Cold War Redux¹:
Who Ended the Cold War and Squandered the Cold Peace?

Amartya Sharma
George Washington University
Washington DC, USA
Abstract

The ideological battles of the previous generations hold the keys to the challenges we face during periods of tumult and chaos. Often, “history may not repeat itself, but it does rhyme,” as Mark Twain waxed poetically. In other words, the past may hold valuable lessons for the future survival of the species on this planet. This essay reexamines the history of the Cold War: who won the ideological battles and how the hard-won victories were later squandered. The history of the twentieth century may offer some teachable lessons for the challenges we face in the twenty-first century. The first part of the essay examines the historical dynamics between American President Ronald Reagan and Russian President Mikhail Gorbachev nearing the end of the Cold War. The second part of the essay how the Western powers squandered the peace dividend, argued within the framework of Fukuyama’s “the end of history” debate, and the immutable power of liberalism and democracy in shaping the future of humanity.

Gorbachev vs. Reagan: Who Ended the Cold War?

The Cold War was a battle of ideology and international dominance that lasted nearly half century. From 1945-1991, democracy vs. communism or capitalism vs. socialism were at war with each other. However, as we look back at the time period, a divided opinion tends to surface: Who exactly ended the Cold War? And, to what extent was the United States responsible? Some say Reagan single-handedly brought down the Berlin Wall with one speech. Others say Gorbachev was a Russian leader unlike any other; one who allowed for liberal reforms and transcended his predecessors. Extensive research suggests that the USSR’s fate met a combination of Gorbachev’s loosened grip on Eastern Europe and the revolutions led by nationalists in the Soviet Bloc. Although the United States and Ronald Reagan successfully funded the Mujahadeen in Afghanistan and demanded Mr. Gorbachev tear down the Berlin wall,
the fall of the Soviet Union was mainly a result of Mikhail Gorbachev’s inability to heal the broken Soviet-communist system. The Communists walled-off or closed system had too many political and economic cracks that Gorbachev’s reforms could not patch. Likewise, external pressures by the United States were affecting the Soviet Union as well. However, much of the corrosive work took place inside the Soviet Union, as opposed to outside the USSR, most significantly an economy that could not innovate and an ideology that many citizens did not believe in.\(^5\)

President Ronald Reagan’s aggressive foreign policy further weakened the Soviet economy, which contributed to its fall.\(^6\) The United States funded the Mujahadeen in Afghanistan to aid their fight against the Soviet Union. This act contributed to the devastation of the Soviet Union’s economy. According to William Hitchcock, author of *The Struggle for Europe*, “[Reagan] expanded the covert arms program to Afghanistan. As a result, by the start of the 1980s, the USSR was spending 12 to 13 percent of its GDP on its military budget.”\(^7\) In the United States today, people still deify Reagan for his aggressive foreign policy stance against the USSR and how it weakened their economy. According to Paul Demakis of the Boston Globe, “[Reagan’s] military buildup was intended to create incentives for the Soviets to negotiate significant arms reductions by eliminating or reducing their advantage in various weapons categories.”\(^8\) The Soviet economy had stagnated since the late 1960s; thus, Ronald Reagan's push for an arms race was able to further weaken the Soviet economy. An examples of such policies includes the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) as well as other arms races during Detente. SALT was able to reduce Soviet production of ballistic missiles. As a result, significant pressure was placed on the Soviet economy due to the United States’ hawkish foreign policy.
While the United States contributed to the weakening of the Soviet economy, much of the United States’ accomplishments towards ending the Cold War would not have been possible without Mikhail Gorbachev and his quasi-liberal reforms. The United States could have raised its military spending as much as it liked; it could have lent even more support to the Mujahadeen, but without a Soviet leader, different from his Stalinist predecessors, it is difficult to imagine the collapse of Soviet Union ever happening. After all, looking at other communist nations (China) today, one could argue that the Soviet Union could still be intact had Gorbachev never assumed power. Thus, the fall of the Soviet Union came primarily from implosion within the Iron Curtain.

