In today's age of geopolitical distrust and unequal power dynamics, one uncomfortable truth has grown more apparent with time which is nuclear weapons, for all their apocalyptic threat, they have become a necessary tool of deterrent to prevent war.

Although the world keeps striving for disarmament and non-proliferation, there is a somber reality we are driven by, nuclear-armed states are almost never invaded, bullied, or toppled over by stronger states. As contradictory as it may seem, nuclear weapons are today's ultimate peacekeepers not because they are ever employed, but because the threat of employing them ensures caution, negotiation, and restraint.

The Cold Calculation of Mutually Assured Destruction

The Cold War conceived doctrine of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) has discouraged total war between nuclear-capable nations for decades. Despite countless flashpoints such as Cuba in 1962, Berlin in the 1980s, Kashmir in the 1990s nuclear states have avoided direct military confrontation with each other. The reason is simple, no victory is worth annihilation. This logic, unsettling though it is, works. It is why the United States and the Soviet Union never fought head-to-head, and why even at the height of tensions today, the U.S. and Russia exercise extreme caution.

The Asymmetrical Power of the Nuclear Club

Nuclear weapons in the present era are the privilege of a very select club, the U.S., Russia, China, France, the U.K., and a couple of others like India, Pakistan, Israel, and North Korea. These nations have a level of impunity that non-nuclear nations cannot possibly achieve. For example, North Korea, with its repressive government and repeated provocations, is safe from attack practically because of its nuclear status. Diplomatic pressure and sanctions are used, but intervention by force is inadmissible not because of ethics, but because of deterrence.

Contrast this with Ukraine, a previous nuclear power that relinquished its weapons in 1994 in exchange for guarantees of security in the Budapest Memorandum. When Russia invaded it in 2014 and once more in 2022, those promises were empty. Without giving up its nuclear weapons, had Ukraine not done so, the war that has devastated so many lives and brought instability to Europe might never have occurred. Alternatively, without Russia having nuclear weapons, NATO might have been able to stop the aggression through military force such as they did in Libya.

The response is the same in Taiwan, as China ups its publicity and military presence in and around the island, in the absence of a Taiwanese nuclear deterrent, invasion becomes a feasible option. With a believable second-strike capability in Taiwan's arsenal, China's calculus would be vastly different and infinitely more prudent.

A New Argument: Proliferation as Prevention

On this, the following can be argued, should other states be allowed to have nuclear weapons as a deterrent? Arguments against will continue that proliferation increases the risk of nuclear accidents, loss through theft, or in irresponsible hands. These are not unreasonable fears but need to be weighed against the real and immediate expense of conventional wars without nuclear deterrence. In Iraq, Libya, Syria, Yemen, DRC and now Ukraine, hundreds of thousands have died not from nuclear bombs but from conventional wars waged on weaker, non-nuclear states.

The threat of nuclear escalation is likely the most widely recognized war-prevention method today. If lesser nations had nuclear arms, they could deter aggression, not by military parity, but by strategic deterrence. It would stem superpower bullying and create more balanced diplomacy.

The Moral Counterargument and Its Weakness

Moral and existential objections have been raised by critics of this position, what if unstable states acquire nuclear weapons? Terrorists? These are valid points, but they overlook strategic self-interest that is supposed to watch over state action. Even dictatorial or unstable states have shown a rational desire to survive. Nuclear weapons are not used; they are used as diplomatic and strategic insurance.

Secondly, the current regime of non-proliferation is also unequal and ineffective in nature. It is a moral high ground for the existing nuclear powers to take while denying the same privilege to others. If nuclear bombs are too lethal for any nation to possess, then disarmament needs to begin with those who already have them. Otherwise, denying the same option to others keeps perpetuating an unequal state of the world wherein war is enabled rather than averted.

Conclusion: Deterrence for All, or Peace for None

We don't live in an equitable world, but nuclear weapons have turned into the great leveler. Rather than viewing proliferation as a threat, maybe it's time to regard it as a stabilizing influence one that gives weaker countries a fair chance not to fight, rather than definitely to do so.

Let us recast the conversation; Nuclear deterrence is not about who can destroy the most it's about who can prevent destruction in the first place. A world where only the strong can do this is a world where the weak remain vulnerable. But a world where all nations possess the capability to ensure their survival via deterrence may be a world less prone to catastrophic war.

Oumar Fofana is a free-lance writer for International Affairs Forum.