By Mishal Zahra

The Mecca Joint Defence Agreement is not really a well-organized military alliance. Instead, it looks more like a backup plan, where the middle powers are essentially preparing themselves for a situation where they can no longer fully depend on the security guarantees of the major powers. Moreover, the agreement is written with vague language that none of the three countries would necessarily be forced to go to war if one of the others were attacked.

A credible collective-defense arrangement depends on four basic conditions: clear commitments, an enforcement mechanism, military coordination, and a shared perception of threat.

The agreement says that an attack on one member is considered an attack on all three, which is quite similar to Article 5 of NATO. The purpose of such a commitment is to deter the adversary from attacking in the first place via the collective alliance response. However, the same situation, when applied to the Mecca pact, looks very different because the three countries face very different security threats and strategic interests. They also have different major power relationships and foreign policy priorities. Due to these differences, the declaration alone does not constitute a credible deterrent. Instead, it gives the impression of a political statement that leaves enough ambiguity for each country to decide how far it is willing to go if another member comes under attack.

A pact with no enforcement mechanism

Saudi officials released the statement, soon after the agreement, that the pact is not a “military axis”, not a “sectarian bloc”, and not related to any nuclear ambition. Additionally, Turkish officials added that the pact doesn’t override their existing commitments and is purely defensive. This kind of diplomatic discourse is important, as states often describe an agreement as purely defensive when they want to show solidarity without taking on a clear military obligation.

If a mutual defence agreement doesn’t clearly explain: What counts as aggression? What exactly triggers a military response? How will the three countries coordinate their forces? Then the promise of collective defence remains vague.

Turkey's Article 5 Problem

Turkey is a full NATO member and has the second-largest military in the alliance. What if Turkey is attacked by a country that isn’t considered a direct NATO enemy, but is involved in a wider Iran war against the Gulf states? In theory, Turkey could try to invoke Article 5 of NATO, but there lies a problem. NATO members have shown limited willingness to get directly involved in conflicts between Iran and Gulf states. This gives rise to questions like: If NATO responds to Turkey's attack, how would the Mecca Pact fit into that response? Such questions aren’t answered in the Mecca agreement.

Thus, instead of providing extra protection, the overlap could create confusion about command of the forces and which alliance takes priority.

Pakistan's Selective Solidarity

Pakistan’s own agreement patterns raise questions about the main idea behind this pact. Islamabad signed a bilateral defence agreement with Riyadh last year; however, Islamabad has not directly intervened militarily against Iran, despite Iran carrying out repeated strikes on Riyadh. Thus, if a bilateral defence agreement with an explicit mutual defence commitment didn’t lead Pakistan to take direct military action, then there is little reason that a trilateral agreement can. In fact, Turkey brings its own strategic priorities, which could make Pakistan’s commitment even less clear.

For Islamabad, the real interests in the Mecca pact can lie somewhere else. This agreement can provide Islamabad with leverage against India by strengthening its regional partnership, a greater diplomatic position, especially after its mediation role in US-Iran talks, and ultimately financial support from the Gulf, which is particularly important at a time when Pakistan continues to navigate economic instability.

Saudi Arabia's hedging strategy

Amid the US-Iran war, Riyadh has become doubtful of the US’s security guarantees in the future. Several developments have added to this doubt: the Iranian missile attacks on Gulf oil infrastructure have shown Riyadh how vulnerable its critical infrastructure can be. Moreover, Riyadh has also reached a nuclear cooperation agreement with the US, and the agreement notably doesn’t include the IAEA’s additional protocol, which provides strong international inspection of a country’s nuclear activities.

These developments collectively suggest that Riyadh is trying to create its own backup plan instead of relying on US security guarantees.

So, what do the two agreements reveal?

The first is a flexible nuclear cooperation framework that creates flexibility for Riyadh in the nuclear domain. The second is the Mecca pact, which gives Riyadh access to Pakistan’s military capabilities and a connection to a nuclear-armed state.

If we look at the civil nuclear cooperation deal and the Mecca pact together, they appear to tell the same story. Both pacts allow Riyadh to diversify its options, while avoiding a formal break with Washington, as Riyadh still heavily depends on its relationship with Washington. Moreover, the nuclear cooperation agreement also provides Riyadh access to the US’s enrichment technology.

Thus, Riyadh isn’t abandoning the US; it is hedging by keeping its relationship with Washington and diversifying its options with countries such as Pakistan and Turkey.

Conclusion

The significance of the Mecca agreement may lie less in creating a NATO-style military alliance than in giving its members greater strategic flexibility. Instead, the agreement brings three governments together that have different strategic priorities. These strategic interests are just shaped under the language of “collective security” that makes the agreement look stronger.

The assumptions underpinning the pact will only remain valid until the agreement faces a real crisis. The real question is therefore not what the member states said when they signed the pact, but how they will respond when one of them is attacked.

Mishal Zahra is a BS International Relations student at National Defence University. She has been associated with IPS, KIIR, and Policy East. Her work focuses on geopolitics, world