Abstract:

This article examines how regional hegemonic aspirations among rival states—such as India and Pakistan, or Israel and Iran—generate contagious conflictual rivalries that destabilize regional orders. Drawing on the Hegemonic Stability Theory and Security Dilemma, the paper proposes a conceptual framework that links domination with systemic instability. While hegemons aim to provide order, in contested regions, hegemonic competition often creates strategic paralysis, undermining prospects for durable peace. Using recent events such as India’s Operation Sindoor and Israel–Iran skirmishes, the article explores how hegemonic behavior, in practice, results not in order but in recurring confrontation and regional entropy. The paper concludes with a critique of domineering security logic and proposes an epistemic turn toward cooperative pluralism.

I. Introduction

Hegemonic Stability Theory (HST) argues that global or regional order is maintained when a single, dominant power—referred to as the hegemon—possesses the capability and will to enforce rules and norms. Initially formulated to understand global dynamics during and after the Cold War, HST has been adapted to regional contexts, where dominant states seek to assert control over their strategic environments. In regions with enduring rivalries, however, hegemonic aspirations can produce instability rather than order. This article examines the logic of hegemonic rivalry at the regional level, focusing on the India–Pakistan and Israel–Iran dyads. It contends that in regions lacking an uncontested hegemon, efforts to dominate result in a contagion of conflict—a phenomenon this article terms "contagious conflictual rivalry." Rather than providing stability, hegemonic ambitions intensify mutual insecurity, trigger proxy confrontations, and render diplomatic solutions ineffective.

II. Theoretical Framework: Hegemony and Security Dilemmas

HST, as developed by Charles Kindleberger (1973) and further refined by Robert Gilpin (1981), posits that a stable international system depends on a hegemon capable of underwriting rules, trade norms, and security guarantees. Keohane (1984) nuanced this idea by suggesting that even without direct coercion, hegemonic leadership can structure cooperation through institutions. At the regional level, John Mearsheimer (2001) argues that states strive for regional hegemony to prevent external intervention and ensure their own security.

However, when multiple states aspire to hegemony, or when a dominant state's behaviour is perceived as coercive rather than consensual, a security dilemma arises. Robert Jervis (1978) defines the security dilemma as a condition in which one state's measures to enhance its security inadvertently threaten others, prompting reciprocal action and a spiral of insecurity. In regional systems marked by strategic mistrust, hegemonic ambitions interact with the security dilemma to create a volatile environment.

Gilpin and Mearsheimer agree that hegemony is rarely benign in contested regions. Rather than creating stability, it fosters distrust, especially when paired with revisionist goals or the use of coercive tools such as pre-emptive strikes, sanctions, or proxy mobilization. The logic of domination becomes a zero-sum game, where the hegemon’s security is perceived as a direct threat by its rivals.

III. Conceptual Framework: Contagious Conflictual Rivalry

This article introduces the concept of "contagious conflictual rivalry" to explain how regional hegemonic competition diffuses insecurity across borders and issue areas. The term captures the cascading nature of conflict where actions by one dominant or aspiring state provoke not only direct retaliation but also trigger third-party alignments, proxy escalations, and issue-linkages that make resolution increasingly difficult.

Key elements include:

1. Assertion of regional hegemony through military, economic, or ideological tools.
2. Reactive countermeasures by rival states (including alliances and deterrence).
3. Horizontal escalation—conflict spreads across domains such as cyber, media, trade, or religion.
4. Strategic entrenchment—both sides become locked in hardened positions, rejecting compromise.

Such dynamics create an environment where trust is minimal and institutional mechanisms (e.g., SAARC or Arab League) become ineffective. The rivalry spreads beyond the initial dispute, infecting broader regional relationships and creating a chronic crisis syndrome.

IV. Case Study I: India–Pakistan and Operation Sindoor

India and Pakistan exemplify a classic regional hegemonic rivalry. Rooted in the traumatic partition of 1947 and decades of territorial and ideological conflict, the India–Pakistan dyad is characterized by repeated wars (1947, 1965, 1971, 1999), ongoing skirmishes in Kashmir, and a race for strategic parity.

