The relationship between displacement and statelessness is a close, though rarely recognized, one.  According to the Institute on Statelessness and Inclusion, as many as one out of three stateless persons in the world has been forcibly displaced. People can be stateless and live in a country they consider to be their own; for example, many Dominicans of Haitian descent who were born and raised in the Dominican Republic yet have neither Dominican nor Haitian nationality.  Some stateless people are displaced within the borders of their own country, as has occurred with many of the 300,000 Syrian Kurds who were rendered stateless by government action.  In some cases, such as with the Rohingya of Myanmar, displacement results directly from statelessness. 

The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) is the UN body with a mandate to both protect refugees and to prevent and reduce statelessness.  Over twenty years ago, UNHCR drew connections between statelessness and displacement, noting that preventing and reducing statelessness is vital for preventing refugee flows. While this figure is likely low for two reasons, the UNCR estimates there are at least 10 million stateless people in the world.3  First, UNHCR categorizes people as either stateless or refugees and if they happen to be both, they are counted as refugees – to avoid double counting and because the UN Convention on Refugees offers stronger protection to refugees than the Statelessness Convention offers to stateless persons. Moreover, if they fall under the jurisdiction of another UN agency, they are not included in UNHCR statistics, either as refugees or as stateless.  This means that many of the 5 million Palestinian refugees falling under United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East’s  (UNRWA) mandate are stateless but because they are considered to be under UNRWA’s responsibility, they are not included in UNHCR’s statistics.  Sometimes the fact that people are persecuted because they are stateless may be grounds for refugee status.

As one of the few studies to look at the relationship between statelessness and displacement has helpfully spelled out, there are at least three ways that the two are related.  First, stateless communities are at risk of forced displacement.  Secondly, forced displacement may contribute to increased risks of statelessness. Thirdly, statelessness can increase vulnerability in forced displacement contexts.

It is a particular tragedy when conflict forces people from their homes and into statelessness. Unfortunately, this is not uncommon.  For example, for a Colombian child born outside the country to acquire Colombian nationality, the parents must register the child with the Colombian consulate in the country in which the child was born.  If the parents don’t want to approach the consulate and if the child isn’t automatically a citizen of the country in which he or she is born, then the child becomes stateless.

While statelessness and displacement are global phenomena, affecting people in every region, the case of Syrian refugees and statelessness is one of the most dramatic examples.  Presently there are over 4 million Syrian refugees living in Turkey, Jordan and Lebanon.  Tens of thousands of Syrian refugee babies have been born in exile and in none of these three countries does the baby automatically become a citizen of the country where the birth takes place.  In order to acquire Syrian citizenship