By Kamakshi Kamat 

The 21st century is witnessing profound changes in the technological and digital sector. With the Digital Revolution bringing innovations like VR (virtual Reality) and Artificial Intelligence, many have come to believe that geography is no longer an impediment to growth and development in modern times. Globalization promised them a “borderless world” where goods, services and capital flowed freely. The internet further accelerated this narrative by enhancing communications and connectivity across the globe. Artificial Intelligence and the digital economy promised value creation through code rather than territory, making geography increasingly irrelevant. While these developments have undoubtedly boosted economic activity they continue to be largely dependent on strategic geographies.

In this supposedly “post-geographic” age, this narrative seems to be optimistic and self-reinforcing. Cloud computing, cryptocurrency, and remote work suggest power runs through servers, not shipping lanes. Data is considered to be the “new oil”. Yet, the recent volatility in the Middle East revealed structural vulnerabilities of countries like India who import 60% of its LPG consumption, 90% of which goes through the strait of Hormuz (Energy Imports). Understanding these chokepoints is crucial for countries like India whose economic and energy interests are closely linked to maritime routes.

In a world where technology is increasingly shaping global power narratives, geography remains central for it to materialise. In The Influence of Sea Power Upon History (1890) Alfred Thayer Mahan argued that maritime routes are essential for global power. To a great extent this argument is still applicable in the present geopolitical scenario. Today, approximately 80% of the volume of international trade in goods is carried by sea, and the percentage is even higher for most developing countries (UNCTAD) (90% of India’s trade passes through the IOR (India's trade in IOR)). Similarly, over 40 % of global trade passes through the Malacca Strait, including 80% of China's crude oil imports and much of the energy supplies to Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan (Malacca Strait). Thus, proving that technology hasn’t eliminated these problems, but is increasingly vulnerable to disruptions and tensions in the region.

Straits albeit narrow waterways, act as the arteries of global trade. The Bab el-Mandeb Strait normally accounts for approximately 10% to 14% of total global maritime trade and roughly 25% of global containerized trade (bab-el-mandeb strait). Similarly, the Suez Canal accounts for approximately 12% to 15% of total global trade by volume (Suez Canal). The pattern is unmistakable; these narrow strips are one of the most consequential geographies making them strategic chokepoints for the contemporary global economy. These straits act as the backbone of global commerce, maritime connectivity, facilitating the movement of critical technologies, REEs, energy resources and capital. Geography therefore, continues to define power while technology amplifies its reach.

Conversely, advanced technology like semiconductors, data centers, and Artificial Intelligence exhibit a higher level of dependency on geography. Much of the discourse surrounding AI frequently speaks about abstract concepts like cyberspace, cloud computing and virtual infrastructure. However, this rhetoric stands on the anvils of more than 200,000 data centres consuming 10-100 times more energy than traditional computing. Global data centers will consume between 3% and 9% of total global electricity by 2030, with some regional metrics (like the U.S. and parts of Europe) hitting the 8% to 12% range  (power consumption). This also requires 12+ elements including gallium, germanium, and lithium essential for chips and batteries. It then requires components which are shipped from 15+ countries before its assembly. Since this process relies heavily on maritime routes, disruptions in these chokepoints could translate not only to economic loss but technical as well.

A similar logic may be used to understand the semiconductor-chokepoint nexus. Taiwan makes 60% of the world's chips and 90% of advanced semiconductors (Taiwan chip domination). These chips travel by sea to California, Germany, and South Korea. The factories require energy—100,000+ watts per chip making Taiwan a critical player in global energy markets. Similarly, China dominates global markets by controlling over 90% of rare earth element production essential for semiconductors, battery magnets, defence systems and AI hardware. China recently imposed gallium and germanium restrictions, weaponizing its geographic control and once again exposing the strategic vulnerabilities of technology. These minerals then move through the Strait of Malacca to reach chip factories in Europe and the Middle East.

Therefore, it is imperative that a legal framework governing these geographies must balance between state sovereignty and the principle of freedom of navigation. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), adopted in 1982, divides oceans into five concentric zones maintaining this delicate balance. Within 12 nautical miles of a coastline, states exercise territorial sovereignty, yet foreign vessels retain the right of innocent passage. Between 12 and 200 nautical miles lies the exclusive economic zone, where coastal states control resource extraction but all nations retain the freedom of navigation (UNCLOS). These provisions create the legal category of "international straits," which includes Hormuz, Malacca, Bab-el-Mandeb, and Gibraltar. However, the political reality is often harsh. States with coastal control often obstruct these narrow channels through military force and asymmetric warfare.

The most recent instance which not only affected India, but the rest of the world was the shut down of the Strait of Hormuz after the strikes on 28th February 2026. Similarly, Bab-el-Mandeb becomes about Houthi attacks, the Red Sea crisis all highlighting the global commerce vulnerability. This proves that despite there being a comprehensive framework the implementation is very much dependent on states. Furthermore, the framework's effectiveness depends on naval patrols, coalition coordination, and the political will to defend commercial shipping against threats. While UNCLOS establishes rights, it lacks an effective enforcement mechanism independent of state power. So, when Iran shuts down Hormuz, or the Houthis attack Bab-El-Mandeb, the legal system doesn’t collapse per se, rather it becomes contingent on factors like diplomatic conditions, naval power and coalitions.

Therefore, for countries like India that rely heavily on these straits, these straits cease to be just maritime concerns and now become strategic necessities. As witnessed, the closure of any one of these chokepoints directly triggers, fuel shortages, inflationary pressures, semiconductor shortages, and critical infrastructure degradation. India's MAHASAGAR doctrine, naval expansion in the Andaman-Nicobar Islands and developmental projects like the Great Nicobar Project reflect the emerging recognition that maritime security is technological security, and technological security is economic security. Therefore, it is clear that in an increasingly multipolar world, a country can either master geography or remain dependent on those who do.

Kamakshi Kamat is a BA LLB student with a keen interest in international relations, geopolitics, maritime security, international law, and Indian foreign policy.