A ‘small’ nuclear war in South Asia would be an unprecedented catastrophe. Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests in 1998 have prevented full-fledged war. But it has not eradicated strategic rivalry between both nuclear neighbors. Instead, both countries have continued to expand and modernize their military capabilities. This has resulted in an increasingly complex security environment in South-Asia. According to the latest report from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), this competition is taking a new turn. The SIPRI 2026 Yearbook now estimates India has 190 nuclear warheads, compared with about 180 a year ago. Pakistan's arsenal is estimated at around 165–170 warheads. More important is SIPRI's assessment that India has deployed 12 nuclear warheads during peacetime. These are potentially deployed on nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines such as K-15 and K-4 for conducting deterrence patrols. The K- 15 SLBM has a range of over 700km meanwhile, the K-4 SLBM has a range of approx. 3,500 km. This shift would mark a significant change from India's traditional nuclear stance.

From deterrence to operational readiness

India has been in a de-mated nuclear posture for decades. Warheads were not attached to delivery systems during peacetime. This enabled the political government to maintain tight control over nuclear weapons, while minimizing the likelihood of accidental or unauthorized deployment. It was an expression of India's long-standing doctrine of restrained deterrence. Nuclear weapons were used as a political tool to deter war. They were not considered operational weapons that could be held in a state of high readiness. The apparent deployment of approximately 12 nuclear warheads during peacetime is indicative of a fundamental change in strategic thinking. While this number is limited, it indicates a shift to a 'deterrence posturing' approach that relies not only on possession but also on operational availability. Such a change in the transition alters the perceptions of nuclear readiness among adversaries. In nuclear politics, perception can matter as much as capability. Islamabad has expressed concerns over SIPRI’s estimates and warns that India’s peacetime deployment and sea-based deterrence could shift South Asia’s strategic balance. Pakistani analysts view the change as moving towards greater operational readiness. Hans Kristensen, a SIPRI researcher, said the evidence is increasing that the nuclear weapon states are "walking away" from their disarmament promises and instead flexing their nuclear muscles.

India's changing nuclear posture cannot be seen solely in the context of India-Pakistan relations. China continues to expand and modernize its nuclear arsenal at a rapid pace. In reaction, India has increased its own build-up of deterrence. According to the SIPRI report, India's modernization programme is increasingly geared towards longer-range systems that can strike targets across China. India is developing its strike capabilities to make them more advanced with the development of the Agni missile series and also the Agni-V. Meanwhile, the sea based component of its nuclear triad is also expanding. This is reflected in submarines such as INS Arighaat and INS Aridaman. Capable of launching ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads. India is also advancing the development of multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRV) technology. It would allow it to carry multiple warheads and thus strike multiple targets. These capabilities are designed to build a more survivable and flexible nuclear force. From India’s perspective, these developments are logical reactions to the evolving security scenario.

This paradox is evident in South Asia. There is an ongoing security dilemma between India and Pakistan. Where security is viewed as a zero-sum game, resulting in greater instability in the region. Both sides consider that the other side's security measures are military preparations. Therefore, military modernization brings a sense of reassurance and often provokes counter-measures and competitive escalation.

Peacetime deployment of nuclear warheads complicates this scenario. India might interpret these moves as a measured response to shifting balances in the region, especially with China and Pakistan. But for Pakistan, the same development is interpreted as a move towards becoming more operationally prepared and less risk of escalation. This perception difference is not a coincidence, but essential to nuclear stability. Nuclear deterrence is not only about military capability, it is also interpretation and signaling, shaped by the lack of trust between the adversaries.

Compressed decision-making process and its risks

The problem is not the launch of an arsenal of multiple warheads. The preparedness facilitates a quicker response process during a crisis. De-mated nuclear forces provided buffers between political tensions and nuclear operations. These buffers allow the leadership more time to handle information, confirm threats, and explore diplomacy before nuclear arms are utilized. Those buffers reduced further during operational deployment. In a crisis situation, decision-makers may be more likely to act rapidly, increasing the danger of misperception, miscalculation, and unintended escalation. The potential risk is high in South Asia where crises escalate rapidly, resources are limited, and trust is low.

In April 2025, the four-day military standoff between Indian and Pakistani proved that India and Pakistan are still prepared for direct military clashes. New doctrines, sophisticated delivery systems and increased operational readiness may make escalation management more difficult. According to some analysts, since the end of the Cold War, the trend of warhead disarmament is likely to reverse in the coming years. This is because the rate of disarmament is decreasing and the deployment of new nuclear weapons is increasing.

Sarina Tareen is an MS scholar at BUITEMS with two years of research experience working on the implementation of youth policy with the Government of Balochistan. Her research interests include changing global dynamics, strategic studies, and security studies in South Asia.