“In some sort of crude sense which no vulgarity, no humor, no overstatement can quite extinguish, the physicists have known sin; and this is a knowledge which they cannot lose.” --J. Robert Oppenheimer, Scientific Director of the Manhattan Project Fissile material includes plutonium and highly enriched uranium and it is used to make nuclear weapons. Securing it reduces the risk of nuclear proliferation. No material, no nukes. Though its rate of production has slowed, fissile material is still being produced, and stockpiles are not as secure as they should be. These twin problems rattle defense efforts. The long-lasting way to ensure nonproliferation is to stop the production of weapons-grade fissile material and to safeguard current stockpiles. The Cold War demanded a constant supply of fissile material in order to sustain the nuclear arms race. Though the U.S.-Soviet deadlock has since passed, fissile material is still in production. Between 1997 and 2003, plutonium and highly enriched uranium increased by 80 and 30 metric tons a year respectively, according to statistics from the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS). Although the production of this material is primarily used for civilian purposes, like nuclear power plants, it creates a fundamental problem: it is the same material used to make nuclear weapons and it undergoes a similar preparation process. The Union for Concerned Scientists states that it takes as little as six kilograms of plutonium or nine kilograms of uranium to produce an implosion weapon. It is sobering to consider that by these estimates, it is possible to construct over 500,000 nuclear weapons! What is alarming is that many of these stockpiles are not adequately safeguarded against theft. Despite substantial gains through the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction—an effort to secure nuclear materials in former Soviet states—Russian facilities remain the most prominent security risk. Moreover, the security standards of nuclear facilities in states that are not members of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) are unknown since they are not subject to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections. What are the implications to vulnerable stockpiles? Severe. Joseph Cirincione, Jon B. Wolfsthal, and Miriam Rajkumar, authors of Deadly Arsenals: Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Threats, report that Russia has the largest stock of weapons-grade nuclear materials in the world, with 180 tons of plutonium and 1,100 tons of highly enriched uranium. And it is not being adequately protected. Harvard Professor Graham Allison notes, “From outright nuclear theft and smuggling to more general problems of inadequate resources for nuclear security systems . . . reports of nuclear insecurity in Russia continue to emerge at an alarming rate today.” Terrorists are more likely to receive plutonium or uranium from Russian stockpiles than from any other sources. The cases are endless. In 2005, Turkish special forces foiled a plot by two men trying to sell 173 grams of Russian uranium for $7 million. In 2003 and 2006, Georgia prevented similar incidences. The 2006 account involved a Russian attempting to sell 100 grams of uranium to Islamist terrorists. To prevent militants from acquiring nuclear weapons material, stockpiles need to be better protected. The Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) was designed to tackle these issues as it is tasked with slowing the proliferation of fissile material. President Clinton proposed the treaty to the United Nations in 1993, but it did not pass. Although there have been recent attempts to ratify it, the United States has stalled negotiations by refusing to approve it. The 2004 vote resulted in 179 in favor, two against (the United States and Palau), and two abstaining (United Kingdom and Israel). The Bush administration is skeptical of IAEA’s ability to verify nonproduction, demanding state-enforced inspections. Furthermore, little is known about the nuclear programs of non-NPT states. Consider the North Korean case. The 1994 Agreed Framework between the United States and North Korea was the first serious attempt to dismantle Pyongyang’s plutonium program in exchange for energy assistance. However, tensions between the two nations prompted North Korea to enrich uranium again in the late 1990s. As a result, the United States persuaded the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) to stop delivering heavy fuel oil as arranged under the agreement. North Korea responded by evicting IAEA agents, withdrawing from the NPT, and resuming both uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing programs. It is widely believed that these programs have benefited from A.Q. Khan’s underground weapons technology market, especially the exchange of nuclear technology for ballistic missile expertise. In 2006, North Korea tested its first bomb. Locations of some nuclear programs have been identified, but much is not known about the nation’s stockpiles, capabilities, or intentions. Kim Jung-Il has made North Korea a difficult bubble to penetrate, and his past demonstrates an unpredictable policy conduct that could have serious global impacts for the future. Uninspected programs are reason for further concern. The world is witnessing the beginning of the first nuclear arms race since the Cold War—between Pakistan and India. Tensions between the two nuclear states are decades-old and have intensified since 1998 when both nations conducted nuclear tests. Though the 1999 Lahore Declaration attempted to alleviate frictions, it was abandoned when Pakistan invaded the Indian district of Kargil. Subsequent peace efforts suffered another considerable blow when Pakistan occupied India-administered Kashmir, and India counteracted with its own troop buildup at the border. Since both nations remain outside of the NPT, their fissile material production programs are not subject to IAEA inspections. Both nations are still producing weapons-grade fissile material for continued nuclear weapons production. Though there are estimates on the number of nukes each has (Cirincione et al report that India has 75-100 and Pakistan has 50-110), neither nation has confirmed its arsenals or plans to produce more. The implications of nuclear capabilities and fissile materials are too great to maintain the status quo. Some disagree. Proponents of deterrence argue that nuclear weapons threaten severe retaliation in the event of an attack. This is apparently a safety mechanism, but current events have proven that Mutually Assured Destruction lives up to its acronym. Gandhi was right when he said that “an eye for an eye makes the whole world blind.” Deterrence has been displaced since the Cold War. Terrorists are a different enemy than the Soviets in that many militants are not deterred by retaliation. Many are willing to die for their beliefs, as evidenced by suicide bombings. Deterrence creates an atmosphere of fear, and fear drives the maintenance of nuclear weapons. It is a troubling cycle. Will we ever be safe from nuclear war? To be so, states must agree to halt the production of weapons-grade fissile material and to fortify stockpiles. Strengthening the Nunn-Lugar initiative and ratifying the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty are initial steps. But efforts must also address the flaws in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and work toward the elimination of all nuclear weapons. As it stands now, the treaty favors a select few, and chooses which countries to reprimand for working outside of its framework and which to condone. Infusing fairness into the nuclear nonproliferation regime may mitigate the desire for some states or would-be terrorists to acquire nuclear weapons. The threat of some person, organization, or state to build the Bomb will always exist as long as these challenges remain.

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