Abstract

China’s strategic embrace of the Taliban following the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan marks a pivotal shift in regional geopolitics, reflecting Beijing’s broader ambitions to reshape Asia’s security and economic order. This paper examines China’s calculated engagement with the Taliban regime, analysing the motivations behind its diplomatic recognition, economic investments, and security assurances. By leveraging a combination of realist geopolitical theory and empirical case studies, the study argues that China’s approach is driven by three core objectives: (1) securing its western frontier against extremism, (2) expanding the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) into Afghanistan’s resource-rich economy, and (3) countering U.S. influence in Central Asia. The paper also explores the repercussions for regional actors, including Pakistan, Iran, and India, and assesses whether Beijing’s strategy risks destabilizing the region or fosters a new equilibrium. Findings suggest that China’s engagement with the Taliban is less about ideological alignment and more about pragmatic opportunism, yet its long-term success hinges on the Taliban’s ability to govern sustainably and resist external pressures. The study contributes to debates on post-American Afghanistan, the evolving Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) dynamics, and the recalibration of Asian diplomacy in an era of contested hegemony.

Introduction

The withdrawal of United States troops from Afghanistan in August 2021 marked not merely the end of a twenty-year war, but the onset of a new chapter in regional and global geopolitics. At the heart of this unfolding narrative is the People's Republic of China, which emerged as one of the first nations to establish working relations with the Taliban following their de facto ascension to power. China's decision was neither impulsive nor purely opportunistic. Rather, it signified a carefully calculated geopolitical manoeuvre to secure its western frontiers, assert influence in Central Asia, and capitalize on the vacuum left by the West (Small, 2022). In turn, this move compelled other regional players, particularly India, to recalibrate their diplomatic postures towards the Taliban regime. The following article critically examines China's early engagement with the Taliban, the motivations behind its policy shift, and the cascading impact this has had on other states, including India, Pakistan, and beyond.

China's Early Engagement: Motivations and Objectives

China's engagement with the Taliban is rooted in its broader strategic vision, which encompasses regional stability, economic expansion under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and counterterrorism concerns, especially regarding Uyghur militancy (Zhao, 2021).

From the outset, Beijing maintained open lines of communication with the Taliban. Even before the formal U.S. withdrawal, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi met with Taliban co-founder Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar in July 2021 in Tianjin. The optics and symbolism of this meeting were significant: it not only conferred a degree of international legitimacy on the Taliban but also projected China as a responsible stakeholder in regional peace (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, 2021).

China’s motivations can be delineated into three principal vectors:

Security and Stability in Xinjiang: China's paramount concern is the potential spillover of extremism into its restive Xinjiang province. The East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), an Uyghur militant group, had reportedly operated from Afghan soil. The Taliban’s assurances to not harbor such elements were instrumental in shaping Beijing’s engagement (Rafiq, 2021).

Geoeconomic Interests: Afghanistan is believed to have over $1 trillion in untapped mineral resources, including lithium and rare earth elements critical for China's tech-driven economy (U.S. Geological Survey, 2010). Chinese firms had already invested in projects like the Aynak copper mine, though security concerns had stalled progress. A stable Taliban regime, in Beijing’s calculation, might permit renewed commercial ventures (Kuo, 2021).

Belt and Road Expansion: Integrating Afghanistan into the BRI via Pakistan’s CPEC (China-Pakistan Economic Corridor) is a long-term strategic goal. While Afghanistan is not yet a formal member of the BRI, Chinese policymakers envision extending connectivity projects through its territory (Safi, 2022).

Diplomatic Legitimacy and Symbolic Gestures

In September 2023, China appointed Zhao Xing as its ambassador to Afghanistan, becoming the first country to do so since the Taliban’s return. This decision underscored China's pragmatic approach: de facto recognition without formal diplomatic recognition, enabling diplomatic channels and economic engagement while avoiding the legal implications of full recognition (Xinhua, 2023).

This move served multiple ends: it reinforced China’s role as a geopolitical trendsetter, reassured the Taliban of a major power's support, and tacitly pressured other regional actors to engage lest they cede influence to Beijing.

1. Timeline of Diplomatic Engagements (2021–2025):

The timeline graph visually captures the staggered yet strategic pace at which key regional actors—China, India, Pakistan, and Russia—engaged diplomatically with the Taliban post-2021. China emerges as the first mover, initiating contact even before the U.S. exit by hosting Taliban leaders in Tianjin (July 2021), and further consolidating its position by appointing an ambassador in 2023. India’s trajectory is marked by caution, beginning with humanitarian aid and culminating in the reestablishment of its Kabul mission. Pakistan, despite being historically linked with the Taliban, shows a more complex timeline, underscoring growing friction and delayed formal diplomatic upgrading. Russia’s relatively late but symbolically important move to initiate delisting of the Taliban in 2024 reveals its balancing act. The timeline underscores how China’s early engagement set off a regional chain reaction in diplomatic realignments.

