



## The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor

One-Belt One Road Initiative is one of the greater initiatives started by Chinese president Xi Jinping in 2013 early on after coming into power. China underwent a major Economic Industrialisation in Eastern China right ranging after the end of Mao Zedong's Cultural Revolution, Deng Xiaoping brought immense Economic Reforms in China resulting in the development from light industry to heavy industries and moving towards privatization in the mid-1990s and officially becoming a part of WTO in 2001. The country in its journey to becoming the world's leading economy underwent a lot of ups and downs after the end of the Cultural Revolution and finally uprising as the world's no. 1 exporter in manufactured goods. Therefore, becoming increasingly dependent on foreign trade and global markets, it developed a strong reliance on imported energy and maritime commercial lanes. As a result of what the country launched this 'going-out' policy. This master Chinese plan has further two sub-initiatives namely Silk-Road Economic Belt marking the land route and Maritime-Silk Route en routing the sea-lanes awning the Eurasian-African continent.

This paper emphasizes one of its six corridors, the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), which is the most commodious, reliable, and generous project taking into account the privilege it has to deal with only one country. Now, the science of thought behind this remarkable project is China's long-desired development of Western China (Xinjiang region),

with the active engagement of the United States with its military presence in the 'Strait of Malacca, hence trying to overcome that 'Malacca Dilemma' and the U.S. alliance of QUAD in the Asia-Pacific region, economical export of goods through the strategic point of Gwadar Port in Balochistan Province and transitory route for the import of Oil from Iran though now presently China will get another importer with Russia's cheap oil the trade with Iran will continue to exist, another practical reason is to ensure its presence in the Arabian Sea and the possibility of developing a naval/military base in the well-calculated port of Gwadar which explicitly could affect India's contribution towards Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) and its cooperation and commitment towards the Indo-Pacific Strategy. On the flip side, Pakistan's major energy crisis, instability in underdeveloped regions, and financial crisis led Pakistani PM Nawaz Sharif to join the hands in the ray of hope of changing the game for Pakistan in terms of trade, commerce, Industrialisation, and most of all erecting firstly the energy-production by settling various Coal, Solar, and Hydropower plants in Pakistan. However, it needed to be admitted that geo-politics and geo-economics are not as convenient as they seem, it comes with intricate challenges, risks, threats, and consequences. This paper will also reflect upon all those challenges with their implications as of present and futuristic terms also will take into consideration every position related to the project along with current settings and trends.




Figure:1 – Sub-routes of CPEC

Elucidating on the main and the sub-routes of CPEC is that this gigantic project starts from Kashgar in the Xinjiang region and reflexes itself reaching the South-Western part of Pakistan till the Gwadar Port. However, this was an overview of the project's route, shedding light upon the sub-routes of CPEC is there are four sub-parts running across distinguished regions of Pakistan named mainly as Eastern alignment (passing through Central Punjab and Sindh), Western alignment (passing through Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan), Central (passing partly through KPK and includes unconnected parts of Punjab and Sindh) and Northeastern alignment (connects Pakistani alignments with the China-Pakistan border at Kunjarab).

## China-Pakistan Relations (Political and Diplomatic ties)

Initially, let us look at the relationship between China and Pakistan, the country's Bilateral ties: Strategic Partnership, Economic Collaboration, Trade, Commerce, and Military-

Cooperation. Islamabad's and Beijing's relationship started in 1950, in which Pakistan became the first Muslim state to recognize the relationship between them both, however, their diplomatic relationship emerged in 1951. The major roadblock of trans-state relationship was the period of the Cold War when the world was divided into two parts: one supported the United States and the other supported the USSR, which China supported following the fact that they both believed in a common Communist ideology and the China that time followed the Lenin's market ideology though they implemented with a balance of market-economy as well. However, soon their relationship started to become vinegary when Pakistan joins the SEATO (South East Asian Territory Organization) 1954 and CENTO (Central East North Territory Organization) 1955 majorly an agreement to comply with other pro-western states, and strengthen their security which opposed the Communist soviet bloc of that of USSR and China. Therefore, in order to maintain a balance between the both Pakistan got a chance to revive its relations with China under the Bandung Conference (1955) held in Indonesia under which Pakistan protected itself by claiming onto the security concerns from India and that co-operating with the U.S. is purely based on their security reasons. After the recovery of Sino-Pak relations, July 1957, Hussain Shaheed Suhrawardy paid his visit to the US the joint statement was issued after having a meeting that both the premier of Pakistan and the President of the US agreed that "International communism is a major threat to the security of the world". Another development, when Hajis visited from Taiwan and these Hajis met religious leaders of Pakistan in Karachi, China soon blamed Pakistan for promoting One-China Policy and the back-filling United States. Therefore, in the area of Gilgit which was then also the disputed area, Border skirmishes erupted on the boundary of the Line of Hunza in 1959, and MIG planes of China violated the air-space of Pakistan and soon Pakistan retaliated by deploying scouts on the borders.

