The Crimean crisis erupted into a full-blown international incident that has become a prominent point of discussion within the International System. The Crimean region was annexed by Putin’s Russian Federation on the 18th of March 2014 and since then the region has increasingly come under Kremlin control. The military campaign which led to the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula occurred after the 2014 Ukrainian Revolution and there are a variety of reasons that can be used to account for Putin’s actions. It is apparent from the debate within the International System that most Western rationale demonstrates Putin to be the aggressor rekindling Soviet imperialism by attempting to reclaim lands lost with the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Interestingly, a variety of scholars have indicated that the Crimean Crisis is a product of the West’s reckless programme of NATO enlargement; these scholars also believe that the potential admittance of Ukraine into the collective defence experiment has caused Putin to act in the manner he has. Nevertheless, Putin’s actions have been dubbed as “a frontal challenge to the post-Cold War European regional order” (Allison, 2014: 1). Although I do agree that such claims can be used to generate a limited understanding behind Putin’s annexation of the Crimean Peninsula it is my argument that the combination of the historical context of the Cold War and the condition of anarchy are the major factors behind the creation of the Crimean crisis.

Most understandings behind the causation of the Crimean crisis that have been perpetuated by commentators blame both the West and Putin. Firstly, when dealing with Western contributions to the Crimean crisis, it has been argued that the West’s desire to admit Ukraine into NATO caused Putin to feel insecure over Russian security. NATO’s inception in 1949 can be used to demonstrate why Russian insecurity has determined Putin’s actions as NATO's raison d’etre was essentially a confirmation of, U.S.-led, collective defence in response to the potential nuclear capabilities of the Soviet Union. This means that with the potential admittance of Ukraine into NATO, a military force backed by nuclear capabilities would now border alongside Russia.

However, even before Putin’s grip of control within Russia, Russian politicians made it clear during the reunification of East and West Germany that any enlargement of NATO into traditional Soviet spheres of influence would be met with animosity. Indeed, “since the mid-1990s, Russian leaders have adamantly opposed NATO enlargement and in recent years, they have made it clear that they would not stand by while their strategically important neighbour turned into a western bastion” (Mearsheimer, 2014: 1). Clearly, the West was fully aware of the potential backlash from the Kremlin that NATO enlargement, so close the Russian territories, would incur.

The insecurity that is triggered following a traditional anti-Soviet military force so close to Russia means that “the trouble is NATO enlargement, the central element of a larger strategy to move Ukraine out of Russia and integrate it into the West” (Mearsheimer, 2014: 1). It has been acknowledged that the West was fully aware of Russian resentment with regards to NATO enlargement within their traditional spheres of influence as “Moscow warned that NATO expansion would create new lines of division. Russia regarded NATO extension as an expansion of NATO’s and U.S. sphere of in?uence” (Sauer, 2017: 86). This explanation for Russia’s annexation of the Crimean Peninsula places the fault firmly at the feet of the Western world. They were fully aware of Putin’s animosity of such policy proposals and by ignoring these clear indications that Putin would act over such actions, we can determine that the West can be blamed for the Crimea crisis. The West forced Putin’s hand into action by embarking upon the path of Ukrainian membership to NATO despite the unequivocal warnings that have been continually projected from the Kremlin.

Alternatively, it has been also argued that Putin harbours most of the responsibility when it comes to the causation of the Crimea crisis. Firstly, understanding Putin’s mentality makes it easier to acknowledge the role he might have played within the creation of the Crimea crisis. Being a former KGB agent, Putin is well known for his strong sense of nationalism. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union Putin never accepted defeat. It has been argued that Putin longs to re-establish and regain territories that the Soviet Union lost with its collapse, leading to the view that “the Crimean question has arisen, of course, because of the collapse of the Soviet Union” (Drohobycky, 1995: 4).

Indeed, Putin’s feeling of shame at the collapse of the Soviet Union has confirmed in his proclamation that the demise of the Soviet Union is “the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the century” (BBC, 2005). Putin felt that he had to restore national pride within Russia and believed he could do so through regaining territory that was lost with the collapse of the Soviet Union.

This means that Putin has acted in an imperialist manner by marching into the Crimea peninsula and regaining a segment of territory that was once under Soviet control. It is also argued that as Putin’s approval ratings within Russia reached an all-time low, as the Russian demonstrations of 2011 illustrated, public calls for Putin’s removal were growing with vigour. Putin felt that he could increase his approval ratings by reclaiming a segment of territory that Russia shamefully lost. Indeed, “in 1954, a controversial decision of Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev, himself an ethnic Ukrainian, transferred the Crimea peninsula to the Ukrainian SSR, extracting it from Russian territory” (Russia Today, 2014), and this move had been viewed with great contempt within Russia.

