By Lachlan Forster 

The trilateral partnership between Australia, the United States of America and the United Kingdom, referred to as AUKUS, has proven to be one of the most important, controversial and unpredictable defence agreements within the Indo-Pacific region. It is not the grouping of these three countries that caused an initial ruckus within the geopolitical sphere, as the AUKUS states have aligned their foreign and defence policy considerations for the greater part of one hundred years. But the exact goals of this partnership, namely the agreement’s ‘First Pillar’ which aims to facilitate Australia’s “acquisition of conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarines”, have alarmed a number of Southeast Asian and Pacific nations who fear the consequences of increasing militarisation within their oceans.

Yet, beyond the much-touted nuclear-powered submarines, AUKUS lays the groundwork for ongoing collaboration in all fields of military technology within its ‘Second Pillar’. From the application of Artificial Intelligence to the exploration of electronic and quantum innovations within warfare, this partnership has formalised the previously de-centralised defence sector cooperation between AUKUS’s member states. Building upon the protocols of the Five Eyes Partnership, which sees the AUKUS states along with Canada and New Zealand share foreign and signals intelligence with each other, the second pillar aims to safeguard Western interests within Australia’s geographical maritime region by creating defence technology uniformity amongst the defence forces in question.

The AUKUS agreement is unlikely to comprise solely of Australia, the UK and the US in the long run, as collaboration with, and potential expansion to include, further states has been entertained by all three member governments. From this, a number of potential partners for development have been identified and stepped forward to express their support for the intended outcomes of the pact, bolstering the united front which is primarily opposed to Chinese expansionist ambitions within the Indo-Pacific region.

The potential outcomes and consequences of expanding AUKUS must be analysed in order to understand the domestic and international political dynamics which could pressure certain nations to collaborate within the alliance’s framework. As its presence increases, AUKUS will undoubtedly challenge policy makers across a number of nations and dictate the possible proliferation of arms in the South Pacific, on a previously unseen scale.

Australia: Between Britain and America

Australia has always been a follower when it comes to defence policy. The first half of the twentieth century, following a young Australia achieving independence, saw the nation’s military considerations and circumstances dictated by the United Kingdom. Australia’s entry into the Boer War, the Boxer Rebellion and the two World Wars was as a loyal member of the British Empire, as Australian troops fought alongside, and often under the command of, British military personnel. This would continue into the latter-half of the century, with Australians serving as a part of the Commonwealth Forces in Korea and Malaysia, but a noticeable shift of influence undoubtedly occurred with Australia’s entry into Vietnam, under the lead of the United States. As Britain scaled back its presence “East of Suez”, the United States gradually took on the paternalistic role in Australia’s defence policies, as the state entered into both Iraq wars, Afghanistan and the fight against ISIS after firm consultation with American policy makers. This is not to say that there was ever any formal break of ties or relations with the United Kingdom. But Australia’s desire to follow the direction of greater military powers has always dictated the decisions of policy makers in Canberra, and the nation’s loyalties undoubtedly shifted in line with the decline of the British Empire and the rise of Pax Americana.

The Morrison government’s decision to ditch a partnership with France to develop a fleet of submarines, in favour of the Trilateral partnership, hints that this ongoing insecurity pertaining to Australia’s defence policy continues. Although the United States is undoubtedly the stronger superpower, the United Kingdom maintains a significant cultural and societal presence within Australian society. AUKUS allows for Australia to nestle itself between these two countries, whilst also providing the US with a reaffirmed commitment of continued collaboration and granting the UK much needed relevance within the context of geopolitical strategy.

The tangible results of AUKUS are disputed. It is highly unlikely that any major technological advancements the three nations jointly make within the defence sphere will be openly taunted and revealed on the global stage. In this context, we simply don’t know if this element of the partnership has been fruitful thus far. Furthermore, the date of Australia’s acquisition of the aforementioned nuclear submarines is still up in the air. Estimates outlined within the initial AUKUS agreement maintained that the Royal Australian Navy would have its first Virginia class nuclear-powered submarine by 2032, and some optimistic analysts tout that this will still be the case. Yet manufacturing delays which have plagued American factories, along with a renewed push from Republican politicians to prioritise domestic production of ships for the United States Navy over resources for foreign states, threaten to delay this process. On the surface, the legislation of AUKUS has yet to amount to much.

But the potential of AUKUS has made a significant impact in the bilateral ties between the member states and the multitude of countries in the Indo-Pacific region. The agreement’s first pillar has caused several states to express their hesitation and concern regarding the proliferation of weapons within their oceans, specifically the island nations of the Pacific Ocean who cite the historical damage French, American and British nuclear testing has left upon their natural coral reefs and population. The Marshall Islands, for example, were subject to 67 nuclear tests in the twenty-first century by the United States military which impacted the landscape and health of the islands in a momentous way. An estimated “55% of all cancers in the [nations’s] northern atolls” were directly attributable to these tests, while birth defects are a continuing side effect into the modern day. This example, combined with other tests in French Polynesia and the Gilbert and Ellice Islands (modern day Kiribati), have given the word ‘nuclear’ and extraordinarily negative connotation with the Pacific Ocean. Irregardless of whether the AUKUS submarines are nuclear powered or capable, the mere presence of nuclear reactors in the oceans of these island states has created extreme discomfort amongst lawmakers and citizens alike.