On the flip side, Indo-Sino relations were alarming over their Ladakh and Northeastern boundaries and war erupted between India and China in 1962. However, this shift in geopolitics made China come closer to Pakistan as the U.S. came in support of India over the border issue with China. In March 1963 Sino-Pak signed an agreement to mark the distinguish border-line between Gilgit-Baltistan and Xinjiang. India condemned the agreement and expressed a concern that there was no border existing between China and Pakistan. It is noteworthy that from this time-onwards the Sino-Pak became devoted to each other and proving their relationship whether in terms of Veto power against India over the separation of Bangladesh or regarding claiming their disputed territory between India and Pakistan, in contrast, the West's relationship also didn't prove to be yielding for India. Later, China-Pakistan joint venture in building the Karakoram Highway (KKH) for connecting Kashgar with Islamabad in 1978 was made which later became the part of CPEC stretch it all the way towards the Gwadar Port. The sino-Pak relationship has developed into a new bond in this 21st century, when President Musharraf visited China and agrees to the enlargement of their relationship in strategic and economic sectors in Nov 2003 entitled "Joint Declaration on Direction of Bilateral Relations." Just after two years, in a visit by President Wen Jiabao, the 6th premier of China, both inter-state signed a historic agreement under the title of "Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Good Neighborly Relations." According to this agreement, Sino-Pak agreed to not join any bloc or alliance which violates the "sovereignty, security, and territorial integrity" of any of both countries. The relationship continued with power-changing Internal Politics and in 2008, when Asif Ali Zardari became the president of Pak, in his visit to China signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) regarding the economy, agriculture, communication, and I.T sector.

( Strategic and Economic Cooperation)

While so many agreements were already under process, it was transparent that Pakistan will become part of Xi's (One-Belt One Road)OBOR initiative, and finally both the countries signed an agreement over the project costing 62 billion projects as valued in 2020. Through the landmark cooperation of Sino-Pak built a Karakoram Highway (KKH) 500 miles long, its increased significance due to the strategic and economic point of view accomplished in becoming one of the highest International highways of the world, despite marking its importance in 1978 (1982 opened for private sector) partner countries took it again under CPEC project and built a Phase- II Thakot-Havelian-120kms (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa)costing \$1315 million.

Proceeding further, Pakistan currently (2022), has a population of 229.5 million, the 5th largest populous, and a country with an increasing population estimated to reach 302.1 million by 2040, a decade after the completion of CPEC projects, worth \$21 trillion. Well, increasing population in the neighbor, allured China's vision of increasing trade agreements - 2007-2012 CPFTA (China-Pakistan Free Trade Agreement)Phase-I under which Pak gained concessions on 6,418 tariff lines, in 2007 Pak exports were \$1.1 bn and eventually by 2012, the exports increased to \$3.14 bn. In April 2019, both signed Protocol on CPFTA Phase-II, in which China liberalized 75% of tariff lines, however, the bilateral trade was \$7.64bn and Pak exports fell to \$1.48bn. The majority of goods exported by Pakistan was Iron Ore, Machinery, and Mechanical appliances parts between 2003-2007, and in coming years the exports of these goods fell and the sale of Organic Chemicals, Oilseeds, oleaginous fruits, lac, gums, resins, and veg extracts rose between 2014-2018 (Analysis driven as per the data released by <https://cdpr.org.pk/> ). In terms of exports, as per the most recent data available Pakistan exports to China was \$235.137 million during 2021, and the same year China exported about \$24.23 billion, which earlier in 2019 and 2020 were \$15.36billion and