The Soviet Union’s communist ideology was rapidly becoming more unpopular compared to centuries prior. In response, Mikhail Gorbachev continued on a path similar to Khrushchev’s, to de-Stalinize the Soviet “empire”. This act formed a political storm Moscow could not handle, contributing to the Soviet collapse. The Soviet Union had been severely weakened by proxy-wars, specifically, in Afghanistan. Likewise, on a day-to-day basis, people in the Soviet “empire” were hurting. Marx’s idea of total equality was no longer fooling many Eastern Europeans. These same Eastern European countries did not want their leadership emanating from Moscow. Professor Joseph Nye of the Harvard Kennedy School said it perfectly, “Although in theory communism aimed to establish a system of class justice, [the Soviet Union] maintained domestic power through a brutal security apparatus involving lethal purges, gulags, broad censorship, and ubiquitous informants. The net effect of these brutal measures was a general loss of faith in the system.” Slavenka Drakulic, the author of *How We Survived Communism and Even Laughed*, makes a similar point, referring to her time living in Communist Yugoslavia, “We simply were not ready to accept a deteriorating standard of living in the name
of an ideology we didn’t believe in. This was how the communists lost.” Here, Nye and Drakulic make it eminently clear why “the communists lost.” It was because Eastern Europe lost faith in their broken system. Regardless of Reagan’s policies, the people of Eastern Europe were bound to revolt against the Soviets because they no longer believed in Soviet-communism or communism as a whole. Drakulic highlights the Yugoslavian example of Eastern European's qualms about communism. Hungary in 1956 is another great example. In protest of their Soviet-communist leadership, they paraded Hungarian flags that had the communist symbol carved out. Other countries such as Romania and East Germany protested communism in similar ways. They epitomize how disgusted Eastern Europe was with the communist system during the Cold War. That disgust sparked the flames for the Eastern European revolutions that tore down the Iron Curtain. As Hitchcock eloquently remarks in The Struggle for Europe, “It is wrong to rob the East Europeans of their place in history as authors of genuine revolution. In 1989, thousands upon thousands of people in Poland, Hungary, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Romania motivated by a simple yearning for personal freedom, pulled down the ramparts of the East European police state.”

The highly unpopular communist system in the Soviet Union broke. Mikhail Gorbachev inherited a country that had remained stagnant since the 1960s. He tried to reform the political flaws; however, he could not repair the broken communist system. In fact, he suffered the unintended consequences of his reforms. After Eastern Europe tasted freedom, they demanded more. This played the largest role in the Soviet collapse. To say that Eastern Europeans were simply tired of the perpetual and brutal security searches that Professor Nye alluded to, would be an understatement. Eastern Europeans were deprived of their civility, happiness, and identity at the hands of the communist police state. They revolted in response. Gorbachev attempted to
attack the heart of this problem by reforming the extremes of communism. He introduced *Glasnost*, which opened the USSR to information, a consultative government, and exchange of western goods and ideas. Glasnost was not able to contain the social and economic disparities of the Soviet Union, however. Gorbachev believed that adopting liberal ideas of free speech and the press would calm the USSR. However, Gorbachev confronted the same problem as Khrushchev when he had pushed for de-Stalinization. Both strengthened the resistance toward Soviet communism -- “once glasnost let people say what they thought, many people said: ‘We want out.’”15

Similarly, Gorbachev abandoned the Brezhnev Doctrine (which stated that a pro-democratization uprising or revolutionary movement in any state in the Soviet Bloc threatened the entire U.S.S.R., justifying intervention of those states), thus, substantially shrinking Soviet military presence in Eastern Europe. Regarding this abandonment, Demakis states, “the discarding of the Brezhnev Doctrine and renounced use of force to resolve conflicts effectively willed the end of the communist regimes in Eastern Europe.”16 For example, after Gorbachev legislated Glasnost, he refused to invoke the Brezhnev Doctrine (military force) after Poland held free elections in 1989. That same year, the Polish United Workers’ Party (communist party) was defeated. Though Gorbachev intended to revive communism’s popularity, he opened a window for Poland to oust Marxist-Leninism, completely. There is a clear correlation between Gorbachev’s loosened grip and liberal reforms to the fall of Soviet Communism.

