By Shakeel Ahmed

Balochistan, Pakistan's largest province by area, has great strategic importance for the region. It connects Pakistan to Central Asia and the Middle East via Afghanistan and Iran. The province occupies a significant place in China’s long-term Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and serves as a key component of the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). Balochistan owns considerable natural resource wealth. Despite being strategically important and resource-rich, the province has been overlooked by the state for a long time. Moreover, it remains widely associated with persistent security concerns. Balochistan has been a hotbed for insurgency since the creation of Pakistan. It has experienced five different waves of insurgencies: 1948, 1958, 1962-1969, 1973-1977, and 2004-present. The current phase of the insurgency has been associated with the highest levels of violence in recent years. This trend is reinforced by South Asian Terrorism Portal (SATP) data  (Figure 1) , which indicates a sharp increase in terrorism-related fatalities in Balochistan in recent years, increasing from 215 in 2020 to 1,534 in 2025, which underscores the growing intensity of violence in the province. These recent acts of insurgency are rooted in the historical foundations of the conflict and the enduring grievances of the Baloch population, particularly long-standing economic marginalisation, persistent state repression, and unequal distribution of resources between the centre and the province. Consequently, the conflict has been addressed only through force or coercion and has been framed merely as a problem of non-state actors.

                                                                  Figure 1 Source: South Asian Terrorism Portal

The Origins of the State-Baloch Conflict

Before the partition of British India in 1947, Balochistan had four principalities: Lasbela, Kharan, Makran, and Kalat. Administratively, Balochistan was divided into two distinct entities: British Balochistan and the Kalat State. The former was administered by the colonial authority, similarly to the rest of British-administered India, replete with the formal institutional power of the ‘thana’ and ‘kutchery’. In contrast, Kalat was a princely state and, like over 500 other princely states across India, was accorded considerable autonomy to conduct its affairs as it saw fit, so long as it accepted British sovereignty over external affairs and provided Delhi with certain fixed revenue. Post partition, like many other regions, Balochistan had to decide its fate, whether to accede to India or Pakistan. Given its strategic and demographic makeup, it was a logical decision for Balochistan to become part of Pakistan. However, Baloch nationalists, who had long sought to establish an independent, separate state for the Baloch ethnicity, advocated for an independent state and merging the Baloch territories in present-day Iran and Afghanistan to form a ‘Greater Balochistan.’ However, on June 29, 1947, the Shahi jirga of British Balochistan, along with the elected members of the Quetta municipal body, unanimously passed a resolution to join Pakistan. In March 1948, Kharan, Lasbela, and Makran acceded to Pakistan. Later that same month, the Khan of Kalat also acceded to Pakistan. Kalat State’s accession to Pakistan remained highly contested, with Baloch nationalists alleging the use of force and rejecting the decision, resulting in widespread unrest and protests across the province. The government of Pakistan deployed forces and assumed authority, arresting several political leaders. This unrest gave rise to a rebel group, led by Agha Abdul Karim, the brother of the Khan of Kalat. It was formally the start of encounters between the Baloch people and Pakistan.

Until 1955, Balochistan remained under the control of the Chief Commissioner, as it had been during the pre-Partition period. The 1955 One-unit plan, to make West Pakistan a single province, worsened the situation. The question of a separate Baloch identity acquired even more significance with the enforcement of the One Unit scheme. In the year 1958, in reaction to one-unit Nauroz Khan and his followers started a guerrilla war against Pakistan. The state responded with a military operation, employing measures that included capital punishment against the separatists. The 1962 uprising came from the political leaders when military dictator Ayub Khan suppressed democratic political struggle and replaced the elected Baloch sardars with central government members. As a response, a guerrilla movement known as ‘Parari’ emerged, consisting of the Mengal, Murri, and Bugti tribes, supported by Baloch nationalist political leaders. The movement ended in 1970 following the dissolution of the One Unit scheme and Ayub Khan’s removal from power.