\$16.17billion respectively, and the trade-deficit of the partner countries reaching \$23.99 billion. In connection with a loan to Pakistan, they owe Rs. 11.61(Pakistani Rupees) trillion which in USD is approx. \$62 billion USD as released by their (Government of Pakistan-Finance Division) [finance.gov.pk/rebuttals\\_details1.html](http://finance.gov.pk/rebuttals_details1.html). The country's present GDP is in the negatives -0.93, and the country's foreign reserves as of 2020 are \$18.5 billion. The economic depression is too high while the Chinese projects and investments are under progress in Pakistan. One of the very basic uncertainty marks here is the future of Pakistan, which already is seeking loans from Central Asia, Russia, China, and the IMF. Therefore, the shrinking and unstable economic condition of Pakistan gives rise to the cross-examining of the increased Chinese investments as the cut-back of the economy is posing a serious threat of falling under debt of Chinese as well as external loans. Nevertheless, analysts could admit that the loans to China are not higher than the loans to other countries and IMF, however, the calculation says China is one of Pakistan's biggest lenders since the beginning of the project and other countries do not have investments under CPEC projects, so it presents not just an irony of win-win cooperation and game-changer for Pakistan but also raises doubt over the intentions of China. Following the above-interpreted facts, some of the controversial affairs extracted are- Is China certain of getting back their loans? Will this project actually lead to the Economic advancement of the country if still yes, then to what extent? How much energy could be produced through those power plants? Also, we see a lot of projects are under-construction (progress), in case the economy collapses will China continue to fund those projects? The paramount speculation is determining growth as Pakistan battles with its economy and surviving on loans, the returns of loans are ambiguous, is the motive behind CPEC projects is really to drive the growth, however, *not penetrating the catastrophic-side* but as per the present state-of-affairs, the indication is that Pakistan can fall into a vicious circle of Debt to China and other countries.

(Defense and Military-ties)

So, far Islamabad's and Beijing's military, and defense ties are concerned, the countries are allies since 1963 after the border agreement between them and since then Pakistan has become one of trusted friend and largest supplier of defense by China. China has been supportive of Pakistan in terms of equipment technology and provided scientific expertise to Pakistan's nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs throughout the 1980s and 1990s, enhancing Pakistan's strength in the South Asian strategic balance. Since, then Pakistan has been a buyer of China's JF-17 aircraft, JF-17 production facilities, F-22P frigates with helicopters, K-8 jet trainers, T-85 tanks, F-7 aircraft, small arms, and ammunition. Beijing also built a turnkey ballistic missile manufacturing facility near the city of Rawalpindi and helped Pakistan develop the 750-km-range, solid-fueled Shaheen-1 ballistic missile. In April 2020, Pakistan received its first batch of Chinese-made VT-4 battle tanks, and before that the Chinese spy drones. Well, this defense relationship is definitely posing a threat to Indian territory and it has been quite evident that China backs Pakistan over their Kashmir Issue with India and the Line of Control (LOC). On the flip side, it can be a lapse to underestimate the military power of India and their recently introduced defense budget in the parliament as per which 25% of India's economy will go into weaponry and building military capabilities. However, the cooperation between Pakistan and China was much needed as per the instability in the regions of Balochistan, terrorist attacks, and turmoil in Xinjiang (the autonomous region) although, the dominant inducement could also be the project which passes from Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (PoK) region and the fear that India may not retain that region back since the removal of 370 Article A, has led the Jammu and Kashmir to come under the same constitution of India and the situation presents a greater possibility of this action to happen in coming years. In addition, Pakistan exceptionally supports China over their issues in the South-China Sea, Taiwan, Xinjiang, and Tibet hence, commercial ties and military



cooperation will keep Pakistan supporting over their issues besides the fact that power of authority relies on powerful states over their ally who might be incapacitated.