Economic flaws, as catastrophic as the political, ravaged the Soviet Union and stagnated its growth. Gorbachev failed at reforming the Soviet Union’s uninventive economy, contributing to the collapse of the Iron Curtain. While Gorbachev’s Glasnost intended to legislate political reforms, *Perestroika* was an economic initiative that allowed market incentives to Soviet
citizens. Perestroika was legislated after the Chernobyl accident, where dozens died due to an accidental nuclear explosion and where hundreds of others were affected by radiation. The explosion was a result of improper funding due to the devastating economic state. This was yet another reason Eastern Europeans used in making the case against Soviet Communism; they were promised equality, but instead had their civility stripped away and were not protected by their government from Chernobyl-type accidents. Similar to Glasnost, Gorbachev believed Perestroika and other liberal reforms (ones that would shift the previously strict Soviet communism into more socialist communism) would help regain the popularity of the communist party and dig the Soviet Union out of its economic abyss. Gorbachev exclaimed that “profound transformations must be carried out in the economy and a higher standard of living must be ensured.” However, as Nye eloquently says, “[Gorbachev] wanted to reform communism, not replace it. But his reforms snowballed into a revolution driven from below rather than controlled from above. In trying to repair communism, he punched a hole in the system. Like a hole in a dam, once pent-up pressure began to escape, it widened the opening and tore apart the system.” Ultimately, Gorbachev suffered the unintended consequences of his reforms.

The stagnant Soviet economy, along with proxy-wars and arms races, plundered Soviet economic innovation and competitiveness, thus, contributing to the Soviet Union’s fall. Going into the 1980s, the Soviet economy had remained stagnant for decades. During the 1970s and 1980s, the Soviet economic growth pattern fluctuated between only 1.8 and 1.9 percent growth. This played a large role in the collapse of Soviet Communism. According to Nye, “The Soviet economy’s decline reflected the diminished ability of central planning to respond to global economic change.” The fact of the matter was that the Soviet economy could not innovate and had not been able to for decades earlier. Likewise, the Soviet economy was not globally
competitive. “According to one Soviet economist, by the late 1980s, only eight percent of Soviet industry was globally competitive. It is difficult for a country to remain a superpower when the world doesn’t want 92 percent of what it produces.”

To summarize, while the United States and the Reagan administration’s aggressive foreign policy pressured the Soviet Union, the USSR imploded from within. It was Romania, Poland, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, and many other nation’s rejections of their Soviet-communist leadership and Gorbachev’s inability to heal the broken communist system that brought down the Berlin Wall. Had Gorbachev’s Glasnost and Perestroika been successful, perhaps, the Soviet Union would have lasted another decade. However, that was not the case; the communist system was beyond even Gorbachev’s repair -- the good communist who saw the problems his citizen faced and responded by legislating freedoms. Though Karl Marx proposed a system of total equality for all, the Soviets upheld an authoritarian regime that may have kept everyone equal, but equally poor. From the Enlightenment to World War II, Europeans have fought against their oppressors for basic rights and freedoms. Eastern Europe’s reaction to the horrors they faced during the twentieth century was no different, merely a replication of what they had done countless times before in their history. They demanded change and Gorbachev could not stop them.

**Putin vs. the West: Who squandered the Cold Peace at the “End of History”?**

How did we arrive at the situation where Gorbachev became persona non grata as a global statesman while Putin is in charge of rebuilding the Russian motherland? Today, almost three decades after the Cold War ended, the Western powers find themselves in a dilemma of their own making: they may have won the ideological battle but squandered the hard-won peace. As Andrew Bacevich, a historian and a retired US Army colonel has asked, despite
winning the Cold War how is it “the United States ended up with gaping inequality, permanent war, moral confusion, and an increasingly angry and alienated population, as well, of course, as the strangest president in American history?”