Expanding the Alliance

Nonetheless, a number of countries have expressed an interest in collaborating within the frame of the AUKUS partnership to varying degrees. All of these potential partners have focused on the agreement’s second pillar of technology sharing and cooperation, potentially signifying an expansion of research and business collaboration across a richer expanse of nations. Yet, the widening of the pact will not be a straightforward affair, with AUKUS being heavily wrapped up in local defence conditions, geopolitical considerations and domestic policy struggles between parties with different visions.

The most proactive, and to date most discussed, potential new member of AUKUS is Japan. The Asian nation’s close cooperation with Australia and the US in the realms of defence and military technologies primes it to immediately contribute to the development of the second pillar of AUKUS. The American Ambassador in Tokyo Rahm Emanuel echoed these sentiments, indicating that collaboration with Japan is very much supported by the United States. Former Secretary of State for Defence of the United Kingdom Grant Shapps furthered this sentiment by noting “Japan’s potential” to help build the technological capabilities of the defence forces of all four nations. The participation of Japan is far from confirmed, with columnist Tsuruoka Michito noting that speculation and discussion on the topic began in April, just before Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida arrived in Washington for high level talks with the United States Government. In this context, Japan’s potential involvement in AUKUS may have been used as a tool by US representatives to raise the stakes of the discussions and put forward a hawkish foreign policy position as pertains to the Asia Pacific. Michito further notes that while the United States remains optimistic on Japan’s future collaboration in the pact, both Australia and the United Kingdom are somewhat sceptical, anticipating a potentially hostile reaction from China, who channeled the Second World War in asserting the Kishida government should “deeply learn from historical lessons” pertaining to militarisation.

Canada, a member of the Five Eyes Alliance and NATO, had a complicated reaction to the announcement of AUKUS. Canada’s exclusion from the pact was interpreted by some as a snub, with a report from the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington asserting that the nation was not “adapting to the realities of modern great power competition” and had been “not invited” due a seeming lack of motivation to bolster defence. This interpretation was weaponised by Canada’s former opposition leader Eric O’Toole, maintaining that the Trudeau Government was “not taken seriously by our friends and allies”. Prime Minister Trudeau responded by emphasising the first pillar of the AUKUS pact and Canada’s commitment to remaining a nuclear free nation. Yet his government has recently pivoted towards encouraging collaboration in the context of the AUKUS’s second pillar, demonstrating that Canada’s government was perhaps alarmed by its initial exclusion from the agreement’s negotiations. Both the Foreign Office and Privy Council of Canada have been alleged to be making great strides to be involved in further AUKUS activities, with a fear of falling behind in intelligence and defence capabilities stoking the country’s renewed interest. But it remains to be seen whether Canada could prove to be an effective, contributing collaborator on a consistent basis, and what their defence industry would have to offer the agreements’s current members.

Another traditional ally of the AUKUS nations is New Zealand, whose position on AUKUS remains embroiled in the small nation’s position of power and influence within the Pacific. Foreign Minister Winston Peters noted that it would be “utterly irresponsible” for his nation not to consider if collaboration with AUKUS is in the “national interest”. However, critics of AUKUS are prominent within New Zealand politics, with those sceptical asserting that participation within the agreement will undermine the nation’s commitment to a nuclear-free Pacific under the Treaty of Rarotonga. This treaty was a critical response to aforementioned nuclear testing within the Pacific Ocean, as its protocols dictate the conditions for a complete ban of nuclear testing, weapons stationing and manufacturing within the Pacific Ocean. Australia is a signatory to the Treaty but has always loosely interpreted its terms, as demonstrated by the repeated stationing of American B-52 bombers, which may contain nuclear weapons within its borders. New Zealand, however, is held in relatively high standing amongst contemporary Pacific Island nations, and the potential of close legislative proximity to the first pillar of AUKUS has raised questions as to whether the country’s reputation may be in jeopardy should it participate in the agreement. This point was somewhat eased after Fijian Prime Minister Sitiveni Rabuka asserted his nation’s enthusiasm for New Zealand potentially embracing a role within AUKUS, noting any “development in that area will benefit” Fiji. Yet, other island nations, including Samoa and the Solomon Islands, remain sceptical of the pact, leaving New Zealand in a tight position.