*Is China de-risking or re-risking itself through this project? What apart from the integration of CPEC countries can bring India and Pakistan together?*

The United States' comeback on China after the Obama administration's 'Pivot to Asia' came back strongly under the Trump administration with his foreign policy of 'Indo-Pacific Strategy' and re-strengthening of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) years after it was proposed by Shinzo Abe in 2007. QUAD has four strong members in the Asia-Pacific region – the United States, India, Australia, and Japan with three of them holding a very strategic position in the Indo-Pacific region, the alliance is mainly working onto contain China's actions of what is widely popular in the name of 'Expansionism' mode, safeguard maritime security and ensuring freedom of navigation mainly in the South-China Sea. This strategic and common interests based alliance is already becoming a roadblock for China since that region that this alliance is targetting has a great potential of representing 63% of the global population, 30% of global GDP, 24% of the household consumption, and almost 75% of recognized energy reserves. This maritime route passes from a very narrow point which falls in the region of Strait of Malacca bordering Malaysia and Singapore in South-east Asia however, the presence of U.S. military and threat to maritime-transport gave rise to a dilemma in the Chinese minds, and one of the possible reason for re-routing it from Kashgar to Gwadar. But, as mentioned above the other dispute of India and Pakistan over the issue of PoK is posing another threat to China. In order to continue to maintain regional influence India during 2016, invested in Iran's Chabbar port 170 kilometers west of Gwadar port, and built a North-South corridor through Iran and Afghanistan. This Corridor not only brings the states of Central Asia, Iran, or Afghanistan closer but also frees Kabul from its dependence on Pakistan to reach the outer world. Therefore, the trajectory of the scenario gives out the

pragmatism the leveraged flexibility of the project has blinded China over the territorial dispute in the connecting area and the Indian presence at Chabbar port.

Drawing from the optimistic theory of the dispute there is another possibility of reconciliation between India and Pakistan but the strong stance of India over their concern of territorial sovereignty definitely makes it an undone deal. But re-routing the project from the actual boundaries of India could be one of the possibilities to get rid of this dispute and insecurity underlying because the involvement could also bring the stakes of India in the CPEC. It has also been proposed by the security analysts that granting India with the overland access route from Pakistan to Afghanistan and Central Asia, could be another factor to get the Indian legitimacy over the project. However, another strategy China could adopt in this measure is to improve the relations between India and Pakistan through changing their perspective towards India which currently is full of hostility and make sure both regions reconcile their border issues. The plot behind this China's step-up could be determined from the above-mentioned increased dependency of Pakistan on Chinese investments and loans to keep their economy boosted and running and the Chinese projects meeting one in all important the energy pre-requisite of Pakistan's households and industries.

*How far will CPEC enhance the development of economic/politically disadvantaged provinces of both countries?*

Leading the development of the disadvantaged provinces of both the states is one of the major drivers of the project and the aims of the project indicate the proposed growth of historically deprived regions. As per the Provincial Home Department's report in 2015, there was a 50 percent reduction in terrorist attacks and target killings in Balochistan in the years 2013-14. The joint-state venture has therefore assumed the stages of development, in terms of reduction in political tensions, to break the taboo of the Baloch people who believe their

rights and resources are exploited to serve others' interests. Other, the installments of the energy projects will lead to the better provision of electricity and will enhance the economic activities and standards of people in these areas. It is also promised to the people of Baloch that the settlement of Coal power projects as part of Industrial hubs will generate jobs for the local population. Furthermore, remarkable GDP growth has been evident from the region of Xinjiang rising from \$147 billion (2014) to \$205 billion (2019), which reveals an increase of about 7.2%.

The way to accomplishment is faced by hurdles, one of the challenges is the angle through which the people of Baloch view these Chinese investments suggests that the impact of CPEC is counter-intuitive. Instead of enabling the under-developed region of Pakistan, the investments of China are seen very suspiciously by the residents as they have been quoting about the Chinese takeover of Sri Lanka's Hambantota Port, Djibouti port in Africa and has pushed these countries to go bankrupt with the Chinese money coming in and taking over the control of the area. Balochs were promised the jobs but the figure of jobs created so far under the entire project is as low as 47,800 in a country with a growing population and their bread-earning profession of fishing has also been taken away by the construction of Gwadar Port. Islamabad's promise is to create 1.2 million jobs under the current and upcoming projects, however under present orbit most of the projects are funded by Chinese companies and the majority of engineers and technicians are from China, hence presenting no scope of jobs for the Pakistani people. There also prevails the apprehension of the regional elites and locals as the center gave preferences to the eastern route of Punjab, largely bypassing Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. CPEC is on its march to complete by 2030, almost 8 years from now and the instability in Balochistan and the influence of militant groups has showed-up in recent years, the terrorist attacks on Chinese engineers in the Kohistan district (July 2021) 13 people were killed have also raised the issue of internal security and also lack of security

