The Australia Group (AG) is an informal multilateral export control regime (ECR) of 43 participating nations that coordinates and controls the export of dual-use technologies to prevent their diversion for the development and proliferation of chemical and biological weapons (CBWs). Materials, technologies, and equipment related to CBWs are dual-use: they can be used for both civilian and military purposes, creating space for the diversion of materials for military purposes that are inimical to international security. Therefore, the ECRs primarily function to regulate the international transfer of sensitive dual-use materials to prevent their diversion, while simultaneously facilitating their peaceful use. The countries party to ECRs leverage the transfer of dual-use technologies and materials across a variety of fields. However, they must meet certain basic criteria to join the club. Pakistan, despite ensuring all the requirements of the AG, is not a member state that curtails its inalienable right to access technology and critical material. It must be included in the group.

The foremost reason for Pakistan’s exclusion from ECRs is the consensus-based nature of the regimes. Membership in the AG, the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), or other ECRs is not governed by formally codified criteria; rather, admission is contingent on consensus among existing members. As a result, it involves geopolitics and the selective treatment of countries that curtail their inalienable rights to access critical technology for socio-economic growth. For example, India, a party to AG since 2018, can play this role to prevent Pakistan’s inclusion. New Delhi can withhold its consent, thereby blocking consensus. Bent upon a decades-long rivalry against Pakistan, New Delhi has several motivations to do so.      

Had there been a criteria-based mechanism, Pakistan would have been a party to the AG, for it objectively fulfills all the requirements to join an ECR. Pakistan has formed a legislative body to regulate the transfer of dual-use sensitive goods: The Strategic Export Control Division. Export controls in Pakistan are also consistent with the guidelines and controlled lists maintained by the AG and the NSG. Islamabad has also maintained robust measures for the safety and security of critical goods at various stages. 

Pakistan is also a party to the conventions prohibiting CBWs, which include the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). As per the CWC’s Article VII, Pakistan established its National Authority (NA) to coordinate with the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) for all matters related to the convention. Pakistan has also declared several industrial and agricultural facilities related to chemical production. The NA regularly submits annual declarations on a National Program for Protection Against Chemical Weapons.

In the biological sphere, Islamabad submits to the objectives of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). It has established legislative and regulatory-cum-administrative measures to regulate the life sciences and strengthen export controls on biological agents. In accordance with the BTWC and the International Health Regulations (2005), Pakistan has implemented stringent biosafety and biosecurity measures.

These efforts are internationally recognized. Pakistan recently presided over the review conference of the Nuclear Safety Convention and was elected chair of the review conference of the Safety Convention. Arguably, these events not only showcase Pakistan’s technical and scientific endeavors but also serve as a form of soft power projection, whereby Pakistan's scientific expertise can be used to forge international collaboration and advance diplomatic objectives related to non-proliferation efforts.

More importantly, Pakistan has a long history of ensuring mechanisms to regulate dual-use material. Its policies have always been consistent with international requirements, and it has a clean and proud history of responsible behavior regarding dual-use materials.

In addition to technical, political, and scientific measures and a history of responsible behavior, it is Pakistan's inalienable right to access dual-use technology for socio-economic development. Dual-use technologies are a ray of hope for the Global South. They are useful in medicine, agriculture, energy, and health sectors. They help achieve sustainable development. As a result, every state, especially developing ones, must have access to these technologies. 

In sum, Pakistan meets all the requirements to join the AG. However, the consensus-based criteria hamper its inclusion. Therefore, there is a need for a criteria-based approach to provide a fair chance to all the aspiring states to join the regime. Curtailing access to them results in resentment and even undermines the regime's effective functioning. No ECR, arguably, can achieve its political objectives unless it ensures inclusion and allows legitimate use of technology without any discrimination. It is the very fact that can help ensure universal adherence and help achieve non-proliferation objectives.

Shah Meer is an Assistant Research Fellow at Balochistan Think Tank Network (BTTN), Quetta. He has been researching nuclear and strategic affairs, foreign policies of major powers, strategic cultures of major powers, and Pakistan-India relations. He holds a master's in advanced International Relations and specializes in strategic affairs. He can be reached at shah.meer@bttn.org.pk and sangatshahmeer44@gmail.com.