Operation Sindoor, a covert Indian operation reportedly conducted in 2025, followed the doctrinal evolution that began with the 2016 "surgical strikes" and the 2019 Balakot airstrike. These actions reflect a strategic shift in India’s defence posture, emphasizing pre-emptive capability and signalling resolve. The operation sought to dismantle Pakistan-based militant infrastructure, projecting India’s capacity for punitive deterrence.

Pakistan’s response was multi-layered: escalation along the Line of Control (LoC), diplomatic engagement with China and OIC, and intensified rhetorical warfare. The result was a wider mobilization of regional actors and media ecosystems, hardening nationalist sentiments on both sides. Even backchannel negotiations—often a pressure-release mechanism—collapsed, further entrenching the rivalry.

This case illustrates how hegemonic assertion by one state triggers a retaliatory spiral, with regional and global implications. The conflict spread into cyber spaces, cultural diplomacy, and international forums, demonstrating the contagious nature of conflict in the absence of resolution mechanisms.

V. Case Study II: Israel–Iran Regional Conflict

The Israel–Iran rivalry is another site of regional hegemonic contestation. Israel seeks to maintain its qualitative military edge, deter hostile non-state actors, and prevent Iran’s regional encroachment. Iran, on the other hand, has developed a network of proxies and allies—Hezbollah in Lebanon, Shia militias in Iraq and Syria, and the Houthis in Yemen—to expand its strategic reach.

Recurring skirmishes—such as Israel’s airstrikes on Iranian targets in Syria and Lebanon, or Iran’s asymmetric responses via proxy attacks—form the basis of what scholars call a "Gray zone conflict." This protracted engagement has diffused across issues (e.g., nuclear negotiations, maritime security, economic sanctions) and borders, drawing in global actors like the U.S., Russia, and increasingly China.

Each state views its actions as defensive, yet the mutual perception is one of existential threat. The rivalry affects the broader Middle East security architecture, obstructs multilateral diplomacy, and undermines regional integration efforts like the Abraham Accords.

The Israel–Iran case further validates the concept of contagious conflictual rivalry, as confrontation in one domain (e.g., nuclear) often spills over into others (e.g., missile defense, proxy wars), making any resolution short-lived and unstable.

VI. Critique: Domination Without Resolution

Regional hegemons often mistake military or strategic dominance for political legitimacy. This confusion leads to a cycle where short-term tactical gains produce long-term strategic stagnation. As seen in both India–Pakistan and Israel–Iran dynamics, hegemonic behaviour reduces trust, empowers hardliners, and collapses negotiation frameworks.

Moreover, international institutions remain weak or partisan in such regional disputes, unable to mediate effectively. Regional organizations like SAARC or the Arab League either collapse under the weight of hegemonic rivalry or become sidelined by extra-regional interventions.

In both cases, domination is pursued at the cost of resolution. Strategic space shrinks, civilian suffering increases, and diplomatic bandwidth is consumed by crisis management rather than conflict transformation.

VII. Toward Cooperative Pluralism

A shift is needed—from domineering security logic to cooperative pluralism. Regional stability must be re-imagined through inclusion, mutual recognition, and institutional resilience.

This requires:

1. Reinforcing multilateral forums with credible mandates.
2. Supporting Track II diplomacy and civil society engagement.
3. Encouraging epistemic pluralism—valuing multiple security narratives.

Regional hegemonic rivalry must be diagnosed as a systemic pathology, not a natural order. Only then can policy frameworks emerge that prioritize coexistence over confrontation. Hegemonic pursuits at the regional level, while justified in the name of order and deterrence, often yield persistent insecurity and strategic paralysis. The concept of contagious conflictual rivalry helps explain the cyclical nature of these regional contests. India–Pakistan and Israel–Iran illustrates how attempts at domination produce more conflict than stability. The future lies not in the enforcement of order by one, but in the shared construction of peace by many.

Dr. Muzammil Ahad Dar is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Kumaraguru College for Liberal Arts and Science

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