commitment from the govt. of Islamabad is also pushing the debate of security in uncertainty, though the Pakistan army deployed their forces the continued attacks raise the question over the safety of Chinese investments.

*How China is visioning a balance of environmental conditions by shifting the scope of industries from the developed East-China to under-developed West China?*

Country	Total CO2 Emissions (million metric tons)
China	10,668
United States	4,576

Figure: 2- Total Carbon-Dioxide Emissions in 2020

*China released about 10.67 billion metric tons of carbon dioxide in 2020, which makes it the world's largest polluter. While the country like the United States faced comparatively fewer emissions possibly due to COVID-19. On the contrary, the United States' contribution to the world's pollution has been highest since the country began industrialization earlier than China which mainly started in the 21st century. Nevertheless, the hotshot is that Eastern China combusts more pollutants compared to Western China.*

Apart from the saga of the existence of 'Two-Chinas' an urban, industrialized, flourishing Eastern China, and a rural, poorer, and unstable Western China. So, do comply with their environment pollution one is more affected by the pollution and other faces less challenge of pollution respectively. Climate Change is an ongoing debate at the International Forum and China's engagement shows that the country is determined about the deteriorating environmental conditions in Eastern China, development in China has come but came with the cost of facing the challenging issue of increasing pollution. However, with the active awareness over Climatic conditions of the East, China not only reflects upon both its self-

interest but also its internal-political dynamics. Besides, the idea that evolution of the Western China will bring stability to the Autonomous Region of Xinjiang, China is therefore also gazing into creating a balance of environmental pollution caused by the Industries. In regards to this, China's idea behind could be that the development in the region creates more stability on that account by providing its strategic position of connecting to Russia, Central Asia, and Middle-East, Europe, Africa through the port of Gwadar. The rationale behind the CPEC projects will also enable China to shift some of the industries towards Xinjiang and the connectivity through the route will leverage the significance of its locus.

One of the reasons for China's high level of emissions is its reliance on coal, which constitutes a major polluting energy resource. In 2020, China also announced they will fully be free from fossil fuels and will make China carbon neutral by 2060. Hence, the CPEC accords to the absolute opportunity for China in achieving the shift of scope of industries.

*How Political Instability in Pakistan can impact the CPEC and How is the coming Pakistan elections will impact CPEC?*

In order for a nation to progress, political stability is the first and foremost factor to the successful running of the system and ensures socio-economic development. Nevertheless, the wobbly Pakistan political system has been predisposed towards dissatisfaction among the citizens and the 'identity crisis' accompanies. Delving into the data of the stable government in Pakistan, since achieving independence in 1947, only two Prime Minister's accomplished their Parliamentary tenure Nawaz Shariff: 1990–93, 1997–98, and 2013–17) elected for three non-consecutive terms in Pakistan, Imran Khan (2018- present), nonetheless, the elections are coming up in 2023 and plenty could be drawn from the current scenario in Pakistan which can carry off to the success and implementation of CPEC. The fundamental cause behind the above-mentioned constituents is the stumbling and segmented political organization. The

ruling party in Pakistan runs with the coalition of other small parties shows weakness in support for the party. Therefore, to formulate any internal or external policy the government has to seek the support of masses within the party, and factions on the basis of interests become a challenging element to carry out any policy successfully. In addition to this, superlative degree of rule of Military over the governmental affairs with its considerable amount of influence is pushing the future of the government in uncertainty and the pages of history have been evidence of this since in the same years of independence of 75 years the military has ruled the country atleast for straight 35 years after its successful military coup in 1958,1977 and 1999. Furthermore, earlier in the start of the CPEC project under the Nawaz Sharif's constituency, the economic progression as the data of end of Sharif's shows decent numbers wherein the debt was \$694,395 million, reserves were \$18.4 billion and GDP attained 5.554%, possibly due to the Chinese was lodging the investments into Early-Harvest projects and his term ended in 2017 over the alleged case of Money-Laundering and Corruption.