In his classic book, “The End of History and the Last Man,” Francis Fukuyama persuasively argued for the rise of Western liberalism and the dissolution of the Soviet ideology and empire at the end of the Cold War. He suggested humanity had reached a moral and economic pinnacle, "not just the passing of a particular period of post-war history, but the end of history as such: That is, the end-point of mankind's ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government." The book elaborated on his 1989 essay, "The End of History?" where Fukuyama synthesized the philosophies and ideologies of Hegel and Marx, who envisioned human history on a progressive ladder from one economic system to another, a dialectic between forces of egalitarianism versus totalitarianism. The main thesis of “The End of History” suggests that liberal democracy is the penultimate form of government, and all other alternative forms of government have ultimately failed. Fukuyama makes a classic Hegelian argument against Marxism, where “human consciousness” (idealism) is seen as the primary source of ideas, motivations or innovations, which precedes the “human condition” (materialism) or “modes of economic production.”

Whereas Marx saw material conditions (class conflict) as the primary force driving the contradictions in capitalism, Fukuyama, following Hegel, suggests changes and modifications in human consciousness precede changes in material conditions. For example, the ideas of ‘freedom,’ ‘liberty,’ or ‘equality’ (universal ideals and values) over time lead to the free flow of capital, open markets, VCRs, the Internet, and global trade (marketization), not necessarily the other way around.
Despite many differences between idealism and materialism, Hegel’s and Marx’s views of history are similar in their teleological endpoint. Both make certain key assumptions about the historical process: they view history as falling into distinct stages or epochs, representing a change in geopolitical location of historical developments from East to West or vice versa, and a radical shift in technology in each epoch. Both view world history as progressive and evolving, an improvement from primitive conditions and earlier stages of human development to more advanced and complex stages. Each epoch represents not just a material improvement but ideally a cultural, societal, and moral progression. One of the main goals of historical progress is to achieve greater human freedom. There is a distinct endpoint to historical development, where a higher level of societal development is achievable with social and cultural evolution, which for Hegelians was the culmination of the Protestant worldview, while for Marxism it was the communist state. Thus, both Hegel and Marx view a purposive unfolding of events in world history, where the general stepwise progression is a necessary one.

Liberal democracies can certainly face setbacks and retrenchment of democratic ideals, but the world system as a whole is evolving towards democratic institutions that are liberal and open in nature. Starting with the French Revolution, a watershed moment, liberal democracies have been better able to manage statecraft, governance and economic development than any other form of societal organization, argues Fukuyama. If that is indeed the case, then how do we explain our current morass, where rising authoritarianism is back in vogue around the world, including in the heart of Western democracies, such as, the United States? Did history really come to an end or was the news of liberalism’s triumph overly exaggerated?

To claim Fukuyama’s view of history is Eurocentric is to state the obvious, as it has been demonstrated by “the subaltern history” movement in South Asia, which has developed the
“history of the masses from below” in post-colonial and post-imperial societies, different from the history of the elites. The term “subaltern,” referring to the work of Marxist theorist Antonio Gramsci, includes masses of people who have not been integrated into the larger capitalist project based on race, class, sexual orientation, ethnicity and religion. Similarly, in American studies the work of Howard Zinn recounts “A People’s History of the United States,” with an emphasis on labor rights, civil rights, and indigenous rights. Internationally, the work of Edward Said on “Orientalism,” Zakaria on “Post-Americanism” and many others have attempted to transcend Western categories of historical analysis.

