By Aheen Hajibadri

Constrained by the geographical borders of Israel and Iran, the Kurds once again find themselves caught in the crossfire. The death of Ayatollah Ali Khameini advances Washington and Jerusalem’s hopes for the removal of the Islamic Republic of Iran. As the possibility of Iranian regime change looms, neighboring Kurdish populations are presented with a paradoxical dilemma: pursue long-desired statehood or risk becoming collateral in another regional upheaval.

The Kurdish relationship with the Iranian state is historically extensive. Strategic alliances between Erbil and Tehran have routinely proven transactional, primarily exemplified by unfulfilled promises during the Iran-Iraq War. Political tensions have since persisted.

The onset of 2024 saw numerous ballistic missile assault campaigns by the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) on American targets within the Kurdistan Region. Among the attacks was a miscalculated strike that killed Kurdish businessman Peshraw Dizayee and four family members. Regime-affiliated media reported that a headquarters for Israeli surveillance had been struck. Realistically, the sole location hit was Dizayee’s home.

Since then, Erbil has endured numerous militia drone and rocket attacks. This is attributed to the presence of American military bases in the capital city. Iran’s recent retaliatory attacks have consistently targeted Erbil International Airport with 70 missiles and drones – an action that is expected to continue throughout the conflict.

Iran’s domestic treatment of its minority Kurdish population relies overwhelmingly on repression. As of 2024, Kurds comprised 10% - 13% of Iran’s population. Within the previous 15 years, the minority population accounts for over 50% of regime-enforced executions for affiliation to opposition groups. Additionally, the nationwide protests succeeding the state-sponsored killing of Jina (Mahsa) Amini were exponentially prolonged in Kurdish regions of Iran, leading to disproportionate fatalities in comparison to the remainder of the country.

The exertion of suppression has emboldened Kurdish opposition groups. On March 1st, five major Kurdish opposition parties in Iran announced the formation of a new Coalition. Together, the conglomeration aims to advance hopes for Kurdish self-determination by democratizing internal political institutions. Doing so requires the decimation of the Islamic Republic. Thus, the Coalition’s pathway forward will require various difficult decisions.

Narrowed focus on Iran has not minimized American and Israeli interest in the region’s Kurdish population. Following initial attacks on Iran, President Donald Trump spoke by phone with leaders from the Kurdistan Region. The call, heavily influenced by the lobbying of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, clarified the objectives of the war while reiterating expectations. That is, inferences deriving from Washington and Tel Aviv view a Kurdish uprising as a given. This is amid reports that the CIA is working to arm Kurdish forces in Iran to orchestrate a ground operation.

Interests held by Kurdish officials in Iraq and Iran expand well beyond acting as a proxy force. Longing for internationally recognized sovereignty, the stateless nation must consider whether wartime involvement aligns with its preferred outcome.

With the death of the supreme leader, the Islamic Republic is approaching uncharted vulnerability. Its potential departure is vital to the Kurdish cause. The possibility of a successful uprising strengthens the perception of Kurds as a legitimate political actor within a volatile region. Particularly, Iran’s Kurdish population, fuelled by the unity of the Coalition, preserves its stake in potential post-regime governance.

Though the prospect of self-rule draws temptation, drawbacks may deter the Kurds from involvement. The conducting of an Iranian-Kurdish-led ground operation would require approval and compliance from the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI). A new statement from KRI Deputy Prime Minister Qubad Talabani emphasized the nation’s plan to maintain neutrality in the conflict, declaring that it is not a part of the war effort for any actor. This comes following increased Iranian drone attacks, including the targeting of Sulaymaniyah.

The proposition of fulfilling American expectations bolsters unfavorable memories for the Kurds. The effects of the U.S. withdrawal from Syria in 2019 continue to linger. Simultaneously, recent comments from U.S. Special Envoy Tom Barrack stated that the role of Kurdish troops as an anti-terror force had largely expired. Feelings of abandonment among Kurds have remained prominent. Consequently, an unsuccessful uprising will be starkly reminiscent of developments of the past: the U.S. will withdraw, while the Kurds will be forced to pay the price of a war they did not begin.

Aheen Hajibadri is a graduate student studying International Affairs: Policy & Analysis at American University.

Works Cited

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