Finally, the tenure of Imran-Khan's command the most recent available data shows the inadequate economic performance of the economy as mentioned in the section of Economic Cooperation has not only offered the chance for the opposition to pass a 'No-Confidence Motion against Imran but also overthrowing an ideology of too 'Eastern Centric' which is 'pro-Chinese rather than being a 'pro-western'. However, the rallies of Imran exhibit his stand against the Western society and they being authoritative over Pakistan's stand but how the military powering government sees it as also a blockade for the approval of 'IMF loans' which the country needs desperately forseeing the performance of their economy depending on loans. Extracting from the synopsis of government change, military-backed government, corruption, and taking heed of who will be in power in 2023, pushes into the rationale of whether there is a possibility of a stable political system in Pakistan in the future, a

government that will be independent in carrying out its socio-economic policies and proper implementation as these factors determine the success of CPEC projects.

*The question of whether China is aiming to increase its presence in South-Asia militarizing Pakistan in the guise of the security operation of the region for the purpose of protecting the Pak-Chinese interests?*

The speculation of whether China is looking ahead to militarize Gwadar arises from the country's strategy of distinctly taking over the Hambantota in Sri Lanka, Port of Doraleh (extension of Djibouti Port), Gwadar in Balochistan, Sittwe in Myanmar, and Chittagong in Bangladesh which strategically falls in the continents of Asia and Africa thus, provide leverage to China in its presence. China already has established a base at the port of Djibouti, the second overseas military base operated by the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) with its South Sea Fleet's presence. This strategy gives strong anchorage to China, in terms of the country's trade dependence, threatening the presence of the United States (Allies) who are against China's activities and also leverage over United States 'Rebalancing Asia' strategy. According to Chinese analysts, there is no such strategy and furnish the speculations by the aiming concept of One-Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative's three No's- China will not interfere in the internal affairs of other nations, China does not seek to increase its so-called 'sphere of influence', China does not strive for hegemony or dominance. Well, the framework says the complete opposite, China Overseas Port Holding Company a, state-owned company that manages the entire development of the Gwadar port to the Construction of New Gwadar International Airport already has secured the 40-years long term contract. Apart from receiving the huge revenue and becoming a regional economic hub, discussions with PLAN might be under-way to install a security base at the port further expanding the Blue-Water Fleet in the Arabian Sea. India thus far suspects China over their encirclement of India by the 'String of Pearls' strategy by the country's active involvement in the strategic

ports in the region under the name of OBOR by reflecting upon one of the recent deals between China and Pakistan over the supply of eight submarines worth approx. \$5 billion.

The issue of security attached with the disapproval of Balochs as the project misuse their province and is entirely Gwadar-centric since most of the projects in the province of Balochistan are implemented under the Gwadar Development Plan and the arc of externally supported groups stretching from Xinjiang via the tribal territories along the border with Afghanistan to Gwadar and involve the groups like East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), Tehrik-I-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), Lashkar-e-Jhagvi (LeJ) and the separatist Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA). It is the likelihood that China could just be using these terrorists pursuits and fragility as an agenda to build up its selling of weapons to Pakistan, military, naval presence in the guise of security operations at Gwadar not merely of the security reasons inside the Gwadar and Balochistan but also drawing from the implication of the presence of India at Chahhabar port.