However, it has been rightly argued that Fukuyama’s main claim has been misinterpreted by many historians. First, he never suggested American style of liberal democracy will be the sine qua non of liberalism around the globe. Second, there isn’t a single model of democracy; there may be multiple models of democracy. In fact, in his essay he mentions the Asian model of democracy in South Korea, Taiwan, India and elsewhere, European model in the European Union, Latin American models of democracy, and maybe even a Russian model of state-controlled reforms. The Chinese model of market reforms may not have been fully anticipated by Fukuyama, given that was a later historical development. Third, it may not be accurate to suggest that history will always move in a predictable, straightforward or linear manner. There may be retrenchments of liberal values from time to time, according to Fukuyama, but the democratic project will continue unabated. In most cases, democratic institutions may become stronger if norms are eroded in favor authoritarianism or totalitarianism. Thus, we should not confuse one-off “historical events” with long range “historical trends”, suggests Fukuyama; events may happen to challenge democratic norms, but the trajectory of history will bend towards the arc of freedom and openness. If totalitarianism does make a comeback in different guises in newly
emerging democracies, it will be vigorously challenged by the democratic and parliamentarian ideals and values in local and international settings.

Yet, there is a quasi-religious sense in which the end of history argument suggests there is no escape or alternative to the confluence of liberalism and global capitalism; it is seen as an inevitable and almost pre-determined endpoint of collective human endeavor and cultural evolution. As Maximillian Alvarez, a historian and writer, has provocatively asked, “All history is the history of empire—a bid for control of that greatest expanse of territory, the past. …The “end of history” didn’t mean the end of military conflicts. It did mean, however, that the marriage of market capitalism and liberal democracy would enjoy eternal dominance.”

Interestingly, the research data on war and peace studies suggest that Fukuyama’s theory may have some power in predicting the lowering of interstate conflicts and wars, which have declined as states have become more democratic, starting with the end of the Cold War. War is seen as a last resort in the era of global cooperation, trade, travel and internationalism, but does this mean we have entered an era of great convergence in history? Does this make the return to authoritarianism less likely? Based on recent trends in democratically run countries the answer is certainly not clear; as neo-liberal democracies have displayed huge gaps in equality and the rise of populism, the challenges to liberal democracies couldn’t have been steeper with the resurgence of Russia and China.

How did Western democracies squander the peace dividend after the Cold War when America was the unipolar superpower, a question posed by the popular conservative commentator Charles Krauthammer? Vladimir Putin at the time was a KGB officer in Dresden, Germany, when the wall came crumbling down; he would later challenge the Western system of
governance and alliances. How Putin assumed the role of a Czarist autocrat is central to the challenge facing Western democracies today.

According to Robert Kagan, the end of the Cold War led to two broad assumptions about economic and ideological determinism in US foreign policy: 1) an affirmation of belief in human progress, rooted in the Enlightenment values, and in the linear progression of history and 2) a belief in working with autocratic states with patience and restraint. “Rather than confront and challenge autocracies, it was better to enmesh them in the global economy, support the rule of law and the creation of stronger state institutions, and let the ineluctable forces of human progress work their magic,” states Kagan. These beliefs have fueled the rise of Putin’s Russia and Xi’s China after the Cold War, as a counterpoint to Western ideals of liberal democracy.

While Reagan’s principled stand against a common enemy may have contributed to the decline of the Soviet Empire, the American presidents who came after the Cold War – George H.W. Bush, Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, and Barack Obama -- have faced a power vacuum abroad and an inwardly looking America domestically. Thus, the working assumptions outlined by the end of history thesis, as enunciated by Fukuyama and later outlined by Kagan, have been significantly challenged, especially after 9/11 when critics assailed Fukuyama and his followers for declaring a premature victory for liberalism and democracy.

