In August 2021 the United States completed its withdrawal from Afghanistan after twenty years of war, and the Taliban swiftly returned to power. This upheaval reshaped regional security and triggered a humanitarian emergency. It also poses hard questions for U.S. strategy. President Biden argued before the withdrawal that by 2021 Al Qaeda in Afghanistan had been “severely degraded” and that America’s only vital interest was preventing another terror attack on its soil.[1] He insisted that future threats could be managed with “over-the-horizon” capabilities.[2] But the speed of Kabul’s fall and its aftermath demand a clear-eyed reassessment: what strategic calculations really drove the withdrawal, and how well is the current policy – sanctions, aid, limited diplomacy and covert counterterrorism – managing the dangers that followed?

By late 2021, Afghanistan’s government collapsed far faster than most experts anticipated. A February 2020 deal had called for a full U.S. withdrawal by May 2021,[3] and President Biden reaffirmed that timeline. In practice, the collapse came on August 15, 2021: Afghan President Ashraf Ghani fled and Taliban fighters entered Kabul with minimal fighting.[4] The U.S. evacuation airlifted roughly 120,000 people out, but many others remained under Taliban rule. U.S. oversight reports later estimated that about $7?billion worth of military equipment was left behind and seized by the Taliban.[5] The Afghan economy—long dependent on foreign donors—then buckled. The IMF projected roughly a 30% GDP contraction after aid dried up,[6] and widespread poverty and food insecurity followed. At the same time, roughly 150,000 Afghans who worked with the U.S. have been resettled in the United States (tens of thousands more await visas).[7] In short, the withdrawal unleashed an abrupt humanitarian and security crisis under a new authoritarian regime.

U.S. policymakers now confront a complex dilemma. In Washington, the rapid collapse triggered intense scrutiny: Congress held dozens of hearings and in 2022 created an Afghanistan War Commission to investigate what went wrong.[8] Lawmakers expressed anger over abandoned allies and demanded accountability. Abroad, the Taliban’s policies have undermined any hope of normalization. Their all-male caretaker government barred girls from most schools and women from most jobs, prompting one U.S. oversight official to warn that this effectively creates “a slave State” for half the population.[9] At the same time, Taliban leaders publicly pledge to honor counterterror commitments, but U.S. analysts see little change on the ground: the State Department’s 2023 report noted that the Taliban “continued to host and shelter members of al-Qa’ida” and even allowed Pakistan’s Tehrik-i-Taliban to operate inside Afghanistan.[10] ISIS-K militants also remain active, carrying out periodic deadly attacks. The result is a stark challenge: the U.S. must counter extremist threats without a ground presence and help civilians without empowering the regime, all while officially refusing to recognize the Taliban government.

The U.S. response has mixed strict sanctions with generous humanitarian relief. Washington still forbids any official aid to the Taliban, but has tried to help Afghanistan’s civilians. In February 2022 the Biden administration issued an executive order moving roughly $3.5?billion of Afghanistan’s central bank reserves into U.S. control — intended for public services and humanitarian programs, not Taliban coffers.[11] The United States remains the single largest donor of emergency aid: by early 2022 it had committed over $516?million in relief to feed, shelter and vaccinate vulnerable Afghans.[12] U.S. Treasury licenses and a U.N. humanitarian “carve-out” allow agencies like the World Food Program to operate despite sanctions.[13] Diplomatically, the Biden team has stopped short of talking directly with the Taliban, but has engaged via U.N. forums and Qatar-mediated channels. U.S. special envoys repeatedly warn that any easing of sanctions or tacit recognition hinges on Taliban reforms — for example, reopening girls’ schools and respecting minority rights. Meanwhile, on counterterrorism the U.S. has transitioned to an “over-the-horizon” posture:[14] drones, intelligence and special-operations assets outside Afghanistan now monitor and, if needed, strike ISIS-K or al-Qa’ida targets.