*The 'Indus Water Treaty' and how it can impact the development of the project?*



Figure:3 – Indus Water System (the six-rivers)



The implications of the 'Indus Water Treaty are not exclusively to Pakistan's water needs but majorly to the success of the CPEC Dam and Hydro-power projects. It is also one of the uninvestigated arguments by many scholars in their papers on CPEC. However, this treaty is an agreement between India and Pakistan over the sharing of waters, in 1960 the treaty signed divided the rivers flowing from India towards Pakistan into – Eastern and Western block in the eastern falls the Ravi, Sutlej, and Beas and the Western cumulate the Chenab, Jhelum, and Indus. As per, the accord India receives a total of about 20% water (33 million acre-feet (MAF) which emanate from Eastern rivers, and 80% of water (135 MAF )which flows from the Western rivers are given the rights to Pakistan. Despite, the countries bearing disputes over their territories and the stance of India on the country's sovereignty the treaty for years have not been violated tagging the Indo-Pak water treaty to respecting the rights of the treaty, despite the fact that entire-flow of water passing from India and also bearing less amount of share per se.

Illustrating from the map of the treaty, the Indus river taking off from the autonomous region of Tibet, flows through Ladakh (district of J&K Jammu and Kashmir), towards the dispute areas of Gilgit-Baltistan running across the north of Pakistan towards the South in Karachi into the Arabian Sea. The Jhelum river flows from the capital of J&K, Srinagar, Chenab flows from the region of Jammu. However, India is not even using the allotted 20% of the water for Irrigation, Power-Generation, and Transport under the treaty which flows from the eastern rivers and enters Pakistan. Now, to meet the growing needs of water consumption in the regions of J&K and Punjab states of India and proposals for Hydro-project demands has made the Modi administration to the planning of installation of projects on the Western rivers which though is objected by the PTI, the objections are completely impractical because the treaty gives India rights to generate the hydro-electricity through the run of river projects to

Western rivers and India also complies fully with the specific criteria for design and operation since they are not storing the water from those tributaries.

Pakistan's groundless criticism of the Indian-hydro power projects comes from the concern of their own Hydro-powered projects currently under construction as part of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. According to data on the official site of CPEC, 2 Hydropower projects are under-erection and 2 of the projects are under-consideration synthesizing which will produce a total of 3414.7 Megawatts of power which is a tremendous amount of power generation. However, the flip side of India's situation and take on the on-going border disputes, the issue of Kashmir, removal of article-370A, the admiration release of the movie of 'The Kashmiri Files', the open speech about 'Hindu-phobia, Sikh-Phobia' in the United Nations and regular discussions on the issue of Kashmir within the committee can anytime soon challenge the status-quo of the Water treaty, whereby the flow of water which India didn't restrict so far could fall under the bureau scrutiny and could diplomatically take-up the region of Gilgit-Baltistan, the sovereign part of the nation. The Indian government can pull the trigger over the excess amount of water flowing to Pakistan, provided the fact that India wasn't utilizing their allotted percentage all could come to the hands of India and demand the open declaration of the cease-fire of secretive operations and separatism by the Islamic state in the illegally occupied area. Therefore, not to overlook the possible Chinese stance, the main player of CPEC which in all the project bears the huge stake whether in terms of provision of Water from the Indus-Water Treaty, or the disputed area, or their own skirmishes with India in Ladakh and Northeast region.

## Conclusion

Extricating from the implications of Net-profits of CPEC partnership, Challenges, Risk-Factors Involved, Present, and Future implications, the project conveys it towards the

generous amount of fragility. The exposure to the project is not unique from India's perspective and actions but also arises from the United States' contemplation. With exception from the externality of the subject, the project also faces a lack of steadiness with internal vulnerability. In spite of that, the probability of the benefitting and breakthrough is yet attainable indicating that the project will be in its final stages 8 years from now be 2030 and many of the energy projects are currently under progress and some under-consideration. Additionally, Early-Harvest projects are already in their final stages and the initiative enters its second stage pioneering further Industrial and Socio-Economic growth. On that account, Pakistan will have to protect itself against the unambitious future and maximize its advantage through change-in internal as well external policies to elevate its country-focused interests, mutual investments from countries as per the incentives of its strategic position, growing population, and improving on the internal-instability and one of them will also be battling with corruption. One of the proposals towards the advancement of the project could be the availability of documents related to loans with Chinese firms, which can give a clearer picture of Chinese intentions and also will enhance the checks-and-balances system where the intellectuals, analysts, media could acknowledge the citizens of the country and held accountable the CPEC authorities lest the country gravitates into a burden of payments.

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