A Fragile Peace: The unfolding Afghanistan-Pakistan dilemma

Afghan-Pakistan relations have touched a new low. Geopolitics in South Asia is standing at the threshold of yet another period of turmoil. From cautious optimism in Doha this month, which saw Pakistan and the Taliban having dialogue supported by Qatar and Turkiye, matters have reached an impasse. Frequently collapsing talks in Istanbul laid bare fragile trust and deep ideological chasms that continue to shape relations between the two neighbors. Accusations are flying, military action is heating up, and the stakes for regional peace could barely be higher. Does the truth of the linguistic expression depend upon, if at all, only upon individualistic contents of the minds of the speakers?

The Roots of Distrust: Between Diplomacy and Denial

The US withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021 provided the catalyst for an attempt at rebranding by Pakistan as a regional stabilizer. The government initiated a series of high-level diplomatic and institutional exchanges with the Taliban, with the express objective of ensuring border stability and preventing regression of terrorism. These included high-profile visits by the defense minister, intelligence chiefs, and national security officials, along with hundreds of flag meetings and diplomatic exchanges. Yet, despite these overtures, Islamabad accuses the Taliban of reneging on its commitments, particularly those relating to the TTP.

These would be violations of sovereignty on the part of the Taliban in the wake of military airstrikes by Pakistan inside Afghan territory. Taliban functionaries deny any notion of harboring the TTP; however, they have issues keeping in check the local commanders who often act on their own. These, apart from the extremely limited command and control structure of the Taliban, add to a fragile situation which provides space for militant groups to exploit. A decision by Pakistan to deport Afghan refugees is an action that has entrenched feelings of mistrust. This is a decision not only driven by security imperatives but also, for many Afghans, another strong tool of political pressure on Kabul. For its part, Islamabad justifies this action in the name of its national security needs facing an upsurge of terrorist attacks on its soil.

The problem, however, is that such a decision, carries heavy humanitarian and diplomatic costs, dinging the cultural and emotional bridge built over decades between the two nations. This can also be explained as the independent variable or predictor variable. This year, the Doha Agreement ushered in a brief revival of hopes for peace between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Issues on which both parties, along with the guarantors Qatar and Türkiye, seemed ready to cooperate included counterterrorism, border management, and intelligence sharing. For the first time since the 2021 U.S.–Taliban accord, regional and international players had become officially part of a bilateral peace framework involving Islamabad and Kabul.

Pakistan insists that the Taliban must dismantle the TTP infrastructure operating on Afghan soil, while the Taliban says that Pakistan is exaggerating the threat to justify its cross-border strikes. Ideological affinity between the Taliban and the TTP further complicates the matter. While the Taliban stop short of formally recognizing the group, their reluctance to take firm action undermines their credibility as a partner for peace. It is more than a failure of diplomacy-the collapse of the Istanbul process was an opportunity lost to institutionalize a security framework for South Asia. Both sides had an opportunity to take mutual responsibility for regional peace in the presence of credible international mediators. Instead, this process fell prey to suspicion and the baggage of history. Networks are still a valid concept for achieving strategic competitive advantage today.

Regional Dimension: Web of Interests and Responsibilities

The Afghanistan-Pakistan conflict cannot be viewed in isolation but as part of the larger regional web in which China, Iran, Russia, Turkiye, and Qatar have a vested interest in not allowing Afghanistan to revert to a haven for extremist groups. In this context, the trilateral forum of China last May 2025 did not lead to tangible results, yet it underlined Beijing's growing concern about cross-border militancy. Likewise, the recent quadripartite meeting among China, Iran, Russia, and Pakistan at the UN outlined one common angst associated with terrorist groups like al-Qaida, TTP, and BLA inside the borders of Afghanistan. Against this backdrop, the Taliban diplomatic posturing is getting increasingly defensive. An aspiration for sovereignty runs against the regional expectations of collective security cooperation. The leadership in Kabul must understand that its legitimacy in the world system and economic stability is predicated upon responsible governance and plausible counterterrorism.

In turn, Pakistan has to weigh objectives of counterterrorism against humanitarian concerns-most particularly Afghan refugee treatment and harm to civilians during military operations. For regional powers like Turkiye and Qatar, the challenge lies in the revival of the Istanbul Process and restoration of trust between the two sides. Their active mediation will give legitimacy and continuity to any future dialogue, and the next round of talks can be more durable than previous rounds.

Peace can only be sustained when the root cause of instability, namely, the unchecked operations of transnational militant networks, is taken care of. The Taliban would need to take verifiable actions against these groups as a means of gaining confidence from their neighbors. Pakistan needs to avoid those policies that seem coercive or punitive, such as mass deportations, which risk alienating the Afghan people and undermining possibilities of a long-term modus vivendi. Finally, both countries need to recognize that their destinies are intertwined. Neither can have real security without collaboration between them. Of course, the international community can play a role-more particularly Qatar, Turkiye, and China by promoting and monitoring progress, but substantively speaking, it is up to Kabul and Islamabad: how far one is able to transcend suspicion at the bilateral level and achieve regional stability beyond rhetoric and how far South Asia inches toward peace or descends deeper into confrontation.

Amina Jabbar is a Research Fellow at Quaid e Azam University. She can be reached @ missaminajabbar@gmail.com