AL, where sometimes individual member states would undermine coordinated peace efforts. This piecemeal approach did little to ensure timely and sustained international pressure, another of the required factors in effective mediation.

This chapter has concluded with strong support for H3: Sudan's dual membership in the AU and AL introduced some competing priorities, which it could strategically use to counteract cohesive mediation and thus complicate peace efforts.

4.8 Conclusion

Chapter 4 does the comparative study of AU and AL interventions in the Darfur conflict, representing the complexities and limitations a regional organization such as AU and AL face regarding crisis management. While their broad goals of fostering stability and political integration in Sudan were mutually shared, their measures and priorities within the perspective of the Darfur crisis faced serious and most of the time conflicting roles. The AU took active steps to reduce levels of violence and protect civilians, largely through AMIS and the later joint mission UNAMID. In contrast, placing greater importance on Sudanese sovereignty, the AL had more diplomatic and politically supporting approaches, often reducing its capacity to have positive impacts on attempts at violence curbing or root cause resolution.

This dual membership complicates the international mediation landscape even more, with Sudan apt to exploit both organizations to its benefit through its dual membership. Its dual alignment enables Sudan to use the regional legitimacy of the AU, on the one hand, and the diplomatic support of the AL, on the other, often at cross-purposes with each other, as counterweights against international pressure for the express purpose of slowing down progress toward comprehensive peace.

The analysis concludes by showing that, although the AU's proactive peacekeeping had a more direct impact on the reduction of conflict violence, its absence of a coordinated approach with AL, exacerbated by Sudan's dual membership, impeded coherent and effective peacebuilding in Darfur. This chapter discusses how regional organizations should better their coordination to handle such protracted conflicts and how challenges arise from such organizations when they also fail to resist conflicted interests within a crisis of common concern.

CHAPTER FIVE

Conclusion

5.1 Introduction

The aim of this chapter is to integrate the observations from the comparative analysis of the AU and AL in the case of dealing with political instability and conflict in Sudan, with a particular focus on their respective roles regarding the Darfur crisis and the general integration challenges in Sudan. The chapter will identify useful lessons and develop strategic recommendations to enhance the effectiveness of regional organizations in conflict environments as complex as Sudan through an evaluation of the AU's peacekeeping-centric approach and AL's model of diplomatic support. Next, the paper discusses implications for Sudan's dual membership within these organizations, emphasizing the accrued benefits and challenges stemming from this unique positioning.

5.2 Key lessons learned

- Strengths of Regional Organizations

African Union (AU): The AU has demonstrated significant strengths in operational engagement, including the deployment of peacekeeping missions; it also facilitates ceasefires and ensures humanitarian aid delivery. Its emphasis on "African solutions to African problems" has enabled local and regional legitimacy. However, some critics argue that this approach may overlook essential international perspectives, although it is rooted in a desire for self-determination. Because of this, the AU faces challenges in balancing local needs with global expectations.

Arab League (AL): The AL effectively utilized diplomatic instruments to champion Sudan on global stages: safeguarding the nation's sovereignty and resisting external pressures, such as sanctions. However, this approach is not without challenges (because navigating international relations is complex). Although the AL is committed to its mission, it must remain vigilant in the face of various obstacles.

- Limitations and Gaps

AU Challenges

The AU encountered substantial resource and logistical constraints, which limited its capacity to maintain long-term peacekeeping missions and enforce agreements. However, the lack of robust funding mechanisms, along with a reliance on external donors, undermined its autonomy. This situation poses challenges, because although there are efforts to improve funding, the dependence on outside support remains a critical issue.

AL Challenges: The AL's approach was deficient in neutrality and lacked a tangible presence, which ultimately restricted its credibility as a mediator. Its emphasis on sovereignty often placed state interests above comprehensive conflict resolution; however, this can lead to further complications. Although there were attempts to address the situation, the overall effectiveness was diminished because of these priorities.

- The Impact of Dual Membership

Sudan's dual membership in both the AU and AL has created conflicting expectations; however, this has also led to fragmented approaches to conflict resolution. The divergence between the AU's interventionist stance and the AL's sovereignty-focused diplomacy has diluted the impact of their combined efforts. Although these organizations aim to address issues effectively, their differing priorities complicate the situation, because they struggle to align their strategies. Thus, the outcome is often less effective than it could be.

- The Need for Coordination

The absence of coordination between the AU and AL underscored the significance of inter-organizational collaboration. Overlapping initiatives, however and competing priorities hindered the creation of a cohesive peace strategy, because this prolonged the conflict in Darfur. Although the intention was to foster unity, the lack of alignment ultimately impeded progress.

5.3 Recommendations

- Resource Mobilization Strengthening

The AU needs to develop more sustainable funding systems, such as regional trust funds, from which minimal dependence can be expected on external donors.

The AL needs to invest more in operational engagement, such as in peacekeeping missions and humanitarian efforts.

- Enhancing Neutrality and Credibility

Both organizations should adopt impartial mediation strategies that engage all stakeholders, including rebel groups and civil society, in order to facilitate inclusivity and engender trust.

The AL, in particular, needs to balance its support for its member states with a commitment to addressing root causes of conflict.

- Strengthen Inter-Organizational Cooperation

The AU and AL should establish a formal coordination mechanism for joint conflict resolution initiatives. Regular consultations, shared resources, and unified strategies could enhance their collective impact.

Collaborative frameworks could leverage the AU's operational strengths and the AL's diplomatic influence for more cohesive

Interventions.

- Leveraging Sudan's Dual Membership

Sudan needs to take advantage of its membership in these two bodies and call for harmonization whereby the AU and AL should have a unified approach, helping eliminate overlapping mandates and ensuring effectiveness accordingly.

Within Sudan, a joint committee by the AU-AL can be set up that could monitor conflict resolution efforts for coherence and common responsibility.

- Fostering Stability over the Long Run and Integration

Capacity-building exercises for Sudan, such as institutional reforms, governance, and reconciliation programs, should be prioritized by both bodies.

Joint efforts should be invested or convergence on causes of instability in Sudan, such as socio-economic disparities and regional inequalities.

5.4 Conclusion

This paper has pointed out the complementary but often contradictory roles played by the AU and AL in consolidating political stability and integration in Sudan, and more specifically, the Darfur conflict. The AU's peacekeeping strengths and the AL's effective diplomatic influence demonstrate the potency of their collaboration, although there have been conflicts in strategies and uncoordinated interventions that have obstructed this effectiveness.

Sudan's dual membership in both organizations underscores the need for a unified framework that aligns their approaches, leveraging the AU's operational expertise and the AL's political support. Enhancing financial and operational autonomy for both organizations is critical to sustaining their interventions. A collaborative, integrated strategy will not only address Sudan's internal challenges but also strengthen regional stability and development efforts. The weight of cooperation and flexibility needed for the long-term peace and integration of Sudan is underscored in this research.

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