2. China’s Strategic Motivations (Pie Chart):

The pie chart delineates the threefold strategic calculus behind China’s engagement with the Taliban regime. The largest segment—Xinjiang security and counterterrorism—highlights Beijing’s paramount concern over the Uyghur militant threat emanating from Afghan territory, particularly the ETIM. The second-largest motivation is geoeconomic, with a focus on mineral extraction and energy reserves essential for China’s tech and green energy sectors. Lastly, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) expansion represents long-term infrastructural and geopolitical ambitions to plug Afghanistan into the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). This tripartite motivation reflects a highly rational and layered foreign policy approach, balancing immediate domestic security concerns with expansive economic and geopolitical visions.

3. India’s Strategic Engagement Dimensions (Radar Chart):

The radar chart presents a multi-vector analysis of India’s evolving strategic interests in Afghanistan under Taliban rule. The three dominant axes—regional connectivity, counterterrorism, and geostrategic positioning—form a triangular pattern reflecting a balanced, yet reactive engagement strategy. Connectivity ambitions, especially via Chabahar and Central Asian corridors, indicate India's persistence in long-term regional integration goals. Counterterrorism reflects India's immediate security concerns regarding Pakistani-backed groups operating in Afghan territory. The third axis, geostrategic competition, mirrors India’s efforts to maintain relevance and hedge against a Sino-Pak strategic arc. The radar plot suggests a policy not of full embrace, but calibrated re-engagement driven by both threat perception and opportunity.

4. Relative Diplomatic Influence (Line Graph):

The line graph reveals the shifting diplomatic clout of China, India, and Pakistan in Afghanistan between 2021 and 2025. China's influence shows a steady upward trend, peaking in 2023 with its ambassadorial appointment and infrastructure overtures. India, which initially saw a decline post-Taliban takeover, demonstrates a modest recovery as it re-establishes diplomatic presence and resumes aid deliveries. In contrast, Pakistan’s influence shows volatility: an initial high in 2021 declines due to border tensions and Taliban-TTP friction, only to slightly rebound by 2025 with renewed diplomatic efforts. The graph reflects how influence in Afghanistan has become a dynamic and contested field, with China securing the upper hand through early, consistent, and pragmatic diplomacy.

India’s Recalibrated Diplomacy

India’s initial reaction to the Taliban takeover was one of caution, if not outright withdrawal. Its consulates were shuttered, and New Delhi adopted a wait-and-watch approach. However, China’s rapid engagement, coupled with the fear of being sidelined in a region where it had historically invested heavily (especially in infrastructure and human development), pushed India towards a quiet diplomatic re-engagement (Pant & Mehta, 2022).

The re-engagement began with humanitarian diplomacy. India sent over 40,000 metric tonnes of wheat to Afghanistan via Pakistan in early 2022, followed by another consignment of 20,000 metric tonnes via Iran’s Chabahar port in 2023 (MEA, 2023). While framed as humanitarian aid, these efforts were dual-purpose: they showcased India's goodwill and ensured visibility in Afghan public life.

In June 2022, India deployed a “technical team” to its embassy in Kabul, effectively re-establishing diplomatic presence without full recognition. This low-key but high-impact move was followed by meetings between Indian diplomats and Taliban officials in Doha and Dubai. The Taliban, in turn, labeled India a “significant regional partner” (The Hindu, 2022).

Critically, India's outreach is governed by three imperatives:

Regional Connectivity: India has long sought to connect with Central Asia via Afghanistan. While the Taliban’s presence complicates this vision, it does not render it obsolete. Pragmatic engagement keeps the door open (Roy, 2023).

Counterterrorism: Indian intelligence closely monitors Taliban links with Pakistan-based groups like Jaish-e-Mohammed and Lashkar-e-Taiba. Engagement allows for intelligence exchange and pressure to curtail such alliances (Fair, 2022).

Geostrategic Competition: With China and Pakistan building a strategic arc in Afghanistan, India must assert its presence to prevent strategic encirclement (Joshi, 2023).

Pakistan’s Uneasy Ally

Pakistan, often described as the Taliban’s principal patron, experienced a paradoxical relationship post-2021. While Islamabad celebrated the Taliban’s return, tensions quickly emerged. Cross-border attacks from Afghan territory, disputes over fencing along the Durand Line, and Islamabad's accusations of Taliban harboring Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) militants strained the relationship (Kugelman, 2024).

Yet, Pakistan could not afford to disengage. In May 2025, it moved to upgrade its diplomatic relations by appointing an ambassador to Kabul—a decision aimed at restoring influence and countering the perception of waning leverage.