When analysing the Crimean Peninsula, it becomes apparent that Russian ethnic groups dominate the region. For example, Russian ethnicity makes up for “58.5%” (Russia Today, 2014) of the Crimean population. This existence of a strong Russian cohort within the Crimea peninsula is said to have motivated Putin to annex the region. Interestingly, this motivation stems from knowing that Russian forces would be widely accepted by a large enough segment of the population. This desire to regain the region under his control has enabled the conclusion to be drawn that Putin “wants to re-establish Russian hegemony within the space of the former Soviet Union” (Sanders, 2014) further fuelling the notion that Putin annexed the Crimea peninsula to restore lost territories and is acting in the manner of an imperialist ruler, ultimately placing the blame for the Crimean crisis at his feet.

Although the case of NATO enlargement and Putin wanting to restore Russian hegemony within the region offers an insight behind the causation of the conflict, it is my argument that the combination of the historical reality of the Cold War within the International System and the notion of Anarchy have had a greater impact upon creating the Crimean crisis. Firstly, the case for NATO enlargement within Eastern Europe has been viewed negatively by Putin. The West may have the greatest intentions in admitting Ukraine into NATO and supporting pro-democracy movements, as many Western NGOs backed the Orange Revolution within Ukraine in 2004, within the region. Indeed, it is believed that the region would be more stable if it became more democratic and this bias towards the understanding of the Democratic Peace Theory, that claims democracies are less likely to go to war with one another, clearly motivates Western thinking.

Furthermore, the West is naive in assuming that the demise of the Soviet Union and the increased interaction with Russia will eliminate the feelings of distrust that plagued the International System during the Cold War. These factors have caused a “downward spiral into a Cold War-mentality” (Stavridis, 2016). The West can give Putin all the reassurances that they can muster, however, as NATO’s foundations are anti-Soviet in nature, the insecurity that having a military force so close to Russian borders is far too grave for Putin to ignore. This distrust of the West stems from the historical context of the Cold War.

Building upon this notion, any action that has been taken by the West has been viewed in a negative light by the Kremlin. The West has continually demonstrated that Ukraine’s admittance into NATO is not an aggressive policy that would be at the detriment of Russian influence within the region. However, this grave miscalculation meant that the West “was not aware that its Ukraine policy was very risky and could have been regarded as an offensive act by Russia, which in its turn could have triggered a reaction” (Sauer, 2017: 82). During the Cold War, the American led West and the Soviet Union were in a constant battle for spheres of influence throughout the International System and that Cold War mentality is still evident.

For example, Yushchenko who wanted to move Ukraine away from traditional Russian influence whilst also “Westernising” politically and economically “got the Western nod, and floods of money poured into groups which support him” (Steele, 2004). Indeed, such meddling has been viewed negatively by the Kremlin as “Russia’s accusations of illegitimate or excessive Western interference found an echo in certain circles in the West, some of whom argued that the entire Orange Revolution was ‘made in the USA’” (Wilson, 2006: 22). Compounding upon this, “Putin evidently was deeply shocked in late February 2014 by the sudden overthrow of President Yanukovych by Ukrainian populist leader’s intent on an explicit European political orientation” (Allison, 2014: 1257). This feeling of dismay stems from Yanukovych, who wanted to increase relations with Russia as opposed to the West, being overthrown by a political movement that Putin believed to had been facilitated by the West.

The Cold War mentality meant that Putin viewed western meddling within the Ukrainian elections as an attack upon Russian influence within the region. Despite all the arguments for Ukraine's greater inclusion in the International System, through Westernising economically and politically, that the West can offer Putin the Kremlin still view these moves as a clear infraction upon Russian dominance within the region. Indeed, such sentiments of distrust being a product of the Cold War which still dominates Western relations with Russia.

Interestingly, measures had been introduced to try and combat such realities of diplomatic relations between NATO and Russia but these measures have ultimately failed. Though there seemed to be a period of increased cooperation between the West and the Kremlin, such as through Russia joining the North Atlantic Cooperation Council in 1991 and the Partnership for Peace Programme in 1994, these have been brief periods of cooperation. These mechanisms have not brought about the utopian expectation of true cooperation between the West and the Kremlin. Putin’s view of NATO became increasingly negative following the potential admittance of Ukraine and the Cold War mentality of old became reinstated.

Efforts to increase cooperation between the West and the Kremlin have continually failed in preventing the creation of clashes between the two conflicting sides. Though one can state that if Putin had just cooperated with NATO then the Crimean Crisis would have been averted, the historical reality of diplomatic relations between the two sides, and the previously failed attempts to increase Russian participation within European defence measures, has meant that true cooperation between the two sides may never be visible within the International System.

The historical reality of the Cold War means that distrust still dictates relations between the West and the Kremlin. However, when analysing the Crimea crisis, it becomes apparent that the combination of the Cold War mentality and the condition of Anarchy have played significant roles in the creation of the Crimea crisis. The effect of anarchy becomes apparent when one understands the implications that this has upon State security and anarchy is defined as “a condition in which there exists no centralised authority above Nation-States that enforces the rule of law” (Steans et al, 2010: 18). The inception of NATO created a collective security community within Europe as during the Cold War “there was concern among Western European countries that Moscow would impose its ideology and authority across Europe” (NATO, 2017). Many argue that through NATO’s redefining the initial anti-Soviet sentiments it perpetuated no longer holds true.