So far the results are mixed. The U.S. and its partners have achieved key objectives: Afghanistan has not again become a base for major international attacks, and humanitarian relief — though far short of need — has saved many lives. Yet the Taliban remain firmly in control with little incentive to change. Experts note that Washington still has two core interests – protecting Americans and aiding the Afghan people (especially those who allied with U.S. forces)[15] – and that without a clear strategy U.S. agencies risk working at cross-purposes.[16] Some analysts argue that withdrawing troops was sound given the futility of the past two decades, but they warn that the Taliban’s takeover will bring “painful changes” and likely intensify conflict.[17] In practical terms, U.S. policy must balance engagement and pressure. Aid and dialogue should continue (via neutral channels) as leverage, but any progress toward normalizing relations must be strictly conditioned. For example, the United Nations’ Nov. 2023 Independent Assessment lays out a phased reintegration plan contingent on Taliban actions, and it calls for a U.N. special envoy to keep international pressure aligned.[18] In short, Washington should work closely with allies and the UN to match incentives (like lifting select restrictions) to Taliban concessions (like allowing women’s education), while maintaining long-term counterterrorism and diplomatic pressure.

The U.S. military exit from Afghanistan was driven by a hard calculation: after twenty years, policymakers judged that direct threats to the homeland could be countered without a permanent footprint there, allowing resources to shift to other challenges. But withdrawal was not the end of U.S. responsibility — it marks the start of a new, difficult phase of engagement. The ultimate test will be whether Washington can prevent Afghanistan from again becoming a sanctuary for terrorists, while still honoring its commitments to the Afghan people. For Americans and allies alike, the outcome will signal whether the U.S. can exit a war responsibly — balancing national security with the values and partnerships it claims to uphold. If Afghanistan again lapses into chaos or terror, critics will question the wisdom of the withdrawal; if Washington instead manages to walk this tightrope — protecting its interests from afar while alleviating Afghan suffering — then it will have taken a step toward redeeming its two-decade investment.

Muhammad Zeshan Ali is an independent researcher and a student of BS International Relations at the National Defence University, Islamabad.

[1] The White House, “Remarks by President Biden on Afghanistan,” The White House, August 16, 2021, https://bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/08/16/remarks-by-president-biden-on-afghanistan/.

[2] House, “Remarks by President Biden on Afghanistan.”

[3] Clayton Thomas, “Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy In Brief,” legislation, Congress.Gov, March 7, 2025, https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R45122.

[4] Thomas, “Afghanistan.”

[5] “- EXAMINING THE BIDEN ADMINISTRATION’S AFGHANISTAN POLICY SINCE THE U.S. WITHDRAWAL,” 2024, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-118hhrg54430/html/CHRG-118hhrg54430.htm.

[6] The White House, “FACT SHEET: Executive Order to Preserve Certain Afghanistan Central Bank Assets for the People of Afghanistan,” The White House, February 11, 2022,

https://bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/02/11/

fact-sheet-executive-order-to-preserve-certain-afghanistan-central-bank-assets-for-the-people-of-afghanistan/.

[7] Thomas, “Afghanistan.”

[8] Thomas, “Afghanistan.”

[9] “- EXAMINING THE BIDEN ADMINISTRATION’S AFGHANISTAN POLICY SINCE THE U.S. WITHDRAWAL.”

[10] Siyar Sirat, “Taliban Sheltered Al Qaeda, Provided Haven to TTP, US Report Says,” Amu TV, December 13, 2024, https://amu.tv/143691/.

[11] House, “FACT SHEET.”

[12] House, “FACT SHEET.”

[13] House, “FACT SHEET.”

[14] House, “Remarks by President Biden on Afghanistan.”

[15] JAMES DOBBINS et al., Engage, Isolate, or Oppose: American Policy Toward the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (RAND Corporation, 2022), https://doi.org/10.7249/PEA1540-1.

[16] DOBBINS et al., Engage, Isolate, or Oppose.

[17] Vanda Felbab-Brown, “The US Decision to Withdraw from Afghanistan Is the Right One,” Brookings, April 15, 2021,

https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-us-decision-to-withdraw-from-afghanistan-is-the-right-one/.

[18] Elizabeth Threlkeld and Sania Shahid, “Pragmatism and Pressure Points: US-Taliban Engagement • Stimson Center,” Stimson Center, March 4, 2024,

https://www.stimson.org/2024/pragmatism-and-pressure-points-us-taliban-engagement/.