Furthering the trend of predictable partners for collaboration, South Korea has also engaged in discussions with the AUKUS states. President Suk-yeol’s foreign strategy for South Korea has been noted as aiming to make the nation a ‘global pivotal state’. This term, coined within the Republic of Korea, outlines a potential status for the nation, whereby it assumes a more prominent role in the security of the Indo-Pacific and capitalises upon its position as a middle power, as opposed to solely dedicating its security forces towards its Northern border with the People’s Republic of Korea. This direction would embrace more proactivity within the Indo-Pacific, with South Korea potentially stationing some of its defence forces outside of the Korean Peninsula, but across the Indo-Pacific within friendly nations. These intended policies have lead to the second pillar of AUKUS being highlighted as a key piece of legislative infrastructure that could empower South Korea in embracing a more prominent role in the Indian Ocean, with the incumbent government speaking to Australian officials on the topic during a bilateral meeting in May. Many anticipate that this interest will likely spark criticism from China, but the South Korean government may be willing to push this boundary should a firm position in AUKUS’s second pillar allow the nation to carve out a more pronounced position within the Indo-Pacific.

Outside of potential collaborators, there has been a noted shift from certain nations in the Indian Ocean region towards acceptance and enthusiasm for AUKUS. Before resigning, Singapore’s Prime Minister Lee Hsein Loong noted his nation would “welcome” a visit from Australia’s nuclear-powered submarines to “Changi Naval Base”. This comment outlines Singapore’s vested interest in Australia’s defence capabilities, which have been assured since the creation of the Five Powers Defence Arrangements in 1971 between the two states, Malaysia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom. But Lee’s comments did remain consistent with Singapore’s friendly and cooperative foreign policy aimed at maintaining productive ties with all partners. The Philippines under the Marcos administration has also shown support for AUKUS since its inception in 2021, characterising the agreement as “essential” to “the security” of Southeast Asia. This enthusiasm stems from the increasing hostility shown towards the Philippines from the Chinese Navy over disputed maritime borders in the South China Sea. Combined with Vietnam’s neutrality on the topic of AUKUS, which curbed expectations of an expected firmer negative stance, the pact has seemed to find a comfortable position within the considerations of Southeast Asian nations three years on from its establishment.

The Dangers of Expansion

As the fruits of the AUKUS agreement continue to manifest, it has become harder for the pact’s participants to deny the undoubted intention of the policy to deter Chinese expansionist aims in the Indo-Pacific. Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States have been extremely careful in their approach to collaborating with external nations under the terms of the second pillar, as it is almost certain that Beijing will have a negative reaction to a perceived expansion of AUKUS.

Should Japan or South Korea embrace the technology sharing aspects of AUKUS’s second pillar and throw the weight of their large defence sectors behind the agreement, it is certain to further the rush to militarise the Korean Peninsula and Indian Ocean. Additionally, should Canada and New Zealand decide to participate with their historical partners, this shift of policy would introduce two new actors into the ongoing tensions in Southeast Asian waters, unifying the front of Western nations whilst also bolstering the budding alliance opposing Chinese policy.

Ultimately, this collaboration will only amount to technology sharing and collaboration on projects that can strengthen military, air and maritime forces. AUKUS is far from a revival of SEATO or the creation of a new joint military force. But there is little doubt that the technologies which may be jointly developed are intended to ward China away from making further gains within the Indian and Pacific Oceans. Policy makers within all of the countries that have been discussed thus far will find it increasingly difficult to maintain cordial relations with China, a critical nation for the regional and global economy, whist they are so obviously attempting to dissuade any military ambitions the nation may have by jointly working to maintain dominance within the Indo-Pacific.

Conclusion

AUKUS is an agreement that still maintains a high level of flexibility and broadness, even after three years of being actively adopted by its members. Expansion and collaboration is a very real possibly in the near future, particularly with the aforementioned long-standing allies of the three central nations. As the agreement seeks to cement the dominance of Western nations within a region that has had its power dynamics unchallenged for a significant amount of time, expansion is a clear strategy that can help manifest these goals at a far quicker pace.

Expansion of the agreement’s collaborative scope is likely to result in the development of new technologies that will change the effectiveness of defence forces and the manner in which combat is conducted. However, the price of this expansion must be considered, especially as a growing list of nations continue to express their anxiety of the agreement’s undoubted militaristic nature. Although the agreement has found a comfortable position within the foreign policy considerations of a number of initially cautious countries, continuous broadening of the agreement’s parameters will eventually result in a potentially dangerous tipping point, possibly facilitating conflict in the Indo-Pacific. This outcome must be avoided, and will likely only be so if AUKUS remains an agreement kept between Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States for the foreseeable future.

Lachlan Forster is a young Australian writer, academic and professional who is studying at La Trobe University. A 2023 New Colombo Plan Scholar to Singapore and Malaysia, Lachlan has been published on the website of the Victorian Parliament, worked with a number of diplomatic and political personnel and held positions on a Consular basis within Melbourne, as well as across Southeast Asia.