However, Fukuyama has defended his original thesis with equally forceful rhetoric: “I believe that in the end I remain right: Modernity is a very powerful freight train that will not be derailed by recent events, however painful and unprecedented. Democracy and free markets will continue to expand over time as the dominant organizing principles for much of the world. But it is worthwhile thinking about what the true scope of the present challenge is.”
Interestingly, Michael Mandelbaum calls the squandering of the peace dividend after the Cold War a “Mission Failure” of American foreign policy.\textsuperscript{39} Central to his argument is the claim that Americans after the Cold War felt too emboldened and failed to realize the limits of their own power. After 9/11, the “war on terror” over-stretched American reach in trying to police the entire world. Furthermore, Fukuyama himself would go on to criticize neoconservatism and the arguable failures of Bush-Era foreign policy (though he did not renege on his original thesis entirely). Not having a singular external enemy and a cohesive foreign policy vision, American power post-Cold War has been bereft in the world, perpetually on the move from one mission to another, not unlike a benevolent empire. While the neo-liberal project of developing markets, trade and globalization has been ascendant, inequality and racial strife domestically has been increasing. Whereas Gorge H.W. Bush’s Gulf War established American supremacy and limits or constraints of power, George W. Bush’s Iraq War after 9/11 seemed untethered, especially, when Americans entered the Iraq War on controversial evidence of WMDs, and prematurely declared “Mission Accomplished”.

Thus, contrary to the original scenario predicted by Fukuyama (which – while he did not completely back off its thesis – he would later criticize, specifically neoconservatives’ efforts to impose democracy via preemptive wars and to pursue a never-ending War on Terror), history may have come roaring back with a vengeance as alternatives to the American system of governance seem more attractive in the newly emerging Asian democracies and in the European Union. Thus, while the Republican Bush administrations, both father and son, wanted to exert American influence abroad, the Democratic presidents, such as Barack Obama and Bill Clinton wanted to withdraw from the world to rebuild the middle classes at home. In both cases,
American power after the Cold War seems unmoored without an overarching mission and purpose against the ideological Russian foe or the emerging Chinese model of statecraft.

**Conclusion**

Interventionism abroad, when coupled with economic collapse and growing inequality due to the housing market crash (2008) and the Covid crisis (2020), has clearly brought Henry Luce’s first American century to a major turning point if not to a dead end stop, despite populist appeals to “make America great again.” While populists may be happy to align with the old Soviet foe to beat out domestic and international enemies, it is not clear that Putin has any interest in advancing the American cause of freedom and democracy. If anything, Putin’s Russia has come to fill in the gap left behind by the over-stretched American presence in Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq and many other places. Instead, Putin wants to rebuild the old Soviet empire and sideline NATO in Eastern Europe. With China rising as a complement to Putin’s reconstituted Russia, America seems increasingly vulnerable now on the global stage, going it alone without its Cold War allies, against a world hostile to unilateralism and American values; another wave of populism at the ballot box may spell the end of American global power. The three decades of Cold Peace squandered between isolationism and adventurism may have summoned the muse of history again.

*Amartya Sharma is a rising undergraduate freshman at the George Washington University in the Politics & Values program.*
References


Endnotes

1 A significant portion of this essay was written during my sophomore year of high school at The Peddie School, Hightstown, New Jersey. It was recognized by Scholastic’s National Art and Writing Awards the following year.


   - “Gorbachev hoped these changes would be enough to spark the sluggish Soviet economy. Freedom, however, is addictive.”
   - Walesa argues that revolutions forged by Eastern European countries brought down the Iron Curtain. Gorbachev’s loosened grip on these nations was originally an economic tactic for the Soviets. However, it backfired, allowing these nations to fight for independence.

   - “At the end of the day the corrosive work was not being done from outside the USSR but from within by an economy that could not innovate and an ideology in which fewer and fewer believed.”
   - In an extremely fascinating article, Cox relates various different perspectives about who ended the Cold War. In the end, he attributes the fall of the USSR to events within the iron curtain, specifically Gorbachev’s loosened grip on E. Europe which allowed revolts for democracy and unification.

   - This article does a great job of comparing and contrasting the most popular arguments around this question. Edmund Levin gives insights into the legitimacy of both the pro and anti-Reagan camps.

- Exploring Cold War politics in Europe’s peace settlement and half century later, Hitchcock delves into how each leader balanced their nations.