Nevertheless, the state's behaviour towards Balochistan did not change much even after the revival of the democratic government. Although the 1973 constitution was supported by all major ethnic parties, including Baloch leaders. However, tensions between the two provincial governments, Balochistan and NWFP, where the National Awami Party (NAP) was in coalition, and the center increased steadily, the former attempting to assert their autonomy, the latter insistent on asserting authority, led to the overthrow of the provincial governments by the center under the pretext that there was a plot being hatched to overthrow the central government. The nationalist leaders once again felt marginalized and betrayed. They started to support the separatist movements. It is believed that Baloch guerrillas had already been preparing for armed struggle against the center following the success of the Bangladesh separation from Pakistan. The insurgency was unable to withstand sustained state repression, as the government deployed around 80,000 troops in the region.

The current wave of insurgency is the deadliest to date. It began in 2004 and remains active, demonstrating greater operational success. One of the major reasons for the start of the insurgency was the state's expansion and control over the region through establishing new cantonments in Sui, Khulo,  and the Gwadar region of the province, which would have given control over natural gas produced in the province, access to mineral and energy resources and strategic control over the coastal city of Gwadar. The spark to the unrest was the rape of a lady doctor, Dr Shazia Khalid, at the Sui gas plant by an army officer, and the subsequent shielding of this officer from criminal prosecution by the government. As a result, the local Baloch attacked government facilities across Balochistan. The state and Baloch took a dangerous turn when the Baloch tribal Leader, Akbar Bugti, along with his 32 tribe’s men, was killed in the military operations in 2006.

Since then, various factions of Baloch separatists have remained actively engaged in attacks against state institutions, government officials, foreigners, members of the Punjabi ethnic group, and public infrastructure. As a result, the conflict between Baloch insurgents and the state has intensified to a point that appears increasingly difficult to reverse.

Historically persistent issues in Balochistan:

As a multi-ethnic country, Pakistan comprises numerous ethnic groups and has historically faced challenges of self-assertion and demands for autonomy across different regions. In the early years of Pakistan’s independence, the Baloch nationalists strived to achieve cultural recognition, regional autonomy, and administrative unification of historical Baloch territories under a decentralized federal framework. In response, the state not only ignored their self-determination demands but also used brutal force, which further marginalized them. Moreover, the state also adopted an exclusivist approach to nation-building and imposed what was a federal-in-form-but-unitary-in-substance political system.

The connections between political and non-political forms of Baloch resistance can be understood through the historically persistent grievances that have shaped Balochistan.

Resource Governance and Economic Marginalisation:

The exploitation of natural resources and unfair distribution of economic shares have been long-standing issues between the state and Balochistan. Balochistan claims that the state has exploited their natural resources without giving it its due share. Natural Gas in Pakistan was first discovered in Sui, Balochistan, in 1952. Despite being the biggest provider of gas to the other parts of the country, gas was not supplied to the producing province until military cantonments were established in the capital city in 1986, which led to gas provision being treated as a priority. The province was also subjected to inequitable arrangements in relation to excise duties on natural gas. After nearly seven decades, Balochistan’s share in the national gas consumption (domestic purposes) remains at a mere 4 per cent.

Additionally, although Balochistan held the primary claim over the resources of the multibillion-dollar Saindak copper-gold project, it received only a 2 per cent share during the project’s first ten years. Whereas 50 per cent of the revenues went to the Metallurgical Corporation of China (MCC), and 48 per cent to the government of Pakistan, as per the lease agreement. The lease was extended twice by the federal government for five years before giving Balochistan a 30 per cent share in the project.

Moreover, China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) project, valued at around USD 62 billion, which was labelled as a ‘gamechanger’ for the region, has further intensified the controversies. Gwadar, Balochistan, is central to the success of CPEC, which constitutes a key corridor within China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Its importance lies in its role in connecting China’s Xinjiang province to the Arabian Sea through Gwadar Port. Since the project was formally launched in 2015, around USD 25 billion had been invested by 2022, of which only 3 per cent was invested in Balochistan, including Gwadar port development. Most of that investment was concentrated in the port itself, while the broader regions of Balochistan and Gwadar received little substantial development that could improve the conditions of surrounding communities. Consequently, this uneven distribution of benefits reinforced perceptions of exclusion and strengthened the view that the project primarily served the interests of the centre, thereby deepening distrust between local communities and the state.