Russia and Central Asia: Following China's Lead

Russia’s response to the Taliban was characterized by cautious pragmatism. Initially keeping the group at arm’s length, Moscow gradually softened its position. In late 2024, the Russian parliament initiated procedures to delist the Taliban as a banned terrorist organization—a significant legal and symbolic shift (TASS, 2024).

Central Asian states like Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan also deepened their engagement, driven by concerns over border security and trade continuity. These moves closely followed China’s lead, reaffirming Beijing’s role as a regional bellwether (Weitz, 2023).

The Western Dilemma and Diplomatic Stalemate

Western nations, particularly the U.S. and EU members, have largely withheld formal engagement with the Taliban, conditioning recognition on human rights, especially women’s rights, and the formation of an inclusive government. Yet, they find themselves sidelined as regional actors shape realities on the ground (ICG, 2023).

This vacuum, filled by China’s strategic activism, challenges the normative foundations of Western diplomacy. Beijing’s approach—prioritizing stability over liberal values—has gained traction in the Global South and among regimes that see Western conditionalities as intrusive.

Panama and the Global South: Watching Closely

While Panama itself may not be directly impacted by Afghan dynamics, countries in the Global South are observing how geopolitical alignments are shifting. The Chinese model of pragmatic, non-ideological engagement offers a template that is increasingly attractive to states seeking development partnerships free from normative preconditions (Mahbubani, 2020).

Towards a New Regional Order

China’s early and deliberate engagement with the Taliban has had a catalytic effect on regional diplomacy. While it has not yet led to formal international recognition of the Taliban, it has normalized functional engagement. In doing so, Beijing has set the tone for a post-American order in South and Central Asia—an order where realpolitik trumps ideological rigidity, and infrastructure diplomacy reshapes spheres of influence.

India’s recalibration, Pakistan’s strategic recalculations, Russia’s legislative adjustments, and Central Asia’s border diplomacy all bear the imprint of China’s opening move. As the dust settles in post-U.S. Afghanistan, one reality is clear: China was first out of the gate, and others are now running to catch up.

The implications of this shift extend beyond Afghanistan. They reveal a global transition towards multipolar diplomacy, where legitimacy is transactional and influence is infrastructural. In this emerging order, it is not who governs that matters, but who engages.

Dr. Muzammil Ahad Dar, Assistant Professor of Political science, Kumaraguru College of Liberal Arts and Science. Dr. Dar is an Assistant Professor of Political Science with over eight years of teaching experience in higher education. He holds a PhD and MPhil in Politics and International Studies from Pondicherry University. Dr. Dar has previously served at the University of Ladakh (Kargil Campus) and various Government Degree Colleges in Jammu and Kashmir. He currently teaches at Kumaraguru College of Liberal Arts and Science, Coimbatore. His academic interests include International Relations, Comparative Politics, and Political Theory, with several research publications in Scopus and UGC-CARE listed journals.

References

Fair, C. C. (2022). India and the Taliban: Strategic Imperatives and Risks. Foreign Affairs.

ICG (International Crisis Group). (2023). Taliban Rule: Western Options. Brussels: ICG Report No. 326.

Joshi, S. (2023). Geopolitical Encirclement and India's Response. ORF Occasional Paper.

Kuo, L. (2021). “Why China Wants a Stake in Taliban-Controlled Afghanistan.” The Guardian.

Kugelman, M. (2024). Pakistan and the Taliban: A Growing Rift. Wilson Center.

Mahbubani, K. (2020). Has China Won? The Chinese Challenge to American Primacy. PublicAffairs.

MEA (Ministry of External Affairs, India). (2023). Press Release on Wheat Aid to Afghanistan.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC. (2021). Statement on Taliban Visit to Tianjin.

Pant, H. V., & Mehta, M. (2022). India’s Taliban Conundrum. Observer Research Foundation.

Rafiq, A. (2021). Uyghurs, ETIM, and Taliban Calculations. Middle East Institute.

Roy, M. (2023). India’s Connectivity Projects in Central Asia: Between Vision and Reality. IDSA Monograph.

Safi, M. (2022). “CPEC and Afghan Integration: An Emerging Frontier.” South Asia Journal.

Small, A. (2022). The China-Pakistan Axis: Asia’s New Geopolitics. Oxford University Press.

TASS. (2024). Russian State Duma Initiates Delisting of Taliban as Terror Group.

The Hindu. (2022). India’s Quiet Diplomatic Return to Afghanistan.

Weitz, R. (2023). Central Asia and Taliban: A Fragile Engagement. Jamestown Foundation.

Xinhua. (2023). China Appoints New Ambassador to Afghanistan.