However, the Cold War mentality means that many individuals within the Kremlin have not been convinced that NATO no longer serves this function. This means that Putin would feel a great sense of insecurity at the prospect of having a traditional anti-Soviet force bordering Russia despite the best efforts of the West to appease his worries. This insecurity, a product of the distrust that lingered during the Cold War era, means that Putin feels that he must secure Russia’s own security.

This is a process known as self-help, and this is dubbed as “the basic principle of action” (Mearsheimer, cited in Bayliss, et al 2011: 92) within an anarchic system as there exists no higher authority above the States that can assure Russia’s security. Putin felt compelled to initiate a means of securing Russia’s own security as he feared that the Crimea peninsula would “host a NATO naval base” (Merishemer, 2014: 1). The condition of anarchy and then the effect that this had upon Putin when coupled with the Cold War mentality, ultimately caused Putin to annex the Crimean Peninsula. Putin wanted to keep the Crimean Peninsula as a buffer zone, as it traditionally once was, between Russia and the Western powers that operate in the guise of NATO. Clearly, the condition of Anarchy and Putin's distrust of the motives behind the West's inclusion of Ukraine into NATO created a scenario in which Putin felt compelled to secure Russia’s security. This accounts for Putin’s decision to annex the Crimea Peninsula, ultimately demonstrating how anarchy contributed heavily to the creation of the crisis.

Also, the effects of anarchy on the creation of the Crimean Crisis can be understood through a neorealist lens and the Security Dilemma. The potential admittance of Ukraine into NATO triggers the Security Dilemma which is when “the build-up of military capacity for defensive reasons by one state is always liable to be interpreted as aggressive by another state” (Heywood, 2014: 63). The admittance of Ukraine into NATO would boost the military capacity of NATO by being able to position forces alongside the Russian borders which is something that NATO has previously been unable to do.

The increased military power that NATO would possess following Ukraine’s admittance is liable to be viewed as an aggressive policy adoption and, indeed, it has been viewed as such by the Kremlin. Western attempts to appease the Kremlin that the admittance of Ukraine into NATO is not being taken to infringe upon Russian influence and is categorically not a security concern for Russia has fallen on deaf ears. The Security Dilemma coincides perfectly with the understanding of Cold War sentiments as it hinges upon the distrust of motives behind the admittance of Ukraine into NATO.  It has been stated that “collective defence is at the heart of the Treaty” (NATO, 2017), however, as it is illustrated above, Putin can interpret this potential action as aggressive against Russian influence within the region. Western “influence in the eastern neighbourhood is severely constrained by competition from Russia” (Christou, 2010: 424), so a reaction of some kind from Putin was to be expected.

Damagingly, the Security Dilemma has had a great impact on Putin’s actions, especially when one remembers the contextual nature of an International System that is characterised by anarchy. As it is mentioned above, Putin seriously views this scenario with great distrust and sees the potential of a military presence, whose inception was anti-Soviet in nature, alongside Russian borders as detrimental to Russian security. Putin views this potential act as an attack upon Russian influence within the region, and with Ukraine joining NATO, he would expect Ukraine to “evict Russia’s Black Sea Fleet from its long-standing base in Sevastopol” (Treisman, 2016), which further reduces Putin’s power within the region.

Ultimately, these implications occurring within an anarchic framework has meant that Putin has had to act pre-emptively to ensure these concerns that he has for Russian security and interests are appeased at the earliest opportunity as there exist no institutional means that Putin can rely upon to feel truly secure. Both the Cold War mentality of distrust and the notion of anarchy have had played a crucial role in the creation of the crisis as such pressures have forced Putin to act. These actions took the form of Putin annexing the Crimean Peninsula which has caused the civil war and is a direct result of the lingering feelings of distrust that have continued despite the fall of the Soviet Union. Also, the condition of anarchy means that Putin feels that he cannot rely upon any other state or institution to guarantee Russian security ultimately causing him to annex the Crimean Peninsula.

Overall, the mainstream debate that exists between the various sides of this issue makes compelling arguments. One can sympathise with how Putin’s fear of a military presence so close to Russian borders would invoke him into action especially after countless attempts by Russian politicians, past and present, to demonstrate to the West that NATO exopansion into territories under Russian influence would not be tolerated. Also, one could also see the merits of the arguments that Putin is merely acting as an imperialist leader in trying to restore the Soviet empire of old whilst also consolidating his own power within Russia.

However, even the themes of anarchy and the Cold War mentality of distrust play key roles within these two explanations for the creation of the Crimean crisis. This acknowledgement means that I can conclude that although there are various plausible explanations for the Crimea crisis, it is the combination of the distrust that has lingered since the Cold War in the International System and the condition of anarchy that have been the greatest contributions to the initiation of the Crimean crisis.

Maneesh Mishra holds a BA in International Relations and Political Science and an MA in International Security. His work has been utilized by a variety of Think Tanks that have focused, primarily on terrorism.

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