Majoritarian Federal model:

Federalism and decentralisation have emerged as commonly advocated tools for conflict regulation in ethnically divided societies. As a multi-ethnic country, Pakistan restructured and redefined its federal system on several occasions, yet the smaller unit, in terms of population, Balochistan, have remained distrustful of majoritarian federalism. Punjab possesses the largest population, with 56 per cent. Punjab holds 141 general seats in the National Assembly, while Balochistan, despite being Pakistan’s largest province by area, holds only 16. Notably, Lahore and Faisalabad together account for 24 general seats, underscoring Balochistan’s limited electoral weight within the federal system. As a result, national political parties have limited electoral incentive to prioritize investment in Balochistan. However, the bicameral federal structure offers limited balance, but the Senate has no authority over money bills. The decisive control over fiscal legislation remains with the National Assembly.

Moreover, the majoritarian design of the federal system serves the under-representation of Baloch in bureaucracy and the military. The majoritarian federal design and under-representation of the Baloch in power structures have remained the most enduring institutional enablers of Balochistan’s marginalized position within Pakistan, enabling re-centralisation of powers and leaving the protection of provincial rights at the discretion of the civilian and bureaucratic elites in Islamabad. The imbalance of power has further alienated the Baloch from the state and reinforced the perception that federal politics offers limited scope for the meaningful redress of provincial grievances.

Constant State repression:

State repression and the use of force have marked relations between the state and Baloch nationalists since the onset of their disputes. Instead of addressing public grievances, the state resorted to coercion, from the arrest of political leaders after the accession of the State of Kalat to the killing of Akbar Bugti. This repression continued after Bugti’s death and was further reinforced through political engineering and the empowerment of illegitimate representatives. The escalating political repression and human rights violations by security agencies further undermined Baloch confidence in federalism and the Constitution, fostering secessionist tendencies.

As tensions in the region have intensified, state repression appears to have become more severe. Baloch nationalist leaders claim that individuals have frequently disappeared without warrants, and that some were later found to have been extrajudicially executed after months of detention without due process. Although the number of enforced disappearances in Balochistan remains contested. No universally accepted dataset exists; the issue has become one of the most enduring sources of political grievance in the province. The nationalist leader of the BNP-M, Akhtar Mengal, has claimed that he provided the state with details of around 5,000 disappeared individuals, of whom only approximately 1,300 were subsequently recovered or released.

Recent state repression in Balochistan has increasingly extended beyond counterinsurgency to include the suppression of peaceful dissent. In particular, activists associated with the Baloch Yakjehti Committee, including Dr Mahrang Baloch, have faced arrest and detention in the context of protests over enforced disappearances. Reports by human rights organisations indicate that these measures form part of a broader crackdown on non-violent political mobilisation in the province.

Balochistan at Present: Escalation and Stalemate:

As shown in  Figure 1, South Asian Terrorism Portal Data indicate that the Baloch insurgency has intensified in recent years. The increasing sophistication of these attacks highlights both the evolving tactical capacity of the insurgents and their resistance to what they view as economic exploitation. In particular, the shift from limited hit-and-run attacks to more coordinated, high-profile operations reflects an intensification of resistance to CPEC. The tactical evolution has also been marked by a rise in suicide attacks, including those involving women, indicating an important change in the operational profile of the insurgency. At least eight women have so far taken part in such attacks, with the first recorded case occurring in 2022. Another notable feature of the current insurgency is the emergence of younger leadership with little trust in formal political processes and weaker ties to tribal authority. The movement has also widened its support base to include the nascent Baloch middle class concentrated along the Makran coast, as well as less advantaged communities in central and eastern districts. Taken together, these developments suggest an important shift in the character of the insurgency: it appears less dependent on traditional tribal structures, broader in its social base, and therefore more difficult for the state to contain through elite bargaining or conventional political co-option.

The state must recognize that the insurgency in Balochistan cannot be contained through force alone. A more durable response requires allowing meaningful political processes to take shape and addressing the core grievances of the Baloch population, including demands for genuine regional autonomy, greater economic equality, and an end to repression. Continued reliance on coercion, or the tendency to reduce the conflict solely to foreign interference, is unlikely to resolve the crisis. If these underlying issues remain unaddressed, the current escalation risks generating wider regional insecurity.

Shakeel Ahmed is a Rotary Peace Fellow pursuing a master’s degree in development studies at the University of Bradford, UK. Originally from Balochistan, Pakistan, his research interests include peacebuilding, conflict, governance, and sustainable development.

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