Firmly into 2026, expectations and current practices around President Trump’s second year in office are marked by turbulence and ambiguity with polls showing historic lows. However, the president’s durability throughout 2026 will not be measured by polls or approval from the public, but by how much the electorate is willing to trade the democratic process for decisive presidential action. If that bargain is struck, its consequences will extend far beyond this administration.

For an increasing number of the population, effective governing seems less measured by orthodox democratic and institutional procedures, and more by a less restrained style of leadership, grounded in speed, decisiveness and outcomes easily visible, even when those outcomes bypass the traditional checks and balances of executive power. A nonpartisan study published in October 2025 by The Steady State, authored by former U.S. intelligence officers, found that 41 percent of Americans believe that “having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament or elections” is a very good or fairly good system.

In this context, 2026 may actually be a favorable year for the Trump agenda, at least in the short term. Three factors help explain this potential: the administration’s growing confidence to utilize unilateral foreign policy action to project decisiveness, increased institutional and public tolerance favoring strong executive authority amidst institutional distrust, and an opposition party that remains fragmented and unable to mount a cohesive objection.

On the international stage, the administration has shown how it intends to conduct foreign policy. In June 2025, strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities not only demonstrated American military power, but also highlighted Trump’s willingness to act decisively and with limited or no regard to congressional involvement. It’s hardly a new dynamic as Congress has increasingly ceded more powers to the Executive Branch, many of which give the president broad discretionary authority.

Recent developments in Venezuela offer an even more forceful example of this approach. The administration has framed the use of U.S. military power as part of fulfilling Trump’s mandate, a framing that appears to resonate with his political base: a recent Quinnipiac poll found that 52 percent of Republicans support military action in Venezuela. While the issue remains highly contested and tensions are elevated, right-leaning media ecosystems have largely reinforced the administration’s narrative.

Domestically, there’s a malaise of exhaustion among the public towards their institutions. The 2025 Edelman Trust Barometer reported that nearly half of Americans polled reported the government has a negative impact on “people like me,” with other sources showing an expanding minority of Americans receptive to leaders who promise to “get things done,” even if that means breaking or bypassing the constraints of a gridlocked bureaucratic system.

Lastly, President Trump is benefitting from another politically imperative advantage: the Democratic Party itself. Pew Research found two-thirds of Democrats are frustrated with their own party. Quinnipiac’s poll heading into 2026 found only 18 percent of voters approve of the way Democrats in Congress are handling their jobs. In essence, this only lowers the political cost of Trump’s unilateral action.

While Trump’s actions are often criticized, even by members of his own party, the general electorate seems to be willing to experiment with this type of unilateral authority. The gridlock of democracy, for many, is too slow and change is wanted now. This is all justified sentiment and understandable, but unfortunately it’s only hastening America’s descent into the authoritative abyss.

The measures being taken now may well deliver short-term political durability for the administration, and perhaps even make people feel like things are “getting done,” but these actions should not be mistaken for stability in the long run.

Functioning democracies are not held together by a single institution, but a collective of merging responsibilities across multiple governing bodies: a Congress asserting constitutional authority, courts maintaining checks and limitations on executive power, civil servants upholding our laws, a free press providing scrutiny, and voters rewarding accountability rather than expediency.

If 2026 proves to be favorable to the administration’s actions, it is less that institutions are functioning as they should and more that the electorate has become more comfortable with their circumvention. Many of these developments carry long-term consequences and challenge the integrity, resilience and credibility of American democracy, leaving its constituents paying the price for decades to come.

Manuel Grajeda III is a researcher, writer and teacher in economics, history and government in Southern California.

Works Cited

Brennan Center for Justice. A Guide to Emergency Powers and Their Use. Brennan Center for Justice, updated July 1, 2025, https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/guide-emergency-powers-and-their-use.

Edelman. 2025 Edelman Trust Barometer: U.S. Report. Edelman, Jan. 2025, https://www.edelman.com/sites/g/files/aatuss191/files/2025-01/2025 Edelman Trust Barometer_U.S. Report.pdf.

Pew Research Center. How Americans Feel About the Republican and Democratic Parties. Pew Research Center, 30 Oct. 2025, https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2025/10/30/how-americans-feel-about-the-republican-and-democratic-parties/.

Quinnipiac University Poll. Voters Give Democrats in Congress a Record Low Job Approval but Still Might Vote for Them in 2026; Majority Think Trump’s Use of Presidential Power Goes Too Far. Quinnipiac University Poll, 17 Dec. 2025, https://poll.qu.edu/poll-release?releaseid=3943.

Wall Street Journal. Venezuela Ushers in the Era of Trump’s ‘Donroe Doctrine’. The Wall Street Journal, 5 Jan. 2026, https://www.wsj.com/world/americas/venezuela-ushers-in-the-era-of-trumps-donroe-doctrine-61f9b080