- In this op-ed, Demakis argues that both Reagan and Gorbachev played large roles in ending the Cold War.


- Argues that USSR is doing more than the US to end the cold war.
- Addresses Soviet withdrawal from Eastern Europe and Afghanistan.
- Says the cold war isn’t over, but must be brought to an end and the Gorbachev regime is doing much more than Reagan of Bush.


- Also gives Gorbachev credit for ending the Cold War.
- Dives deeper into what the Reagan administration did regarding tensions with the Soviets.
- Review for a book called *How the Cold War Ended*.


- The Soviet collapse was due to the decline of communist ideology and economic failure. This possibly could have happened without Gorbachev, argues Nye.


- Examines relationship between material culture and happiness and individuality behind the Iron Curtain; Drakulic looks at the eradication of female identity and her own experiences.


http://archive.boston.com/bostonglobe/editorial_opinion/oped/articles/2009/11/05/who Ended the Cold War/ 
- While American conservatives only give credit to Ronald Reagan, Demakis argues both Reagan and Gorbachev had huge roles in the end of the Cold War.


23 Tom Parfitt. Vladimir Putin consoles exposed Russian spies with 'singalong'. *The Guardian.* 
- Putin praises Russian agents who were expelled and hints at a grim future for 'traitors.'

- With the end of the Cold War, DC establishment prevailed in a world-historical struggle and the future looked very bright. History had brought the US to the very summit of power, and American-style liberal democratic capitalism was a universal force. In the decades that followed Americans put this idea into practice, embracing globalization while setting out on military campaigns to spread American values confident that U.S. can defeat any challenge. Bacevich claims this is an illusion and a fool’s errand.
- Fukuyama celebrates the end of Socialist Marxism, with the victory of the forces of capitalism and democracy.

- The article preceded the book, which compares Hegel’s vision with Marx’s, and claims Marxists had hijacked Hegel’s real thesis.

https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1057/9780230595934_9
- Williams claims Marx and Hegel are more similar than dissimilar in their view of history.

- Guha outlines a subaltern history of South Asian continent, which is truly post-colonial and post-imperial, hence starting a movement of history of the local people and non-elites.

- Zinn argues for the first time for a history of the minority populations in the US, who had been left out of the textbooks, namely, America's women, factory workers, African-Americans, Native Americans, working poor, and immigrant laborers.

- Said presents a critical view of the Western conceptions of societies and peoples of the Orient, those who inhabit the places of Asia, North Africa, and the Middle East.

- Zakaria shows the success of liberal democracy across the world has created competition for the US in terms of economic, industrial, and cultural power.

https://www.theosthinktank.co.uk/comment/2019/08/07/why-history-didnt-end
- Spencer presents a view of Fukuyama that is sympathetic to the context and the times in which it was written.

33 Louis Menand, "Francis Fukuyama Postpones The end of history", *The New Yorker*, last modified 2020, accessed October 31, 2020,
- A more subtle and sympathetic view of Fukuyama’s theory placed within the context of his own evolution in terms of Hegel and Marx, and author’s current thinking on the subject.


- A critical view of Fukuyama’s end of history as a Eurocentric theory, which represents the power of the neo-liberal empire to own people’s history.


- The report documents lowering of interstate conflict after the end of the Cold War.


- Essay shows the challenges to liberal democracy from the rise of autocratic states like China and Russia who have co-opted market capitalism without reforming their political systems.


- Fukuyama defends his original claim after 9/11.


- The book documents the failure of American foreign policies after the Cold War.


- Biography of Holbrook shows the end of the American century in Afghanistan and South Asia, and other missions Holbrook took on during his long State Department career.


- The book documents how authoritarianism is making inroads in Western democracies.


- The article shows how the Russians are filling the gaps in power vacuum left by the US.
- The article documents how Putin has tried to rebuild Russian power after the Cold War.

- This essay shows the limits of American power if populism continues to rise.